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ABSTRACT 
 
This study aims at making a comparative examination of the administration of 
juvenile justice systems in South Africa and Tanzania with a view to establishing the 
extent to which the Tanzanian Government has effectively honoured its obligations 
to domesticated international juvenile justice standards for the protection of the rights 
of children in conflict with the law. Divided into eight chapters, the methodology 
adopted by this study is the “legal centralism approach”, which centres on the laws 
that are made and enforced by the state. In this context, the study employed both 
field and library research; whereby relevant international human rights instruments 
and municipal laws were analysed in the context of data obtained from the field. 
 
In the main, the study has noted that, whereas South Africa has effectively 
domesticated international juvenile justice standards in the Child Justice Act (the 
CJA), Tanzania has not effectively domesticated those standards because provisions 
relating to children in conflict with the law as set out in Part IX of the Tanzanian 
Law of the Child Act (the LCA) are not sufficient to adequately protect the rights of 
offending children. As such, the thesis has recommended for the amelioration of this 
situation, including constitutionalisation of child rights and enacting a specific law to 
protect the rights of children in conflict with the law. The proposed constitutional 
and legislative reforms can help to spell out the juvenile justice system, prerequisite 
structures, procedures, specialized staff and premises for processing child offenders. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
1.0  INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
1.1  Background to the Study 
 
Until recently, children’s rights the world over were viewed as ‘falling within the 
realm of charity.’1 This means that society regarded children as miniature adults,2 
whose legal status was ‘largely based on their “needs” as opposed to their “rights.”’3 
In many situations, children were treated as “objects,” with mini rights. For instance, 
at the family level, children were considered as “property” or “chattel” of the parents, 
particularly the father. At the community level, children’s rights were not given any 
special protection, leading to the prevalence of corporal punishment and passing of 
capital punishments such death sentence on children.
4
 
However, as children continued to increasingly experience unbearable abuses and 
exploitation, the world community realised the need to have specific legal protection 
mechanism for children. In the US, by the end of the 19
th
 century many states had 
established a separate court system for children. In 1924, the then League of Nations 
adopted the Declaration of the Rights of the Child, which inspired the United Nations 
(UN) to adopt the Declaration of the Rights of the Child in 1959. In 1979 the African 
Declaration on the Rights and Welfare of the Child was adopted. In 1989, the first 
                                                 
1
 Sloth-Nielsen, J. and B.D. Mezmur, “Surveying the Research Landscape to Promote Children’s 
Legal Rights in an African Context.” African Human Rights Law Journal. Vol. 7 No. 2, 2007, pp. 
330-353, at pp. 330-331. 
2
 Flekkoy, M. and N.H. Kaufman, Rights and Responsibilities in Family and Society. London: Jessica 
Kingsley Publishers, 1997, p. 15. 
3
 Mezmur, B.D., “The African Children’s Charter versus the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child: A Zero-sum-Game?” SA Public Law. Vol. 23, 2008, pp. 1-28. This article is also published in 
The Justice Review. Vol. 8 No. 2, 2009, pp. 18-46. 
4
 Rios-Kohn, R., “Comparative Study of the Impact of the Convention on the Rights of the Child: Law 
Reform in Selected Common Law Countries.” In United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF), 
Protecting the World’s Children: Impact of the Convention on the Rights of the Child in Diverse 
Legal Systems. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 34-99, p. 39. 
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ever binding international children’s instrument – the UN Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (the CRC) – was adopted by the UN General Assembly, followed by the 
adoption of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (the 
ACRWC) in 1990. 
 
As a positive recognition of the need for an international instrument providing 
adequate protection of children’s rights, the CRC has been ratified by all members 
(193) of the UN, except the US and Somalia. This ‘signals that the rights which 
contribute towards the protection of children have outgrown the discretionary power 
of the national legislators.’5 With the adoption of the two principal international 
children’s rights instruments, states around the world are increasingly domesticating 
the principles and standards enshrined in these instruments as well as in other 
international human rights instruments into municipal laws.  
 
In this context, both Tanzania and South Africa have enacted legislation on 
children’s rights and juvenile justice as obliged by international children’s rights 
treaties. Whereas South Africa enacted the Children’s Act in 20056 and the Child 
Justice Act (the CJA) in 2008
7
, Tanzania enacted the Law of the Child Act (the 
                                                 
5
 Sloth-Nielsen, J. and B.D. Mezmur, op. cit, p. 331. 
6
 Act No. 38 of 2005. According to its long title, this law seeks to give effect to the rights of children 
as contained in the Constitution of South Africa by setting out principles relating to the care and 
protection of children. It also defines parental responsibilities and rights; and makes further provision 
regarding children’s courts and the issuing of contribution orders. It further makes new provision for 
the adoption of children; and provides for inter-country adoption to give effect to the Hague 
Convention on Inter-country Adoption. In addition, it prohibits child abduction to give effect to the 
Hague Convention on International Child Abduction; and provides for surrogate motherhood. The law 
also creates new offences relating to children. 
7
 Act No. 75 of 2008. This law establishes a criminal justice system for children, who are in conflict 
with the law and are accused of committing offences, in accordance with the values underpinning the 
South African Constitution and the international obligations of the Republic of South Africa regarding 
the administration of juvenile justice. 
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LCA) in 2009
8. In fact, these laws have incorporated international children’s rights 
norms in both countries’ domestic legal system.9 However, South Africa has taken a 
more progressive incorporation of international children’s rights norms than 
Tanzania. That is to say, whereas South Africa has adopted a separate law on child 
justice; Tanzania has adopted a composite law, incorporating provisions for the 
protection and promotion of children’s rights together with those relating to children 
in conflict with the law. His situation has resulted in the strengthening of juvenile 
justice in South Africa more than in Tanzania, whereby provisions relating to 
juvenile justice are incorporated in only one part (i.e. Part IX), which are generally 
weak and not expansive enough to incorporate the entire body of international 
juvenile justice standards. 
 
Coincidentally, both the CJA and the LCA came into force on 1
st
 April 2010, making 
it a significant basis for undertaking a comparative study on the efficacy of these 
laws as regards the administration of the juvenile justice systems in these countries 
in the context of the international juvenile justice norms. In addition, there are other 
reasons that have formed the basis for undertaking a comparative study on the 
administration of the juvenile justice systems in these countries, as set out below. 
 
                                                 
8
 Act No. 21 of 2009 (Cap. 13 R.E. 2009). This law combines provisions for child care, maintenance, 
child protection, custody and access as well as foster care/placement and adoption (as also set out in 
the South African Children’s Act) as well as provisions relating to children in conflict with the law (as 
contained in the South African Child Justice Act). These provisions seek to domesticate international 
children’s rights and juvenile justice standards in Tanzania. 
9
  It should be noted that the enactment of juvenile justice-specific laws in South Africa and Tanzania 
has been influenced by the development in international children’s rights law that emphasises the need 
for (a) putting in place special legal protection of children in conflict with the law at the domestic 
level; and (b) establishing separate institutions, systems and procedures for dealing with children in 
conflict with the law. 
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First, both countries follow the common law system, whereby South Africa blends 
the common law system with a mixed Roman-Dutch system.
10
 This means that the 
countries have a similar approach to domesticating international instruments
11
 as 
well as enacting, implementing, interpreting and applying laws. Second, whereas 
South Africa has specifically constitutionalised children’s rights (particularly in 
Section 28 of the 1996 Constitution), Tanzania has yet to do so. Therefore, the South 
African approach in constitutionalising children rights can also be replicated in the 
envisaged Tanzanian new constitution. 
 
Third, with Tanzania playing a leading role in “democratising” South Africa from the 
1960s to 1990s, both countries have a high rate of crimes, with South Africa being 
amongst the leading countries in the world.
12
 In both countries, crimes continue to 
threaten the personal safety, socio-emotional health and economic growth of their 
                                                 
10
 See particularly African Child Policy Forum, Harmonisation of Children’s Laws in Eastern and 
Southern Africa: Country Briefs. Addis Ababa: African Child Policy Forum, 2012. 
11
 Both countries adopt the dualist approach to domesticating international instruments, which requires 
that such treaties can only be incorporated into national law by domestic statute. See particularly 
Odongo, G.O., “The Domestication of International Standards on the Rights of the Child with Specific 
Reference to Juvenile Justice in the African Context.” LL.D. Thesis, University of Western Cape, 
2005; and Africa Wide Movement for Children, An Africa Fit for Children: Progress and Challenges. 
Kampala: Africa Wide Movement for Children, 2012. 
12
 Globally, South Africa ranks 7
th
 on the list of the world’s top ten countries with highest reported 
crimes rates. These countries are ranked as follows: US (11,877,218); United Kingdom (6,523,706); 
Germany (6,507,394); France (3,771,85); Russia (2,952,370); Japan (2,853,739); South Africa 
(2,683,849); Canada (2,516,918); Italy (2,231,550); and India (1,764,630). This data derive from a 
web-based crime rates map that shows the world top ten countries with the highest reported crime 
rates. The map indicates the number of crimes that took place per 100,000 people and its indicates that 
South Africa is the only African country in the top ten list. The map is available on 
www.mapsofworld.com/world-top-ten/countries-with-highest-reported-crime-rates.html (accessed 11 
February 2013). For a detailed analysis of the crime rates and their causes in South Africa, see for 
instance, Steyn, F., Review of South African Innovations in Diversion and Reintegration of Youth at 
Risk. Claremont: Open Society Foundation for South Africa, 2005; Dissel, A., “Youth, Crime and 
Criminal Justice in South Africa.” The World Bank Legal Review: Law, Equity and Development. Vol. 
2, 2006, pp, 236-261; and Legal and Human Rights Centre, The State of Juvenile Justice in Tanzania. 
Dar es Salaam: Legal and Human Rights Centre, 2003. 
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citizens, particularly those living in poor and criminogenic environments (i.e., 
environment conducive to crime).
13
  
 
Fourth, in both countries children and youth are in the particularly vulnerable group, 
both as victims and perpetrators of crime. In South Africa, for instance, it is 
estimated that 3,593 children under the age of 18 were in prison as at 31
st
 May 2004, 
while 1,868 were awaiting trial and 1,725 were serving sentences.
14
 The numbers of 
children in prison in South Africa dropped to 536 in March 2011. This figure was 
658 in 2010 and 973 in 2006.
15
 With regard to the actual number of children 
processed through the juvenile justice system in South Africa, Sloth-Nielsen and 
Gallinetti point out that: 
It is to be noted that there is no clear benchmark of how many children are expected 
to be channelled through child justice processes annually. Various guesstimates 
have been proffered, the most well known being around 100 000 children arrested 
per annum. ... The baseline study of the Child Justice Alliance (2007) gives an 
indication of the very wide range of non-serious or ordinary offences for which 
children appear in courts on a day to day basis.
16
 
 
Although in Tanzania there is no official record regarding the actual number of 
children in imprisonment and those awaiting trial,
17
 there is sufficient information 
                                                 
13
 Steyn, ibid, p. 1. 
14
 Sloth-Nielsen, J., “What does the New Correctional Services Act say About Children in Prison?” 
Article 40. Vol. 3 No. 3, 2004. 
15
 Waterhouse, S., “Parliament Reviews the Implementation of the Child Justice Act” Article 40. Vol. 
13 No. 2, September 2011. See also Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, Annual 
Report on the Implementation of the Child Justice Act, 2008. (Act No. 75 of 2008), 2011, p. 26. 
16
 Sloth-Nielsen and J. Gallinetti, “‘Just Say Sorry?’ Ubuntu, Africanisation and the Child Justice 
System in the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008.” P.E.R., Vol. 14 No. 4, 2011, pp. 63-90, p. 84 (note 52). 
See also Gallinetti, J. and D. Kassan, Research on the Criminal Justice System Pertaining to Children 
in Three Magisterial Districts. Cape Town: Child Justice Alliance, 2007. 
17
 According to official Government information, ‘without information about the total number of 
juveniles who were detained, it is difficult to know whether this represents improvement, or that more 
juveniles are being detained in facilities with adults.’ See Research and Analysis Working Group, 
Poverty and Human Development Report 2007. Dar es Salaam: MKUKUTA Monitoring 
System/Ministry of Planning, Economy and Empowerment, 2007, p. 68. See also Mashamba, C.J., 
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pointing to the high prevalent rate of child offending in the country.
18
 According to 
disaggregated statistical data available, between 2003 and 2005 there were 281 
offending children arrested by the police, 427 charged and sentenced, and 844 kept in 
pre-trial detentions in Tanzania.
19
 Even data from recent studies by the Commission 
for Human Rights and Good Governance (CHRAGG) and the Ministry of 
Constitutional and Legal Affairs (MoCLA) have not been able to establish the exact 
number of children processed through the criminal justice annually. 
 
In early 2011 CHRAGG conducted a comprehensive survey on children in detention 
in Tanzania.
20
   In carrying out this study, CHRAGG undertook inspection visits to 
65 detention centres around the country where children are held, including 30 
prisons, 29 police stations, then 5 Retention Homes
21
 and the one Approved School.  
CHRAGG’s report focused on conditions and treatment of children in detention.22  
Accordingly, the CHRAGG Report revealed that there were 1400 children in adult 
                                                                                                                                          
“Overview of the Implementation of Cluster III of MKUKUTA: Governance and Accountability.” 
The Justice Review. Vol. 5 No. 5, 2007, pp. 19-23, p. 22. 
18
 See Legal and Human Rights Centre, op. cit. See also Mashamba, C.J., “A Child in Conflict with 
the Law under the Tanzanian Law of the Child Act (2009): Accused or Victim of Circumstances?” 
The Justice Review. Vol.8 No. 2, 2009, pp. 156-209. 
19
 These data are reported in United Republic Of Tanzania, “Consideration of the Second Periodic 
CRC Report: 1998-2003,” answers to questions raised for additional and updated information 
considered in connection with the 2
nd
 CRC report to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child on 
15
th
 -19
th
 May 2006. 
20
 Under Section 6 (1) (h) of the Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance Act, No. 7 of 
2001, CHRAGG has the mandate to visit prisons and places of detention or related facilities to assess 
and inspect conditions of persons held in detention. 
21
 By the end of 2012 there were established 7 Retention Homes under Section 133(9) of the Law of 
the Child Act. As per the First Schedule to the Law of the Child (Retention Homes) Rules (2012) GN. 
No. 151, the existing Retention Homes are located in Arusha, Dar es Salaam, Mbeya, Moshi, Mtwara, 
Mwanza and Tanga Regions. However, the Mtwara and Mwanza Retention Homes are yet to be 
operational.  
22
 United Republic of Tanzania, “Inspection Report for Children in Detention Facilities in Tanzania”. 
Dar es Salaam, Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance, June 2011 (herein after 
referred to as “The CHRAGG Report”). 
7 
 
  
 
 
prisons and detention facilities in the country.
23
  In April 2011, MoCLA convened 
the Child Justice Forum
24
, which culminated in the undertaking of two 
comprehensive studies: an assessment of the access to justice system for under-18s, 
and an assessment of the juvenile justice system.
25
  The scope and execution of the 
studies was overseen and guided by the Child Justice Forum, under MoCLA in 
collaboration with UNICEF (Tanzania Country Office). Relevant to this study is the 
assessment of juvenile justice system, whereby data was collected through a series of 
semi-standardised interviews and focus group discussions with juvenile justice 
professionals, including Police Officers (at all levels); Prosecutors (State Attorneys 
and Police Prosecutors), Magistrates, defence lawyers, Retention Home staff, 
Approved School staff, staff in adult prisons, Social Welfare Officers, Ward Tribunal 
members and staff at relevant CSOs and NGOs.  In total, 96 professionals were 
interviewed across the 10 research regions.  A total of 192 children in conflict with 
the law were also interviewed across the 10 research regions.  The majority of these 
children (170) were interviewed on a one-to-one basis, and the rest were interviewed 
in three focus group discussions.
26
  
 
Fifth, the two countries have nonetheless distinct approaches to legally addressing 
the ever-increasing problem of child offending. In South Africa, already there is a 
Child Justice Act, which was first tabled in Parliament in August 2002, aiming at 
                                                 
23
 Ibid.  
24
 This is an inter-agency forum comprised of key national state and non-state actors mandated to 
develop recommendations and strategy for reform of the child justice system. 
25
 The Children’s Legal Centre (a UK-based NGO) and the National Organisation for Legal 
Assistance (a Tanzanian NGO) were commissioned to undertake these studies.  The researcher was 
one of researchers in the assessments. 
26
 United Republic of Tanzania, “An Analysis of the Situation for Children in Conflict with the Law in 
Tanzania.” Dar es Salaam, Ministry of Constitutional and Legal Affairs (MoCLA)/UNICEF, July 
2011. 
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protecting the rights of children accused of committing crimes and managing their 
progress through the criminal justice system.
27
 In Tanzania, on the other hand, the 
law reform of the legislation concerning children accused of committing crimes has 
taken a very long time to be completed.
28
 The law reform process in Tanzania began 
in 1988 when the Law Reform Commission of Tanzania (LRCT) was commissioned 
by the Government to undertake legal research on legislations concerning, inter alia, 
children’s rights in the country. It submitted its report to the minister responsible for 
justice in 1994 recommending the “overhaul” of the entire children law regime 
because all the laws were outdated,
29
 but since then nothing was done in respect of 
legislating for juvenile justice,
30
 until November 2009 when Parliament passed the 
Law of the Child Act (2009).
31
 
 
In fact, the law review process undertaken by the LRCT coincided with landmark 
developments in the area of children’s rights at the international arena. In 1989 the 
United Nations (UN) General Assembly passed the CRC, which Tanzania signed and 
ratified by June 1991. Similarly, in 1990 the then Organization of African Union 
(OAU, now the African Union [AU]) passed the ACRWC, which Tanzania ratified 
                                                 
27
 Steyn, F. Op. cit., p. 1; and Dissel, A., “Youth, Crime and Criminal Justice in South Africa”, op. cit, 
pp. 249-254. 
28
 Mashamba, C.J., “Accepting the Necessary Evil: The Need for a new Statute Promoting and 
Protecting Children’s Rights in Tanzania.” The Justice Review. Vol. 5 No. 5, 2007, pp. 11-15. 
29
 Amongst the outdated laws include the repealed Children and Young Persons Ordinance, Cap. 13 of  
1937 [later, the Children and Young Persons Act, Cap. 13 R.E. 2002]. See also United Republic of  
Tanzania, Report of the Commission on the Law Relating to the Children in Tanzania. Dar es Salaam:  
Government Printer, 1996. 
30
 For a detailed account on the children’s rights law reform in Tanzania, see particularly, United 
Republic of Tanzania, ibid.   
31
 For a comprehensive account of Tanzania’s legislative efforts on this law, see particularly 
Mashamba, C.J. and K.L. Gamaya. “The Enactment of the Tanzanian Law of the Child Act (2009): 
Some Lessons Learnt from CSOs’ Participation in the Lawmaking Process.” The Justice Review. Vol. 
8 No. 2, 2009; and Mashamba, C.J., “Domestication of International Children’s Rights Norms in 
Tanzania.” The Justice Review. Vol. 8 No. 2, 2009. 
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in February 2003. Indeed, Tanzania ratified these international instruments on 
children rights without any reservations, meaning that it ‘has undertaken to bring her 
domestic legislation in line with all the provisions of (these international instruments 
on the rights of the child).’32 
 
In principle – as well as per the constant recommendations and reminder of the UN 
Committee on the Rights of the Child (the CRC Committee) – it is an essential aspect 
of States Parties thereto, while implementing the CRC, to ensure that all domestic 
legislation is “fully compatible” with the provisions and principles of the CRC.33 In 
respect of Tanzania, the CRC Committee, in its Concluding Observations in respect 
of the country’s initial report (1998) and the second periodic report (1998-2003), was 
concerned ‘at the lack of a clear time frame (for Tanzania) to finalize the consultative 
process and enact “The Children’s Act.”’34 
 
It should be noted that, in its second periodic report to the CRC Committee (1998-
2003), Tanzania reported that it was undertaking legislative review and collecting 
views of stakeholders, including children, through the national ‘White Paper.’35 It 
                                                 
32
 See Mashamba, C.J., “Basic Principles to be Incorporated in the New Children Statute in Tanzania.” 
In Mashamba, C.J. (ed.), Using the Law to Protect Children’s Rights in Tanzania: An Unfinished 
Business. Dar es Salaam: National Organization for Legal Assistance, 2004, p. 107. 
33
 See Mashamba, C.J., “Accepting the Necessary Evil: The Need for a new Statute Promoting and 
Protecting Children’s Rights in Tanzania”, op. cit. See also Hodgkin, R. and P. Newell, 
Implementation Handbook for the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 3
rd
 edn. Geneva: United 
Nations Children Fund (UNICEF), 2007. 
34
 See UN CRC Committee, “Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 40 of 
the Convention – Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: United 
Republic of Tanzania,” CRC/C/TZA/CO/2, dated 2nd June, 2006, para 9. 
35
 Mashamba, C.J., “Accepting the Necessary Evil: The Need for a new Statute Promoting and 
Protecting Children’s Rights in Tanzania”, op. cit. 
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was reported that the National White Paper would engender “The Children’s Act.”36 
Nevertheless, the CRC Committee urged Tanzania to ‘engage all efforts and 
resources necessary for the enactment of the Children’s Act in Tanzania Mainland 
and a similar Act in Zanzibar, as a matter of priority. It further [urged Tanzania] to 
ensure that all of its domestic and customary legislation [should] conform fully to the 
principles and provisions of the Convention, and ensure its effective 
implementation.’37 
 
This Chapter, therefore, lays down the foundation of this study. It sets out the reasons 
for undertaking this comparative study on the administration of the juvenile justice 
systems in Tanzania and South Africa. It also sets out the background to, and 
statement of, the problem under research. The Chapter further lays down the 
objectives, scope, justification, hypotheses and methodologies of this study.  
 
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
The thrust of this thesis is that, unlike South Africa, Tanzania is far behind in its 
domestication and implementation of international juvenile justice standards in the 
light of the CRC and ACRWC. In order to be able to carry out a critical assessment 
on the administration of juvenile justice in Tanzania, this thesis looks at the issue as 
                                                 
36
 See United Republic Of Tanzania, “The Country Second Periodic Report on the Implementation of 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC): 1998-2003,” Ministry of Community Development, 
Gender and Children; August, 2004. See also United Republic Of Tanzania, “Consideration of the 
Second CRC Periodic Report: 1998-2003 – Answers to Questions Raised for Additional and Updated 
Information to be Considered in Connection to Second CRC Report during the UN CRC Committee 
Session on 15
th
-19
th
 May, 2006, in Geneva, Switzerland,” Ministry of Community Development, 
Gender and Children; April 2006. 
37
 See UN CRC Committee, “Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 40 of 
the Convention – Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: United 
Republic of Tanzania”, op. cit, para 10. 
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to whether or not Tanzania has effectively domesticated international juvenile justice 
standards in comparison with South Africa. This is grounded in the fact that, over the 
past two decades since the CRC and ACRWC were adopted, States Parties to these 
international treaties have committed themselves to domesticating the juvenile justice 
standards enshrined therein.
38
 As UNICEF notes, the monitoring of the 
domestication and implementation of these instruments at the domestic level shows 
that ‘the rights, norms and principles involved are regularly ignored and seriously 
violated virtually throughout the world … on a scale … unmatched in the field of 
[human] rights implementation’.39 Tanzania is no exception to this reality; and, 
therefore, this study attempts to address the issue of the extent to which the 
provisions of the CRC and the ACRWC relating to the administration (and 
functioning) of an effective juvenile justice system have been domesticated in 
Tanzania as compared to South Africa.  
 
 Appreciating the relevance of the CRC and the ACRWC in the administration of 
juvenile justice, specific laws and provisions protecting the rights of children in 
conflict with the law have recently been enacted in both South Africa and Tanzania. 
However, the study shall demonstrate how Tanzania took a slow pace to commence 
the legislative review process and the impact of lack of wide and effective 
consultation of stakeholders in this process. It is to be noted that, as a result lack of 
wide and an effective consultation, the Tanzanian child law contains several gaps, 
which may negatively impact on the administration of juvenile justice. As such, this 
                                                 
38
  Odongo, G.O., “The Domestication of International Standards on the Rights of the Child with 
Specific Reference to Juvenile Justice in the African Context”, op. cit, p. 6. 
39
 UNICEF, Innocenti Digest No. 3 on Juvenile Justice. Florence: UNICEF, 1998, p. 2.   
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thesis will examine these gaps and the extent to which they positively or negatively 
impact on the administration of juvenile justice in Tanzania. 
 
Since the LCA became operational on 1
st
 April 2010, Tanzania still has only one 
Juvenile Court at Kisutu in Dar es Salaam
40
 and no other courts have, so far, been 
designated as Juvenile Courts as required under the LCA.
41
 There are also only 5 
functioning, but poorly equipped, Retention Homes in the country
42
, with two 
additional ones being recently established in Mtwara and Mwanza Regions
43
, but are 
yet to become functional.  As such, this thesis examines the implications of having 
only one Juvenile Court and only five functioning Retention Homes for the entire 
country; particularly, in the light of the requirement under the CRC and ACRWC 
that States Parties thereto have an obligation to establish separate laws, processes, 
procedures, structures and institutions/personnel for dealing with children in conflict 
with the law.  
 
This thesis focuses particularly on juvenile justice rights and norms set out in the 
CRC and the ACRWC; principally because of the neglect by States around the world 
of their responsibilities in this regard.
44
 In Tanzania the administration of juvenile 
                                                 
40
 Juvenile Courts are established under Section 97(1) of the LCA. 
41
 Section 97(2) of the LCA empowers the Chief Justice, by notice in the Gazette, to designate any 
premises used by a primary court to be a Juvenile Court. 
42
 The functioning Retention Homes are located in Arusha, Dar es Salaam, Mbeya, Kilimanjaro and 
Tanga Regions. However, the Mtwara and Mwanza Retention Homes are yet to be operational.  
43
 Established 7 Retention Homes under Section 133(9) of the Law of the Child Act. See also First 
Schedule to the Law of the Child (Retention Homes) Rules (2012) GN. No. 151. 
44
 Some authors have described a child in conflict with the law the “unwanted child” of States’ 
responsibilities. See particularly Defence for Children International, Juvenile Justice: the Unwanted 
Child of State Responsibilities. Geneva: Defence for Children International, 2001, p. 1.  As Odongo 
points out, in many countries, ‘young people in the juvenile justice system are generally viewed only 
in the narrow perspective as law breakers and a threat to the public. The fuller picture is not seen of 
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justice has been identified as unsatisfactory in various respects.
45
 According to a 
report by the Law Reform Commission of Tanzania (LRCT), the colonially-inherited 
juvenile penal law
46
 had been intended to deal with ‘many problems of street 
children (both delinquent and non delinquent)’ prevalent in the colonial era. 
However, ‘the methods of dealing with the said two categories of children (were/are) 
mixed up,’ with sheer lack of clear provisions in the law on how best to deal with 
both categories.
47
 Nonetheless, the LCA has not been able to get rid of this anomaly. 
Therefore, this thesis examines the ramifications of this problem on the effective 
administration of juvenile justice in Tanzania in the context of the standards set out 
in the CRC and ACWRC and borrowing a leaf from the South African experience, 
which has comprehensively reformed its child justice law. 
 
In order to have a clear understanding of the realistic approach to improving 
domestic law and practice relating to the administration of juvenile justice in 
Tanzania, the thesis comparatively examines the process of reforming the child 
justice legislation in South Africa, which took a wider consultative approach as 
opposed to the Tanzanian case. Indeed, South Africa ratified the CRC in 1995, and 
subsequently adopted the 1996 Constitution, which includes a special provision 
guaranteeing the rights of children accused of committing crimes. It should be noted 
that the Tanzanian Constitution does not have specific child rights or child justice 
provisions. At the same time, there are adequate initiatives aimed at diverting young 
                                                                                                                                          
children who are in need of understanding and assistance and who themselves are often victims of 
violence and social injustice.’ Odongo, G.O., “The Domestication of International Standards on the 
Rights of the Child with Specific Reference to Juvenile Justice in the African Context”, op. cit, p. 8.  
45
 See United Republic of Tanzania, The Law Relating to Children in Tanzania, op. cit. 
46
 The Children and Young Persons Act, Cap. 13 R.E. 2002, was repealed by the LCA in 2009. 
47
 Ibid. 
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offenders in South Africa
48
 as opposed to Tanzania where there do not exist any of 
such initiatives. Even before the Child Justice Act was enacted in 2008 there was an 
estimated number of 18,000 children being diverted from the criminal justice system 
annually in South Africa. This number was thence expected to increase dramatically 
with the enactment of the Child Justice Act.
49
  The thesis will, therefore, investigate 
the efficacy of these diversion measures in South Africa and how Tanzania can 
emulate and domesticate some of these measures to ensure that children in Tanzania 
are also diverted from the criminal justice process as soon as they come into contact 
with the law. 
 
So, against this background to the problem surrounding this study, the thesis 
critically examines the extent to which the just-enacted juvenile justice laws in 
Tanzania and South Africa comply with the international juvenile justice standards 
enshrined in the CRC, the ACRWC and other international human rights instruments, 
taking into account the practical circumstances prevalent in the two countries under 
study. In particular, the thesis attempts to investigate the reasons forming the basis 
for Tanzania’s non-compliance with its international obligation to effectively 
domesticate and implement international juvenile justice norms in its juvenile justice 
system, with a view to charting out feasible recommendations for further reform(s) 
and improvement of the Tanzanian juvenile justice law.   
                                                 
48
 Steyn, F., Review of South African Innovations in Diversion and Reintegration of Youth at Risk, op. 
cit. 
49
 Muntingh, L., “Personal Correspondence between Louise Ehlers (OSF-SA) and Lukas Muntingh 
(NICRO), quoted in Steyn, ibid, p. 1.  
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1.3 Justification of the Study 
This study is expected to form part of a working document for advocacy for further 
law reform and enforcement of legislation relating to juvenile justice in Tanzania, as 
there is no any extensive scholarly work produced on this area of legal knowledge in 
the country. As such, being a member of an NGO working in the areas of human 
rights as well as juvenile justice in Tanzania, and having played a leading role in the 
CSOs’ lobbying for the enactment of the Law of the Child Act (2009), the researcher 
intends to use the findings of this study in the formulation of new initiatives in the 
administration of juvenile justice, particularly diversion of young offenders from the 
criminal justice system in Tanzania. So, the output of this study is expected to be 
two-thronged: first, it will serve as an advocacy tool for further reform and 
enforcement of legislation concerning juvenile justice in Tanzania; and, secondly, it 
will contribute immensely to the existing knowledge on juvenile justice not only in 
Tanzania but in Africa as a whole. 
 
1.4 Objectives of the Study 
This study has strived: 
(i) To make a comparative analysis of the experiences between South Africa and 
Tanzania in dealing with the problems and challenges encountered in the 
administration of juvenile justice with a view to bringing forth lessons that 
Tanzania can learn and emulate in its endeavour to improve the 
administration of juvenile justice;  
16 
 
  
 
 
(ii) To comparatively assess the efficacy of the juvenile justice laws put in place 
in Tanzania and South African in accordance with their international 
obligations; and 
(iii) To recommend better approaches for improving administration of the juvenile 
justice system in Tanzania, with a view to effectively protecting the rights 
and welfare of children in conflict with the law in the context of 
International Children’s Rights Law. 
 
1.5 Hypotheses 
This study tested the following hypotheses:  
(i) Both in Tanzania and South Africa, efforts have recently been made to 
enact laws for the protection of children in conflict in line with their 
international obligations, but in Tanzania the law is not adequate and yet 
to be effectively implemented; 
(ii) The Law of the Child Act (2009) has placed enormous roles, power and 
obligations in the hands of Social Welfare Officers, Police Officers and 
Magistrates in the administration of juvenile justice, but they are not 
specifically trained in this field as well as they are inadequate in number 
to be able to effectively administer the juvenile system in Tanzania, 
which makes it distinguishable from the South African experience; 
(iii) Unlike the South African Child Justice Act, the juvenile justice system 
under the Law of the Child Act (2009) in Tanzania does not expressly 
favour diversion of offending children away from the criminal justice 
17 
 
  
 
 
system at all levels of the administration of juvenile justice; consequent to 
which, children accused of offending criminal law in Tanzania are dealt 
with together with, and/or in similar manner as, adult offenders at all 
stages of the criminal justice system; and 
(iv) Children deprived of their liberty in Tanzania do suffer a number of 
inhuman and degrading treatments while in detention either in police 
custody or in the prisons awaiting trial or “serving their prison terms.” 
 
1.6 Literature Review 
Unlike in South Africa, in Tanzania there is a dearth of literature on children’s rights 
generally and juvenile justice in particular. As Julia Sloth-Nielsen and Benyam 
Mezmur points out, this is a similar situation in most of Sub-Saharan African 
countries.
50
 This is notwithstanding the fact that the CRC and the ACRWC are now 
regarded as popular in Africa, as elsewhere in the world, which would otherwise 
suggest ‘a high level of normative consensus among the various nations of the world 
(particularly in Africa) on the idea and content of children’s rights as human 
rights.’51 The situation is, however, different in South Africa, where standards and 
normative principles enshrined in the CRC and ACRWC have been enshrined in the 
1996 Constitution. The Constitution contains several provisions giving domestic 
application to international children’s rights standards. As Saine contends, the South 
African Constitution includes provisions protecting children’s rights, which include 
the guarantee that children have the right not to be detained except as a measure of 
                                                 
50
 Sloth-Nielsen, J. and B.D. Mezmur, op. cit. 
51
 Ibid. 
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last resort and then for the shortest appropriate period of time, separate from adults 
and in conditions that take account of his her age.52  
 
This reality in South Africa is made true because ‘one of the proactive elements that 
make the South African Constitution progressive is its express reference to the 
guarantees and protection of … children’s rights, as lucidly contained [for example] 
in Section 28 of the 1996 Constitution.’53 According to Julia Sloth-Nielsen, this 
element, together with South Africa’s ratification of the CRC,54 has ‘provided the 
impetus for redrafting legislation affecting children, to get effect to constitutional and 
international law commitment.’55  
 
Discussing the import of Section 35 of the Constitution of South Africa – which 
provides for the basic due process rights
56
 in the criminal justice system right from 
the arrest stage to the sentencing stage – De Waal, et al, point out that although these 
due process rights in the Constitution do not seek to replace the statutory and 
common law principles governing the administration of criminal justice,
57
 ‘the latter 
must comply with the provisions of the Bill of Rights and the rest of the [South 
African] Constitution.’58  
                                                 
52
 Saine, M., “Protecting the Rights of Children in Trouble with the Law: A Case Study of South 
Africa and The Gambia.” LL.M. Thesis, University of Pretoria, 2005, p. 21. 
53
 Mashamba, C.J., “Enforcing Social Justice in Tanzania: The Case of Economic and Social Rights.” 
LL.M. Thesis, Open University of Tanzania, 2007. 
54
 South Africa ratified the CRC in 1995. 
55
 Sloth-Nielsen, J., “Promoting Children’s Socio-economic Rights through Law Reform: the 
Proposed Children’s Bill.” ESR Review Vol. 4, No. 2, June 2003, p. 2.  
56
 For instance, it provides that child deprived of his or her liberty must be released from detention if 
the interest of justice so permits, but subject to reasonable conditions. See Section 35(1)(f) of the 
Constitution of South Africa (1996). 
57
 De Waal, J. et al, The Bill of Rights Handbook. Cape Town: Juta & Co. Ltd., 2001, p. 585. 
58
 Saine, op. cit, p. 26. 
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According to Sloth-Nielsen, though, the lack of adequate literature on juvenile justice 
in Sub-Saharan Africa could be attributed to the fact that many of these countries, 
including Tanzania, are now embarking on reform programmes aimed at aligning 
their juvenile penal laws along the international standards set out, inter alia, in the 
CRC and the ACRWC.
59
 According to Sloth-Nielsen and Mezmur, the law reform in 
most Sub-Saharan African countries has taken a slightly similar direction where most 
of them have adopted an approach where juvenile justice has been (is being proposed 
to be) included in comprehensive child law enactments.
60
 Indeed, this has already 
happened in Kenya, Lesotho, Nigeria, Tanzania and Uganda, to mention but few 
cases. On the other hand, other Sub-Saharan African countries have resorted to 
separating the juvenile laws from the comprehensive child law enactments, like 
Ghana, Mozambique and South Africa, The Gambia.
61
 One thing to note in these law 
reform initiatives in Africa, though, is the fact that both approaches to legislating for 
children’s rights have tended to incorporate standards in the CRC and the ACRWC. 
As Odongo argues, the adoption of the CRC and the ACRWC has revolutionised ‘the 
area of child law in all its facets with a clear move from the doctrine of parens 
patriae which, by and large, entrusted parents with rights (rather than 
responsibilities) over their children.’62 This reality has been reflected in a number of 
                                                 
59
 Sloth-Nielsen, J., “Strengthening the Promotion, Protection and Fulfillment of Children’s Rights in 
African Context.” In Alen, A., et al (eds.), The UN Children’s Rights Convention: Theory Meets 
Practice. 2007, p. 103. 
60
 Sloth-Nielsen, J. and B.D. Mezmur, op. cit, pp. 332-337. 
61
 Ibid. 
62
 Odongo, G.O., “The Impact of International Law on Children’s Rights on Juvenile Justice Law 
Reform in the African Context.” In Sloth-Nielsen, J. (ed.), Children’s Rights on Africa: A Legal 
Perspective. Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2008, pp. 147-164, p. 147. 
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child laws, including those specifically on child justice, which have been enacted 
from 1990s to date.
63
 
 
 Nonetheless, at the international level it is settled that the areas of children’s rights, 
in general, and juvenile justice, in particular, have received as wider research 
activities as other human rights fields. According to Manfred Nowak in his work 
entitled: Introduction to the International Human Rights Regime, children, 
themselves being human beings, are entitled to all human rights and freedoms.
64
 To 
him, and indeed to all human rights jurists such as Rios-Kohn,
65
 it was basing on this 
point of view that the world community decided as early as in 1924
66
 and later in 
1959
67
 to adopt specific international children’s rights instruments.68 These early 
initiatives, indeed, culminated in the adoption of the CRC at the global level and the 
ACRWC at the African regional level. 
 
As Mezmur points out, the CRC ‘represents a very comprehensive compilation of 
child-specific rights.’69 According to him, the CRC consists of both civil and 
political rights on the one hand, and economic, social and cultural rights on the 
                                                 
63
 See, for instance, Uganda’s Children Statute (1996), Kenya’s Children’s Act (2004), South Africa’s 
Children Act (2005) and Child Justice Act (2008), and Tanzania’s Law of the Child Act (2009). 
64
 Nowak, M., Introduction to the International Human Rights Regime. Leiden/Boston: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2003, pp. 91-94. 
65
 Rios-Kohn, R., “Comparative Study of the Impact of the Convention on the Rights of the Child: 
Law Reform in Selected Common Law Countries”, op. cit. 
66
 In this year, the defunct League of Nations passed the Geneva Declaration on the Rights of the 
Child. 
67
 In this year, the United Nations passed its own version of the Declaration on the Rights of the Child. 
68
 Nowak, op. cit, p. 91. 
69
 Mezmur, B.D., “The African Children’s Charter versus the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child: A Zero-sum-Game?”, op. cit, p. 20. 
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other.
70
 As Chirwa opines, although the CRC codifies all these categories of human 
rights, in Article 4 it ‘nods in favour of the views of opponents of economic, social 
and cultural rights.’71 In Chirwa’s opinion, among such views ‘are that economic, 
social and cultural rights engender positive obligations; are cost extensive and can 
therefore only be realised progressively.’72 However, Chirwa points out that, such 
views have lost ground in contemporary times, because: ‘It is now accepted that 
economic, social and cultural rights entail negative obligations and therefore can be 
enforced immediately.’73 In order to avoid this kind of ideological differences the 
two categories of rights impliedly brought about by the CRC, Chirwa argues, the 
ACRWC has refrained from such controversial categorisation. 
 
On her part, Rios-Kohn in her work entitled: “A Comparative Study of the Impact of 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child: Law Reform in Selected Common Law 
Countries,”74 assesses the impact of the CRC on law review and reform in selected 
countries of the Commonwealth Caribbean that apply the common law tradition. She 
opines that until the seventeenth century, children’s rights were not recognised under 
the common law.  
 
Interestingly, Africa is the only continent in the world with a specific regional 
instrument for the protection of children’s rights and welfare, including those 
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children in conflict with the law. As Lloyd points out, the African regional system 
for the protection of children’s rights is the ‘most progressive achievement of all 
regional systems, as it is the only system to provide for a comprehensive mechanism 
for the protection and promotion of children’s rights at a regional level.’75 In her 
considered view, this system ‘serves as an innovation in the arena of children’s 
rights.’76 To her, the ACRWC ‘explicitly recognises that the child in Africa occupies 
a unique and privileged position in African society and that for the full harmonious 
development of the child’s personality, the child should grow up in a family 
environment in an atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding (Preamble of the 
ACRWC).’77 
  
In principle, the ACRWC complements the CRC in the context of the UN’s 
recognition of regional arrangements for the protection of human rights made at its 
92
nd
 Plenary Meeting in December 1992. At this meeting, the UN General Assembly 
reaffirmed that: ‘regional arrangements for the promotion and protection of human 
rights may make a major contribution to the effective enjoyment of human rights 
…’78 This was re-echoed one year later at the 1993 Vienna World Conference on 
Human Rights, which also reaffirmed ‘the fundamental role that regional and sub-
regional arrangements can play in promoting and protecting human rights and 
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stressed that such arrangements should reinforce universal human rights standards as 
contained in international human rights instruments.’79 
 
Although the ACRWC complements the CRC, in its early years it failed to garner 
support from African countries as was the case with the latter. As Mezmur contends, 
it took nine years, for instance, ‘to get 15 countries to ratify the ACRWC and so 
bring the Convention (sic) into force.’80 Twenty years after its adoption, up until now 
the ratification rate is 45 countries. All in all, as Chirwa points out, the ACRWC 
offers a very comprehensive space where a number of basic principles and standards 
on which a juvenile justice system should be based. In this regard, 
The Charter breaks new ground for the protection of children’s rights [in the 
juvenile justice system] in three respects. First, the Charter requires that a criminal 
case against a child must be determined “as speedily and possible”.81 This entails a 
pace that is over and above that applicable to adults.
82
 Secondly, the Charter 
expressly provides that rehabilitation of the child must be the essential aim of 
treatment of the child during trial and after conviction. This provision does not come 
out clearly in the CRC. The Charter is therefore more progressive as it strengthens 
the argument of some leading scholars in international law who contend that 
rehabilitation is a right of every prisoner. Thirdly, the Charter guarantees every child 
the right to be afforded legal and appropriate assistance in the preparation and 
presentation of his defence. This formulation is not qualified in any way and finds 
no comparison in any other human rights instrument …
83
 
 
However, Chirwa finds a number of weaknesses with the ACRWC, including its lack 
of clear enumeration of alternative ways – i.e. diversion measures – of dealing with 
juveniles who comes into contact with the penal law. Chirwa also points out that the 
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ACRWC is retrogressive in that it does not contain all rights ‘surrounding the 
administration of [juvenile] justice, especially those in the ICCPR, e.g., the right 
against self-incrimination and retrospective criminal laws and punishment, and the 
right for child victims to be compensated for miscarriage of justice.’84 
 
In order make sure that the basic standards and principles enshrined in the 
international children’s rights instruments are fully realised at the domestic level, 
there is an international obligation imposed on States Parties to the CRC and the 
ACRWC for domestication of these instruments. In most common law countries, like 
Tanzania, the domestication of international instruments is done through legislative 
action. But, as Jonas contends, ‘while legislation has the advantage of providing an 
important framework for action against violations of children’s rights, it remains 
ineffective in detecting and addressing instances where those violations are 
concentrated and most hazardous.’85 
 
So, Hodgkin and Newel
86
 concur with Makaramba
87
 in responding to this pessimistic 
view. They contend that the existence of laws providing for the promotion and 
protection of children’s rights is not enough if those laws do not provide adequate 
and lucid legal powers and institutions needed in ensuring effective realisation of the 
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rights enshrined in those laws. In this regard, there is a ‘need for the state party to an 
instrument to establish a national infrastructure including relevant institutions which 
can promote, protect and enforce rights stipulated in the instrument.’88 According the 
CRC Committee, such institutions may be in the form of children’s commissioners, 
ombudspersons, or as part of the national human rights institutions.
89
 
 
In his comprehensive analysis of the administration of juvenile justice in selected 
African countries entitled: “The Domestication of International Law Standards on the 
Rights of the Child with Specific Reference to Juvenile Justice in the African 
Context,”90 Odongo argues that, 
By becoming parties to these international treaties [CRC and ACRWC], State 
Parties agree to be bound by their terms and to take all political, legal and 
administrative steps necessary to implement the core imperatives of the treaties as 
encapsulated in their Articles. In effect, this means that State Parties are bound both 
by the procedural reporting requirement as well as the obligation to take legislative 
steps, among others, to ensuring that children’s rights as contained in the treaties are 
realized and implemented in domestic systems.
91
 
 
This argument is buttressed by Odongo’s contention quoted at the beginning of this 
analysis to the effect that the CRC and the ACRWC have revolutionized the way 
societies around the world now view the rights and welfare of children coming in 
conflict with the law.
92
 In fact, his contention proceeds from the thesis that 
contemporary juvenile justice has brought about widespread, indeed universal, 
appreciation that ‘children and adolescents have special needs and limited capacities 
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and hence require distinctive or at least separate treatment from adults.’93 According 
to Odongo,  
 
Predating the ‘child rights-centred’ approach to the issue of juvenile justice, the 
philosophical underpinning of the idea that children accused of committing offences 
should be treated differently from adults has been argued from a number of 
theoretical standpoints. This debate is mainly captured in views in criminology 
where juvenile justice theory is based on the ‘welfare model’ and the ‘justice 
model’. … Suffice it to say that the debate on these theories concentrates on western 
criminal law systems.
94
  
 
Therefore, Odongo’s thesis in this work aims at showing ‘the relevance of this debate 
in an African context drawing examples from a number of African countries.’95 In 
fact, this is a point of departure in the thesis: that is to say that it acknowledges that  
 
… children as bearers of certain minimum universally agreed standards that have 
now crystallized as children’s human rights, the CRC and other international norms 
on the rights of the child stand firmly in the theoretical justification of any issue 
regarding the child. The subject of juvenile justice is no exception.
96
 
 
According to Odongo, most of the African countries that have embarked on 
reforming their child rights law, including child justice, have incorporated this view 
in their respective domains.
97
 One thing that remains outstanding in this regard is the 
fact that, in many jurisdictions juvenile justice remains embedded in the criminal 
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justice system. This is because, as Alemika argues, the criminal justice system ‘is a 
sub-sector of the wider legal order in society.’98 It functions to prevent and resolve 
disputes amongst citizens, between citizens and the state, and among groups in 
society – i.e. socio-cultural, political, economical and governmental agencies. Within 
the criminal justice system there are several branches, significant to this study is the 
juvenile justice system.  
 
As most scholars on juvenile justice contend, the concept and practice of juvenile 
justice derived from developments in the criminal justice system in the 19
th
 century 
after the first juvenile court was established in Chicago, in the US, in 1899.
99
 
Odongo, for one, points out that, 
Prior to the juvenile court’s invention, the system for controlling juvenile 
delinquents was contained within the general criminal justice system which meted 
out to children or adolescents above a certain age the same criminal justice rules 
or procedures as adults with little or no differentiation or reduction of the 
applicable punishment measures.
100
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On his part, Pitts points out that in both the US and the UK, when the concept of 
juvenile justice emerged in the late 19
th
 century, the responsibility for this new form 
of children and youth justice in the criminal justice system was placed ‘in the hands 
of a new legal and administrative entity, the juvenile court.’101 Pitts points out that by 
1910 separate juvenile courts with distinct and discrete institutional and 
administrative machinery for dealing with young offenders had been established in 
most Western European countries.
102
 
 
To date, international law has developed human rights norms that require the 
criminal system to observe a number of basic rights and freedoms as well as juvenile 
justice in the administration of the criminal justice system. Lacey, et al, observe that 
this development was made clear over 150 years when the doctrine of “due process” 
was given more weight in the English criminal justice system. This was made 
possible ‘by the expansion of criminal law’s scope and by liberal ideas about the 
rights of individuals vis-à-vis the state.’103 According to Inciardi, the doctrine of due 
process ‘emphasizes the need to protect procedural rights [in the criminal justice 
system] even if this prevents the legal system from operating with maximum 
efficiency.’104 The due process rights have been incorporated in a number of human 
rights instruments,105 including the CRC and the ACRWC; consequently, their 
incorporation in municipal juvenile justice law. 
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Christina Maganga’s work entitled: “Administration of Juvenile Justice in Tanzania: 
A study of its Compatibility with International Norms and Standards,” 106 examines 
the nature and scope of administration of juvenile justice in Tanzania by identifying 
the gap between the now-repealed juvenile justice law and practice. She also places 
much emphasis on international standards for the administration of juvenile justice 
and concludes that: ‘Although some Tanzanian laws and international standards on 
administration of juvenile justice provide guidance for the children’s rights, the 
practice of courts and other state organs defeat the purpose.’107 
 
However, this work merely provides a descriptive analysis of the administration of 
juvenile justice in Tanzania as it was laid down in the now-repealed Children and 
Young Persons Act.
108
 As will be seen in this study, this law derived its basis on its 
English predecessor, the Children and Young Persons Act (1933), which was 
repealed and replaced by the end of 1930s. In Tanzania, though, it remained in force 
despite its archaic characteristics and ramifications on the administration of juvenile 
justice in the context of contemporary international children’s rights standards. A 
point of departure in the present study is, therefore, that it premises issues of 
administration of juvenile justice in the contemporary standards and norms as 
articulated in the existing international children’s rights instruments. 
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Although many authors agreeably points out the need to have clear methods,
109
 
mechanisms and institutions for the domestic implementation of children’s rights in 
general and the rights of children in conflict with the law in particular, there is a 
dearth of literature as to which method is efficient in given circumstances 
surrounding the administration of juvenile justice. Therefore, this study strives to 
explore appropriate and applicable modes for effective implementation of juvenile 
justice principles in Tanzania basing on lessons learnt from the South African 
example. 
 
1.7 Research Methodology  
The subject under review in this study is rather complex, involving relatively 
intertwined stakeholders, both international and municipal legal principles, and a 
myriad of problems and challenges facing children in conflict with the law. Now that 
the processing of children in conflict with the law is well entrenched in state laws, 
the study applies the “legal centralism approach.”  This approach centres on the laws 
that are made and enforced by the state.
110
 Viewed in this context, as John Griffiths 
points out, under the legal centralism principle ‘law is and should be the law of the 
state, uniform for all persons, exclusive of all other law, and administrated by a 
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single set of state institutions.’111 Using this approach, this study examines 
international and state laws, norms, institutions, international and national 
publications, and other international legal instruments relating to the rights of 
children in conflict with the law, with a view to critically assessing what the juvenile 
legal regimes in South Africa and Tanzania provide. This approach has enabled this 
thesis to unearth challenges, problems, gaps and best practices inherent in the 
administration of juvenile justice in the two countries under study. 
 
In this regard, the study has utilized mostly library research work complemented with 
field research. In this context, primary data for the study were obtained from the 
analysis of relevant international human rights instruments and municipal laws, law 
reports, journals, periodicals, textbooks, declarations, Parliamentary Hansards, 
general comments and concluding observations of relevant international treaty 
bodies, and state reports on children’s rights generally and on juvenile justice in 
particular. This entailed maximum use of the library and the internet that was 
complemented by data obtained from the field as secondary sources of information 
used in making relevant analyses, observations and conclusions in this study.  Paper 
presentations and group or target-oriented discussions were also made at various 
workshops and seminars as secondary sources for the research.  
 
In order to achieve this, three sets of questionnaires were developed for the following 
respondents: first, children in conflict with the law; second, juvenile justice 
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personnel; and, third, victims of child offending and members of the general public. 
The questionnaires were administered on a number of selected respondents, who 
provided practical experience on the way the juvenile justice system is administered 
and problems, challenges and gaps inherent therein. 
 
The study has also used a comparative approach to studying the administration of 
juvenile systems in Tanzania and South Africa, whereby respective juvenile justice 
laws and practices have been analysed in order to find out challenges, gaps and 
problems encountered and how they are addressed in the process. This approach has 
also helped us to identify the best practices for Tanzania to learn from the South 
African experience in the administration of juvenile justice. 
 
In order to get a comprehensible, comparative picture on the best practices in the 
administration of juvenile justice the researcher visited and interacted with the 
United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child (CROC), the African 
Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC) as well as 
child justice practitioners in both South Africa and Tanzania. In particular, the 
researcher participated in presentation of alternative reports relating to Tanzania’s 
implementation of the CRC and the ACRWC before the CROC and ACERWC, 
respectively; and participated in two public hearings before the African Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (AfCHPR) in March112, June113 and September114 2012 
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in Arusha, Tanzania. Whereas in the former the researcher participated as an 
                                                                                                                                          
attempts to get the Federal Republic of Nigeria to deposit the declaration required under Article 34 (6) 
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observer representing the ACERWC, in the latter he was representing (as an 
advocate) the 1
st
 Applicant in the hearing. These visits to the CRC, ACERWC and 
AfCHPR provided the researcher with valuable information and contacts with 
officials of the Court as well as he interviewed a number of stakeholders in the work 
of the Court, including parties, judges, the court registry officials and advocates 
participating in the hearings before the Court. Insofar as the interviews with these 
respondents provided general and specific experiences they had in the work and 
mandate of these bodies, the same have been used holistically to stimulate ideas and 
heads of inquiry relating to the effectiveness of these bodies in the sphere of human 
rights and children’s rights protection within their respective jurisdictions. As such, 
the nature of such interviews has made it necessary to omit the particular names and 
descriptions of such respondents from the main body or bibliography of this thesis. 
 
The researcher also attended and presented a paper at an International Conference on 
Violence against Children in Juvenile Justice Systems that was held in Bishkek, 
Kyrgyzstan, in September 2012. The conference was organised by Penal Reform 
International (PRI) in collaboration with UNICEF and the Project to End Torture and 
Ill-treatment of Children. At this conference the researcher met such distinguished 
child rights experts as Prof Jaap Doek (former Chairperson, UN Committee on the 
Rights of the Child); and Justice Imman Ali (Judge of the Appellate Division of the 
Bangladesh Supreme Court), whose expertise on child justice tremendously informed 
this study, particularly on diversion. 
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In the end, the materials so obtained were subjected to critical scholarly inquiry and 
analysis to enable the researcher to come up with realistic conclusions and 
recommendations.  
 
1.8 Limitations of the Study 
This study is limited by a number of factors. First, although the subject of children’s 
rights in general, and juvenile justice in particular, has been well researched in South 
Africa, in Tanzania there is a dearth of such research, particularly regarding the 
influence of international child rights law on domestic legislation. This is largely due 
to the infancy of available state practice and jurisprudence on juvenile justice in 
Tanzania, as compared to South Africa where there are quite opulently researched 
materials as well as a progressively emerging jurisprudence on juvenile justice. 
Although the thesis aims at contributing to knowledge on juvenile justice and thus 
bridging this gap in Tanzania, there was scarcity of research sources in relation to a 
number of specific juvenile justice issues considered. In order to remedy the problem 
of the dearth of literature on juvenile justice in Tanzania, the thesis made an attempt 
at placing reliance on the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child 
(CROC)’s and South African emerging jurisprudence on this subject. It also 
considered relevant comparative interpretations on these issues by other UN and 
regional human rights bodies, particularly the African Committee of Experts on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC) and domestic courts and administrative 
bodies.  
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Second, when the Law of the Child Act (LCA) was enacted in 2009 and became 
operational on 1
st
 April 2010 the Rules of Procedures to regulate proceedings in the 
Juvenile Court were not promulgated by the Chief Justice as required under Section 
99(1) of the LCA. Up until this thesis was completed
115
, the rules were yet to be 
promulgated. This has resulted in the “delay” on the part of the Juvenile Court to 
fully apply the LCA with regards to the administration of juvenile justice. As such, 
there was no jurisprudence or practice by the state juvenile justice institutions 
available to provide information to the researcher regarding the application of the 
juvenile justice provisions in the LCA. This is contrary to the South African case, 
whereby the coming into force of the Child Justice Act on 1
st
 April 2010 went hand 
in hand with the operationalization of the newly promulgated rules and practice 
notices/guides/policies. As a result, there is an emerging progressive jurisprudence 
on juvenile justice in South Africa.
116
 
 
Third, the implications of the lack of Juvenile Court Rules have been that there are 
no specialised juvenile justice institutions
117
 and personnel in place in Tanzania. 
What are available are the general personnel in these institutions that are assigned to 
deal with children in conflict with the law on a case-by-case basis, with no adequate 
training or skills to do their job. As such, the researcher did not get the benefit of 
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obtaining relevant information from specialised juvenile justice institutions and 
personnel, which is not the case in South Africa, where such institutions and 
personnel are in place. In particular, it was difficult for the researcher to obtain data 
relating to children in conflict with the law disaggregated by age, gender, offences 
committed and the nature of sanction imposed on, or action taken against, such 
children. Data disaggregated in accordance with arrests, pre-trial or police bail, 
prosecutions, releases, convictions/sentences, diversions, or corrections for children 
in conflict with the law was difficult to come by in these institutions. This fact was 
particularly responsible for the situation where the thesis has to devote a significant 
amount of space to describing the law, principles, structures and practices of the 
juvenile justice regime in the context of international juvenile justice standards. 
 
Although other common law East African countries
118
 have domesticated juvenile 
justice standards in their national legislation, South Africa was chosen to provide a 
comparative experience due to its comprehensive domestication and effective 
application of international juvenile justice standards enshrined in the CJA as well as 
in the 1996 Constitution. This can be evidenced particularly in the number of cases 
involving child offenders that have been dealt with by the courts as well as the 
juvenile justice institutions established and the specialised personnel recruited to man 
the juvenile justice system in South Africa.
119
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119
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CHAPTER TWO 
2.0 THE NEXUS BETWEEN CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND JUVENILE 
JUSTICE 
2.1 Introduction 
The concepts of crime and criminal justice ‘have been a part of human history for so 
many millennia that their roots are buried in antiquity.’120 Amongst the early scholars 
to speak of crime and justice include Cicero (in the 1
st
 century B.C.) and later 
Aristotle, which means that the concept of criminal justice is as old as civilization.
121
 
During the early Greek and Roman legal values and theories, emphasis was placed 
only on the study of the philosophy of justice as opposed to the contemporary legal 
thinking, which describes criminal justice as pertaining to the norms, functions, 
structure and decision-making processes ‘of agencies that deal with the management 
and control of crime and criminal offenders – the police, the courts, and correctional 
systems.’122  
Implicitly, it embodies ‘processes and decisions pertaining to the enactment and 
enforcement of criminal laws, the determination of the guilt of crime suspects, and 
the allocation and administration of punishment and other sanctions.’123 Accordingly, 
the norms, institutions and processes of criminal justice administration ‘are 
politically determined, in the sense that their articulation and incorporation into the 
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governance systems of society involve the exercise of political power through the 
legislative and judicial organs of government.’124 
 
Viewed in this sense, the legislature, police, courts and prisons ‘are the core 
institutions of criminal justice administration in modern states.’125 At the heart of the 
concept of criminal justice, thus, are ‘normative ideas of transgression against 
criminal code: intention, responsibility or culpability and desert.’126 As Etannibi 
Alemika argues, the criminal justice system ‘is a sub-sector of the wider legal order 
in society.’127 Viewed in this sense, the legal system functions to prevent and resolve 
disputes amongst citizens, between citizens and the state, and among groups in 
society – i.e. socio-cultural, political, economical and governmental agencies. Within 
the criminal justice system there are several branches, significant to this study is the 
juvenile justice system.  
 
Therefore, this Chapter examines the fundamentals of criminal justice as it impacts 
on human rights and juvenile justice. Viewed in this sense, the Chapter examines the 
relationship between criminal justice and juvenile justice as the concept and practice 
of juvenile justice derived from developments in the criminal justice system in the 
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 Aduba, N.J. and E.I. Alemika, “Bail and Criminal Justice in Nigeria.” In Chikwanha, A.B. (ed.), 
The Theory and Practice of Criminal Justice in Africa. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2009, 
pp.85-109. P. 88. See also Alemika, E.E.O. and E.A. Alemika, “Penal Policy: Prison Conditions and 
Prisoners’ Rights in Nigeria.” In Bem Angwe, B. and C.J. Dakas (ed.), Readings in Human Rights. 
Lagos: Graphic, 2005. 
126
 Alemika, E.E.O., op. cit, p. 11. According to Alemika, the term “desert” is a central focus of the 
criminal justice system, which ‘refers to what the criminal, victim and society deserve as a 
consequence of crime.’ Ibid. 
127
 Ibid, p. 24. 
40 
 
  
 
 
19
th
 century after the first juvenile court was established in Chicago in 1899.
128
 The 
Chapter also discusses the place of human rights and juvenile justice in the 
administration of the criminal justice system, in the context that the former are 
premised on the need to balance between the interest of the state in prosecuting 
criminal offenders and the offenders’ basic human rights and needs. In this context, 
the Chapter examines the essence of the “due process rights” – i.e. the right to a fair 
trial and a public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal 
established by, and acting in accordance with the, law – in the administration of the 
criminal justice system. 
  
2.2 The Concept of (Criminal) Law 
Any meaningful study on crime, criminal law, criminal justice (within which juvenile 
justice is premised) and criminology needs to be grounded on the understanding of 
the nature and purpose of law; because law ‘touches virtually every human 
interaction.’129 In many societies in the world to date, law is used ‘to protect 
ownership, to define the parameters of private and public property, to regulate 
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business, to raise revenue, and to provide compensation when agreements are 
broken. Laws define the nature of institutions such as the family. Laws regulate 
marriage and divorce or dissolution, adoption, the handling of dependent and 
neglected children, and inheritance of property.’130  
 
In actual sense, the concept of law has preoccupied philosophers and social thinkers 
for centuries,
131
 who have, now and then, came up with different, contending 
definitions of what is law.
132
 This is because, ‘like other social and historical 
phenomena, law, too, is a complex
133
 social phenomenon.’134 As such, ‘[t]here 
cannot be a one single answer or definition of “law.” [But this] does not mean that 
we cannot understand the nature of law.’135 
 
A better understanding of law is always sought by looking at the nature and function 
of law in a given social set up.
136
 In the political sphere, for instance, laws are created 
to protect legal and political systems, as it organises and regulates power 
relationships in a given society. In essence, laws establish who is superordinate and 
who is subordinate. Laws ‘maintain the status quo while permitting flexibility when 
times change. Laws, particularly criminal laws, are designed to preserve order as 
well as to protect private and public interests. Society determines that some interests 
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are so important that a formal system of control is necessary to preserve them; 
therefore, laws must be enacted to give the state enforcement power.’137 
 
In the light of the foregoing conceptualisation, law can be viewed as ‘a formal 
system of social control that may be exercised when other forms of control are not 
effective.’138  
 
For some people, law is described as any social norm or any organised or ritualised 
method of settling disputes; though many scholars insist that this view may be ‘a bit 
more complex, that some system of sanction is required for a genuine legal 
system.’139 In traditional Africa, for instance, ‘there has typically existed a process of 
dispute settlement conducted by elders or accepted influential “big men” who 
manage the process of arbitration and negotiation with an emphasis on 
conciliation.’140 In this context, the traditional African concept of law is based on the 
philosophy of “Ubuntu”, whose ‘features include solidarity, unity, care for one 
another, compromise, and tolerance.’141 Unlike the English and continental European 
concept of law that insists on retribution or punishment, the traditional African 
concept of law focuses on reconciliation and restoration of communal relationship 
and social cohesion.
142
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In view of John Austin, a 19
th
 century English jurist, law is a set of definite rules of 
human conduct with appropriate sanctions for their enforcement. To him, both the 
rules and sanctions must be prescribed by duly constituted human authority.
143
 
According to Roscoe Pound, an American legal scholar, law is really a social 
engineering which attempts to command the way people in a given society should 
behave.
144
  
 
For the purpose of this study, it is probably trite to consider law as a set of rules and 
regulations that guide human conducts; and a set of formal, governmental sanctions 
that are applied when those rules or regulations are violated. This description of law 
justifies the contention that: 
 
The principal objective of a legal system is the establishment of rules which in the 
broadest sense are designed to regulate relationships. Human societies are highly 
complex social structures. Without systems of rules or codes of conduct to control 
them, such societies would find it difficult to maintain their cohesion, and would 
gradually break up.
145
 
 
Very often, human interactions degenerate into differences or conflicts between 
individuals or institutions. This would, thus, need binding rules to help the 
conflicting parties to reconcile their conflicts or differences through use of 
established legal principles and rules that have been developed to define individual 
rights, duties and obligations. So criminal law, being a fundamental branch of law, 
falls within this ambit. 
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2.2.1 The Sources and Nature of Criminal Law 
The modern-day sources and nature of law have passed a long period of contending 
views amongst philosophers and jurists. In the past, philosophers and other scholars 
had ‘argued over the sources of law, some contending that laws derived from rulers, 
referred to as positive law, are not the only laws.’146 For instance, some scholars have 
argued that natural law, also referred to as higher law, is an important source of law 
that comes from higher rulers and thus ‘understood to be binding on people even in 
the absence of, or in conflict with, laws of the sovereigns.’147 In the main, natural law 
focuses perhaps on the earliest understanding of law and crime in human society. So, 
natural law ‘refers to a body of principles and rules, imposed upon individuals by 
some power higher than man-made law, that are considered to be uniquely fitting for 
and binding on any community of rational beings.’148 
 
Hugo Grotius, a Dutch early natural law theorist, jurist and statesman
149
 – in his 
major work De Jure Belli ac Pacis published in 1625
150
 – stated that natural law 
derives from the law of nature. To him, the law of nature is ‘a dictate of right reason 
which points out that an act, according as it is or in conformity with rational nature, 
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has in it a quality baseness or moral necessity and that, in consequence, such an act is 
either forbidden or enjoined by the author of nature, God.’151 
 
From this explanation, an inference may be made to the effect that: ‘Since natural 
law has generally referred to that which determines what is right and wrong and 
whose power is made valid by nature, it follows that its precepts should be eternal, 
universal and unchangeable.’152 Viewed in this regard, an examination of natural 
law
153
 from the time of the ancient Greeks to the present legal theory suggests that 
there is no single and unchanging view of the concept.
154
 To Roman jurists, for 
example, jus naturale, or natural law, meant a body of ideal principles that people 
could understand rationally and that included the perfect standards of right conduct 
and justice. Throughout the Middle Ages the law of nature was identified with the 
Bible, with the laws and traditions of the Catholic Church, and with the teachings of 
the church fathers.
155
 
 
Historically, the concept of natural law was seen in first known written legal 
document called the Code of Hammurabi,
156
 which was an embodiment of the then 
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existing rules and customs of Babylonia, dated approximately 1900 B.C.
157
 It 
incorporated the religious habits of the Babylonian people and emphasised the 
importance of religious beliefs.
158
 In the main, it reflected the economic problems of 
Babylonian society, ‘giving specific regulations about how commodities were to be 
priced and marketed. The ‘eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth’ philosophy was 
ingrained in the code. If a physician performed a careless operation, his hand was 
removed; if he was responsible for the death of a woman by causing a miscarriage, 
the life of one of his daughters was taken.’159 
 
So, the code ‘presented the idea that justice was man’s inherent right, derived from 
supernatural forces rather than by royally bestowed favour.’160  
 
As such, in order to better understand the nature and sources of criminal law one has 
to take into account the basic elements that constitute the body of rules and 
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regulations called law. These elements revolved around the principle of normativity 
of law. This is because: 
Law is a system of social rules of special kind of norms. There [are rules] which are 
prohibitive. They tell what to do. And there [are] rules which are directive. They 
direct what to do… Law is binding on the person directed to. This is what is called 
normativity of the law, which means that the members of society are bound to act in 
accordance with the law. The normativity of law entails sanctions which are 
established in case of a rule, which is a law, is not adhered to. Thus behind the rules 
of social behaviour which are called law there is punishment for those who do not 
follow them.
161
 
 
So, the normativity of law requires that every person in a given society obeys a 
collection of common standards called norms, failure of which attracts certain form 
of sanction.
162
 
 
2.2.2 Criminal Law as a Method of Social Control of Deviant Human 
Behaviour 
In principle, law emerged as an advanced stage of the methods of social control of 
human behaviour. Before modern law emerged, social control was achieved in less 
formal ways, as customs and taboos regulated human behaviours.
163
 During the 
rudimentary stages of mankind evolution, people took care of their own needs and 
lived at a subsistence level. In fact, they grew or captured their own food and made 
their clothing and housing; ‘they had no need for exchanging goods and services. 
Submission to custom controlled most of their behaviour; and laws were not 
necessary. Those who deviated from the norms of the group were spotted easily; the 
community could react with nonlegal sanctions.’164 
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During this period of humankind evolution, these informal sanctions of human 
behaviour were seen as more effective and included a disapproving glance, a frown, 
a nod, an embarrassing silence, a social invitation, or social isolation. These informal 
sanctions were successful because: 
The threat of being banished from society (or a smaller group) can be a serious 
deterrent to deviant behaviour. These informal methods of social control are most 
successful when the group is closely knit, making it relatively easy to know the 
norms and the general will of the group and to identify transgressors.
165
 
 
That way, it was easy for the early humankind society to maintain social order and 
control human behaviours through customs and usages. But as society grew bigger 
and bigger, human behaviours became diverse; and, according to Emile Durkheim 
(1858-1917),
166
 a French sociologist, it is impossible for all people to be alike and to 
hold the same moral consciousness.
167
 
 
2.2.2.1 The Evolution of Formal Social Control of Deviant Human Behaviour 
Scholars and sociologists, particularly Emile Durkheim,
168
 maintain that, as societies 
grew bigger and became more complex, ‘they developed a division of labour; as that 
occurred, they moved from mechanical (the less complex type of society in which 
members are highly integrated through their cultural and functional similarities) to 
organic solidarity (the more complex type of society in which members are 
integrated because they are functionally interdependent).’169 According to Durkheim, 
in organic societies such as the contemporary ones, some individuals tend to differ 
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from the collective type – in certain cases; some of these divergences may include 
criminal behaviour.
170
 To him, such criminal behaviour is not because it is 
intrinsically criminal but because the collectivity defines it criminal.
171
 Indeed, 
Durkheim saw crime as the products of norms. According to him, the concept of 
wrong is necessary to give meaning to right and is inherent in that concept. For a 
society to be flexible enough to allow positive divergence, it must permit negative 
digression as well. In Durkheim’s view, even a community of saints will create 
sinners. If no deviation is permitted, societies become stagnant. He stated that crime 
‘implies not only that the way remains open to necessary change, but that in certain 
cases it directly proposes these changes... crime [can thus be] a useful prelude to 
reforms.’  
 
In this sense he saw crime as being able to release certain social tensions and so have 
a cleansing or purging effect in society. He further stated that ‘the authority which 
the moral conscience enjoys must not be excessive; otherwise, no-one would dare to 
criticize it, and it would too easily congeal into an immutable form. To make 
progress, individual originality must be able to express itself ... [even] the originality 
of the criminal... shall also be possible.’172 So, to him, crime helps to prepare society 
for such changes; it is one of the prices society pays for freedom.
173
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Expanding the concept of anomie – a Greek word meaning ‘without norms’ – which 
was later expounded by the famous American sociologist, Robert K. Merton (4
th
 July 
1910 – 23rd February 2003),174 Durkheim believed that ‘one of society’s most 
important elements is its social cohesion, or social solidarity, which represents a 
collective conscience.’175 To Durkheim, ‘the absence of a sense of community is 
viewed by some as a major problem in modern society. In explaining this, Durkheim 
defined tow types of solidarity, mechanical and organic.’176 
 
To Durkheim, mechanical solidarity is characteristic in primitive societies, whereby 
it is dominated by the collective conscience. The type of law manifests this 
dominance; where the reason for the existence of law is to ‘discourage individuals 
from acting in a way that threatens the collective conscience.’177 However, when 
societies become larger and more complex, ‘the emphasis in law shifts from the 
collective conscience to the individual wronged, and law becomes restitutive. This 
shift from mechanical to organic solidarity is characterised by an increased need for 
a division of labour, a division that may be forced and therefore abnormal, leading to 
the creation of unnatural differences in class and status.’178 
  
Therefore, as sociologists have suggested, ‘the development of a formal system of 
social control was necessary for society to progress.’179 For instance, after studying 
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the modern capitalist system, Max Weber reasoned that a precondition of its growth 
was the development of formal legal rationality. According to him, as societies 
became more complex and economically advanced, there was an increasing 
rationality.
180
 
 
2.2.2.2 Comparison Between Criminal Law and Other Social  
Controls of Deviant Human Behaviour 
As we have noted above, law emerged as an advanced stage of social control of 
human behaviours. Although law has certain similarities with other forms of social 
control of human behaviours, it significantly differs with these forms for law is more 
specific than these forms.  
 
(a) Criminal Law is Unequivocal 
Unlike the other forms of social control, law is enacted in clear and explicit terms. 
For instance, in criminal law, the law defines the nature of the offence and the 
punishment (or range of types of punishments) ‘to be imposed for conviction of that 
offence. Laws cannot define every possible situation that would constitute a 
violation, but… they may be declared unconstitutional if they are vague.181 Laws 
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must be clear enough to give adequate notice to potential transgressors that they are 
in danger of violating them.’182 So, criminal law should be certain enough to reduce 
its unnecessary violation by ordinary citizen. 
 
 
(b) Criminal Law Arises from a Rational Procedure 
Another significant difference between law and other forms of social control of 
human behaviours is that law arises from a more rational procedure. In its modern 
character, law is a result of formal enactment process by a legislative body or 
interpretation by a court that occurs upon adherence to certain laid down legislative 
or judicial principles. In this case, law becomes applicable to ‘all who transgress its 
provisions, unless there are justifications or defences for the otherwise illegal 
acts.’183 Indeed, law specifies sanctions, and only those sanctions may be applied. 
Viewed in this perspective, law ‘differs from other types of social control in that its 
sanctions are applied exclusively by organised political agencies. Physical force may 
be involved in enforcing the sanctions, although this is limited to reasonable action 
applied by an official party.’184 
 
(c) The Application of Criminal Law is ‘Regular’ 
Another remarkable difference between law and other forms of social control of 
human behaviours is that law is characterised by regularity, technically manifested in 
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the principle of stare decisis.  This ensures that the application law adheres to the 
decisions or rulings of courts in previous similar cases. Through the principle of 
stare decisis, courts are able to guarantee security and certainty of their interpretation 
of the law, in that decided cases establish precedent for future court decisions. 
However, courts may overrule prior decisions in the light of new facts, reasoning, or 
changing social conditions.
185
 
 
(d) Other Differences between Criminal Law and Other Forms of Social 
Control  
Other differences between law and other forms of social control include the fact that: 
in most legal systems, law, unlike the other social controls, provides for the right of 
appeal where a person is aggrieved with the decision of a lower tribunal. Another 
difference is that law does not reward conforming behaviours, for it is primarily 
concerned with negative sanctions on offenders.
186
 
 
2.3 The Concept of Crime and Criminal Law 
In its nature, this work is about crime committed by children and young persons. So, 
it is trite to describe the concept of crime itself before we move into the details of 
child offending. The concept of crime has already received different definitions 
between legal scholars and social scientists. While legal experts stick to the legal 
definition of crime, social scientists have argued that ‘if we are interested in knowing 
why people engage in behaviour that is detrimental to society, we should go beyond 
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the legal definition and include behaviour that is defined as criminal but for which no 
arrests have been made.’187 To sociologists, accused persons who have committed 
offences but have not been prosecuted because of legal technicalities should be 
included in the definition of crime. To them, the involvement of legal technicalities 
in describing crime is irrelevant to a study of criminal behaviour. 
 
In addition to the foregoing arguments, some social scientists contend that behaviour 
that are deviant or different from that of the generally held social norms but not 
studied should also be included in any study seeking to define what is crime.
188
 
 
However, this study adopts the legal approach to defining crime; because, under the 
common law, ‘only those persons who have actually been convicted of crimes are 
considered criminal, and thus it is important to focus on that approach for purposes 
of official data.’189 In this sense, ‘the term crime should be limited to its strict legal 
definition and the term criminal used only to refer to someone who has been 
convicted in an adult criminal court.’190 This is so contended because: ‘The terms 
crime and criminal have severe implications and repercussions. They should be used 
only after proper procedures have been followed to establish which acts are criminal, 
as in the case of defining crime, or in the case of criminal, after a guilty or the 
determination of guilty by a judge or jury.’191 However, this contention does not 
make irrelevant the other non-legal definitions of the terms crime and criminal.  
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So, according to the legal definition of crime, it is not in dispute that a crime is an act 
or that must be so defined or prescribed by law. Under the legal definition of crime, 
no one can be held to be a criminal unless all the basic elements specified by a 
criminal law are present and proved beyond reasonable doubt. Functionally, the 
precise legal definition of crime may be put thus: ‘Crime is an intentional act or 
omission in violation of criminal law (statutory and case law), committed without 
defence or justification and sanctioned by the state as (an offence).’192  
 
So, from this definition, a crime has two important basic elements: action and 
omission, as described herein below. 
 
2.3.1 An Act or Omission 
In the legal definition of crime, an action or omission forms a very central role in the 
completion of the offence. Under the common law, for a person who is accused of 
committing an offence to be held liable for that offence, it must be proved in court 
that he actually undertook some action leading to the commission of that offence. In 
this sense, the general rule of criminal law, under the common law, is that a person 
cannot be held liable for a criminal offence for thinking about committing that crime. 
Under this general rule, certain elements of the offence must be put into action 
toward the commission of that crime. So, “to consider to murdering a spouse but to 
do nothing toward the commission of that act is not a crime; hiring someone to 
murder a spouse is a crime.”193 
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However, a very significant exception to this general rule is that where a person has a 
legal duty to act in certain ways, but he or she intentionally fails to act in order to 
prevent the occurrence of an adverse act on an individual. For example, a prison 
superintendent or warden may be held liable for the death of an inmate who refuses 
to get his or her meals on ground of striking against the court’s denying him or her 
bail, if the prison statute imposes some legal duty on the warden to make sure that all 
the inmates under his or her custody are properly attended to.  
 
It should be noted that the exception to the general rule requiring an individual to 
commit an act leading to commission of an offence must be grounded in the 
existence of a legal, not a moral, duty to act. This means that even if there is in 
existence of a moral duty to act, an individual cannot be convicted of an offence 
where there is only a moral, not a legal, duty to act. For example, a person cannot be 
convicted of an omission to rescue a person locked in a trunk of a car in which he is a 
passenger, even if that person dies of dehydration. It will only suffice for the accused 
person to say that he or she did not know that there was a person in the car trunk. As 
Prof. Sue Reid argues, “A legal duty may exist, however, if we are the parent, 
spouse, or other close relative, or if we have assumed a duty through a contractual 
relationship such as operating a licensed day care centre.”194 In special cases, though, 
legal duties may be imposed on certain individuals in other relations apart from the 
ones described by Reid. 
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2.3.2 mens rea and actus reus 
The requirement that for a crime to be proved, an individual must have either 
criminally acted or omitted to act, presupposes yet another important element of 
criminal law that requires that such act or omission must be voluntary, and the actor 
must have control over his or her actions. This element is what is technically referred 
to as mens rea – meaning that, the mental element that establishes criminal 
culpability on the part of the accused person. Under the common law, mens rea is a 
very critical factor in determining whether or not an act or omission was a crime. The 
essence of the principle of mens rea ‘is that criminal liability should be imposed only 
on persons who are sufficiently aware of what they are doing, and of the 
consequences it might have, that they can fairly be said to have chosen the behaviour 
and its consequences.’195 
 
However, although the element of mens rea is important in the determination of a 
crime in the criminal law, it has historically not been clearly defined or developed 
thoroughly by many common law jurisdictions.
196
 Nonetheless, it is almost common 
in many jurisdictions to define the criminal intent through the approach that divides 
criminal culpability into four mental states: intentional, knowing, reckless, and 
criminal negligence.  
 
There are, nonetheless, several exceptions to the intent requirements. The first 
exception is that a person may be held criminally liable for murder when death 
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results from the commission of another offence. For example, a person who commits 
arson by setting fire to a house, causing death to its inhabitants, may be charged with 
both murder and arson.
197
 In some cases, an employer may be vicariously held liable 
for criminal acts of their employees committed in the course of their work, even if 
the employer does not know that his/its employees are committing the criminal acts. 
In principle, though, vicarious liability ‘generally depends on the relevant offence 
being construed as one of strict liability or with a reverse-onus defence.’198 In this 
regard, direct liability, which applies to traditional, mens rea offences, ‘renders the 
company liable only when a director or senior officer of the company has the 
appropriate knowledge to satisfy the mental element of the offence. In the case of 
manslaughter, gross negligence will satisfy the mental element.’199  
 
As is the case with mens rea, defining actus reus is not easy; because it is ‘not a 
tightly defined concept but rather a loose “common denominator” which denotes the 
requirement that every crime requires an external element.’200 In principle, the 
bedrock of the doctrine of actus reus is composed of acts, omissions and causes of 
criminal offences.
201
 In other words, it is that element of the ‘definition of an offence 
which consists in the behaviour which the defendant engages in, seen from an 
external point of view: abstracted from its meaning or significance for the defendant 
herself.’202  
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In some crimes, actus reus may consist simply in an action a piece of behaviour and 
in other cases, it may consist ‘wholly or partly in a particular result’s being caused, 
as in the case of murder and manslaughter – causing the death of a person – or 
causing death by dangerous driving.’203 In criminal law, these are known as “result 
crimes.”204 
 
2.3.3 Violation of the Elements of Criminal Law 
For an accused of a crime to be convicted, it is must be proved beyond reasonable 
doubt that the accused has violated all elements of a crime as established by criminal 
law.
205
 Indeed,  
Establishing proof of any element may be difficult, but one of the most difficult is 
causation. In recent years the causation element has been a hindrance to prosecuting 
many of the charges brought against individuals who have engaged in sexual and 
other acts while infected with acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), a 
deadly disease first discovered in 1979 and spreading rapidly throughout the world 
today.
206
 [Emphasis in the original text]. 
 
This is at least the case in the US, where cases of both criminal and civil nature have 
been successfully litigated in courts of law against the culprits on HIV/AIDS 
causation. In the US, and certain other Commonwealth jurisdictions, some states 
have enacted laws providing that sexual acts engaged in by a person who knows that 
he or she has AIDS or is HIV positive and who does not tell the partner of that 
condition is a crime. For instance, the Michigan statute provides as follows: 
(1) A person who knows that he or she has been diagnosed as having acquired 
immunodeficiency syndrome or acquired immunodeficiency syndrome 
related complex, or who knows that he or she is HIV infected, and who 
engages in sexual penetration with another person without having first 
informed the other person that he or she has acquired immunodeficiency 
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syndrome or acquired immunodeficiency syndrome related complex or is 
HIV infected, is guilty of a felony. 
(2) As used in this section, “sexual penetration” means sexual intercourse, 
cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any other intrusion, however slight, 
of any part of a person’s body or of any object into the genital or anal 
opening of another person’s body, but emission of semen is not required.207 
 
The Michigan statute was unsuccessfully challenged in 1998 in Jensen v Michigan
208
 
by a woman who had appealed against her convictions for knowing that she was HIV 
positive and engaging herself in sexual penetration without informing her partner of 
her HIV status. She was sentenced to concurrent terms of two years and eight months 
to four years of imprisonment on each of the three counts. On appeal, the Michigan 
Court of Appeals found that: ‘the HIV notice statute is neither unconstitutionally 
overbroad nor violative of defendant’s rights to privacy or against compelled 
speech.’209 
 
In actual fact, to successful prosecute cases of this nature; the prosecution must prove 
criminal intent on the part of the accused. For instance, in Jensen the court found 
criminal intent to be inherent in the socially and morally irresponsible actions of the 
defendant.  
 
2.4 The Purpose of Criminal Law 
From time immemorial criminal law has not been able to regulate all human 
behaviours in toto. However, the scope of criminal law has always been to offer 
some standards, goals, and guidelines to regulate human behaviours. This underlies 
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the choice of ‘a statement of what conduct is so important that it must be sanctioned 
by the state.’210 In this sense, 
The serious impact of criminal law should lead us to question what kinds of 
behaviour ought to be covered by its reach. For example, some people question the 
use of the criminal law to enforce wearing helmets while riding bicycles or 
motorcycles or wearing seat belts and shoulder straps in automobiles. … (However) 
in Atwater v City of Lago Vista,
211
 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favour of the 
police who arrested Gail Atwater, who was not wearing her seat belt in violation of 
a Texas statute that provided a maximum fine of $50 for the offence, a 
misdemeanour.
212
 In writing for the Supreme Court, Justice David Souter stated that 
although Atwater had suffered “gratuitous humiliations” and “pointless indignity” 
when she was arrested (with her children in the car), taken in handcuffs to the police 
station, and held in jail until she posted $310 for bail, the police had the legal 
authority to make the arrest.
213
 
 
So, this case (and many others that may be asked) raises the issue of how extensive 
the law should be. Basic questions that can be raised here are: ‘Would civil sanctions 
suffice? How should the law respond to activities such as same-gender sexual acts, 
prostitution, the use of alcohol or other drugs, and attempted suicide? In short, we are 
faced with the critical question of whether the criminal law should be used to 
regulate activities that may be considered religious, but not legal issues.’214 
 
In a nutshell, though, the purpose of criminal law, as rationalised in the consensus-
conflict perspective of criminology and sociology of law, is to prohibit or limit 
certain conducts that are deemed unacceptable by society ‘so that peace, safety and 
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security can be guaranteed.’215 Seen in this context, the goal of criminal justice is to 
ensure that violators of criminal law are punished, ‘so that the prevailing values and 
norms of society are protected, and harmony among individuals and groups is 
guaranteed and sustained. The provisions of criminal law, undoubtedly, embody 
religious, political, economic and socio-cultural values shared by a very significant 
proportion of the population in society.’216 
 
In this case, criminal law is necessary in ensuring human beings live peaceful and in 
harmonious coexistence. For instance, without a criminal law provision prohibiting 
murder in modern society ‘social interaction and coexistence will be precarious.’217 
 
However, this general goal of criminal law has been widely criticised by many 
scholars ‘as being indifferent to the diversity of groups in society and their divergent 
interests.’218 For most scholars, criminal law may be coercive, exploitative and 
repressive in certain societies for the purpose of furthering certain interests of the 
powers that be. This was, for instance, true during colonialism in Africa whereby 
colonial rulers enacted laws and established criminal justice agencies that coerced, 
repressed and helped to exploit Africans.
219
 Ironically, after independence most of 
Sub-Saharan African states retained these coercive, repressive and exploitative 
criminal justice systems as they were ‘found to be useful by the new ruling class, 
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[however] the subordinate classes could only accept the arrangement from a position 
of weakness. Because post-colonial states are based on a very shaky foundation, 
coercion is more widely practiced compared to more stable developed countries.’220 
 
As Richard Bowd contends, the new African elite retained and continued to apply the 
coercive colonial criminal laws because throughout the period of colonialism it was 
these elites who had been tasked with the management of the country under 
supervision of a semi-absent landlord. In maintaining the existing systems, such 
elites ‘found themselves in advantageous position from which they could, with 
relative ease, ensure their position and consolidate their power: not always for the 
benefit of the populations they were meant to be serving.’221 
 
This reality makes criminal law a subject of law which is not ‘a neutral instrument 
that treats and serves all citizens and groups equally.’222 Critically viewed in this 
context, ‘criminal law embodies only selected concerns and values among the 
universe of moral norms differentially valued by different groups.’223 Consequently, 
criminal codes disproportionally ‘embody the values and interests of the individual 
and groups that make criminal law, influence the enactment of law, or enforce and 
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administer the criminal codes. Therefore, criminal law does not equally represent the 
interests of the various groups in society.’224 
 
Conceptualised in a radical-conflict paradigm in criminology and sociology of law, 
‘the social value which receive protection of the criminal law are ultimately those 
which are treasured by dominant interest groups’ in society.225  In this context, 
criminal is predominantly used to ‘control the behaviours of the poor and powerless, 
especially those behaviours considered offensive by lawmakers and rulers.’226  
 
2.5 The Nexus between Criminal Justice and Juvenile Justice 
As we have seen in the preceding section, criminal law aims at controlling 
unacceptable behaviour with a view to ensuring and restoring order and harmony in 
society. In this sense, criminal law is a sub-sector of criminal justice. Within the 
criminal justice system there is yet another emerging subset: juvenile justice. As will 
be discussed in Chapter 4 of this work, the concept and practice of juvenile justice 
derived from developments in the criminal justice system in the 19
th
 century after the 
first juvenile court was established in Chicago in 1899.
227
 Historically speaking, prior 
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to the juvenile court’s invention, the system for controlling juvenile delinquents ‘was 
contained within the general criminal justice system which meted out to children or 
adolescents above a certain age the same criminal justice rules or procedures as 
adults with little or no differentiation or reduction of the applicable punishment 
measures.’228 
 
In England,
229
 the juvenile justice system was first embedded in the concept of youth 
justice that was for the first time introduced in England and Wales through the 1854 
Youth Offenders Act. Through this law, there emerged a practice by which ‘children 
and young people under 16 could be transferred on completion of a sentence in an 
adult jail.’230 With this law, there were established Industrial Schools for 7-14 year 
olds convicted of vagrancy.
231
 As was the case in the US, in the UK throughout the 
19
th
 century there were widespread public and media concerns about the perceived 
“crisis of control” of the justice system as a result of corruption, brutality and 
indiscipline to which children were exposed in adult jails. This led to a shift in 
approach from a criminal justice system that sought to punish children and young 
people convicted for crimes to treatment and the need for alternatives to custody.
232
  
 
In both the US and the UK, the responsibility for this new form of children and youth 
justice in the criminal justice system was placed ‘in the hands of a new legal and 
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administrative entity, the juvenile court.’233 Pitts points out that by 1910 separate 
juvenile courts with distinct and discrete institutional and administrative machinery 
for dealing with young offenders had been established in most Western European 
countries.
234
 As Platt argues, before the establishment of the juvenile the court in 
Western Europe and the US the criminal justice system had only young offenders, 
who were normally of the apparent higher ages above juveniles.
235
  
 
With this development, the criminal justice system had to start entertaining the 
superiority of the principle of the welfare of the offending children as opposed to 
justice: the shift from the “deeds” of the child to his or her “needs” in the criminal 
justice system. In England and Wales, the Children and Young Persons Act (1933) 
established the principle that children and young offenders ‘should be dealt with in 
ways that promoted their “welfare” and that any necessary “treatment” should be 
available to them.’236 According to Pitts, the Act ‘also formally abolished capital 
punishment for those under the age of 18, and consolidated the nineteenth century 
reformatories and Industrial Schools into a national system of Approved Schools for 
the treatment of young offenders aged 10-15.’237 
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From this analysis, there is an historical linkage between the emergence and 
development of juvenile justice from within the criminal justice system, making the 
former part and parcel of the latter. 
2.6 The Place of Human Rights and Juvenile Justice in the Administration of 
the Criminal Justice System 
The discussion in the previous sections in this Chapter is premised around the 
concept of criminal justice and its role in the control of social behaviour of members 
of society. The conceptual hypothesis ensuing from this discussion is summed thus: 
the criminal justice system is a tripartite arrangement involving the allocation of 
entitlements and deprivations that are due to or deserved by those who commit 
criminal offences, victims of those offences and the society at large. Contextualized 
in this nous, the operation of the criminal justice system is seen as an ‘amalgam of 
loosely coupled subsystems sequentially involved in law making, law enforcement 
and policing, prosecution, judgment and sentencing, administration of penal 
sanctions and correctional programmes.’238   
 
However, the operations of these subsystems are normally poorly coordinated; 
producing diverse results, some of which may be deemed, or are actually, unjust.
239
 
In order to minimize the injustices in the criminal justice system, due to this poor 
coordination of subsystems, international standards have been put in place to regulate 
the administration of the criminal justice system. These include the human rights 
norms that require the system to observe a number of basic rights and freedoms as 
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well as juvenile justice in the administration of the criminal justice system. 
Therefore, in this section we discuss the role of human rights and juvenile justice 
principles and standards in controlling injustices in the administration of the criminal 
justice system. 
 
The synergy between criminal justice and human rights was made clear over 150 
years when the doctrine of “due process” was given more weight in the English 
criminal justice system. This was made possible ‘by the expansion of criminal law’s 
scope and by liberal ideas about the rights of individuals vis-à-vis the state.’240 The 
doctrine of due process ‘emphasizes the need to protect procedural rights [in the 
criminal justice system] even if this prevents the legal system from operating with 
maximum efficiency.’241 This move, which propounds the philosophical school of 
thought on criminal punishment based on “deontological” or “rights-based” theories, 
was a significant departure from the “consequentialist” theories of criminal 
punishment. While the latter emphasises that criminal justice’s punishment should 
bring about “good consequence” – i.e. criminal punishment should result in reduction 
in crime – the former insists that ‘an offender should be punished only after he has 
been found guilty in a fair procedure respecting rights of due process, and only in 
proportion to his “just deserts.”’242 
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Ever since, international norms have evolved to guarantee individual criminal 
suspects’ rights in the administration of criminal justice against injustices. These 
basic rights include the right to be presumed innocent until otherwise proved by a 
court of competent jurisdiction and in accordance with the law. For instance, Article 
11(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948 provides that 
every person ‘charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent 
until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the 
guarantee necessary for his defence.’  
 
This principle has been reiterated in many subsequent human rights instruments 
adopted by the UN as well as regional bodies such as the AU and the EU. In this 
context, Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) of 1966 provides a very expansive enumeration of the rights of persons 
accused of committing criminal offences.  For instance, it enumerates that every 
person has the right to liberty and security of person. In this context, no one shall be 
subject to arbitrary arrest or detention; no one shall be deprived of his liberty except 
on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law. 
The article also provides that anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of 
his arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges 
against him; whereby he should be promptly brought before a judge or magistrate or 
other legally authorised officer to be tried within a reasonable time. The article 
further stresses that the detention of those arrested or awaiting trial should be an 
exception, not the general rule. 
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In Article 10, the ICCPR obliges States Parties thereto to ensure that all persons 
deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the 
inherent dignity of human persons. The article stresses that accused persons shall, 
save in exceptional circumstances, be segregated from convicted persons; and shall 
be subjected to separate treatment appropriate to their status as unconvicted persons. 
In addition, the article emphasises that accused juveniles shall be separated from 
adults and brought, as speedily as possible, for adjudication. 
 
Besides, Article 7 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR)243 
provides that: ‘every individual shall have the right to be presumed innocent until 
proven guilty by competent court or tribunal.’ As Alemika observes, 
The importance of the idea of “presumption of innocence” is that the deprivation of 
the human rights of and imposition of punishment on an innocent person constitutes 
criminal injustice. One of the main implications of the presumption is that suspects 
should be treated as if they were innocent, and accorded their rights until their guilt 
has been determined or established through due process by a competent and 
impartial court or tribunal.
244
 
 
There is also another right that international norms have developed in the 
administration of criminal justice. This is the right to a fair trial. Under Article 14 of 
the ICCPR, for instance, it is provided that every person accused of offending 
criminal law shall have the right to a fair trial and a public hearing by a competent, 
independent and impartial tribunal established by, and acting in accordance with the, 
law. 
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Another right in this regard is the right not to be subjected to torture or any form of 
cruel or degrading treatment. In most developed jurisdictions, like the UK, national 
legislation have incorporated
245
 these rights and constantly and increasingly 
expanded on the jurisprudence of those countries. For instance, the UK enacted the 
Human Rights Act in 1998 ‘with the object of making the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) and its associated jurisprudence – primarily the decisions of 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
246
 – a source of rights and duties in 
English proceedings, including criminal proceedings.’247 In this regard, the English 
Human Rights Act has incorporated all “Convention rights” in the ECHR relating to 
the administration of criminal justice. These include: prohibition on torture and 
inhuman or degrading treatment;
248
 non-retroactivity of penal law;
249
 freedom from 
unlawful deprivation of liberty;
250
 and the right to respect for private life.
251
 The 
English Human Rights Act also sets the substantive right to a fair trial enumerated in 
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Article 6 of the ECHR is provided in extenso, giving it ‘extensive evidentiary 
applications that English criminal lawyers have only just begun to exploit.’252 
 
Apart from the foregoing rights to which accused or convicted persons are entitled in 
the criminal justice system, Article 14 of the ICCPR catalogues the following 
minimum guarantees to which such persons are entitled: first, to be promptly 
informed and in detail in a language which he understands, of the nature and cause of 
the charge against him. Second, to have adequate time and facilities for the 
preparation of his defence and to communicate with counsel of his choosing. Third, 
to be tried without undue delay. Fourth, to have a legal counsel as well as well as free 
assistance of an interpreter if he does not understand or speak the language used in 
court. 
 
Other rights inherent in the administration of the criminal justice system include the 
need to have child-friendly procedures in criminal cases involving children, taking 
into account their age and the desirability of promoting their rehabilitation into good 
citizens. The Article also emphasises the need for the right of appeal or review or 
revision of a sentence and conviction by a higher court in the criminal justice system. 
 
From the international norms, many constitutions, including those of Sub-Saharan 
African countries, have entrenched these rights. In the same vein, the Constitution of 
the United Republic of Tanzania has enumerated these basic rights in Article 12 
(rights of equality and dignity of the person); Article 13 (rights of equality before the 
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law, fair trial, appeal, presumption of innocence, and prohibition of discrimination 
and torture/degrading treatment); Article 14 (the right to life); and Article 16 (the 
right to privacy). 
 
As it can be gathered from the explanation above, the international norms for the 
administration of criminal justice strive to invoke human rights standards and 
fairness of criminal trials in the context of the rule of law or principle of legality and 
the presumption of innocence.
253
 Seen in this context, 
The ideals of the rule of law and of due process captured in Articles 5, 6 and 7 of the 
ECHR have a special significance fro criminal law: both the legitimacy of 
substantive criminal laws and fairness of the procedures through which they are 
enforced are seen especially important given criminal law’s distinctively coercive 
methods. The rule of law is generally conceived in terms of a cluster of procedural 
requirements: laws should be consistent, of general application, certain in their 
effects, clear, publicised and prospective rather than retrospective in application.
254
 
 
In addition, these requirements are ‘combined with the principle of equality before 
the law – the idea that all citizens, including rulers or lawmakers, should be subject 
to law – and with the principle of legality – the idea that laws should be created in 
accordance with the constitutional procedure.’255 In this sense, these ‘norms of 
human rights are aimed at ensuring that innocent persons are not convicted or 
punished. They are also intended to ensure that the human dignity of a convicted 
person is not violated through cruel and degrading treatment.’256 
 
                                                 
253
 Alemika, E.E.O. “Criminal Justice: Norms, Politics, Institutions, Processes and Constraints”, op. 
cit, p. 20. 
254
 Lacey, et al, op. cit, pp. 16-17. 
255
 Ibid, p. 17. 
256
 Alemika, op. cit.  
74 
 
  
 
 
Therefore, it is trite that any criminal justice system should incorporate human rights 
as well as juvenile justice principles and norms in order for it to comply with the 
doctrine of rule of law and human rights. This underscores the need to place human 
rights and juvenile justice high at the agenda of administration of the criminal justice 
system in a country, including Tanzania. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
This Chapter has examined and traced the genesis of the criminal law; the main 
attributes of criminal law; and the nexus between criminal law and justice. The 
Chapter also has explored the essence of criminal law in justice; the nexus between 
criminal justice and human rights and juvenile justice. The rationale for this Chapter 
was to lay down a synergy that exists between the concept of justice, human rights, 
criminal justice and juvenile justice, which form the basis upon which this study is 
founded.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
3.0 THE EVOLUTION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 
3.1 Introduction 
The adoption of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) in 1989 and 
the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC) in 1990 has 
revolutionised the conception of juvenile justice worldwide. The two instruments 
have resulted in a radical shift from the doctrine of parens patriae – “the state as 
parent” – and the paternalistic approach to rehabilitating children in conflict with the 
law to modern day conception of juvenile justice that combine welfarism and child 
justice resulting in reintegration of offending children back to society. From the 
early conception of juvenile justice in the US and Western Europe which insisted on 
the needs as opposed to deeds of the offending child, the CRC and the ACRWC have 
brought about the importance of the child’s rights in the administration of juvenile 
justice. 
 
Before the two instruments were adopted in the late 20
th
 century, there were other 
international instruments relating to children’s rights257 that contained provisions 
which ‘were protectionist and welfare orientated in character.’258 In the texts of these 
instruments the tone of the rights was that the child was ‘not in a position to exercise 
his own rights; adults exercised them in place of the child and in doing so were 
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subject to certain obligations. Thus it could be said that a child had special legal 
status resulting from his inability to exercise his rights.’259 This early perception of 
children’s rights was given judicial underpinning in a 1979 Irish case of the State (M) 
v The Attorney General
260
, where the Irish Supreme Court recalled that: 
… the courts have consistently construed the right of liberty of [a child], as being a 
right which can be exercised not by its own choice (which it is incapable of making) 
but by the choice of its parent, parents or legal guardian, subject always to the right 
of the courts in appropriate proceedings to deny that choice in the dominant interest 
of the welfare of the child. 
 
However, the rights of child subsequently and gradually evolved towards 
“empowering the child”; and, with the adoption of the CRC and the ACRWC, there 
has been a clear move ‘towards recognising that the child is an active holder of rights 
and not merely a passive object of the rights bestowed upon her or him’.261  
 
This Chapter, therefore, discusses the administration of modern juvenile justice in the 
historical context. The Chapter begins by tracing the   state of the rights of children 
in conflict with the law in the pre-juvenile justice era, where a briefly review of the 
history of children’s rights as well as a prelude to modern juvenile justice at common 
law are provided. In this regard, it is noted that children who committed crimes in 
early common law were not given any special treatment because they were 
considered as adults. At common law, for instance, the minimum age of criminal 
responsibility was set as young as seven years, and children guilty of crimes were 
imprisoned. It is also observed that the principle of the best interests of the child or 
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“the child’s welfare” was recognised by the common law courts in the early 
twentieth century.
262
 
 
The Chapter further traces the conception of the juvenile justice system in the late 
1800s, which strived to reform US policies regarding youth offenders. Prior to this 
period, misbehaving juveniles in the US, like in other parts of Western Europe, often 
faced arrest by the police, initial placement in the local jail with adults, and eventual 
institutionalisation in a house of refuge or workhouse.
263
  The Chapter argues that in 
the US, juvenile justice in its earliest form was conceived and developed out of the 
need for a separate court for child offenders, away from the ordinary courts that dealt 
with offending adults. So, the first juvenile court was established in Cook County 
under the 1899 Illinois Juvenile Court Act; and by 1945 every State in the US had a 
juvenile court. From the early 20
th
 century, the juvenile court was transplanted to 
Western Europe; and in England, it was given legal recognition through the 
enactment of juvenile justice-specific legislation.
264
   
 
The Chapter analyses the three models of juvenile justice from its inception – the 
welfarism, back to justice and corporatism – as they have impacted on the 
development of modern day juvenile justice. The Chapter finally discusses modern-
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day administration of juvenile justice in the context of the CRC and the ACRWC, 
particularly in African. 
 
3.2 The State of the Rights of Children in Conflict with the Law in the Pre-
Juvenile Justice Era 
This section discusses the state of the rights of children in conflict with the law 
before the concept of juvenile justice emerged. It argues that during this period, 
children in conflict with the law were treated in the same manner as adult offenders. 
 
3.2.1 A Briefly Overview of the History of Children’s Rights 
In order to understand the contemporary trends in the administration of juvenile 
justice worldwide it is important to briefly review the history of children’s rights. 
Modern conceptions of the rights of the child could be embedded in the reasoning of 
the early 20
th
 century Polish pedagogue, Janusz Korczak,
265
 who opined that: 
‘Children are not made human beings, they are born human beings.’266 Historically 
speaking, children’s rights were not recognised under the common law until around 
the seventeenth century.
267
 During this period and before, in most of the European 
countries, ‘the special nature of children was ignored and children were treated as 
miniature adults.’268 As British legal theory historians have indicated, the historical 
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origins of the British common law system actually reveal a ‘brutal indifference to a 
child’s fate.’269  
 
According to Rebecca Rios-Kohn: ‘It is well documented that until approximately 
the nineteenth century, children were treated like property or chattel but were valued 
by their families for their contributions through their work.’270 This approach to 
children’s rights and welfare was well articulated by Blackstone to the effect that the 
father might ‘indeed have the benefit of his children’s labour while they live[d] with 
him, and [were] maintained by him: but this [was] no more than [the father was] 
entitled to from his apprentices or servants.’271 It is worthy noting that, 
Although the principle of the best interests of the child has deep Anglo-Saxon roots, 
a review of the historical development of parenthood and childhood under early 
common law shows that the notion of children’s rights did not exist whatsoever. 
Children had a low status within society and within the family. The law, which 
usually reflects the values and traditions of a society, treated them accordingly.
272
 
 
Therefore, at common law children were treated as are treated in most developing 
countries today, where they are ‘forced to work as a result of their level of poverty. 
Child labour was not only acceptable, but it also was promoted at the highest level; 
for example, by Parliament, which stated that a working child was more useful to his 
family.’273 As it is the case in most developing countries today, it was justified by 
society’s perception ‘that for those children of the lower classes, education was not 
necessary as child labourers were deemed essential to the country’s economy. Thus, 
the vast majority of working children had very little schooling. In 1840, only 20 per 
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cent of children had gone to school and, finally, in 1870, the Education Act was 
passed in England, requiring all children between the ages of five and ten to attend 
school.’274 
 
3.2.2 Prelude to Modern Juvenile Justice  
Perceived in the foregoing context, children who committed crimes in early common 
law were not given any special treatment because they were considered as adults. At 
common law, for instance, the minimum age of criminal responsibility was set as 
young as seven years, ‘and children guilty of crimes were imprisoned.’275 Indeed, 
The harshness of the laws at that time is illustrated by the Stubborn Child Statute 
enacted by the State of Massachusetts in 1646, which provided that a stubborn or 
rebellious son above 15 years of age could be put to death pursuant to a complaint 
submitted by the child’s parents. According to historical records, children were 
hanged as 1708 and the notion of a juvenile court for the juvenile offenders only 
emerged in the late twentieth century.
276
 
 
This kind of treatment offered to children at early common law was akin to treating 
children as if they were invisible. It was this perception of children that made some 
states in England and the US to enact ‘laws protecting animals from cruelty before 
they would enact legislation to protect children from abuse.’277 This mistreatment of 
children in the early common law was exemplified in the famous case labelled as the 
“Mary Ellen Affair.” Thus, 
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In this 1874 case that occurred in New York City, a child’s parents were prosecuted 
for keeping their daughter chained to a bed and fed only bread and water. Because 
of the absence of legal protection for children at the time, the prosecutors were 
forced to draw an analogy with a law for the prevention of cruelty against 
animals.
278
 
 
This kind of treatment of children in both the UK and US prompted wide criticism 
amongst children’s rights reformers, leading amongst whom were Jane Adams and 
her fellow progressive reformers who, together with the Chicago Bar Association, 
convinced the Illinois legislature to establish a separate court on Cook County. The 
juvenile court, created under the 1899 Illinois Juvenile Court Act, was among other 
things intended to deal with troubled children ‘in a more benign setting than the 
criminal courts.’279 In the beginning, the ‘mission of the juvenile court was to help 
young law violators get back on the right track, not simply to punish their illegal 
behaviour.’280 
 
Therefore, the principle of the best interests of the child or “the child’s welfare” was 
recognised by the common law courts in the early twentieth century. However, the 
same courts did not recognise the existence of a legal relationship between parent 
and child where the child was born out of wedlock. As Rebecca Rios-Kohn contends, 
At common law, a child born to a woman outside of marriage was regarded as a 
filius nullius, or bastard, and had few rights. As Blackstone noted, “he can inherit 
nothing, being looked upon as a child of nobody.” The mother had no parental rights 
but had a duty to support the child. At the same time the father of a child born 
outside of marriage could not acquire parental rights nor had any legal duties in 
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relation to the child’s upbringing and well-being. Under the English common law, 
all children born before matrimony were deemed bastards by the law.
281
 
 
The above quoted Blackstone’s reasoning aimed at justifying ‘the common law’s 
refusal to grant children born outside of marriage legitimate status even if subsequent 
to their birth the parents became legally married. This view reflects the way the laws 
were drafted at the time, to protect certain societal interests but not necessarily those 
of the child’s.’282 
 
3.3 The History and Emergency of a Juvenile Court  
In order to understand the contemporary trends in the administration of juvenile 
justice system worldwide it is crucial to take into account how the system has 
progressed since its inception at the global level.
283
 The juvenile justice system was 
created in the late 1800s to reform US policies regarding youth offenders. Prior to the 
20
th
 century, ‘misbehaving juveniles often faced arrest by the police, initial 
placement in the local jail with adults, and eventual institutionalisation in a house of 
refuge
284
 or workhouse.’285 Historically, 
 
While recognising that children were different from adults in many ways, the 
[criminal justice] system failed to provide safeguards for [children] that are taken 
for granted today. During the last two decades of the 19
th
 century and the early years 
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of the 20
th
 century, the child-saving movement defined juvenile delinquency as a 
social problem. With that movement came reforms in police departments, courts, 
and correctional institutions, as well as the creation of a complex juvenile justice 
system.
286
 
 
In the US, juvenile justice in its earliest form was conceived and developed out of the 
need for a separate court for child offenders, away from the ordinary courts that dealt 
with offending adults. With the creation of a separate juvenile court system, the 
contemporary ideals and principles of juvenile justice were hatched, nurtured and 
developed beyond the borders of the US. 
 
3.3.1 The Need for, and Purpose of, a Separate Juvenile Court in the US 
Indeed, this reform of the criminal justice system was founded on a reform concept 
which asserted that, ‘children are different from adults, and the juvenile justice 
system should reflect these differences.’287 Recognising that young people may be 
less culpable than adults and more amenable to change, ‘reformers acknowledged 
society’s responsibility to protect children and created a system whose central tenets 
were not punishment and retribution, but protection, treatment, and rehabilitation.’288 
 
It was upon this foundation that the first juvenile court was established in Cook 
County under the 1899 Illinois Juvenile Court Act.
289
 Therefore, the original juvenile 
court was ‘based on the notion that children were different from adults; that 
rehabilitation was possible and more important than punishment; that most children 
were redeemable; and that judges, making individualised decisions about children, 
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could best determine whether the juvenile or adult court was the appropriate forum to 
prosecute a case.’290 So, within a short period after the first juvenile court was 
established in Cook County, Chicago, ‘specialised juvenile courts existed in every 
state in the United States and throughout Western Europe.’291 By 1945, there was a 
juvenile court in every state in the US.
292
 
 
3.3.2 Early Dominant Theories in Juvenile Justice: Parens Patriae and 
‘Welfarism’  
When the early reforms in the processing and treatment of juvenile offenders took 
place in Chicago and later in all states in the US in the latter part of the 19
th
 century, 
there was an ‘increasing awareness that the roots of crime and delinquency were not 
necessary to be found within individual offenders but, rather, were products of the 
culture and environment in which they lived.’293 Coupled with the hitherto concern 
over the abuse and neglect of children both in and out of criminal justice’s penal 
institutions in the US, the new juvenile justice values emerged ‘based on the already 
established concept of parens patriae.’294 
 
The concept of parens patriae – meaning, “the state as parent” – was first developed 
at common law in England, where the Court of Chancery had the power to intervene 
in property matters to protect the rights of children. With the emergency of the new 
juvenile justice philosophy in the US, this jurisdictional focus was expanded to 
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include the managing of “dependent and neglected” children. In this regard, the US 
court intervention ‘was justified by the theory that such child’s natural protectors – 
the parents – were unable or unwilling to provide an appropriate level of care.’295 In 
order to atone this situation, the court had to take the place of parents – i.e. parens 
patriae – by providing specific protection to dependent and neglected children, most 
of whom were juvenile delinquents. This took the form of merging the concept of 
parens patriae with the medical model of treatment ‘to establish a system of juvenile 
justice designed to reform and rehabilitate young offenders.’296 In this context, 
The underlying philosophy was that if a child “went astray,” it was the parents who 
had failed. The court could take over the role of the parent, diagnose the problem, 
and prescribe the appropriate treatment. It did not matter what the child had done. 
His or her deviant behaviour was merely a symptom of the problem. The duty of the 
court was not to blame the child or determine guilt, but to identify and treat the 
underlying problem.
297
 
 
Furthermore, the court had to consider the young offender’s welfare as its central 
concern. This would serve two purposes: one, it would protect the future of the child; 
and, two, it would permit an informal court process ‘that considered the entire history 
and background of the child’s difficulties, without being hampered by the limitations 
and requirements of official criminal procedure.’298 In the end, this would make the 
juvenile processing a civil rather than a criminal matter.  
 
When the first propagandists for the reform of the criminal justice towards juvenile 
justice emerged in the US – popularly known as “child savers”299 – and later in 
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Western Europe, the early and dominant model was the welfare theory.
300
 This 
theory provided the rationale for the approach to children deemed to be delinquent.
301
 
The advocates for the welfare theory asserted that ‘because the “welfare” of young 
offenders should be a paramount consideration, [child] offenders should, wherever 
possible, be dealt with by experts in the care and protection of children and young 
people.’302 This assertion was contrary to the argument advanced by conservative 
politicians, senior police officers, magistrates and judges in the US and Western 
Europe, ‘who wished to retain a strong element of retribution in the youth justice 
system.’303 
 
As was the case with the concept of parens patriae, under the welfare theory ‘courts 
assumed an important role in protecting a child.’304 Seen in this context, 
Welfarism advocated for a separate justice system for juveniles. At the heart of such 
a system was a social construction of childhood under which children were 
perceived as immature, both mentally and socially. Indeed, the prevailing 
philosophy underlying the original idea of a juvenile court was that rather than use 
criminal punishment to address children’s violations of the law, children were to be 
nurtured and given guidance with a view to making them responsible adults. Thus, 
welfarism was informed by a desire to be benign as manifested in the general role of 
the state as parens patriae.
305
 By this, the juvenile court judge was an instrument of 
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the state for the application of intervention measures in situations that embodied 
prevailing social inadequacies.
306
  
 
To achieve this role, the juvenile court was given powers to extend “protection” 
measures to minors in ‘irregular situations’ who included law violators, abandoned 
or neglected children, those in situations that put their well-being at risk and child 
orphans. In sum,  
… the categories comprised both children in need of care and protection and 
delinquent children. For these children in ‘irregular situations’, their cases were to 
be attended to by an administrative judge who reached the verdict on the proper 
protection to be extended for the children’s welfare (or ‘best interests’). The verdict 
would usually entail probation or supervision, authorizing institutionalization in an 
orphanage or foster home, or sentencing the child to one of the penal institutions 
that existed then.
307
 The ‘best interests’ of the child was thus viewed in light of the 
paternalistic role of the state in the choice of the best protection measure.
308
 
 
In sum, the juvenile court, through the doctrine of parens patriae, ‘placed emphasis 
on treatment, supervision and control rather than on punishment and allowed the 
state to intervene affirmatively in the lives of more young offenders.’309  
 
Through the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries, the doctrine of parens patriae and the welfare 
theories gained steady ground in the US, Canada and Western Europe. As Pitts notes, 
the welfare theory in juvenile justice in the UK was given greater impetus in the 
1960s ‘by research that showed that the children who passed through the juvenile 
courts were overwhelmingly poor, badly educated and, in many cases, victims of 
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violence or abuse.’310 When the Labour government was elected in the UK in 1964, 
it became sympathetic to these children, which indicated that the “welfarist” 
argument would prevail. This sympathetic approach was exacerbated by the 
proposals made by the 1964 White Paper in the UK, entitled: The Child, the Family 
and the Young Offender. This White Paper, inter alia, ‘proposed the replacement of 
the juvenile court with a family council, composed of health and welfare 
professionals, which would address the social and psychological problems 
underlying youth crime.’311 In fact, the White Paper originated from a report for the 
Fabian Society by the late Lord Longford in 1963, in which he observed that: 
No understanding parent can contemplate without repugnance the branding of a 
child in early adolescence as a criminal, whatever offence he may have committed. 
If it is a trivial case, such a procedure is indefensible, if a more serious charge is 
involved this is, in itself, evidence of the child’s need for skilled help and guidance. 
The parent who can get such help for his child on his own initiative can most 
invariably keep the child from court. It is only the children of those not so fortunate 
who appear in the criminal statistics.
312
 
 
Notably, the White Paper proposed a radical shift of power ‘from the police, 
magistrates, lawyers and judges to psychologists, psychiatrists and social 
workers.’313 However, this proposal was vehemently and successfully opposed by the 
Conservative Opposition, leading to a significantly modified reform package that 
was presented to Parliament in the Children and Young Persons Act (1969). With 
this law, the juvenile court was retained with restricted powers of the magistrate to 
impose Borstal sentences. The law also passed responsibility for the supervision of 
young offenders in the community (from probation officers as was the case under the 
Probation of Offenders Act); and decisions about placements of young offenders in 
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Approved Schools, which were re-designated Community Homes with Education 
(CHEs) to local-authority social workers. The 1969 law also introduced a new 
measure: Intermediate Treatment (IT), ‘which could be utilised formally as a 
requirement in a Supervision Order, but which also permitted local authorities to 
establish community-based schemes to “prevent” youth crime among children and 
young people deemed  to be “at risk” of offending.’314 Upon proving its worth, the 
UK government envisaged, the IT would replace the Detention Centre and the 
Attendance Centre. In retrospect, ‘it is evident that the 1969 Act marked the 
highpoint of the 36-year struggle to construct a child-centred youth justice system, in 
which a concern for the “welfare” of the child, their needs rather than their deeds, 
was paramount.’315 
 
3.3.3 The Need for Constitutional Oversight of the New Juvenile Court in the 
US 
Although the doctrines of parens patriae and welfarism were meant to treat the 
offending child basing on their needs, rather than their deeds – with a view to 
rehabilitating them – the administration of juvenile justice in the US in the early days 
was later to be seen as violative of certain children’s rights. Two problems emerged 
in this context: first, in the early juvenile justice system in the US, children ‘were not 
allowed the so called due process safeguards of the law.’316 Indeed, this was in the 
absence of legal representation and other procedural safeguards like rules of 
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evidence. Secondly, there was and ‘extensive reliance on the use of 
institutionalization, often, for indeterminate periods of time.’317 
 
This was a result of the fact that in the US the juvenile court system ‘functioned for 
nearly 70 years with little constitutional oversight, and without the required presence 
of lawyers.’318 Interestingly, 
As the 1960s progressed, however, both the courts and society [in the US] had to 
deal with growing questions about the continued validity and vitality if the juvenile 
court’s informality and treatment focus in the absence of full regard for due process. 
On the one hand, critics from the right complained that the “kiddie court” was not 
fully capable of dealing with the “new” and “more dangerous” delinquent youths of 
that era, while their counterparts from the left urged with equal heat that the court 
was ignoring the juveniles’ rights.319  
 
One of the overarching issues that critics from the left advanced was the lack of the 
right to counsel, which was dealt with for the first time in Gideon v Wainwright.
320
 
The issue of the right to counsel was further expounded in Kent v United States.
321
 In 
this case, Morris Kent was denied his due process and statutory rights when the trial 
judge failed to hold a hearing prior to transferring the 16-year old to the adult court 
for trial and did not   give Kent’s lawyer access to social information relied on by the 
court. Subsequently, the Court decided, among other things, that ‘there must be a 
meaningful right to representation by counsel in that the child’s attorney must be 
given access to the documents considered by the juvenile court in making its 
decision, and that the court must accompany its waiver order with a statement of the 
reasons for transfer.’322 
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Although in Kent the US Supreme Court was dealing with procedural irregularity in 
transfer proceedings, Justice Fortas, in reference to the importance of the right to 
counsel, observed succinctly that: ‘the right to representation by counsel is not a 
formality. It is not a grudging gesture to a ritualistic requirement. It is of the essence 
of justice.’323 One year after the decision in Kent, the President’s Commission on 
Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, appointed by President Lyndon 
Johnson, issued its report ‘that expressed, among other things, serious reservations 
about many of the fundamental premises of the [US] juvenile justice system, 
including its lack of procedural safeguards.’324  
 
In principle, some of the issues identified above were addressed by the US Supreme 
Court in the landmark case of In Re Gault.
325
 In fact, Gerald Francis Gault was a 15-
year-old Arizona youth charged with making rude telephone call to a female 
neighbour. He was taken into custody without notice given to his parents, detained 
awaiting a hearing, convicted by a juvenile court in a rather summary hearing, and 
committed to a juvenile correctional facility for an indeterminate period not to extend 
his 21
st
 birthday. Justice Fortas, once again, wrote the opinion for the US Supreme 
Court and ‘he initially ruled – for the first time, surprisingly – that juveniles are 
persons within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment and, thus, are protected by 
its Due Process Clause.’326 According to Justice Fortas, Gault’s constitutional rights 
had been violated in several important respects – i.e. first, juveniles and their parents 
are entitled to constitutionally adequate notice of the precise nature of the charges 
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against the youth. Second, a youth charged with an act of delinquency must be 
advised of the right to the assistance of counsel and, if indigent, given the right to 
have counsel appointed. Third, the juvenile has the right to confront the witnesses 
against him or her in the hearing guilty or innocence and to cross-examine those 
witnesses. And, lastly, the privilege against self-incrimination applies to juvenile 
proceedings and the child must be informed of that right as well. 
Reinforcing the central importance of the right to counsel developed in Gideon and 
reinforced in Kent, Justice Fortas was of the opinion that: ‘it would be extraordinary 
if our Constitution did not require the procedural regularity and the exercise of care 
implied in the phrase “due process.” Under our Constitution, the condition of being a 
boy does not justify a kangaroo court.
327’ Most interesting on this issue was Gerald 
Gault’s observation made at an American Bar Association ceremony honouring 
Amelia Lewis with the Livingston Hall Award. Amelia was actually the lawyer who 
initiated Gault’s habeas corpus proceedings, challenging the Arizona practices. At 
this ceremony, Gault observed that, ‘without a lawyer, he had no idea what was 
happening to him in court until the judge said he was committed “until he was 
twenty-one” and he realised that was more years than he could count on the fingers 
of one hand.’328 Remarkably, ‘Gault marked the constitutional domestication of the 
previously parens patriae juvenile court, and a new era dawned based on a process 
model contrasted with the historic informality of juvenile court proceedings.’329 
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Later on, the US courts went further requiring the juvenile to be proved guilty 
beyond reasonable doubt during the adjudicatory stage of delinquency cases.
330
 At 
the same time, courts subsequently held that although the right to a jury was not 
required by the US Constitution in delinquency cases, a state could provide a jury if 
it so wished.
331
 In addition, subsequent courts held that the Double Jeopardy Clause 
prevented a juvenile to court from transferring a juvenile the adult court after 
previously finding him or her delinquent.
332
  
 
3.3.4 Criticisms against the Separate Juvenile Court in the US: Emergence of 
the Back to Justice Theory 
Despite the foregoing remarkable developments in the US juvenile justice system, 
there is now a blistering debate whereby some jurists in the US are pressing for 
radical reform of the juvenile justice, including re-incorporating juvenile court back 
onto the “ordinary” criminal courts. Some scholars333 have referred to this movement 
as a “back to justice theory.”334 One of the proponents of the abolition of a separate 
juvenile justice system in the US is Professor Barry Feld of the University of 
Minnesota. In his view and that of other abolitionists, the ‘court’s responsibility for 
young offenders should be ended.’ 335 To him, the juvenile court ‘no longer lives up 
to its part of the initial bargain. Prosecutors in juvenile courts openly promote 
dispositions that amount to proportional retribution. Judicial decisions are based 
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explicitly on the severity of each juvenile’s crime rather than the complexity of his or 
her problems.’336 
 
This assertion is actually a counter-attack against the dream of the early juvenile 
justice reformers, who a century ago, ‘dreamed a dream that the juvenile system 
could reform delinquent children and transform society. And they worked devotedly 
to transform that dream into reality.’337 This being the case, the contemporary 
movement aimed at abolishing the juvenile court in the US would make these 
reformers ‘recoil in horror at the prospect of the increasing numbers of juveniles 
being tried and convicted in criminal courts and sentenced to serve long terms in 
adult prisons.’338 
 
In contrast to the conformists of the US juvenile justice system, it is Professor Feld’s 
view that the juvenile justice system has strayed too far from its original mission, 
which calls for policymakers to cancel it. According to him, today’s juvenile court 
‘retains much of the terminology of juvenile law, but functions as a pseudocriminal 
court. Worse, it fails to provide complete due process protections for the accused 
youth. Juvenile courts are still not required to provide bail, jury trials, or the right to a 
speedy trial for youthful offenders.’339 
 
Therefore, Professor Feld and other abolitionists recommend that all people violating 
the penal law, regardless of their age, should be dealt with in a criminal court. 
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Nonetheless, the criminal justice system should ‘continue to recognise the lessened 
culpability of the very young by imposing sentences with a “youth discount” – a 17-
year-old defendant would get 75 percent of the sentence length due an 18-year-old, a 
16-year-old would get 50 percent, etc.’340  This proposition is actually very strong 
and policymakers in the US are finding it difficult to avoid. As Jeffrey Butts 
contends, it would be wrong ‘to assume that all critics of the juvenile justice court 
are heartless, law-and-order types who feel little compassion for the poor, 
disproportionately minority youth who comprise the bulk of the juvenile court’s 
clients.’341 The critics most in favour of abolishing the juvenile justice system 
(Professor Feld, for example) ‘are often motivated by a concern for youth.’342 In their 
learned view, ‘the juvenile court has never lived up to its rehabilitative promise and it 
never will.’343 More importantly, they contend that ‘the juvenile court’s lower 
standards of due process are no longer tolerable given its modern emphasis on just 
deserts and retribution. Courts were meant to handle law violations, the abolitionists 
say, not social welfare problems.’344 
 
At the same time, as Butts points out, it is wrong to describe all defenders of the 
juvenile court as “soft on crime” or unconcerned with victim’s rights. Accordingly, 
some of those who defend the juvenile justice system ‘do so because they believe 
[that] despite its flaws, the juvenile court offers a unique opportunity for broad, early 
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intervention and effective crime prevention.’345 In fact, the juvenile court was 
originally ‘conceived as an informal, quasi-civil court precisely in order to free it of 
the procedural complexities that prevent the criminal court from acting too 
aggressively. The juvenile court was deliberately designed to be flexible and quick to 
intervene.’346 
 
Nonetheless, many states in the US have already started embarking on legislative 
reforms where the juvenile court has been engrained in the ordinary criminal justice 
system. As such, since the US Supreme Court’s decision in Gault in 1967, 
lawmakers across the US ‘have encouraged juvenile courts to embrace the goals and 
operational style of the criminal courts.’347 In fact, juvenile courts today in the US 
‘pursue many of the objectives once unique to criminal courts, including 
incapacitation and retribution. Both juvenile courts and criminal courts rely on plea 
bargaining for case outcomes.’348 In fact, both are forced by growing caseloads ‘to 
adopt assembly-line tactics and they often have difficulty providing individualised 
dispositions. The day-to-day atmosphere in modern juvenile courts (especially in 
urban areas) is increasingly indistinguishable from that of criminal courts.’349 
 
3.3.5 ‘Corporatism’ as the Third Model of Juvenile Justice 
Developments in, and criticisms against, the juvenile justice system necessitated the 
emergency of yet another important mode in the administration of juvenile justice in 
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the 1980s. This period witnessed the growing number of countries around the world 
who saw the need to develop local multi-agency diversion panels to deal with 
offending children. The multi-agency panels were, in most cases, composed of 
representatives from the police, social services, education, the youth and the 
voluntary sector (such as NGOs or religious charities). In England and Wales, for 
instance, 
Multi-agency diversion panels developed a range of educational, recreational and 
therapeutic ‘alternatives to prosecution,’ to which children and young people in 
trouble [with the law] could be diverted as a condition of their police caution. Many 
panels offered robust informal intervention in the spheres of education, family 
relationships, use of leisure, vocational training and drug abuse.
350
 
 
This kind of approach to dealing with child offenders ushered in a new model of 
juvenile justice: “corporatism” that supplanted both the “welfare” and the “back to 
justice” models,351 ‘and was triggered, initially, by a desire to manage young 
offenders more cost-efficiently.’352 The panels diverted a volume of child and young 
offenders away from the criminal justice system, thus minimising the costs. Viewed 
in this context, 
The emergence of corporatism did expose the simplistic nature of justice-welfare 
models while at the same time documenting the reality that juvenile justice practice 
had evolved beyond the core essentials of either justice or welfarism (for example in 
the primacy of diversion). This said, corporatism did not gain much significance as 
a theory per se but rather as a means of bringing to the fore the changes in practice, 
especially within the UK. In the debates on the philosophical frameworks for 
juvenile justice, it found little favour outside the UK and has largely been eclipsed 
even in recent texts there.
353
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However, the corporatism movement has received criticism particularly relating to 
the ever-present danger that its involvement of informal systems of justice ‘may 
make greater inroads into the lives and liberties of their subjects than would be the 
case in formal system it shadows.’354  As Pitts observes, critics have argued that 
‘because corporatism, through the medium of the “caution plus”, elaborates a 
“shadow tariff” alongside the formal tariff operating within the juvenile court, it 
effectively acts as “judge and jury” without regard to either the rules of evidence or 
due process of law.’355 
 
However, as Pitts argues, there is little evidence that this has actually happened. 
Notably, the Conservative government in the UK – eager to build on the successes of 
the multi-agency diversion panel and alternatives to custody developed as part of the 
Intermediate Treatment Initiative – institutionalised many of the practices in the 
panels within the Criminal Justice Act (1991).
356
 Nonetheless, through Corporatism, 
‘the goal of securing welfarism, justice or rights for young people has become 
increasingly obscured.’357 
 
3.4 The Spread of the Notion of Juvenile Justice Out of the US 
Although the notion of having a separate juvenile court is under constant criticism in 
the US, where it germinated, the concept is being engrained in many legal systems 
across the globe.
358
 As Odongo contends, this trend ‘is reflected in countries over the 
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world starting with Western European countries. In Africa, the phenomenon of 
juvenile courts was largely of colonial import and remains prevalent in a number of 
countries.’359 In this part, therefore, we trace this development in view of what took 
place since then up until to date. 
 
3.4.1 The Spread and Development of the Juvenile System in the UK 
Inspired by the US juvenile court, by 1910 ‘separate juvenile courts and a discrete 
institutional and administrative apparatus for dealing with young offenders had been 
established in most Western European countries.’360 In effect, the advent of the 
juvenile court, ‘with its unique amalgam of science, law and administration, ushered 
into existence a wholly new kind of human being, the “juvenile delinquent”, the 
management of whom constituted its raison d’etre.’361  
In England and Wales, for instance, three significant laws were enacted to give the 
juvenile court a legal force. These were the Children Act (1908) and the Prevention 
of Crime Act (1908), which established a national system of juvenile courts; and the 
Probation of Offenders Act (1907) that introduced community supervision as 
alternative to custody.  As Pitts reflects: ‘By 1920, approximately 8,000 of the 
10,000 people being supervised by probation officers were aged between 8 and 18 
years.’362 
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Under the Prevention Crime Act in the UK, the Industrial Schools and reformatories 
were placed under the administrative control of the Home Office. The Act also 
Borstal institutions,
363
 which ‘were penal institutions for inmates aged between 16 
and 20 years, staffed by teachers as well as prison officers, and unlike adult prisons 
they provided educational and vocational programmes and military training.’364 
 
As Crimmens and Pitts reminisce, one of the paradoxical ramifications of the 
introduction of these new institutions for child offenders brought about the 1907/8 
law reform in laws relating to juvenile delinquents in the UK, was an unprecedented 
raise of the number of juvenile delinquents consigned to the reformatories and 
Borstals.
365
 The reason for this increase was attributed to the new institutional 
approach of these institutions that focused on reforming juvenile delinquents as 
opposed to punishing them. The institutions were, thus, seen as beneficial to the 
consigned children as opposed to the ordinary prisons. However, the increase in the 
number of confined children in these institutions led to imposition ‘of greater 
custodian control on a larger number of less problematic subjects,’366 than it was 
envisaged. Originally, the institutions were ‘established to create “alternative 
custody” and vouchsafe the humane treatment of those [children] consigned to 
custody.’367  
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In effect, this “spreading of the net of control” was exacerbated by the issue of the 
probation order under the Probation of Offenders Act (1907). The order ‘placed 
young offenders under obligatory surveillance, with the ever-present danger of 
harsher penalties if they did not abide by the conditions of the probation order.’368 In 
effect, these conditions required ‘not only that a young person desist from crime but 
that they also pursue an honest and industrious life, refrain from associating with 
other people involved in crime, and report to their probation officer when required to 
do so.’369 This helped in scaling down crime rate of youth and child offending in 
England and Wales at the start of the twentieth century.
370
 
 
3.4.2 The Spread and Development of Juvenile Justice into Africa 
The introduction of colonial rule in Africa in the 19
th
 century went hand in hand with 
the imposition of legal systems, especially in the form of criminal justice, that were 
transplanted from the colonial powers – particularly, Great Britain and France. These 
powers had themselves ‘over a relatively long period, evolved advanced and 
complex criminal justice systems in an attempt to meet the increasing demands of 
their society.’371 As we have seen in Chapter Two, the origins of criminal law in 
these countries were derived from Roman private law, ‘which is based on 
determining the level of culpability for crimes against person and property, including 
libellous comments, assault and injury, theft of property and financial dishonesty.’372 
In the Roman private law, high level of discretion was retained by the administrators 
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of the law and punishment was mainly based on reparations. With the collapse of the 
Roman Empire, this law lost its original form; but was developed into what is now 
practised in the Western world.
373
 So, when the colonialists established their 
presence in Africa, they introduced criminal justice systems that were rooted in their 
homeland’s legal systems. As a result, the majority of the legal systems existing 
today in Sub-Saharan Africa are certainly influenced by those in their former 
colonialists.  
 
In order to establish and retain control of large populations in African colonies with 
relatively few administrators, the colonialists established a dual system of law, which 
imposed institutions akin to those in their home countries
374
 at the same time 
retaining some of the well established indigenous African justice systems.
375
 This is 
what has come to be known as dual legal system – or legal pluralism as best known 
in jurisprudential terms.
376
 In this regard, the British colonial criminal justice was 
‘concerned particularly with the maintenance of law and order; sentencing was based 
on the principles of retribution and general deterrence and there was a marked 
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reluctance to take into account customary notions of compensation and 
restitution.’377 
 
So, juvenile justice being a sub-sector of the criminal justice system was born out of 
this colonial experiment. In many cases, juvenile justice laws in Africa formed part 
of colonially inherited laws ‘with the resultant effect that the philosophy of how to 
manage child offenders reflected the social construction of childhood as 
conceptualized by the colonizing countries.’378 Mirrored through this reality, Odongo 
proposes two questions that arise from this historical reality: first, whether or not the 
juvenile justice laws in Africa could mirror the welfarism and justice models then 
prevalent in Western Europe; given the fact that colonialism was introduced not for 
the betterment of Africa’s welfare, but for colonial and capitalist interests. Second, 
‘whether more recent developments in western countries have found their way into 
African juvenile justice systems.’379 
 
According to Odongo, in recent times, Africa has witnessed ‘socio-economic 
transformations similar to those which shaped the social construction of childhood 
and by extension the subject of juvenile justice in terms of welfare or justice models 
in North America and Western Europe in the early 20
th 
century.’380 These socio-
economic conditions are seen in the relationship between youth crime and 
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urbanisation in the African context in amplification of the general link between 
urbanisation and increase in crime rate.
381
 As observed in section 4.2.1 above, part of 
the efforts of “the progressives” or “child savers” in fashioning ways of dealing with 
child deviance ‘arose as a result of increased industrialization and consequent 
urbanization from which they feared there would result social disruption, including 
the problem of deviancy.’382 In fact, 
This is mostly manifest in very fast rates of urbanization reaching an average rate of 
5 per cent per annum in the sixteen years between 1980 and 1996.
383
 With 
urbanization comes the strain on basic services and, together with a host of factors 
such as the whittling down of the traditional family structure and the high 
prevalence of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, increasing crime rates including youth 
offending are inevitable.
384
  
 
Indeed, the consequences of economic restructuring programmes, the impact of debt 
crisis on social policies and community life ‘are all relevant factors to the general 
issue of crime in Africa and child offending in particular.’385 As the United Nations 
notes,  ‘in Africa as [with the Asian and the Pacific regions], child crime and 
delinquency are primarily urban phenomena and specifically attributable to hunger, 
poverty, malnutrition and unemployment which are linked to the marginalization of 
children in already severely disadvantaged segments of society.’386  
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So, these factors have just helped to reshape the African juvenile justice systems in 
the 1990s and 2000s, which witnessed immense juvenile justice law reform 
initiatives in the context of the CRC and ACRWC. These reforms, by implications, 
have helped to do away with the colonially inherited juvenile justice laws in many 
Sub-Saharan countries.
387
 However, before this period, most of African juvenile 
justice systems were founded on colonially inherited laws, which were marked by the 
dominance of welfarism. For instance, most of British colonies – e.g. Kenya, 
Nigeria, Uganda, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe – have a semblance of juvenile justice 
laws akin to the repealed 1933 British Children and Young Persons Act. In these 
countries, the juvenile laws – mostly bearing the same name as the British juvenile 
justice law – provided for the welfare of young offenders and the establishment of 
juvenile courts. They covered both children in need of care
388
 and protection and 
children in conflict with the law and made no distinct provisions for the separate 
treatment in the application of the law for these two groups of children.
389
  
 
Although the former colonies continued to apply the colonially inherited juvenile 
justice laws based on welfarism, their former colonial powers had experienced 
radical transformation of the laws from welfarism to justice model and eventually, 
some elements of a crime control philosophy in the new western juvenile justice 
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systems.
390
 It was only in the 1990s and 2000s when Sub-Saharan countries began to 
reform their colonially inherited laws partly due to their ratification and 
implementation of the CRC and ACRWC. This steady widespread of the juvenile 
justice system has been intensified by the promulgation of the CRC in 1989 and the 
ACRWC in 1990.
391
 Both the ACRWC and the CRC – supplemented by the trio non-
binding international juvenile justice instruments
392
 – ‘represent a blend of both 
justice and welfare theories.’393 In addition, the CRC ‘and other instruments offer a 
new model for considering juvenile justice in light of the overall vision of child 
autonomy and respect for the child’s rights.’394 According to Doek, child autonomy 
is very important in exploring whether children’s rights have had an impact on 
juvenile justice in the domestic legal systems.
395
 In addition, Odongo argues that ‘the 
CRC reveals an attempt to move away from paternalistic views of juvenile justice by 
the emphasis it places on reintegration as the primary objective of the juvenile 
justice system rather than rehabilitation.’396 
 
In Africa, for instance, since the turn of the past millennium many countries have 
been busy overhauling their inherited colonial laws and replacing them with modern, 
more accessible and often more comprehensive children’s statutes that, inter alia, 
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promote and protect the rights of juveniles in conflict with the law.
397
 Indeed, while 
some of these law reform processes ‘are complete and the final statutes passed by 
parliament, others are not yet at that stage and are either under development or in 
parliamentary processes.’398 In the former examples are Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, 
Nigeria and Uganda; whereas examples of the latter are Botswana, Lesotho, 
Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, South Sudan and Swaziland where the review 
and redrafting processes are just commencing.
399
 
 
In fact, all these law reform processes are inspired by the CRC and the ACRWC; that 
is, they are ‘premised on the rights of the child rather than the powers of the 
parents.’400 Interestingly, 
[In Africa today] there is an ongoing debate about the inclusion of juvenile justice 
legislation in comprehensive child law enactments, a debate which has not been 
resolved. Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda provide examples of composite approaches to 
the issue, with child justice being included in the overall Children’s Act. Lesotho, 
too, has adopted the strategy of linking child justice to child protection and welfare 
generally; possibly arising from the strategic concern, linked to harsh public and 
political perceptions about crime in Southern Africa, that separation of child 
offenders legislatively-speaking might eventually result in a punitive criminal 
justice response to children in conflict with the law.
401
 
  
Therefore, there is a considerable legislative action aimed at promoting and 
protecting juvenile justice in Africa to date.
402
 Tanzania, just coming late in the 
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picture,
403
 has adopted a composite approach to legislating on juvenile justice. Unlike 
South Africa that has separated the juvenile justice legislation
404
 from the 
mainstream child rights law,
405
 Tanzania has included provisions relating to juvenile 
justice in a comprehensive Law of the Child Act (2009)
406
, which comprises all 
children’s rights except those which have to do with inheritance407 and early 
marriages.
408
 
 
3.5 Contemporary Administration of the Juvenile Justice System  
As indicated in the previous section, juvenile justice now occupies a central role in 
the administration of criminal justice the world over. With the increasing 
inevitability to have child-specific laws in many legal systems around the world, a 
need to have a separate juvenile justice system becomes of paramount significance. 
In this section, therefore, we shed a light on the contemporary principles of 
administration of juvenile justice. 
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3.5.1 The Rationale for a Separate Criminal Justice System for Offending 
Children in Modern Times 
 The aforementioned trends in dealing with offending children at the international as 
well as local arenas reflect the results of the global experience and reflection over 
several decades on the best ways to protect the rights of the child, particularly the 
one in conflict with the law.
409
 The imperatives of having special rules and principles 
that protect the welfare of young offenders, separate from adult offenders, are best 
opined by C. de Rover in the following regards, 
Because of their age, juveniles are vulnerable to abuse, neglect and exploitation and 
need to be protected against such threats. In keeping with the objective of diverting 
juveniles away from the criminal justice system and directing them towards the 
community, special measures for the prevention of juvenile delinquency must be 
developed.
410
 [Emphasis supplied.] 
 
Viewed in the foregoing context, the contemporary criminal justice system should be 
‘concerned with the balancing of competing interests, those of the victim and of 
society.’411 In this regard, 
Society cannot let misdeeds go unnoticed, while the child offender requires the 
development and application of responsive and useful measures aimed at ensuring 
future maturation into law abiding adulthood. It goes without saying that child 
offenders are frequently drawn from the most vulnerable and marginalised groups. 
They are the children of broken families, they live in gang-infested neighbourhoods, 
they are without satisfactory adult role models, they themselves have been 
victimised from early in life, they often have proven psychological and psychiatric 
deficits, low achievement rates at school and so forth. 
 
Therefore, criminal law and the criminal justice system should ensure that such 
children are treated in such a manner that would not further victimise them; rather, 
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alternative measures should be embedded in the criminal justice system that ensure 
that those children in conflict with the law grow and develop into responsible and 
productive adults. Recently, the need to deal with children in conflict with the law in 
a more compassionate manner and positive manner has been expressed judiciously in 
Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and 
Others
412
, where the South African Constitutional Court held that: 
The Constitution draws this sharp distinction between children and adults not out of 
sentimental considerations but for practical reasons relating to children’s greater 
physical and psychological vulnerability. Children’s bodies are generally frailer and 
their ability to make choices generally more constricted than those of adults. They 
are less able to protect themselves, more needful of protection and less resourceful 
in self-maintenance than adults. These considerations take acute effect when society 
imposes criminal responsibility and passes sentence on child offenders.
413
 
 
In practice, there has been in existence a semantically misunderstanding when a state 
is urged to set up a juvenile justice system or to undertake comprehensive reform of 
the existing system.
414
 However, according to children’s rights activists,415 juvenile 
justice is not a system but an overlapping of systems.
416
 In that regard, therefore, ‘the 
administration of juvenile justice is not so much a different set of rights to which 
juveniles are entitled, as a set of provisions that aim to offer protection in addition to 
the rights of adult persons - which of course apply equally to juveniles.’417 Rather, 
the juvenile justice system is a necessary, parallel establishment to the effective 
functioning of any criminal justice system in any jurisdiction to date. 
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3.5.2 Juvenile Justice as an Integral Part of Human Rights 
Today, it has been well settled that it is of paramount significance to accord children 
and adolescents special care and assistance; thus, the need for ‘a separate body of 
human rights treaties for young people of the apparent age below 18 years.’418 This is 
so principally because, ‘children and adolescents are in a period of development. 
What happens to them or fails to happen at each step of the way in the law 
enforcement process not only affects them in the here-and-now but will also shape 
their future development for good or for ill.’ Therefore, states ‘must respond to the 
criminal activity of minors, certainly for the sake of society and for the sake of the 
offenders.’419 
 
Therefore, the administration of juvenile justice aims at enhancing the ‘well-being of 
the juvenile and to ensure that any reaction to juvenile offenders is proportionate to 
the circumstances of the juvenile and the offence. Juvenile offenders should be 
diverted from criminal justice system and redirected to community support services 
wherever possible.’420  As such, the abovementioned international instruments are 
designed specifically, first, to protect the human rights of juveniles; second, to 
protect the well-being of juveniles who come into contact with the law; third, to 
protect juveniles against abuse, neglect and exploitation; and, lastly, to introduce 
special measures to prevent juvenile delinquency.
421
 These international instruments 
contain, inter alia, the principles outlined below. 
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3.5.3 Basic Principles of Administration of Juvenile Justice 
The general principles of administration of juvenile justice are contained in the 
CRC,
422
 which requires states parties to take measures that combat abuse, neglect 
and exploitation of children through its “4 Ps” principles.423 The CRC contains, in 
the main, measures that aim at protecting juveniles in conflict with the law. Article 
40 is relevant to this point. It provides for the right of children alleged or recognized 
as having committed an offence to respect for their human rights; and, in particular, 
to benefit from all aspects of the due process of law, which include, but not limited 
only to, legal or other related assistance, in preparing and presenting their defence. 
The article also requires that ‘recourse to judicial proceedings and institutional 
placements (of juvenile offenders) should be avoided wherever possible’.424 Thus, 
the article emphasizes resort to diversion system 
425
 of the administration of juvenile 
justice. 
 
In terms of the provisions of Article 37 of the CRC, deprivation of liberty for 
children can only be used as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate 
time. Parallel to these provisions are the provisions of Article 39 of the CRC, which 
provide for rights of children as victims of crime. The article requires states parties 
thereto to take appropriate measures to promote physical and psychological recovery 
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and social reintegration for children victims of abuse, neglect, torture or any other 
forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Such recovery and 
reintegration ought to occur in an environment that fosters the health, self-respect 
and dignity of the child.
426
  
 
It is axiomatic that Africa is the only continent on the earth that has got a specific 
child rights instrument, i.e., the ACRWC. Detailed provisions about juvenile justice 
are contained in Article 17 of the ACRWC.  The Article, more or less, contains 
similar provisions as those provided for in Articles 37, 39 and 40 of the CRC. 
Nonetheless, Article 17 of the ACRWC includes further aspects of placing the child 
at the centre of family and community. In particular, the ACRWC provides, under 
Article 17(3), that: ‘The essential aim of treatment of every child during the trial and 
also if found guilty of infringing the penal law shall be his or her reformation, 
reintegration into his or her family and social rehabilitation.’ 
 
It also does not contain any express provision on diversion in contrast to Article 
40(4) of the CRC. Unlike the CRC, the ACRWC leaves a room for States Parties 
thereto to set their own minimum age of criminal responsibility. This room, which is 
amenable to abuse by certain notorious states which have already set the age of 
criminal responsibility as lower as 7 years, is couched in the following wording: 
‘There shall be a minimum age below which children shall be presumed not to have 
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the capacity to infringe the penal law.’427 Nonetheless, the ACRWC ‘is an instrument 
that seeks to “Africanize” the administration of juvenile justice.’428 
 
3.5.4 Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency under International Human Rights 
Law 
The principles of prevention of juvenile delinquency are provided for in the UN 
Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (also popularly known as the 
Riyadh Guidelines).
429
 The Riyadh Guidelines
430
 were promulgated to form a 
positive, pro-active, and comprehensive approach to the prevention of juvenile 
delinquency.
431
 The Guidelines, for many reasons, ‘express a growing awareness that 
children are full-fledged human beings.’432 They are concerned primarily with the 
prevention of juvenile delinquency. Indeed, 
They focus, particularly, on early protection and preventive intention paying 
particular attention to children in situations of social risk. Social risk here implies 
children who are demonstrably endangered and in need of non-punitive measures 
because of the effects of their circumstances and situation on health, safety, 
education…as determined by a competent authority.433 
 
This concept buttresses the Riyadh Guidelines, paying particular attention on factors 
that underlie social risk, including possible inherent behaviours of a particular child 
or group of children, inherent characteristics like disability, relationship between the 
child and the family, and socio-economic circumstances in which the child lives, 
such as poverty. It can be summed up, in effect, that in most ‘cases children at social 
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risk are affected by the interplay of all those factors, the more adverse the factors, the 
greater the chance that the child will drift towards delinquent activities.’434 
 
The Riyadh Guidelines are said to be comprehensive in that they deal with almost 
every social area; the three main environments in the socialization process (family, 
school and community), the mass media, social policy, legislation and juvenile 
justice administration.
435
 They emphasize for ‘comprehensive prevention plans at 
every government level,’ including coordination of efforts between governmental 
and non- governmental agencies.
436
 They highlight, further, a need to have 
systematic and continuous monitoring and evaluation, as well as community 
involvement ‘through a wide range of service and programmes; interdisciplinary 
cooperation; youth participation in prevention policies and processes.’437 The 
Guidelines, moreover, introduce socialization process by which emphasis should be 
placed ‘on preventive policies facilitating the successful socialization and integrating 
of all children and young persons, in particular through the family, the community, 
peer groups, schools, vocational training and the world of work, as well as through 
voluntary organizations.’438 
 
The Guidelines also comprise of some elements calling for proactive approach such 
as the focus on upgrading the quality of life, the overall well being of children as 
potential members of the society. Under Guideline 6, for example, the Guidelines 
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punctuate that: ‘Community-based services should be developed (with) [F]ormal 
agencies of social control (being) utilized only as a last resort.’ By virtue of 
Guideline 2, prevention of juvenile delinquency requires efforts by the entire society 
to ensure harmonious development of adolescents, with respect for the promotion of 
their personality from early childhood.’ In relation to the mass media, the Riyadh 
Guidelines categorically enumerate that mass media ‘should portray the positive 
contribution of young people to the society (so as to enable them feel that their 
respective contribution [is] valuable to the society).’439 
 
Pursuant to the provisions of Guideline 5 (f), the Guidelines demand that if a state 
labels a child as a delinquent or deviant, ‘the labelling can unwittingly contribute to a 
child’s anti-social behaviour.’440 
 
3.5.5 Safeguarding the Best Interest of the Child in the Administration of 
Juvenile Justice 
The United Nation Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile 
Justice (the Beijing Rules) do provide explicitly for safeguarding the best interest of 
the child in the course of administration of juvenile justice.
441
 The Rules operate 
within the framework of two other sets of rules governing juvenile justice, both 
adopted in 1990: The United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile 
Delinquency (the Riyadh Guidelines) and the United Nations for the Protection of 
Juveniles Deprived of their liberty (the JDL Rules). In principle, 
These three sets of rules can be seen as guidance for a three stage process; firstly, 
social policies to be applied to prevent and protect young people from offending 
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[the Riyadh Guidelines]; secondly, establishing a progressive justice system for 
young persons in conflict with the law [the Beijing Rules]; and finally, safeguarding 
fundamental rights and establishing measures for social re-integration of young 
people deprived of their liberty, whether in prison or other institutions (the JDL 
Rules).
442
 
 
 These Rules develop and extend those articles of the CRC that cover issues such as 
arrest, detention, investigation and prosecution, adjudication and disposition and the 
institutional and non-institutional treatment of juvenile offenders.
443
 They, in the 
main, provide a framework within which a national juvenile justice system should 
operate and a model for state of affair and humane response to children who may 
find themselves in conflict with the law.
444
 In sum, the Beijing Rules cover the whole 
range of administration of juvenile justice processes, which include investigation and 
prosecution, adjudication and disposition, and non-institutional treatment and 
institutional treatment of juvenile offenders. 
 
Nonetheless, it is important to note that the Beijing Rules are not a binding treaty; 
although some of them have become binding on states parties by being incorporated 
into the CRC
445
 and the ACRWC,
446
 others can be treated not as establishing new 
rights but as providing more detail on the contents of existing rights.
447
 However, the 
UN General Assembly has created some sort of enforceability by requiring states 
parties to inform the Secretary General every five years on the application of the 
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Rules. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) are also urged to collaborate with 
governmental institutions in implementing these principles.
448
 
 
3.5.6 Protecting the Rights of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty 
The UN Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty (the JDL 
Rules) ensure that juveniles are “compelled” to be deprived of their liberty ‘only 
when there is an absolute necessity to do so.’449 The Rules emphasise that juveniles 
under detention should be treated humanely, with due regard for their status and with 
full respect for their human rights.
450
 Under the JDL Rules, the expression of 
“children deprived of their liberty” applies to include deprivation of children’s liberty 
in all situations, including children in welfare institutions.
451
 Accordingly, 
deprivation of liberty in this regard includes, ‘any form of detention or imprisonment 
or the placement of a person in a public or private custodial setting from which a 
person under the age of 18 is not permitted to leave at will, by order of any judicial, 
administrative or other public authority.’452 
 
In that respect, the Rules apply to juveniles deprived of their liberty by operation of 
penal law on those under 18 years of age deprived of their liberty in health and 
welfare placements.
453
 It is interesting to note that these Rules have the advantage of 
applying to all those children under 18 deprived of their liberty without any reference 
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to national definitions of childhood, and without being dependent upon the 
jurisdiction of special proceedings.  
 
Forming the crux of a body of rules meant to provide elaborations of the basic 
principles of the CRC, these Rules comprise of such fundamental principles, inter 
alia, as, first, children should be deprived of their liberty only as a last resort and for 
the minimum period; and this should be limited only to practically exceptional cases. 
Second, juveniles should only be deprived of their liberty in accordance with the 
principles and procedures of international law. Third, there is a need to have 
established small open facilities to enable individualized treatment and to avoid the 
additional negative effects of deprivation of liberty.
454
  
 
Fourth, deprivation of liberty should only be in facilities which guarantee meaningful 
activities and programmes promoting the health, self respect and sense of 
responsibility of juveniles, so as to foster their skills to assist them in developing 
their potential as members of society.
455
 Fifth, there should be decentralization of 
detention facilities so as to enable access and contact of juveniles with family 
members hence reintegration into the community. Sixth, all juveniles deprived of 
their liberty should be helped to understand their rights and obligations during 
detention and be informed of the goals of the care provided.
456
 And, lastly, juvenile 
justice personnel should receive appropriate training including basic principles of 
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welfare and human rights.
457
Domestic Implementation of the Provisions of the 
International Standards of Children’s Rights in the Juvenile Justice 
3.5.7 Domestic Implementation of the Provisions of the International 
Standards of Children’s Rights in the Juvenile Justice 
The UN Guidelines for Action on Children in the Criminal Justice System
458
 aim at 
assisting states in the domestic implementation of the provisions of the CRC (and the 
ACRWC) together with those of the above stated rules and guidelines. The 
Guidelines for Action provide, inter alia, for measures to be taken at the international 
level in implementing the provisions of the aforesaid instruments, the importance of 
a rights-based approach in juvenile administration and pro-active responses based on 
effective preventive and re-integrative measures. They further accentuate the essence 
of the principle of non-discrimination including gender sensitivity in the 
administration of juvenile justice, upholding of the best interest of the child, the right 
to life, survival and development and the duty of states to respect the view of the 
child.
459
 
 
In the final analysis, it can be noted that all these international instruments apply in 
dependent of each other. As such, in broad practical terms, criminal justice personnel 
‘should look: first, to the Convention on the Rights of the Child and then to the 
Riyadh Guidelines in seeking to prevent children from coming into conflict with the 
law; secondly, to the Convention and the Beijing Rules when dealing with children 
alleged as or accused of having come into conflict with he law; thirdly, to the 
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Convention and the United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of 
their Liberty for dealing with children found to be in breach of the criminal law.’460 
 
3.5.8 The International Umbrella Principles in Administration of Juvenile 
Justice  
The International Umbrella Principles are a number of fundamental principles that 
apply to each and every stage of the administration of juvenile justice.
461
 They are 
essentially subsumed from the relevant international instruments, as discussed above, 
to provide basic common standards in the administration of juvenile justice the world 
over. For the purposes of this study, therefore, some fifteen International Umbrella 
Principles are herein below reproduced: 
 
(i) Juvenile justice legislation should apply to all those under the age of 
18 as the age of childhood;
462
  
(ii) Juvenile justice is an integral part of national development process of 
the state and as such should receive sufficient resources to enable the 
juvenile justice system  to be organized in accordance with 
international principles;
463
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(iii) The principle of non-discrimination and equality is applicable to 
juvenile justice, and this includes a prohibition on discrimination on 
account of the child and child’s family;464 
(iv) The guiding principle for any policy or action concerning juvenile 
justice is that the best interests of the child is a paramount 
consideration;
465
 
(v) Delay in deciding matters relating to a child is prejudicial to the best 
interests of the child;
466
 
(vi) Every child shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the 
inherent dignity of the human person, taking into account the age of 
the child;
467
 
(vii) At all stages, children should be treated in a manner that facilitates 
their reintegration into society and their assuming a constructive role 
in society;
468
 
(viii) Children are entitled to express their views freely in relation to 
criminal justice, and the views of the child should be given due weight 
in accordance with both the age and the maturity of the child;
469
 
(ix) Children have the right to seek, receive and impart information 
concerning the juvenile justice system in a form that is both accessible 
and appropriate to children;
470
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(x) Juvenile justice should be organized in a manner consistent with 
children’s rights to privacy, family, home and correspondence;471 
(xi) If children are deprived of their family environment they are entitled 
to special protection and assistance; 
472
 
(xii) No child shall be subject to torture or to other cruel, inhuman, 
degrading or harsh treatment or punishment;
473
 
(xiii) At any stage of the juvenile justice process, children should not be 
unlawfully or arbitrarily deprived of their liberty;
474
 
(xiv) The arrest, imprisonment or detention of children should only be used 
as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of 
time;
475
 and 
(xv) Parents (or guardians) are to be notified of any arrest, detention, 
transfer, sickness, injury or death of their child.
476
 
 
To supplement the International Umbrella Principles above stated, Penal Reform 
International (PRI) and members of the Interagency Panel on Juvenile Justice (IPJJ) 
have developed ten points
477
 as their contribution to the Committee on the Rights of 
the Child Day of general Discussion on “Sate Violence against Children,” in Geneva, 
22
nd
 September 2000. The points were deduced from the aforementioned 
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international instruments, focusing at ways of reducing violence within the juvenile 
justice system around the world.
478
 In this regard, PRI and IPJJ believe that ‘a proper 
administration of juvenile justice cannot be achieved without a strong education and 
social welfare system. Helping young people in conflict with the law to become law 
abiding adults is much more the job of parents, teachers, social workers and 
psychologists than it is (for the) police, courts and prisons.’479 With the ten point 
scheme, PRI and IPJJ seek to advance the point that ‘juvenile offending should be 
dealt with as far as possible outside the formal criminal justice and penal system,’ as 
it is important to make sure that ‘alternative systems – particularly those involving 
institutional care – take proper steps to protect children from violence and abuse.’480 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
This Chapter has discussed the administration of modern juvenile justice in the 
historical context. The Chapter has also traced the   state of the rights of children in 
conflict with the law in the pre-juvenile justice era, where a briefly review of the 
history of children’s rights as well as a prelude to modern juvenile justice at common 
law are provided. In this regard, it has noted that children who committed crimes in 
early common law were not given any special treatment because they were 
considered as adults. At common law, for instance, the minimum age of criminal 
responsibility was set as young as seven years, and children guilty of crimes were 
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imprisoned. It has also observed that the principle of the best interests of the child or 
“the child’s welfare” was recognised by the common law courts in the early 
twentieth century. 
 
The Chapter has further traced the conception of the juvenile justice system in the 
late 1800s, which strived to reform US policies regarding youth offenders. Prior to 
this period, misbehaving juveniles in the US, like in other parts of Western Europe, 
often faced arrest by the police, initial placement in the local jail with adults, and 
eventual institutionalisation in a house of refuge or workhouse. The Chapter has 
argued that in the US, juvenile justice in its earliest form was conceived and 
developed out of the need for a separate court for child offenders, away from the 
ordinary courts that dealt with offending adults. So, the first juvenile court was 
established in Cook County under the 1899 Illinois Juvenile Court Act; and by 1945 
every State in the US had a juvenile court. From the early 20
th
 century, the juvenile 
court was transplanted to Western Europe; and in England, it was given legal 
recognition through the enactment of legislation specific for juvenile justice.  
 
The Chapter has also analysed the three models of juvenile justice from its inception 
– the welfarism, back to justice and corporatism – as they have impacted on the 
development of modern day juvenile justice. It has also discussed modern-day 
administration of juvenile justice in the context of the CRC, the Riyadh Guidelines, 
the Beijing Rules, the Rules and the ACRWC, particularly in African. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4.0 PROTECTION OF CHILDREN’S RIGHTS ININTERNATIONAL 
LAW 
4.1 Introduction 
In the contemporary set up of international law, children’s rights form a very fast 
growing body of normative principles and standards. This is because the world 
community has, over the past twenty years or so, committed itself to ensuring that 
the rights of the child are fully protected, as children are now considered one of the 
key beneficiaries of human rights. This was not the case before the 20
th
 century. 
Before this period, children’s rights were not given any consideration within the legal 
systems around the world, which facilitated consistent and sometimes legally-
accepted abuses against children.
481
 This trend only changed from the latter part of 
the 19
th
 century when human rights activists, legal scholars and jurists started to 
advocate for legal protection of children - beginning first with the rights of children 
in conflict with the law and later to all children’s rights.482 
 
In this Chapter we, thus, discuss the protection of children’s rights from the 20th 
century up until to date and its impact on contemporary conceptualisation of 
children’s rights. The Chapter will tentatively trace the genesis of the notion of, and 
rationale for, children’s rights protection. It will also discuss modern trends in 
international children’s rights, whereby the human rights protection mechanisms in 
the major international children’s rights instruments – i.e. the CRC and the ACRWC 
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together with other international human rights instruments touching on children’s 
rights – will be examined in the contexts of their efficacy, implementation and 
applicability in municipal laws. 
 
4.2 Modern Trends in International Protection of Children’s Rights: An  
Overview 
As we discussed in Chapter One, children’s rights were until recently seen as falling 
within the domain of charity. Before the 19
th
 century, children were regarded as part 
of the family; thus, needing no specific protection. But with the increase in violation 
of children’s rights – particularly of those children in conflict with the law – it was 
increasingly felt that children also needed special protection as offered to other 
vulnerable sections of society like women, the elderly and persons with disabilities. 
As a result of this new approach, child justice reformers in the US in the late 19
th 
century onward and in England in the early 20
th
 century propagated for reform of the 
criminal justice system with a view to affording special protection to children who 
came into contact with the criminal justice system. This resulted in the establishment 
of the juvenile court – first in the US and then in the UK and other European 
countries.
483
 
The development in the criminal justice system towards recognising the rights of 
offending children influenced the thinking of many scholars and policy makers at the 
international level. Consequently, in 1924 the League of Nations adopted the 
Declaration of the Rights of the Child, followed by the 1959 United Nations 
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Declaration on the Rights of the Child. As a result of this development, the UN 
declared 1979 as the International Year of the Child, culminating in the adoption of 
the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)
 484
 in November 1989 – forty-
one years after the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was adopted in 
1948 by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly. Notably, the CRC was the first 
ever binding children’s rights instrument to be adopted by the same UN General 
Assembly. One year later, in 1990, Africa adopted its own children’s rights 
instrument – the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
(ACRWC).
485
 As it has been argued, 
Quarrying the mine of their legitimacy from the inspiration of the UDHR, the two 
instruments have now formed a very central part to the claim for children’s rights at 
the municipal, regional and international levels. Many constitutions and laws that 
were enacted after the two instruments were adopted have made reference to, or 
contained principles envisaged in, the two instruments.
486
 
These principal international children’s rights were preceded by other international 
instruments which provided for the protection of the rights of the child in general and 
juveniles in conflict with the law in particular. Besides, almost all international 
human rights instruments adopted before and after the adoption of these two 
instruments contain provisions generally protecting children’s rights and particularly 
the rights of children in contact with the penal law. Traditionally, the promotion and 
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protection mandate of children’s rights is vested in treaty bodies established under 
the provisions of the relevant treaties as discussed in the succeeding sections. 
 
4.3 The UN Human Rights System and Protection of Children’s Rights  
The United Nations (UN) system for the protection of children’s rights is embedded 
in the general human rights protection mechanism as well as through the specific 
children’s rights protection mechanism under the CRC. This part, as such, discusses 
the two sets of protection of children’s rights under the UN human rights system. 
 
4.3.1 The UN Human Rights Protection Mechanism 
The United Nations human rights protection mechanism contains two systems: the 
UN Charter-based system; and the UN treaty-based system. Under the Charter-
based system, the UN Charter of 1945 sets the basis for human rights in a nutshell. 
One of the main objectives of the UN Charter is to secure international peace, 
development and human rights.
487
 Unlike other subsequent UN instruments, the 
UN Charter does not emphasise on protection, but rather promotion of, and 
universal respect for, human rights.
488
 To be able to pursue this objective, the UN 
created the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), ‘which, along with other 
many tasks, is primarily responsible for human rights issues.’489 Under Articles 56, 
62 and 68 of the UN Charter, ECOSOC is empowered, inter alia, to set up 
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commissions for the protection of human rights universally.
490
 In this section we, 
thus, examine the UN human rights protection mechanism. 
4.3.1.1 An Historical Overview 
In practice, though, ECOSOC soon delegated its human rights mandate to the 
Commission on Human Rights
491
 that was established under the provisions of Article 
68 of the UN Charter. Although the Commission, which was founded in 1946, was 
de facto a principal body regarding promotion of human rights universally, it 
required ‘formal approval from ECOSOC in all its decisions.’492 As Nowak rightly 
reflects, 
For many years, the Commission took the term ‘promotion of human rights’ far 
too literally, considering every action that went beyond advisory services (e.g. 
delegating experts and organising seminars upon the invitation of individual 
states) as inadmissible interference with the domestic jurisdiction of states in 
accordance with article 2(7) of the [UN] Charter. [Emphasis in the original 
text.].
493
 
 
As such, during the first decades of its existence the Commission’s main 
achievement was to set standards – ‘i.e. to carry out a comprehensive universal 
codification of human rights, which was largely completed by the end of the Cold 
War.’494 As a result of this task, up until the end of the Cold War towards the end of 
the 1980s, the UN has been able to establish an extensive network of international 
human rights instruments ranging from the International Bill of Human Rights
495
 to 
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special conventions,
496
 bodies and procedures to monitor States Parties’ adherence to 
these treaty obligations. The Commission has also, from 1960s, established a number 
of thematic and country-specific mechanisms, such as special rapporteurs, and 
working groups. These mechanisms are aimed at fostering worldwide protection of 
human rights, ‘which are based directly on the UN Charter and increasingly diffused 
the argument of inadmissible interference in national matters (at least with gross and 
systematic human rights violations).’497 In principle, 
This gradual development was endorsed by the express recognition of the 
legitimacy of international measures for the protection of human rights during the 
1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights. At the same time, the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights was established, hailing a new era for the UN 
human rights system, which from promotion and protection was to move on to 
international enforcement, and finally, to the prevention of human rights 
violations.
498
 
 
This integration has, in effect, resulted in making the human rights concept at the UN 
system a reality as well as a field of operation, with many significant field operations 
having been undertaken over the past sixty years ranging from humanitarian to 
international criminal law enforcement aimed at universal protection of human 
rights. In fact, with this integration function, human rights are ‘gradually assuming 
the significance the authors of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights intended for them, but which then got lost in the times of the Cold 
War.’499 
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These achievements apart, the UN Charter did not define the term “human rights,” 
rather it presupposed it. The definition of human rights was, thus, to be embedded in 
the UDHR as we are going to see below. 
 
4.3.1.2 Extending the Concept of Human Rights in International Law 
As we have already seen, one of the major tasks of the Commission on Human 
Rights was to promote human rights, and in so doing, it was expected to develop a 
universally acceptable definition of human rights. In the very beginning, the idea to 
accomplish this task was framed in three successive steps: ‘to pronounce a non-
binding declaration as a basis for a legally binding convention, and create 
international implementation mechanisms.’500 Given the contending nature of the 
world order then, it was agreed on consensus that a non-binding universal declaration 
was feasible, with the drafting of two binding covenants to happen later. So, the 
UDHR was to be adopted in 1948 while the two binding conventions took almost 
twenty years later to be adopted in 1966 and ten more years thereafter to enter into 
force in 1976. 
 
The UDHR was drafted along the contentious divides between the Eastern and 
Western Blocs then forming the crux of the Cold War. While the West emphasised 
on the human rights concept born of the Age of Enlightenment (i.e. civil and political 
rights or “first generation” rights), the East favoured the so-called “second 
generation” rights (economic, social and cultural rights). Therefore, on a par, Articles 
1-21 of the UDHR contained more or less the “first generation” rights and with the 
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“second generation” rights being accepted as more or less on equal footing with the 
former. As Manfred Nowak wonders, 
In doing so, they pre-empted the doctrine of interdependence and indivisibility of all 
human rights, which was not formally recognised until the 1993 Vienna World 
Conference, and in fact, is still a matter of controversy for most industrialised 
countries.
501
 
 
In addition, in terms of Article 28 of the UDHR it is recognised that everyone, 
including a child, is entitled to a ‘social and international order in which the rights 
and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realised.’ In effect, this 
provision has laid down the basis for the “third generation” or “collective” rights 
claim. It is also to date ‘considered the foundation for the legitimacy of the 
international human rights regime in general.’502 Interestingly, unlike the subsequent 
two UN conventions forming the International Bill of Rights, the UDHR contains 
rights that the former did not formally enshrine – like the right to property503 and the 
right of asylum.
504
 
 
Although the UDHR – being a mere resolution of the UN General Assembly – is not 
binding under international law, ‘it still represents an authoritative interpretation of 
the term “human rights” in the UN Charter, and thus can be considered indirectly 
constituting international treaty law.’505 In addition, the UDHR has also formed the 
basis for the core activities of all the UN human rights bodies over the past sixty 
years, including the Commission on Human Rights (now the Human Rights Council) 
itself.  
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At the same time, some of the UDHR’s provisions – such as the prohibition of 
torture and slavery – ‘today enjoy the status of customary international law, yet 
despite certain legal opinions to the contrary.’506 Furthermore, many of the 
constitutions enacted immediately after the adoption of the UDHR – particularly 
those of Asian and former African colonies – have referred to the UDHR as a source 
of moral, political and legal significance.
507
 
 
Indeed, the UDHR has ever since constituted a major step forward in the promotion 
of human rights and the rule of law at the international, regional and national levels. 
It evidently comprises, in one consolidated text, nearly the entire range of what today 
are recognized as human rights and fundamental freedoms.
508
 Traditionally, all 
binding human rights treaties under the UN human rights system have established 
treaty bodies mandated to monitor the implementation of the respective instruments 
at the domestic level. This is the case with reference to the CRC as analysed below. 
 
4.3.2 Major UN Children’s Rights Instruments 
All children’s rights instruments under the UN human rights protection mechanism 
fall under the treaty-based human rights system. Under the UN human rights 
protection mechanism, there have been developed and adopted a handful of 
international human rights instruments expressly providing for children’s rights. 
These are the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC); the UN Guidelines 
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for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (the Riyadh Guidelines); the United 
Nation Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (the 
Beijing Rules); the UN Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty 
(the JDL Rules); and the UN Guidelines for Action on Children in the Criminal 
Justice System. However, in the discussion below we confine ourselves to the CRC 
only, as it is a binding international instrument with a treaty monitoring body – i.e. 
the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child. 
 
4.3.2.1 The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 
This part examines the CRC from a historical point of view. It critically looks at the 
rationale behind the adoption of the CRC, its normative principles, the obligations it 
imposes on States Parties and its enforcement mechanism. 
 
(a) Adoption of the CRC 
The CRC was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 20
th
 November 
1989. It came into force on 2
nd
 September 1990, less than a year after its adoption, 
becoming the only international human rights instrument to come into force at such a 
short period.
509
 As Goonesekere contends, the CRC ‘was also the only Convention 
whose entry into force was accompanied by a major world conference that focused 
on implementation of the rights guaranteed by the treaty.’510 In September 1990, 
Heads of State and Government from around the world gathered in New York at the 
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World Summit for Children, where they adopted a Declaration ‘with specific goals 
and targets on implementation’ to be achieved within the next decade.511  
 
At this Summit UNICEF ‘played a major role in the Summit meeting, and initiated a 
process that helped to ensure that the CRC was ratified by all countries, except 
Somalia and the United States of America, by 2000.’512 As Goonesekere points out: 
‘This near-universal ratification within just a decade is unique in the history of a 
human rights treaty.’513 As Doek contends, ‘[n]o other human rights treaty comes 
close to universal ratification’ and ‘the CRC is at the same time the human rights 
treaty with widest coverage.’514 Therefore, it is trite to conclude that; the fact that the 
CRC is the most widely ratified of all international human rights instruments ‘is 
testimony to the high value placed on safeguarding the rights of children.’515 
 
(b) A Critique on the CRC 
The CRC, in effect, erased the obscurity of children’s rights in the area of 
international human rights law. This means that with the adoption of the CRC, 
children’s rights ‘have come to be regarded as part and parcel of international human 
rights law.’516 Now, the CRC has influenced national constitutions and legislation, 
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whereby states around the world have been incorporating therein its underlying 
principles and standards.
517
 
 
Although it has received near-universal ratification and domestication, to many 
scholars in Africa and Asia, the CRC is sometimes perceived as ‘a Convention that 
originated on the West and articulated legal norms and values on children that had 
evolved in the West.’518 This is evidenced by the construction of some provisions in 
the CRC, particularly on adoption (Article 20) and on the role of extended family 
(Article 5). This argument is further verified by the fact that during the 10 years of its 
drafting Africa, for instance, was represented only by Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and 
Senegal.
519
 Furthermore, ‘specific provisions on aspects peculiar to Africa were not 
sufficiently addressed in the UN instrument.’520 These aspects include harmful 
traditional practices; the impact of armed conflicts on children’s rights and welfare; 
and responsibilities of children to parents, guardians, relatives and the society at 
large, which have been sufficiently addressed by the ACRWC.
521
  
 
All in all, the CRC is a very useful international human rights instrument in elevating 
the rights of the child at the global level. The fact that it received near-universal 
ratification and the fact that many countries around the world have incorporated most 
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of its substantive principles and standards into their legal systems, ‘signals that the 
rights which contribute towards the protection of children have outgrown the 
discretionary powers of national legislators.’522 This reality has been intensified by 
the popularity the CRC has received over the years of its existence over and above 
other international human rights instruments. This suggests a ‘high level of 
normative consensus among the various nations of the world (particularly in Africa) 
on the idea and content of children’s rights as human rights.’523 
 
(c) Normative Principles of the CRC 
The CRC is the first UN human rights instrument to contain both civil and political 
rights, on the one hand, and economic, social and cultural rights, on the other. By this 
fact, it can correctly be argued that the CRC attempts ‘to meet the different needs of 
children and juveniles not only by establishing special guarantees for the protection 
of children (e.g. from violence in the family or at school, from abuse, exploitation, 
neglect or unacceptably poor circumstances), but also by protecting children in the 
development of their identity, autonomy and active participation in social life (e.g. by 
the right to privacy, freedom of expression, information, religion, association and 
assembly or by the right to be heard in judicial proceedings).’524 This wide-ranging 
set of provisions contained in the CRC ‘reflects a broad spectrum of global 
perspectives on children’s rights.’525 
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This integration of core human rights into a single treaty is the benefit that the CRC 
received from the hitherto developments in international human rights law. The CRC 
also benefited from the new trends in consolidating and strengthening the 
universality and indivisibility of human rights. Set up in this context, 
 
The CRC therefore does not adopt a completely culturally relativist approach but 
sets out, in general, universal standards and norms of achievements. Civil and 
political rights and socio-economic rights are included as equally important rights. 
Significantly, the Convention focuses on implementation and monitoring of 
children’s rights through adequate allocation of national resources and cooperation 
and solidarity among the State, families and communities, civil society, and the 
international community. The concept of “evolving capacity” as a child grows from 
childhood to adolescence, and the definition of childhood in terms of an upper limit 
of 18 years, also focus on children’s participation in implementing these norms and 
on monitoring performance.
 526
  
 
In principle, the CRC contains provisions that are essentially the logical outcome of 
the new approach in the development of international human rights standards.
527
  
Indeed, 
 
The CRC contains a comprehensive listing of obligations that states are prepared to 
recognize towards the child.  These obligations are of both direct and indirect 
nature.  Direct in such matters as those pertaining to providing education facilities 
and ensuring proper administration of juvenile justice.  And indirect in cases which 
enable parents, the wider family or guardians to carry out their primary roles and 
responsibilities as caretakers and protectors of children.
528
 
 
The range of rights covered by the CRC, in this regard, is described as the “Four Ps” 
– provision, protection, prevention and participation.  As observed by Nigel 
Cantwell, it can thus be said that children have the right to be provided with certain 
things and services, ranging from a name and nationality to health care and 
education.  They have the right to be protected ‘from certain acts such as torture, 
                                                 
526
 See Goonesekere, op. cit, p. 2. 
527
 Mashamba, C.J., “Institutional Care and Support to Orphaned and Vulnerable Children in 
Tanzania: A Legal and Human Rights Perspective”, op. cit. See also Mashamba, C.J., “Domestication 
of International Children’s Rights Norms in Tanzania”, op. cit, p. 9. 
528
 Ibid. 
140 
 
  
 
 
exploitation, arbitrary detention and unwarranted removal from parental care.  And 
children have the right to do things and to have their say, in other words to 
participate both in decisions affecting their lives and in society as a whole.’529  
 
The CRC has four general principles: non-discrimination (Article 2); the child’s best 
interests (Article 3); the right to life (Article 6), survival, and development; and 
respect for the child’s opinion (Article 12). These general principles are sometimes 
considered as the “four pillars” of the CRC, which are of ‘fundamental importance 
for the implementation of the whole Convention.’530 These pillars are extended in the 
basic rights and fundamental freedoms in the CRC, including the rights relating to 
the preservation of identity; rights in adoption; the child’s right to grow up with, and 
not to be separated from, his parents, except where necessary; and the rights to 
health, education, adequate standard of living and social security. Others are rights of 
children in conflict with the law; the rights against child sexual abuse, exploitation, 
abduction, sale and trafficking; the rights of disabled children, child soldiers and 
refugee children; and rights against child labour and violence against children. 
Who is a child under the CRC? The CRC also defines a child as ‘every human being 
below the age of eighteen years unless, under the law applicable to the child, 
majority is attained earlier.’531 This definition has, however, received wide criticism 
from many scholars, who view it as ‘ambiguous and weak, lacking specific 
protection …, such as in relation to child betrothals, child participation in armed 
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conflict and child labour.’532 Interestingly, a very strong definition of who a child is, 
is provided for by Article 2 of the ACRWC, which stipulates that a child is ‘every 
human being under 18 years.’ According to Lloyd, the definition in the ACRWC is 
more useful as ‘there are no limitations or attached considerations’533 as is the case 
with the definition in the CRC. 
The CRC also describes the principle of “the best interests of the child” in Article 3.  
The Article provides expressly that,  
3.1 In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private 
social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative 
bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration. [Emphasis 
supplied.] 
 
It can be gathered from the provisions of Article 3(1) of the CRC that the principle of 
the best interests of the child provides a ‘yardstick by which to measure all the 
actions, laws and policies affecting children.’534 On his part, Philip Alston refers to 
this principle as the lens through which all other rights are viewed.
535
 However, the 
use of an indefinite article “a” immediately before the words “primary consideration” 
– as opposed to the use of a definite article “the” in Article 4(1) of the ACRWC– has 
attracted criticism that it makes the application of the principle of the best interests of 
the child optional under the CRC as opposed to the ACRWC, which makes it 
mandatory.
536
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Although the basic source of the principle of “the best interests of the child” is 
Article 3(1) of the CRC, the principle is also referred to in numerous other provisions 
of the Convention
537
 as well as in other UN/international human rights 
instruments.
538
 For instance, Article 18 of the CRC, which provides that both parents 
(mother and father) are responsible for the upbringing and development of the child, 
requires that parents’ basic concern in this process must be the best interests of the 
child. Under Article 9 of the CRC, where it is necessary to separate the child from 
his or her parents, such separation must be in the best interests of the child. Pursuant 
to Article 20, where it is found to be in the best interests of the child to be separated 
from the home environment; such child is entitled to special protection by the state. 
In Article 2, the CRC provides the principle of non-discrimination in the following 
expression, 
2.1 States Parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present 
Convention to each child within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any 
kind, irrespective of the child’s or his or her parent’s or guardian’s race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, 
property, disability, birth or other status. [Emphasis added]. 
 
This article implies that States Parties to the CRC have an obligation to always 
ensure that discrimination against children on any of the listed grounds is not allowed 
in all actions, decisions, policies, practices and/or legislative enactments concerning 
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children. However, unlike the ACRWC
539
 (which extends the obligations to states 
and non-state actors), the CRC imposes the obligation to ensure that children are not 
discriminated on the state. At the same time, the CRC, in Article 2(1), ‘confines state 
parties to ensure children only “within their jurisdiction” receive rights in the CRC 
without discrimination.’540 
 
In the CRC, there is also the principle of life, survival and development of children, 
which ‘ensures that children have the capacity to ascertain their rights and ensure the 
protection of their welfare.’541 This principle does ‘not only prioritise children's 
rights to survival and development but also puts emphasis on the right to develop to 
their fullest potential in every respect, including their personalities, talents and 
abilities.’542 This principle underpins that States Parties to the CRC should ensure 
that the inherent right to life guaranteed in Article 6(1) is guaranteed by abolishing, 
inter alia, death penalty. By extension, States Parties are obliged to ensure that, in 
order to guarantee this right, there is maximum survival and development of the child 
in their respective jurisdictions.
543
 
 
Another equally fundamental principle of the CRC is participation of children in 
decision-making or in action concerning their rights and welfare.
544
 This principle 
‘sets out the principle that children should be listened to on any matter or decisions 
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which concerns or affects them, and that their views should be given due 
consideration in accordance with their age and maturity.’545  
 
Interestingly, the CRC ‘also tries to find a balance in the sensitive triangle of 
children-parents-state.’546 For instance, Article 5 (together with Article 18 in 
particular) provides a framework for the relationship between the child, his or her 
parents and family, and the State.
547
 According to Hodgkin and Newell, Article 5 
provides the CRC with a flexible definition of “family” and introduces to the 
Convention two vital concepts: parental “responsibilities” and the “evolving 
capacities” of the child.548 The article provides that: 
5. States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents or, 
where applicable, the members of the extended family or community as provided for 
by local custom, legal guardians or other persons legally responsible for the child, to 
provide, in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child, appropriate 
direction and guidance in the exercise by the child of the rights recognized in the 
present Convention. [Emphasis supplied.] 
 
The article, in the opinion of Hodgkin and Newell, also ‘signals clearly that the 
Convention regards the child as the active subject of rights, emphasizing the exercise 
“by the child” of his or her rights.’549   
 
In the broad sense, ‘this article expounds that maintenance, care, custody and 
protection of the child is the primary responsibility and duty for parents, guardians 
and/or relatives.’550 The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CROC) has 
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expanded the interpretation of the article in its General Comments. The role of 
parents in relation to the capacities and rights of babies and younger children is 
explained in the Committee’s General Comment No. 7 on “Implementing Child 
Rights in Early Childhood” thus: 
The responsibility vested in parents and other primary caregivers is linked to the 
requirement that they act in children’s best interests. Article 5 states that parents’ 
role is to offer appropriate direction and guidance in ‘the exercise by the child of the 
rights in the … Convention’. This applies equally to younger as to older children. 
Babies and infants are entirely dependent on others, but they are not passive 
recipients of care, direction and guidance. They are active social agents, who seek 
protection, nurturance and understanding from parents or other caregivers, which 
they require for their survival, growth and well-being. Newborn babies are able to 
recognize their parents (or other caregivers) very soon after birth, and they engage 
actively in non-verbal communication. Under normal circumstances, young children 
form strong mutual attachments with their parents or primary caregivers. These 
relationships offer children physical and emotional security, as well as consistent 
care and attention. Through these relationships children construct a personal identity 
and acquire culturally valued skills, knowledge and behaviours. In these ways, 
parents (and other caregivers) are normally the major conduit through which young 
children are able to realize their rights.
551
 
  
Under Article 18 of the CRC, both parents (father and mother) have common 
responsibilities for the upbringing and development of their children. The article 
provides, in extenso, that: 
 
18.- 1. States Parties shall use their best efforts to ensure recognition of the principle 
that both parents have common responsibilities for the upbringing and development 
of the child. Parents or, as the case may be, legal guardians have the primary 
responsibility for the upbringing and development of the child. The best interests of 
the child will be their basic concern. 
 
2. For the purpose of guaranteeing and promoting the rights set forth in the present 
Convention, States Parties shall render appropriate assistance to parents and legal 
guardians in the performance of their child-rearing responsibilities and shall ensure 
the development of institutions, facilities and services for the care of children. 
 
3. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that children of 
working parents have the right to benefit from child-care services and facilities for 
which they are eligible. 
 
From the foregoing analysis it can be summed up that the CRC ‘corresponds with the 
universal human rights in many areas and in addition, also includes a number of 
                                                 
551
 See Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 7, 2005: “Implementing Child 
Rights in Early Childhood.” CRC/C/GC/7/Rev.1, para. 16. 
146 
 
  
 
 
rights specific to children.’552 This is why it contains, in Articles 37 and 40, 
provisions specific to offending children, who should be dealt with separately in a 
juvenile justice system that should not be part of the criminal justice system.  
 
(d) Obligations of States Parties to the CRC 
It is a general rule of international human rights law that every single human right 
has a corresponding duty and a duty-holding party. The nature and contents of duties 
are important in national and international human rights promotion and protection.
553
 
Traditionally, the prime duty-holder of human rights under international law is the 
state, which derives from the fact that states are the signatories to international 
human rights treaties; thus, bound by the said treaties.
554
 
 
Under international human rights law, there are three categories of state obligations 
or duties to domesticate international norms contained in international treaties to 
which states are parties. In terms of the provisions of Article 26 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (1960): ‘Every treaty in force is binding upon the 
parties to the treaty and must be performed in good faith.’ The said state obligations 
include: first and foremost, the obligation to respect; secondly, the obligation to 
protect; and, thirdly, the obligation to fulfil, human rights. The obligation to respect 
human rights requires States to refrain from interfering with human rights. For 
                                                 
552
 Nowak, op. cit, p. 93. 
553
 Mashamba, C.J., “Enforcing Social Justice in Tanzania: The Case of Economic and Social Justice.” 
LL.M. Thesis, Open University of Tanzania, 2007. 
554
 This is by virtue of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties under the principle of pancta 
sunt servanda (Article 26). See also Mashamba, C.J., “The Mandate of the ACERWC and How 
CHRAGG Can Collaborate with the ACERWC in Order to Highlight the Issue of Children Detained 
in Adult Prisons in Tanzania.” A Briefing Paper Presented by at the UNICEF-PRI Workshop on 
“Developing Advocacy Strategies” held at UNICEF Conference Hall, Dar es Salaam, 26-27 May 
2011. 
147 
 
  
 
 
instance, the right to housing is violated if the State engages in arbitrary forced 
eviction.
555
 The obligations to protect and fulfil human rights require States to 
prevent violations of such rights by third parties. For instance, 
…. the failure to ensure that private employers comply with basic labour standards 
may amount to a violation of the right to work or the right to just and favourable 
conditions of work. The obligation to fulfil requires States to take appropriate 
legislative, administrative, budgetary, judicial and other measures towards the full 
realization of such rights. Thus, the failure of States to provide essential primary 
health care to those in need may amount to a violation.
556
  
  
The wording of the foregoing paragraph implies that both the obligations to protect 
and fulfil human rights impose a positive duty on the State to respectively intervene 
and provide for basic necessities in order to prevent violations of the rights by third 
parties.
557
 It is proper to maintain, therefore, that: 
By this, the state is obliged to make policies and legislation in order to regulate the 
relationship between individuals and ensure that individuals do not violate each 
others’ rights; for example, the state is obliged to act if a landlord illegally evicts a 
tenant. Again, the courts can protect from improper invasion, in this case, from 
other parties than the state. The duty to fulfil human rights means that the …. State 
must take appropriate legislative, administrative, budgetary, judicial and other 
measures towards the full realisation of the rights.
558
 
 
On its part, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, unlike other human 
rights instruments, imposes a positive duty on States Parties thereto to respectively 
intervene and provide for basic necessities in order to prevent violations of human 
rights; and it does not allow for state parties to derogate from their treaty obligations 
even during emergency situations. For instance, in the matter of Commission 
Nationale des Droits de l’Homme et des Libertes v Chad,559 where there was a 
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communication alleging that there had occurred accounts of killings and wanton 
torture of civilians as a result of the civil war between the security services and other 
rebel groups in Chad, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights held 
that: ‘even a civil war in Chad cannot be used as an excuse by the state violating or 
permitting violations of rights in the African Charter.’  
 
The duty to promote human rights is another positive duty, which requires the State 
to actively support the rights, raise public awareness about the rights and how to 
access them, and cultivate a culture of respect for the rights. It may take many forms, 
such as educational activities, media awareness programmes, and public awareness 
raising campaigns.
560
 In many jurisdictions to date, most of the promotional 
obligation for human rights is done by national human rights institutions, like the 
Indian Human Rights Commission, the Tanzanian Commission for Human Rights 
and Good Governance, the Ghanaian Commission for Human Rights and 
Administrative Justice, and the South African Human Rights Commission.
561
  
 
In the context of this analysis, the CRC contains explicit and unambiguous positive 
obligations for states parties to undertake to ensure that the child’s rights and 
freedoms are realised.
562
 A cursory perusal of the provisions of the CRC indicates 
that most of the articles containing substantive rights are phrased in obligatory terms:  
“States Parties shall undertake …”; “States Parties shall ensure …” and “States 
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Parties undertake to …” respect children’s rights or take appropriate measures or 
actions for child rights protection. In this sense, “measures” which States Parties are 
obliged to undertake include enacting legislation, adopting policies and undertaking 
programmes aimed at realising children’s rights in their jurisdictions. This also 
includes an obligation on States Parties to allocate sufficient budgets for child-related 
matters. 
 
(e) Procedural Framework for Monitoring the Implementation of the CRC 
Under the UN human rights protection mechanism, each of the core human rights 
instruments has a treaty monitoring body. Traditionally, treaty bodies are 
independent bodies of experts, who are elected from amongst nationals of the States 
Parties to the respective international human rights treaty. The experts’ work for the 
treaty bodies – usually, referred to as committees – is ‘usually done on honorary and 
voluntary basis.’563 Conventionally, the only mandatory monitoring procedure of 
provided in all the core treaties under the UN human rights system ‘is that of 
examining states reports.’564 As Nowak points out, 
Each treaty provides that states submit initial reports on the steps they have taken 
to implement the rights recognised by the treaty within one or two years of the entry 
into force of the treaty, to be followed by regular periodic reports every two to five 
years. The reports are to point to progress, as well as to problems and difficulties 
that may arise in the context of implementation of the treaty. They are also to 
include sufficient legal, statistical and other accurate information as may be useful 
for the Committees in gaining a comprehensive impression of the human rights 
situation and implementation of the relevant treaty at the domestic level.
565
  
 
The reports are, ideally, to be a result of a comprehensive national discussion process 
involving a wide range of state and non-state actors such as parliament, national 
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human rights institutions, and the civil society. However, in most cases, many states 
have been preparing the reports behind closed doors involving only government 
officials. This has resulted in many reports to lack a comprehensive, critical and 
objective human rights assessment, ‘which is the real objective of every state 
reporting procedure’566 under the UN human rights system. 
 
In this arrangement, the duty of the treaty monitoring bodies ‘is to critically examine 
the state reports in public sessions’567 and issue concluding observations and 
recommendations for the relevant states and publish them in their annual reports. 
After the concluding observations and recommendations are issued, ‘Governments 
are expected to pay heed to these recommendations and give an account of their state 
of implementation in the follow-up report. NGOs also play an important monitoring 
role in this, particularly at the national level.’568  
 
The treaty bodies also publish “general comments”569 ; or “general 
recommendations”570 on specific provisions in the treaties, which, along with the 
decisions taken during the complaints procedures, ‘constitute the main source of 
interpretation for the rights and other provisions contained in the respective 
treaties.’571 
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In case of the CRC, it is monitored by the CROC, which is established under Article 
43(1).  The Committee is comprised of eighteen experts ‘of high moral standing and 
recognised competence in the field covered by [the] Convention.’572 These experts 
are elected by States Parties from among their nationals who serve in their personal 
capacity. In electing the members to the Committee, regard should be had to 
‘equitable geographical distribution, as well as to the principal legal systems.’573 The 
tenure of members of the Committee is four years, with a possibility of re-election.
574
 
The Committee meets in Geneva, Switzerland, three times per annum (January, May 
and September) for a period of three weeks per each session.
575
 
Under Article 44 of the CRC, States Parties are obliged to submit to the CROC, 
through the Secretary-General of the UN, ‘reports on the measures they have adopted 
which give effect to the rights recognised herein and on the process made on the 
enjoyment of those rights.’ The periodicity for state reporting is two-phased : (i) 
within two years of the entry into force of the Convention for the State Party 
concerned ; and (ii) thereafter every five years.
576
 The contents of a report should 
comply with the requirements of Article 44(2), which stipulates that, 
2. Reports made under the present article shall indicate factors and difficulties, if 
any, affecting the degree of fulfilment of the obligations under the present 
Convention. Reports shall also contain sufficient information to provide the 
Committee with a comprehensive understanding of the implementation of the 
Convention on the country concerned. 
 
Unlike the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
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(ACERWC),
577
 until recently the CROC did not have inter-state or individual 
complaints communication procedures.
578
 Only in 2011 an Optional Protocol to the 
CRC was adopted to allow such procedure; but it is yet to become operational for 
insufficient ratifications. Nonetheless, the CROC issues very useful General 
Comments in interpreting the CRC. It also holds an annual Day of General 
Discussion, which involves a number of stakeholders, including NGOs. The CROC 
further actively involves NGOs in the pre-sessions, which are held in camera 
between the Committee and the representatives of the NGOs. The aim of these pre-
sessions is to enable the CROC to receive alternative information to complement the 
States Parties’ reports; and, thus, prepare list of issues or questions to be taken to the 
respective States Parties for consideration during the open sessions.
579
 Under Article 
44(5), the CROC is obliged ‘to submit to the [UN] General Assembly, through the 
Economic and Social Council, every two years, reports on its activities.’ 
 
4.3.2 Protection of Children’s Rights in “Other” UN Human Rights Treaties  
Apart from having child rights-specific international human rights instruments, the 
UN treaty-based human rights system also has a number of instruments containing 
certain provisions that protect the rights of the child. As we have seen above, the 
CRC was adopted as a direct influence of the UDHR and as a result of the world 
community’s endeavour to have child rights-specific mechanism for the protection of 
children’s rights; and, as such, it now forms part and parcel of the UN human rights 
protection mechanism in place today. So, it is not accidental that children’s rights are 
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also protected in other international and regional human rights instruments. As such, 
children’s rights are also protected in the context of ‘rights catalogued and 
guaranteed in the international human rights instruments
580
 as well as those in the 
[UDHR].’581 These international human rights instruments form the international 
normative framework for children’s rights. In principle, some of these instruments 
also ‘contain certain child specific rights which amplify their relevance for children’s 
rights protection.
582
 To the extent that they have been ratified by the relevant African 
states, these universal human rights instruments hold guarantees for the right[s] of 
children in those states.’583 
 
All these instruments have treaty bodies, which oversee the implementation of the 
respective treaties at the municipal level. Thus, through the state reporting mandate 
the treaty bodies also ensure that children’s rights are adequately protected. 
 
4.4 The African Regional Human Rights System and the Protection of 
Children’s Rights 
Since the inception of colonialism in the late 19
th
 century, the concept of human 
rights in Africa has been overshadowed by contending views. While some scholarly 
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works on the subject of human rights in Africa have contended that there is a remote 
realisation of the principle of universality over “indigenousness” of human rights in 
Africa,
584
 some have ‘engaged the impracticability of certain categories of human 
rights in and for Africa and the mass of impediments to human rights protection in 
African states.’585 Some scholarly works about the African human rights history have 
concentrated on ‘documenting the history and spate of state-sponsored violations of 
human rights particularly as they relate to democratisation, electioneering and the 
political process’586 in Africa.587 However, as a contribution to the ever increasing 
body of human rights norms at the international level, the African human rights 
system should be regarded as unique and a potent tool for vindicating human rights 
in an African context. In this section we, therefore, briefly discuss the African human 
rights system and its essence in making children’s rights a reality in an African 
context. 
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4.4.1 The African Human Rights System 
This part critically examines the African Regional Human Rights Systems and its 
role in the protection of human rights, generally, and children’s rights, in particular. 
The potent role of regional human rights systems is also examined. In this context it 
is argued that the normative framework for the protection of human rights in the 
African regional human rights system is premised in the objectives of the 
Constitutive Act of the AU,
588
 one of which is to ‘promote and protect human and 
peoples’ rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights [ACHPR] and other relevant human rights instruments,’589 including the 
ACRWC. The ACHPR’s principal implementation mechanism, which is carried out 
through the AComHPR, is also examined. Established under Article 30 of the 
ACHPR, the AComHPR has the tripartite mandate to promote, to ensure and to 
interpret the human and peoples’ rights in the ACHPR.590 
 
4.4.1.1 An Historical Overview 
The African human rights system is premised around the key functions of the African 
Union (AU), whose membership comprises of all African states, except Morocco.  
Established in 2002, the AU is a successor of the Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU), which was founded in 1963. The OAU placed special emphasis on fighting 
colonialism, racism and apartheid. But its Charter did not make any mention 
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whatsoever to human rights.
591
 This justifies the interest of powers that be at that 
time in Africa. At that moment, the main interest of the independent states in Africa 
was to gain and maintain political power; thus, the OAU Charter’s focus was ‘on the 
protection of the state, rather than the individual.’592 Although African leaders at 
independence propagated the right to self-determination for Africans from European 
colonial powers, ‘they were not inclined to take this right further than political 
independence.’593 In this regard, 
 
They did not grant their own peoples the right to self-determination vis-à-vis the 
new African States (as the Biafra war in Nigeria showed in all brutality), nor did 
they allow African people any individual rights within these new states that might 
be enforced by regional monitoring bodies. … Instead, they seemed to be of the 
opinion that by abolishing colonialism and apartheid they would automatically 
guarantee individual human rights as well. Sadly enough, the most serious and 
systematic violations of human rights, such as those committed by atrocious regimes 
of Idi Amin in Uganda and “Emperor” Bokassa in Central Africa, had to occur to 
convince African leaders that these assumptions had been long.
594
 
 
This tendency, in fact, was a result of a long-established legal system that was 
premised around fragmenting society along patriarchal systems and divide-and-rule 
tactics employed by the colonial powers across Sub-Saharan Africa during 
colonialism. At independence, the new African elites, who formed part of the local 
colonial administration, retained the colonial legal systems for their benefit and 
disliked the incorporation of basic rights and fundamental freedoms in their domestic 
legal systems.
595
 As Bowd rightly points out, 
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The continued application of colonial legal systems suited the new elite ruling class 
[in Africa] because throughout the period of colonialism it was often these elites 
who had been tasked with the management of the country under supervision of a 
semi-absent landlord. In maintaining the existing systems, such elites found 
themselves in an advantageous position from which they could, with relative ease, 
ensure their position and consolidate power: not always for the benefit of the 
populations they were meant to be serving.
596
 
 
This thinking was, consequently, extended even to the legal set up of the OAU. As a 
result, during the two decades of African independence, many African elites turned 
out to be dictators, violating human rights with impunity in the process. In particular, 
systematic violations of human rights were more overt in Guinea, Equatorial Guinea, 
Mobutu’s Zaire [now Democratic Republic of Congo], Chad and Mauritania.597 This 
reality compelled several legendary heads of states in Africa – particularly, Julius 
Nyerere (Tanzania) and Leopold Senghor (Senegal) – to initiate a human rights 
campaign for Africa that materialised in the adoption of the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) in Banjul, The Gambia, in 1981.598 The 
Charter, also known as the Banjul Charter, came into force in 1986. The Charter is 
now ratified by all 53 members of the AU
599
, except Morocco, which is the only 
African country that is not a member of the AU after it pulled out of the defunct 
OAU due to the recognition and admission of the Saharawi Arab Democratic 
Republic (SADR) into the OAU.
600
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The adoption of the ACHPR is very important in enriching the “African regional 
human rights system,” which means ‘the past, present and ongoing collective or 
concerted efforts by African peoples and states to secure human rights and freedoms 
for all peoples under a coherent arrangement [are achieved].’601 This system 
‘revolves around diverse institutions and normative frameworks’ within the AU set 
up based on ‘treaties that are elaborated and explained by other non-binding 
documents, such as resolutions, declarations and guidelines.’602 The normative 
principles of human rights in these instruments are enforced by diverse institutions of 
the AU, which are: the AU itself, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (AComHPR), the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR),603 
and the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
(ACERWC). These institutions are also complemented by a number of existing 
specialised agencies or personnel ‘whose mandates are specifically aimed at human 
rights protection and promotion in Africa.’604 
 
4.4.1.2 The Potent Role of the African Regional Human Rights System  
The African regional human rights system is amongst the three currently existing 
regional human rights systems in the world. The other two are the American and 
European regional human rights systems. As Shelton argues, these regional human 
rights systems are thought to be essentially potent than the UN human rights 
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system,
605
  ‘because they are able to take better account of regional conditions.’606 
The UN itself has recognised regional arrangements for the protection of human 
rights through a resolution made by the UN General Assembly at its 92
nd
 Plenary 
Meeting held in December 1992.
607
 This was reaffirmed at the June 1993 World 
Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, where it was stated, inter alia, that regional 
and sub-regional human rights systems can play a very important role in the 
promotion and protection of human rights; and, as such, they should complement and 
reinforce universal human rights standards.
608
 
 
 
(a)  The Normative Framework of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights 
The normative framework for the African regional human rights system is premised 
in the objectives of the AU, which are set out in Article 3 of the Constitutive Act of 
the AU.
609
 Accordingly, one of the objectives of the AU is to ‘promote and protect 
human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights and other relevant human rights instruments.’610 The reference to 
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“other relevant human rights instruments” includes the African Charter on the Rights 
and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC).  
 
It is in this context that at the apex of the institutional arrangement for the African 
regional human rights system is the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. 
Below the Assembly are other principal organs of the AU that have ‘critical roles to 
play in the promotion and protection of human rights in Africa.’611 These organs 
include: the Executive Council; the AU Commission that serves as the Secretary of 
the AU; the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights; the Pan-African 
Parliament; the Peace and Security Council; the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights; the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child; the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC); and other 
specialised and technical committees. Under the AU set-up, the human rights, 
democracy and good governance mandate is under the Political Affairs portfolio.  
 
As stated in Article 3(h) of the Constitutive Act of the AU, the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) is specifically “conceived as the bedrock” of 
the human rights protection agenda in Africa.
612
 It is, in fact, a ‘primary human rights 
instrument for Africa.’613 As Akinseye-George points out, the Charter has positively 
impacted on ‘the development of constitutional law with particular reference to 
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human rights’614 in an African context, whereby most African countries have 
incorporated some its norms into their constitutions and laws. 
 
Conceptually, the ACHPR ‘bears greater resemblance to the contents of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948 than to the European and 
inter-American regional human rights systems.’615 Like the UDHR, the ACHPR 
emphasises on equality of all human rights in its preambular paragraph in the 
following regards: ‘Civil and political rights cannot be dissociated from economic, 
social and cultural rights in their conception as well as universality and that the 
satisfaction of economic, social and cultural rights is guaranteed for the enjoyment of 
civil and political rights.’ 
 
In principle, this foundation ‘represents one of the most distinctive features of the 
normative renditions of the ACHPR.’616 In this regard, the ACHPR endorses the 
underlying principles of universality, inalienability, interdependence and 
indivisibility of human rights. 
 
Another distinctive feature of the ACHPR is its inclusion of duties of the individual 
person ‘towards his family and society, the state and other legally recognised 
communities and the international community.’617 In this regard, the ACHPR 
emphasises that the ‘rights and freedoms of each individual shall be exercised with 
due regard to the rights of others, collective security, morality and common 
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interest.’618 Another duty of the individual person is to ‘respect and consider his 
fellow beings without discrimination, and maintain relations aimed at promoting, 
safeguarding and reinforcing mutual respect and tolerance.’619 Article 29 of the 
Charter has a catalogue of duties of an individual in the following respects: 
 
Article 29 
The individual shall also have the duty: 
1. To preserve the harmonious development of the family and to work for the 
cohesion and respect of the family; to respect his parents at all times, to maintain 
them in case of need; 
2. To serve his national community by placing physical and intellectual abilities at 
its service; 
3. Not to compromise the security of the state whose national or resident he is; 
4. To preserve and strengthen social and national solidarity, particularly when the 
latter is threatened; 
5. To preserve and strengthen the national independence and the territorial integrity 
of his country and to contribute to its defence in accordance with the law; 
6. To work to the best of his abilities and competence, and to pay taxes imposed by 
law in the interest of the society; 
7. To preserve and strengthen positive African cultural values in his relations with 
other members of society, in the spirit of tolerance, dialogue and consultation and, 
in general, to contribute to the promotion of the moral well-being of society; 
8. To contribute to the best of his abilities, at all times and at all levels, to the 
promotion and achievement of African unity. 
 
Furthermore, the ACHPR contains human rights as well as peoples’ rights, which is 
unique as compared to other regional human rights instruments. Whereas “human 
rights” in the ACHPR are couched as entitlements of “every individual”620 and “of 
all peoples”,621 “peoples’ rights,” or “solidarity rights” or “collective rights” are 
framed as the inalienable right to self-determination and socio-economic 
development;
622
 the right to economic, social and cultural development as well as the 
right to development;
623
 the right to national and international peace and security;
624
 
and the right to a satisfactory environment.
625
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Interestingly, the ACHPR does not contain derogation clauses, as is the case with 
many international human rights treaties, which means that ‘no African government 
is permitted to abridge these rights even during emergencies.’626 This argument was 
reinforced by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights in Media 
Rights Agenda and Constitutional Rights Project v Nigeria,
627
 where it held that ‘[i]n 
contrast to other international human rights instruments, the ACHPR does not 
contain a derogation clause. Therefore limitations on the rights and freedoms 
enshrined in the Charter cannot be justified by emergencies or special 
circumstances.’628 While the ACHPR contains certain “claw-back” clauses629 in 
some civil and political rights, ‘there are no such claw-back clauses in respect of the 
economic, social, cultural and collective rights provisions in Articles 15 to 24. These 
guarantees are all in plain, unrestricted, and unconditional language.’630 
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In terms of obligations imposed on states parties, Article 1 of the ACHPR establishes 
the fundamental obligation of states to ‘recognise the rights, duties and freedoms 
enshrined in this Charter and … undertake to adopt legislative or other measures to 
give effect to them.’ This obligation is reinforced by corollary provisions of Article 
62, which oblige states parties to submit biennial reports ‘on the legislative or other 
measures’ they have put in place in order to give effect to the ACHPR. To fulfill this 
obligation, states parties are obliged, in terms of Article 25, to ‘promote and ensure 
through teaching, education and publication, the respect of the rights and freedoms’ 
in the ACHPR. In addition, Article 26 obliges states parties ‘to guarantee the 
independence of courts
631
 and … allow the establishment and improvement of 
appropriate national institutions entrusted with the promotion and protection of the 
rights and freedoms’ in the ACHPR. 
 
(b)  Human Rights Implementation in Africa: The Role of the Human Rights 
Commission  
 
The ACHPR’s principal implementation mechanism is available through the 
AComHPR, which is established under Article 30 with the tripartite mandate to 
promote, to ensure and to interpret the human and peoples’ rights in the ACHPR.632 
Established in 1987, the AComHPR is comprised of 11 members acting in their 
                                                 
631
 In Media Rights Agenda and Constitutional Rights Project v Nigeria the AComHPR held that: ‘A 
government that governs truly in the best interest of the people … should have no fear of an 
independent judiciary. The judiciary and the executive branch of government should be partners in the 
good ordering of society. For governments to oust the jurisdiction of the courts on a broad scale 
reflects a lack of confidence in the justiciability of its own actions, and a lack of confidence in the 
courts to act in accordance with the public interest and rule of law.’ Ibid, para. 81. 
632
 Article 45(1) – (3) of the ACHPR. 
165 
 
  
 
 
individual and personal capacities.
633
 These members are elected by the Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government
634
 to serve for a period of six years and may stand 
for re-election (Article 36).  For the past two decades of its existence, the 
Commission has been ‘the quasi-judicial body of the African Charter [on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights], responsible for implementing and enforcing the rights provisions in 
the African Charter.’635  
 
Headquartered in Banjul, The Gambia, the Commission discharges its mandate in a 
tripartite arrangement through examining state reports under the state reporting 
procedure. The Commission also examines complaints from states and individuals 
under the complaints procedure; and it also undertake promotional activities. Viewed 
in this context, 
The state reporting procedure enables the Commission to examine measures a state 
party has put in place to secure the provisions of the ACHPR. The complaints 
procedure permits the consideration of both inter-state complaints (Articles 47-54) 
as well as individual complaints (Articles 55-6). … The Commission’s promotional 
mandate enables it to ‘undertake studies and researches on Africa’s problems in the 
field of human and peoples’ rights’ and to pursue educative programmes; to 
formulate normative human rights standards and to embark on co-operative 
programmes that would enhance human rights protection in Africa (Article 45).
636
 
 
However, over time, the fulfilment of the mandate of the Commission has been 
imperilled by the lack of timely or sheer failure of state reporting by many states in 
Africa.
637
 Besides, even when states do submit reports, ‘they frequently fail to send 
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competent representatives to present them.
638
 This leads to long delays, and some 
reports have become very [out]dated by the time they are examined.’639 
 
In order to minimise the impact of this problem, the Commission later adopted a 
radical approach to this. At its 23
rd
 Session in 1998 it decided that it ‘would 
henceforth consider states’ reports without the presence of representatives once 
affected states had been given adequate opportunity to attend and had failed to 
respond.’640 It also decided to issue “Concluding Observations” in conformity with 
UN human rights treaty bodies. 
 
Other impediments of the Commission in its state reporting mandate is the lack of 
effective follow-up mechanisms, in that the Commission does not have the mandate 
or mechanism to make follow up on the implementation of its recommendations.
641
 
This weakness has been criticised as lacking ‘seriousness [and] incisiveness’ and as 
constituting ‘a reduction of the whole exercise [of examining states’ periodic reports] 
into a rigmarole.’642 Parallel to this impediment is the problem of disregard of the 
decisions of the Commission by the concerned African states. For instance, the 
Commission reported at a joint meeting with African Human Rights Court held in 
June 2006, that by then ‘only in about one or two cases had the Commission’s report 
                                                 
638
 Viljoen, F., “Overview of the African Regional Human Rights System.” In Heyns, C. (ed.), Human 
Rights in Africa. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998, pp. 128-205, p. 189. 
639
 Olowu, op. cit. 
640
 Ibid. 
641
 Du Plessis, op. cit, p. 529; and Nmehielle, V.O.O., The African Human Rights System, its Laws, 
Practices and Institutions. 2001, p. 246. 
642
 Quashigah, K., “The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Towards a More Effective 
Reporting Mechanism.” African Human Rights Law Journal. Vol. 2 No. 2, 2002, pp. 261-300, p. 278. 
167 
 
  
 
 
been formally recognised and responded to.’643 As Kanyeihamba (one of the pioneer 
judges of the African Human Rights Court) points out: ‘In respect of the 
overwhelming majority of the Commission’s reports, the response from those it had 
addressed them was a conspicuous silence.’644  
 
This problem is compounded by the fact that the decisions of the Commission are not 
binding, compelling the Commission to seek ‘amicable resolution and, should that 
fail, makes non-binding recommendations which the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government should adopt.’645 As it can be rightly observed, in Africa: ‘It becomes 
apparent that those states which have perpetrated human rights violations have the 
power to lobby like-minded states to potentially veto the adoption of these 
recommendations, hence our particular criticism that human rights in Africa are at 
the behest of states.’646 
 
 
So, given this kind of diplomacy and political good-will amongst African states, 
human rights protection within the African regional human rights system has been 
compromised in most cases. 
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To the contrary, the individual complaints procedure of the Commission ‘has been 
kept remarkably active.’647 This is evidenced by the number of cases it has examined 
and the decisions coming from this process. However, this procedure is constrained 
by a sheer imbalance decisions taken by the Commission, which tend to favour civil 
and political rights at the expense of socio-economic rights.
648
 This is manifested in 
its decisions in Malawi African Association, Amnesty International v Mauritania
649
 
and Free Legal Assistance Group and 3 Others v Zaire.
650
 In these cases, the 
Commission granted effective remedies to violations of civil and political rights 
more than it did to socio-economic rights, ‘losing one of numerous opportunities it 
had to elaborate on the content of economic, social and cultural rights as well as to 
chart the path of granting appropriate remedies and relief for established 
violations.’651  
 
Although the Commission has been praised by many scholars
652
 on its decision in 
Social and Economic Rights Action Centre and the Centre for Economic and Social 
Rights v Nigeria (known famously as the SERAC case),
653
 Olowu criticises it for 
‘uncritically adopting the “progressive realisation” paradigm adopted by the CESCR 
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[the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights], which … has no legal or 
factual basis in the ACHPR.’654 According to Olowu, the decision ‘is bereft of any 
substantial remedy for the established violations, which may explain why there has 
been no tangible outcome from the decision in the troubled Niger-Delta region, long 
after its delivery.’655 
 
 
The inter-state communication mechanism under the ACHPR, which was designed to 
enable African states to play a watchdog role, has remained dormant all over this 
time. In this respect, the Commission has received only reports filed by DRC against 
Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda;
656
 and by Ethiopia against Eritrea,
657
 both alleging 
violations of the ACHPR provisions. 
 
(c)  Strengthening the Human Rights Implementation in Africa: The 
Establishment of the Human Rights Court  
The overt challenges facing the African Human Rights Commission attracted a 
number of criticism and many critics recommended for the establishment of an 
effective African human rights court dedicated to human rights.
658
  In order to 
address some of these major challenges in making the ACHPR more effectively and 
widely implemented and given legal force across and around Africa, the OAU 
decided to establish an African Human rights court. The decision to establish the 
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African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights was taken during the summit of Heads 
of State and Government of the OAU, held in Tunis, Tunisia, in June 1994.  
 
In particular, the summit requested the Secretary-General of the OAU ‘to convene a 
meeting of government experts to ponder, in conjunction with the African 
Commission, over the means to enhance the efficiency of the African Commission 
and to consider in particular, the establishment of an African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights.’659 This idea came to fruition in 1998 when the OAU Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government ‘finally adopted the Protocol establishing an African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights.’660 As indicated by many scholars, ‘it is the 
lack of an effective enforcement mechanism under the African Human Rights 
Charter that necessitated the adoption of the Protocol on the African Human Rights 
Court.’661 
 
 
However, this Protocol ‘never effectuated an actual functioning court.’662 The Court 
materialised when the OAU, which was widely regarded as an ineffective regional 
body,
663
 was replaced by the AU in 2002. The AU was more pro-active in 
establishing the Court, whereby in 2004 the Protocol to the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (the African Human Rights Court Protocol) was adopted. The 
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Protocol, which entered into force on 25
th
 January 2004, expressly states that the 
African Human Rights Court shall ‘complement the protective mandate of the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights …’664 Viewed in this context, 
the African regional human rights court is now composed of two reinforcing bodies: 
the Commission, which is a quasi-judicial human rights institution
665
 and the African 
Human Rights Court, which is the ‘main judicial institution.’666 Both in theory and 
expectation, these ‘two bodies create an operable judicial system for Africa.’667 
 
The first ever judges of the Court were elected upon a directive of the summit of 
Heads of State and Government of the AU held in Banjul, The Gambia, in June 2006 
and were sworn on 2
nd
 July 2006 in the same city before all Heads of State and 
Government.
668
 As many African scholars are enthusiastic about the prospects of the 
African Human Rights Court,
669
 one can only view it as a more effective mechanism 
to boost the image of the Commission, at least by looking at the Court’s mandate and 
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the mechanism put in place for enforcement of its judgments. The Court has a 
mandate to render advisory opinions on any legal matters pertaining to the ACHPR 
or any other relevant human rights instrument. In so doing, the court has jurisdiction 
on the interpretation of its own jurisdiction,
670
 whereby its judgments are final and 
are not subject to appeal.
671
  As an independent organ of the AU, the decisions and 
orders of the African Human Rights Court are binding.
672
 In principle, the 
implementation of the judgments of the Court is monitored by the Council of 
Ministers of the AU on behalf of the Assembly,
673
 which serves as the Executive 
Council of the AU and ‘prepares decisions on strategic areas of focus for the 
Assembly’674 of Heads of State and Government. As Du Plessis submits, under the 
Court’s set up, non-compliance with the judgment or order of the Court ‘may have 
resulted in an AU decision, which in turn may have led to the imposition of sanctions 
as envisaged under the AU Constitutive Act.’675 
 
The Court, under Article 5(3) of the African Human Rights Court Protocol, ‘may 
recognise relevant NGOs with observer status before the Commission, and 
individuals to institute cases directly before it, in accordance with article 34(6) of this 
Protocol.’ In terms of Article 34(6) of the Protocol,  
 
At the time of the ratification of this Protocol or any time thereafter, the State shall 
make a declaration accepting the competence of the court to receive cases under 
article 5(3) of this Protocol. The court shall not receive any petition under article 
5(3) involving a state party which has not made such a declaration. 
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Interpreting the two foregoing Articles in Michelot Yogogombaye v Senegal
676
 the 
AfCHPR held that the combined effect of these provisions is that ‘direct access to the 
Court by an individual is subject to the deposit by the respondent State of a special 
declaration authorizing such a case to be brought before the Court.’677 In this case the 
AfCHPR found Senegal to have not accepted the jurisdiction of the Court to hear 
cases instituted directly against the country by individuals or non-governmental 
organisations. In such circumstances, the Court held that: ‘pursuant to Article 34(6) 
of the Protocol, it does not have jurisdiction to hear the application.’678 A similar line 
of holding was made by the Court in its recent decisions in Amir Adam Timan v The 
Republic of The Sudan
679
 and Femi Falana v African Union
680
. In the latter case, the 
applicant argued that Article 34(6) of the Protocol was inconsistent with Articles 1, 
2, 7, 13, 26 and 66 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The 
applicant contended that the requirement for a State to make a declaration to allow 
access to the Court by individuals and NGOs was a violation of his rights to freedom 
from discrimination, fair hearing and equal treatment as well as his right to be heard. 
The applicant alleged to have made several attempts to get the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria to deposit the declaration under Article 34(6) of the Protocol, to no avail. 
Furthermore, the applicant argued that his reason to file the application against the 
respondent was because it was the representative of the 54 member states of the 
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African Union, thus, capable of being sued, as a corporate community, for and on 
behalf of its constituent members. 
 
Striking the application out, the Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain this 
application because the respondent, the AU, is not a member to the Protocol; and, as 
such, it cannot be sued on behalf of its member states. In the main, the Court held 
that: 
73. At this juncture, it is appropriate to emphasize that the Court is a creature of the 
Protocol and that its jurisdiction is clearly prescribed by the Protocol. When an 
application is filed before the Court by an individual, the jurisdiction of the Court 
ratione personae is determined by Articles 5(3) and 34(6) of the Protocol, read 
together, which require that such an application will not be received unless it is filed 
against a State which has ratified the Protocol and made the declaration. The present 
case in which the Application has been filed against an entity other than a State 
having ratified the Protocol and made the declaration falls outside the jurisdiction of 
the Court.  
 
Therefore, the Court held to have no jurisdiction to entertain the Application. 
 
Although the involvement of NGOs and individuals in instituting cases at the Court 
is seen in some quarters as a particularly innovative element,
681
 the Court’s Protocol 
has failed to make unequivocal provision granting locus standi to these important 
stakeholders in the promotion and protection of human rights in Africa.
682
 The 
declaration expected to be made by States when ratifying the Protocol in Articles 
5(3) and 34(6) mentioned above have been unreasonably withheld by most African 
States
683
; thus, narrowing the involvement of most civil society organisations.
684
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However, this could be remedied by the CSOs or individuals submitting their cases 
to the Commission, which may then refer them to the Court.
685
 This point is founded 
in the fact that during the drafting of the Protocol ‘many states objected or made it 
clear that non-governmental organisations or individuals would not have direct 
access to the court except with their permission.’686 
 
In determining cases, the Court should apply the Constitutive Act of the AU, 
international treaties (whether general or particular) ratified by the concerned states, 
international custom as evidence of general practice and accepted law. The Court 
may also apply general principles of law recognised universally or by African states, 
judicial decisions and writings of the most highly qualified publicists of various 
nations as well as the regulations, directives and decisions of the AU, ‘as subsidiary 
means for the determination of the rules of law, and any other law relevant to the 
determination of the case.’687 In deciding cases before it, the Court has also to bear in 
mind the complementarity between it and the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights688, which may include drawing inspiration from the latter’s 
jurisprudence.
689
 Litigants before the Court also have the right ‘to be assisted by 
legal counsel and/or any other person of the party’s choice’.690 
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(d)  Merging the Human Rights Court and the Court of Justice: Whistling in 
the Wind? 
Even before the Court could start functioning and deliver to the intended 
expectations, a decision was taken to conjoin it with the African Union Court of 
Justice (ACJ), ‘so as the two stand together as a composite Court – the African Court 
of Justice and Human Rights.’691 This decision was contrary to the original intension 
of the AU, which wanted to have two separate judicial institutions – the African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the ACJ. Originally,  
The ACJ was intended to be the principal judicial organ of the AU with its primary 
role being the authoritative interpretation, application and implementation of the 
Constitutive Act of the AU and the various Protocols. Its mandate also included the 
adjudication of contentious matters between state parties to the Constitutive Act on 
any issues referred to it by mutual agreement between states. The ACJ was not 
originally conceived to have competency to interpret the African Charter [on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights], although cognisance could be taken of the Charter. The 
African Court, by contrast, would focus on violations of the African Charter and 
would be the principal arm by which the Charter would be enforced.
692
 
 
Nonetheless, upon a suggestion by the then Nigerian president, Olusegun Obasanjo, 
who was then the Chairperson of the Assembly of the AU, made in July 2004, the 
AU agreed to merge the two courts on ground, inter alia, that there was a growing 
number of institutions at the AU, making the AU unable to support them financially 
and in terms of human resources.
693
 As a result, the AU Commission was requested 
to work out the modalities on the implementation of this decision, culminating in the 
set up of a panel of legal experts who met in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 13-14 
January 2005 to chart out and recommend on the way forward. The report of the 
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meeting was submitted by the AU Commission to the Executive Council of the AU 
at the summit in Abuja, Nigeria, in January 2005.
694
  In this respect, 
The AU Commission recommended that the [merger] of the jurisdiction of the two 
courts should be retained while at the same time making it possible to administer the 
protocols [establishing two courts] through the same court by way of special 
chambers, and the necessary amendments to both protocols be effected through the 
adoption of a new protocol by the AU Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government.
695
 
 
 
Further consultations between the AU organs (i.e. the Executive Council, the 
Permanent Representatives Committee [composed of ambassadors to the AU in 
Addis Ababa] and the AU Commission) and government legal experts from member 
states took place between January 2005 up until at the July 2008 AU summit when 
Justice Ministers formally adopted a ‘single legal instrument [“the Single Court 
Protocol”] to create an African Court of Justice and Human Rights.’696 Under Article 
1, the Single Court Protocol replaces the two protocols that established the two 
courts.
697
 As a result of the adoption of the Single Court Protocol, the Protocol on the 
Establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights would remain in 
force, in terms of Article 7 of the Single Court Protocol, for a transitional period of 
one year to enable the African Human Rights Court ‘to take necessary measures for 
the transfer of its prerogatives, assets, rights, and obligations to the African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights.’  
                                                 
694
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The effect of this decision is that ‘the African Court on Human and Peoples’ rights 
will be subsumed into the African Union Court of Justice, hence the name “African 
Court of Justice and Human Rights.”’698 This decision, however, has been termed 
‘highly controversial.’699 As Sceats contends, amongst the first institutions ‘to voice 
concern was the [African] Commission [on Human and Peoples’ Rights], which 
warned that the two courts had ‘essentially different mandates and litigants’ and that 
the decision could have “a negative impact on the establishment of an effective 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights.”’700 
 
In addressing this challenge facing the merger of the two courts, the new court has 
been divided into two sections: a general section dealing with disputes over matters 
such as powers of the AU and breaches of states’ treaty obligations; and a human 
rights section to deal with cases of violations of human rights. Under this 
arrangement, every section shall be composed of eight judges.
701
 
 
As Du Plessis earnestly argues, the decision to merge the two courts raises several 
legal issues. One of those issues is the question of the binding nature of the two sets 
of protocols. While Article 7 of the Single Court Protocol requires that the Human 
Rights Court Protocol should remain in force for a prescribe period of one year, the 
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amending Single Court Protocol will come into force thirty (30) days after it receives 
fifteen (15) ratifications.
702
 In the words of Du Plessis, 
 
The decision to merge the courts brings into focus the legality of amendments to the 
two instruments establishing the Courts. Regard is to be had to article 40(2) of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which provides that any amending 
agreement does not bind any state already a party to the treaty which does not 
become a party to the amending agreement. The result would be the anomalous 
situation whereby state parties are party to differing treaties on the same subject, 
giving rise to legal uncertainty and insurmountable problems with respect to 
enforcement.
703
 
 
Another critical issue regarding this merger relates to the lack of clear elaboration on 
the principle of complementarity between the new merged Court and the AComHPR. 
Although the AComHPR is one of the key entities eligible to submit cases to the 
Court,
704
 its role as a complementary human rights organ in Africa has been 
neglected. To the contrary, Article 2 of the Human Rights Court Protocol provides 
for a system of complementarity between the AComHPR and the African Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, ‘which has generally been interpreted to mean that the 
Court would complement and reinforce the Commission.’705 This anomaly may, 
however, be atoned by amending the Rules of Procedure of the AComHPR to bring 
them in conformity with the Rules of Procedure of the merged Court.
706
 
 
As many critics have observed, although the merger of the two courts was justified 
on minimising resources at the AU Commission, the delay in finalising this process 
and making the merged court functional, has in effect ‘simply prolonged the wait for 
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an African Court dedicated to human rights.’707 It is historically regrettable that the 
idea and dream to have an effective African Court on Human Rights was mooted in 
1961 at a conference of African jurists in Lagos, Nigeria. At this conference it was 
decreed that Africa needed a human rights charter with an effective court to ensure 
that human rights and basic fundamental principles are effectively realised. As set 
forth in the Preamble to “The International Commission of Jurists, African 
Conference on Rule of Law: A Report of the Proceedings of the Convention,” 
 
In order to give full effect to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, 
this conference invites the African Governments to study the possibility of adopting 
an African Convention of Human Rights in such manner that the conclusions of this 
conference will be safeguarded by the creation of a court of appropriate jurisdiction 
and that recourse thereto be made available for all persons under the jurisdiction of 
the signatory states.
708
 [Emphasis added.] 
 
 
Ever since the OAU decided to have a human rights court in 1998, slow pace has 
been made to ensure that the court is operational. Even after the court was made 
operational in 2006, the court has determined no significant cases
709
, with a number 
of the pioneer judges having finished their tenure.  This justifies the argument often 
advanced by many scholars on African human rights to the effect that African states 
are adamant to making human rights realisable in their jurisdictions. For instance, Du 
Plessis is of the view that, it is trite that human rights protection ‘is routinely viewed 
as being at the behest of states on the African continent. This is more obvious from 
                                                 
707
 Ibid, p. 542. See also Sceats, op. cit. 
708
 Available at http://www.africancourtcoalition.org/editorial.asp?page_id=16 (accessed 28 
December 2011). 
709
 However, the first case to be finally heard by the Court (Femi Falana v African Union, Application 
No. 001/2011) was publicly heard on 22
nd
 and 23
rd
 March 2012. This researcher attended this public 
hearing on an official invitation (as a member of the ACERCW) by the Court and he has notes of the 
hearing on file. 
181 
 
  
 
 
the failure of states responsible for human rights violations to implement the 
recommendations of the African Commission [on Human and Peoples’ Rights].’710 
 
In the view of Justice Kanyeihamba, one of the first pioneer judges of the African 
Human Rights Court,  
 
Since taking the oath of office in 2006, the judges of the African Court [had] not 
discovered any encouraging signs that they [would] be treated differently from the 
Human Rights Commission. Indeed, their situation appears to be much worse than 
that of the commissioners. The Commission’s advisory opinions can and have been 
ignored with impunity. The African Court’s envisaged jurisdiction would mean the 
delivery of binding judgments and orders that could adversely affect Member States 
and for this reason, its role as seen and expected by its legal fraternity, its judges, 
and indeed, the world at large, is resented and opposed by many states of the 
African Union, even though outwardly they express lukewarm support.
711
 [Emphasis 
supplied.] 
 
 
This attitude by African leaders and politicians will risk the human rights section of 
the merged court to being regarded as of “second class” to its counterpart: the 
general section. This is because of the historical fact that in the AU set-up and 
decision machineries, human rights issues have been perceived as less significant 
‘than the border disputes and other matters of “high state” [concern] which are likely 
to occupy the general section.’712 Going by the experience of the pioneer judges of 
the Human Rights Court, the AU organs have been regarding the human rights 
bodies of the AU as subordinate to them; thus, receiving low status, which 
compromises their effectiveness.
713
  
 
Leaving this pessimism apart, the key task of the human rights section of the merged 
Court ‘is to hear cases brought against African states for failure to respect human 
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rights.’714 The judgments and orders of the court shall be binding; whereby, in terms 
of Article 43(6) of the Merged Court’s Statute, the Executive Council of the AU is 
charged with the monitoring mandate of these judgments. In terms of Article 45, the 
Court may, ‘if it considers that there was a violation of a human or peoples’ right, 
order any appropriate measures in order to remedy the situation, including granting 
fair compensation.’ In addition, the court may also, by virtue of the provisions of 
Article 55 of the its Statute, issue advisory opinions ‘in open court, notice having 
been given to the Chairperson of the [African Union] Commission and Member 
States, and other International Organisations directly concerned.’ 
 
One of the problematic procedural matters pertaining to the proceedings of the court 
is failure to grant direct access to individuals victims of human rights abuses and 
NGOs. It is very saddening that at the very late stage of negotiations for the merger 
Protocol ‘African states voted to deny automatic standing to individual victims of 
human rights abuses and NGOs.’715 As is the case with the African Human Rights 
Court’s Protocol, although Article 30(f) of the Statute of the African Court allows 
individuals and NGOs accredited to the AU or its organs to submit cases to the court, 
Article 8(3) of the Single Court Protocol [in a more or less similar tone as to Article 
34(6) of the Human Rights Court’s Protocol], provides that, 
 
8.3. Any Member State may, at the time of signature or when depositing its 
instrument of ratification or accession, or at any time thereafter, make a declaration 
accepting the competence of the Court to receive cases under Article 30(f) involving 
a State which has not made such a declaration. [Emphasis supplied] 
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This rule is prohibitive of individuals and NGOs from accessing the merged Court in 
two respects: first, individual victims of human rights abuses and NGOs can only 
have locus standi if the state from which they are nationals or operate has made a 
declaration to the effect that they may bring cases to the Court. This aspect – which 
was orchestrated by Egypt and Tunisia
716
 – is prohibitive to NGOs and individuals 
victims of human rights abuses to access the court. Given the high level of hatred to 
human rights and the NGOs spearheading respect for these rights prevalent in most 
African countries, few African countries are expected to make declarations allowing 
NGOs and individuals to submit cases to the Court.  
 
This argument is backed up by the experience evidenced by most countries that 
ratified the African Human Rights Court’s Protocol, which has a similar provision in 
Article 34(6). For instance, of the 24 states that ratified the African Human Rights 
Court’s Protocol, only two – Mali and Burkina Faso – entered the necessary 
declarations allowing such access.
717
 This means that unless states do not make such 
declarations, this limitation will ‘render access to justice [under the merged Court] 
illusory for human rights victims.’718  
 
Second, the NGOs must first be accredited to the AU or its organs. Experience has 
indicated that only few NGOs are accredited to the AU and its organs; and the 
process of accreditation is not so much known to most NGOs around Africa as well 
as the accreditation process is not that much smooth and speedy. As Sceats argues, 
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the requirement for accreditation ‘constitutes a major difference between the Court 
and the European Court of Human Rights, where direct access for individuals (and 
NGOs and other entities which can show they themselves are a “victim” of human 
rights abuse) is now compulsory.’719 In a more liberal tone, the AComHPR has ‘long 
permitted NGOs to bring cases under the African Charter [on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights], even where they are not directly affected by the alleged violation (in other 
words, unlike in the European Court of Human Rights, standing is not restricted to 
“victims”).’720 
Recognising the negative implications of this limitation, in June 2008 the Coalition 
for an Effective African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights – a consortium of 
African NGOs – sent an open letter to the AU Assembly and Executive Council 
condemning the denial of direct access to individuals, in particular as ‘a step back in 
access to justice for all in Africa [that] dilutes the effectiveness of the continental 
judicial system and runs contrary to the provisions on access to justice in several 
international human rights instruments.’721 
 
This apart, entities that can have direct access to the Court, in terms of Article 29, are 
States Parties; the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the AU; the Pan-
African Parliament; and Staff of the AU on appeal ‘in a dispute and within the limits 
and under the terms and conditions laid down in the Staff Rules and regulations’ of 
the AU. Presumably, the latter applies to matters to be submitted to the general 
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section of the merged Court. Entities that can submit cases to the Court under Article 
30 include the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights; the Committee 
of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child; and African Intergovernmental 
Organisations accredited to the AU or its organs. 
 
In as much as the Court is yet to start working, as its founding Protocol has not 
entered into force, only expectations can be expressed at this stage. However, the 
merged Court is very significant in furthering the cause of human rights in Africa. 
When the Court becomes operational, it will expectedly make a reality the dream that 
has haunted Africa for an effective African Human Rights Court since the Lagos 
1961 Conference of Jurists. However, given all the obvious concerns raised in this 
analysis facing the merged Court, the future of this court will ‘certainly depend on 
the quality of the case law [it is going to] generate.’722 Nonetheless, in terms of its 
working relationship with the African peoples, the Court’s limited access by 
individuals victims of human rights abuses and NGOs may render the Court distant 
from the lives of the African peoples; thus, reducing its credibility before the very 
people it is intended to serve. This will, therefore, require rethinking the need to 
remove the above limitation. It is also expected that States Parties found in violation 
of human rights by the merged Court would respect and effectively implement its 
decision to avoid rendering it obsolete as has been the case with the AComHPR. 
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4.4.2 The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC) is the first 
and only single regional human rights treaty to specifically protect and promote the 
rights and welfare of the child in the world.
723
 It was adopted in 1990 by the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to provide for a specific and comprehensive 
mechanism for the protection and promotion of children’s rights and welfare at the 
African regional level.   
 
In order to fairly discuss the ACRWC, this study will discuss it from three angles: 
the historical framework of the Charter; its normative framework; and the procedural 
framework.  
 
4.4.2.1 Historical Framework of the ACRWC 
The adoption of the ACRWC was a very significant historical milestone that 
manifested the need for legal protection of children in Africa. It was a further step in 
this regard, following the promulgation of the Declaration of the Rights and Welfare 
of the African Child in 1979. The Declaration was adopted by the Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government of the OAU at its 16
th
 Ordinary Session. Before the 
adoption of the ACRWC, the OAU Secretariat also had recognised and streamlined 
various children’s rights in its programmes, including child trafficking, child labour 
[working in collaboration with ILO under the IPEC], and children in situations of 
armed conflict. African states also were committed to international children’s rights 
in terms of both ratification and implementation of the CRC. In the drafting process 
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of the ACRWC, CSOs – under the auspices of the African Network for the 
Prevention and Protection against Child Abuse and Neglect (ANPPCAN) – were 
involved and their views were considerably incorporated in the final draft of the 
Charter. 
 
Amongst the widely cited reasons for adopting the ACRWC is the under-
representation of African States during the preparatory work on the CRC.
724
 
Furthermore, in this preparatory work, issues peculiar to Africa were not clearly 
taken into account. These issues include issues of child soldiers, early marriage, 
female genital mutilation/excision, illiteracy, as well as the role of the family, in 
particular the extended family.
725
 Therefore, when the decision to formulate a charter 
for African children was taken up, it took into account all these issues. To date, the 
ACRWC has been ratified by 46 out of the 53 AU member states.
726
 
 
From the historical realities, the ACRWC ‘recognises children in Africa as direct 
bearers of rights and, in turn, children bear responsibilities to others.’727 As Lloyd 
points out, this ‘may be considered a controversial addition by Western thinkers, but 
it reflects the underpinning of African society, and positive conclusions can be drawn 
from this addition, once one understands the African concept of human rights.’728 
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The adoption of the ACRWC means that African states have an obligation to 
implement two international children’s rights instruments concurrently.729 They, 
thus, implement both the CRC and the ACRWC in a complementary mode. 
 
4.4.2.2 The Normative Framework of the ACRWC 
In principle, the ACRWC adequately addresses issues relating to the rights of the 
child on the continent in an African context.
730
 The African Charter reinforces the 
protection given to children by the CRC regarding, for example, the child’s best 
interests principle, the participation of children in armed conflicts, marriage and 
children marriage promises, refugee and internally displaced children, protection 
against apartheid and discrimination as well as socio-economic and cultural rights. In 
this part, we are not going to discuss all the substantive rights that are similarly 
provided in the CRC (which was done in section 3.3.2 above), but only those with 
some degree of difference with the latter. 
 
As already noted above, the ACRWC is more concise and clear in defining who a 
child is. In Article 2, it defines a child as ‘every human being under 18 years.’ 
Concerning parental responsibilities, there is a terminological difference between the 
two children’s rights instruments. While the CRC imposes obligations on parents in 
the context of “child’s custodians,” the ACRWC extends the parental responsibilities 
to “other people in charge of the child”. In fact, this is in appreciation of the concept 
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of extended family in the African context, which misses in the CRC. Parallel to 
parental responsibilities, the ACRWC imposes responsibilities on the child, which 
include the duty to respect parents and the duty towards the society, community and 
the nation. In this context, it can be argued that the concept of duties answers to the 
idea of the child’s participation in his family, community, and society inherent in 
Africa. 
 
Unfortunately, the Charter does not explicitly provide for a child’s right to social 
security, as appears in Article 26 of the CRC. In terms of criminal justice for 
children, the ACRWC does not have as clearer provisions as the CRC. For instance, 
it does not provide for the right to diversion in a comprehensive form as is the case 
with Articles 37 and 40 of the CRC. The ACRWC also does not strongly state 
anything relating to the CRC’s principle that deprivation of liberty should be used as 
a matter of last resort and only for the shortest possible period of time; except for a 
provision that obliges States Parties to ‘ensure that every child accused in infringing 
the penal law’ … ‘shall have the matter determined as speedily as possible by an 
impartial tribunal.’731  In addition, the ACRWC does not have provisions prohibiting 
life imprisonment without release or for challenging a detention order; nor are there 
provisions setting out the minimum age of criminal responsibility; and provisions 
making explicit reference to the requirement to established separate laws, procedures 
and judicial system for children. However, given the fact that the ACRWC 
complements the CRC, such lacuna can be filled in by resort to specific provisions in 
the CRC where the ACRWC lacks such provisions. 
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Nonetheless, the ACRWC contain clear and unequivocal provisions that provide 
guarantees to children in the criminal justice systems in Africa, including fair trial 
guarantees – that is, every child is innocent until proven guilty732; shall be informed 
promptly, ‘in a language that he understands and in detail’733, of the charge(s) against 
him
734
; shall be given legal and other appropriate assistance
735
; and shall have their 
matters dealt with as speedily as possible and is entitled to appeal.
736
 In the criminal 
justice system for children, the press is prohibited from attending trials
737
  to ensure 
that the child’s rights to privacy and dignity are guaranteed.738 
 
4.4.2.3 Obligations of States 
The ACRWC contains ‘a comprehensive, inclusive and progressive provision for the 
general obligations and responsibilities of state parties.’739 The obligations imposed 
on states parties to the ACRWC include taking necessary measures to implement 
provisions and principles in the Charter. The “measures” envisaged by the Charter 
include adoption of legislation, review and introduction of policies and other 
administrative or programmatic measures, including budgetary allocation, for 
children in accordance with laid down constitutional processes.
740
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Imperative to these obligations, is the duty imposed on African states to promote 
positive cultural values and traditions ‘as well as measures which promote those 
traditions and values which are inconsistent with the rights, duties and obligations 
contained in the ACRWC.’741 “Necessary steps” advanced in the Charter as part of 
obligations of states; pertain to introduction and implementation of mechanisms at 
the national or local level for coordination of policies and programmes relating 
children’s rights and welfare.  
 
4.4.2.4 The Procedural Framework of the ACRWC 
Like the CRC, the ACRWC’s implementation is monitored by a specialised body – 
the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
(ACERWC). The ACERWC was established in 2001 in accordance with Part II of 
the ACRWC. The ACERWC has extensive mandate than the UN Committee on the 
Rights of the Child (CROC), which ‘only has the jurisdiction to receive and 
comment on state reports submitted periodically.’742 Apart from receiving and 
commenting on state reports, the ACERWC has the mandate to receive and consider 
individual communications and conducts ad hoc missions and onsite visits of states 
‘considered to be violating their treaty obligations.’743 Nonetheless, basing on the 
principle of complementarity that exists, the two instruments protecting the rights of 
the child in Africa should not be seen as opposing each other. On the contrary, they 
are complementary and mutually reinforcing.  
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The ACERWC is composed of 11 independent members of high moral standing, 
integrity, impartiality and competence in matters pertaining to the rights and welfare 
of the child.
744
 These members serve in their personal capacity and are elected from 
amongst nationals of member states.
745
 Immediately after the ACRWC came into 
force on 29
th
 November 1999, the OAU requested members to submit nominations; 
but by November 2000 only five names had been deposited. This delayed the 
establishment of the ACERWC until 2001. The tenure of committee members is five 
years only. Unlike under the CRC, the tenure of the members of the ACERWC is not 
renewable. 
 
It is important to note, while assessing the work of the ACERWC, that it takes the 
principle of independence of its members seriously, unlike the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (AComHPR). The history of the AComHPR reveals 
that Ambassadors and Ministers from member states have been elected to serve as 
commissioners. But the short history of the ACERWC reveals a sharp contrast to this 
practice. During the Committee’s first composition, of the 11 members 3 resigned 
after they were elected to ministerial and diplomatic positions while still serving on 
the Committee.
746
 As Lloyd concludes: ‘It is positive to note that the members [of the 
ACERWC] take their role seriously and comply with such provisions. Not all human 
rights protection and monitoring bodies have adhered so rigorously to the 
requirements of impartiality and independence of committee members.’747 
                                                 
744
 Article 33(1) of the ACRWC. 
745
 Ibid, Article 35. 
746
  Lloyd, op. cit, p. 41. 
747
 Ibid. 
193 
 
  
 
 
The ACERWC has adopted its own rules of procedure to enable it to carry out its 
mandate smoothly and effectively.  
 
The ACERWC was established by the OAU at the time of its transformation to the 
AU. While the focus of the OAU was on political stability, peace and security, the 
AU focus has been more human rights-centred. This transition has impacted on the 
functioning of the ACERWC in many ways; significant to this analysis being 
budgetary deficiencies and inadequate staff to support its secretariat.
748
  For instance, 
the Committee’s first secretary was recruited in mid-2007 after five years of tussles 
amongst the committee members and the AU Commission.
749
 Lloyd reveals that lack 
of certain funding has been one of the stumbling blocks the ACERWC has been 
facing since its establishment. According to Lloyd, 
Due to the problems arising during the transitional period of the AU, the ACERWC 
has been [financially] resourced mainly through donations, inter-agency 
participation and collaboration. This has affected the work it has undertaken: there 
was a lengthy work plan from the outset, but when finance was not available, the 
ACERWC had to reduce its plans and rework priorities according to the donations 
received and conditions attached to some of the funding.
750
 
 At the same time, members did not appreciate ‘that any proposal they want to 
undertake in the name of the ACERWC, such as country visits, should be circulated 
to the Chairperson of the Commission of the AU to prepare an estimated costing.’751 
This has delayed funding through the AU Commission, derailing the work of the 
ACERWC in effect. 
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The above challenges apart, the ACERWC works with stakeholders including those 
who are not members to the ACRWC.
752
 In the regard, it works with 
specialized institutions, inter-governmental organizations, and CSOs.
753
 As 
Lloyd argues, this collaboration has helped the Committee to achieve its 
mission over the period since it was established.
754
 In order to facilitate this 
collaboration, the ACERWC has adopted the Criteria for Granting Observer 
Status in conformity with Article 43 of the ACRWC and Articles 34, 37, 81 
and 82 of its Rules of Procedure. These Criteria allow it to formally involve 
CSOs in its work relating to ‘preparation of complementary reports, 
submission of communications or undertaking of lobbying and/or 
investigation missions.’755 
 
The mandate of the ACERWC is four-fold: (i) general mandate; (ii) reporting 
procedure; (iii) communications procedure; and, (iv) investigation procedure. In the 
first place, the general mandate of the ACERWC is that it serves as the guardian of 
children’s rights and welfare in Africa, whereby it can conduct any activity for the 
furtherance of children’s rights on the continent. As with the CRC, the ACERWC 
has the mandate to receive and consider initial and periodical reports submitted by 
states parties in accordance with Article 43 of the ACRWC. To be able to do 
                                                 
752
 Mashamba, C.J., “The Mandate of the ACERWC and How CHRAGG Can Collaborate with the 
ACERWC in Order to Highlight the Issue of Children Detained in Adult Prisons in Tanzania.” A 
briefing paper presented by at the UNICEF-PRI workshop on “Developing Advocacy Strategies” held 
at UNICEF Conference Hall, Dar es Salaam, on 26-27 May 2011. 
753
 Article 42, ACRWC; and Rules 78-81 of the Rules of Procedure. 
754
 Lloyd, op. cit, pp. 43-44. 
755
  Ibid, p. 44. See also Mezmur, B.D., “Still an Infant or a Toddler? The Work of the African 
Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and its 8
th
 Ordinary Session.” African 
Human Rights Law Journal. Vol. 7 No. 1, 2007. 
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discharge this mandate effectively, the ACERWC has adopted in Rules of Procedure 
for this purpose.
756
 This mandate seems to be repetitive of the same mandate under 
the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child. In appreciation of this, the ACERWC 
has decided that  
in order to avoid repetition, and in order to encourage governments to fulfil their 
obligations towards both committees, whilst recognising the specific nature of the 
several provisions of the ACRWC, if a state party has already submitted an initial 
report to the CRC committee, whether that report has been reviewed or not, that 
state party would be invited to update the information already submitted and add 
information on the different provisions contained in the ACRWC.
757
 
Unlike the CRC Committee, the ACERWC has the mandate to receive and consider 
individual communications.
758
 With this mandate the ACERWC is better positioned, 
unlike the CRC Committee, ‘to make a valuable contribution to the development of 
children’s rights through the receipt of communications and holding individual states 
accountable for violating the provisions and principles contained in the 
ACERWC.’759 In this sense, communications can be made by any person, group of 
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 Rules 66, 67, 68 and 69 of its Rules of Procedure. 
757
 Lloyd, op. cit, p. 47 (note 26). 
758
 Article 44 of the ACRWC. 
759
 Ibid. Article 44. The first decision in the context of this provisions was made by the ACERWC in 
March 2011 in Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa (Banjul) and Open Society 
Justice Initiative (New York) (behalf of children with Nubian background in Kenya) v  The 
Government of Kenya. Communication No. Com/002/2009.  In this matter, the ACERWC was seized 
in 2009 with a Communication submitted by the authors alleging the violations of a number of Charter 
rights of children of Nubian descent living in Kenya by the Government of Kenya. The Government 
of Kenya has ratified the Charter on 25 July 2000, and has undertaken the obligation to implement all 
the rights in the Charter. The Communication alleged that children of Nubian descent living in Kenya, 
descendants from Sudanese Nubian members of the British colonial armed forces, have suffered, and 
continue to suffer, a violation of their rights. In particular, the Communication alleged the systematic 
and discriminatory denial to these children of their right to acquire Kenyan nationality that is essential 
to the enjoyment of their protected human rights. Apart from the right against discrimination (Article 
3 of the Charter) and the right to acquire a nationality (Article 6(3) of the Charter), the 
Communication alleged that the denial of nationality to these children also caused a subsequent 
violation of their rights to equal access to education (Article 11(3) of the Charter); access to health and 
health services (Article 14(2)(b) of the Charter); a violation of the prohibition against degrading 
treatment (Article 16 of the Charter); and an infringement of Article 20(2)(a) and (b) of the Charter 
requiring States Parties, in accordance with their means and national conditions, to take all appropriate 
measures to assist parents and other persons responsible for the child.  
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persons or NGO recognized by the AU, by a member state, or the UN. The 
communication must relate to the rights and welfare of the child covered in the 
ACRWC.  
 
Furthermore, the ACERWC has the mandate to undertake investigations on 
violations of children’s rights in any AU member state, which is not under the UN 
CRC Committee. This power, which is similar to that in the ACHPR empowering the 
AComHPR to do the same thing, is provided for in Article 45 of the ACRWC. In 
order to effectively achieve this mandate, the ACERWC has developed specific 
Guidelines on the investigations procedure.  However, the effective implementation 
                                                                                                                                          
The ACERWC, after considering the Communication in accordance with its Guidelines for the 
Consideration of Communications, and offering both parties the opportunity to share their views, 
declared the Communication admissible in 2010. The same decision on admissibility has been 
communicated in good time to the authors and the Government of Kenya. 
After successive requests made by the African Committee addressed to the Government of Kenya to 
share its views both on admissibility and the merits of the Communication failed, the ACERWC met 
on 22 March 2011 during its 17
th
 Ordinary Session and considered the merits of the Communication. 
The ACERWC was of the view that the best interests of the children involved in the Communication 
demanded that a decision needed to be made without any further postponement and delay.  
Therefore, the ACERWC, after a detailed consideration of the merits of the Communication, and 
based predominantly on the provisions of the Charter, but also by drawing inspiration from other 
relevant international and regional children’s rights law and jurisprudence, found the Government of 
Kenya in violation of its obligations in: 
(i) Article 3 of the Charter on non-discrimination, as children with Nubian background in Kenya 
are systematically discriminated against by the state on the basis of multiple expressly 
prohibited grounds;  
(ii) Article 6(3) of the Charter, as children with Nubian background in Kenya are deprived of 
their right to acquire a nationality (with the effect that these children are at risk of 
statelessness); 
(iii) And as a result of the violation as outlined in A and B above, Article 11(3) of the Charter as 
the right to equal access to education is denied to children with Nubian background in 
Kenya; 
(iv) And Article 14(2)(b) of the Charter, as children with Nubian background in Kenya are denied 
equal access to necessary medical assistance and health care to all children with emphasis on 
the development of primary health care. 
Since this decision was made in march 2011, the Government of Kenya did not implement it, 
prompting the ACERWC to decide (at its 19
th
 Session held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in March 2012) 
to undertake a mission in Kenya, which has been scheduled to take place in the second half of 2012. 
After this mission, the ACERWC will further recommendations to the Government of Kenya in 
respect of remedies that it deems appropriate in order to promote, protect, respect and fulfill the best 
interests of children of Nubian descent living in Kenya. 
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of this mandate is not realistic as the undertaking of investigations must be upon 
agreement with the state party concerned. As Lloyd argues, the provisions ‘are also 
wholly dependent on the extent to which states parties are prepared and willing to 
give full effect at a national level to any recommendations and proposals. Article 45 
of the ACRWC will further require state party commitment to provide the necessary 
financial and logistical support to enable investigations by the ACERWC to 
occur.’760 
 
All in all, the mandate and work of the ACERWC is very important to the realization 
of children’s rights and welfare in the African context. This is given further impetus 
by the provision for it to resort to other sources of information and inspiration from 
international law.
761
 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
The discussion in this Chapter has been devoted to the historical protection of 
children’s rights in the 20th century and its impact on contemporary protection of 
children’s rights at both the international and the African regional levels. The 
Chapter has tentatively traced the genesis of the notion of, and rationale for, 
children’s rights protection. It has also discussed modern trends in international 
children’s rights protection, whereby the protection mechanisms in the major 
international children’s rights instruments – including the CRC and the ACRWC – 
were examined in the contexts of their efficacy, implementation and applicability in 
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761
 Article 46 of the ACRWC. 
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municipal laws. In the context of this Chapter, the effectiveness of any human rights 
instruments is achieved only if there is an effective human rights protection 
mechanism that can render the treaty effective and meaningful to the people it is 
intended to serve. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
5.0 STATE OBLIGATION TO DOMESTICATE INTERNATIONAL 
JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS IN SOUTH AFRICA AND 
TANZANIA 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In many countries around the world, ‘measures have been taken or are underway to 
bring existing laws, relevant to children in conflict with the law, in line with the 
provisions of the CRC, in particular article 40’762 and Article 17 of the ACRWC. 
Whereas some countries, like Kenya
763
, The Gambia
764
, Tanzania
765
 and Uganda
766
, 
have adopted a composite legislation constituting provisions for protection of rights 
of children in conflict with the law and those for the care and protection of children’s 
rights in a single text, others have adopted separate legislation for the two aspects of 
children’s rights. Whereas South Africa has adopted the latter approach767 after it 
ratified the CRC in 1995
768
 and the ACRWC in 2000
769
; Tanzania ratified the CRC 
in June 1991 and the ACRWC in 2003. This means that South Africa and Tanzania 
are bound to implement the two children’s rights instruments at the domestic level. 
                                                 
762
 Doek, J., “Child Justice Trends and Concerns with a Reflection on South Africa.” In Gallinetti, J., 
et al (ed.), Child Justice in South Africa: Children’s Rights Under Construction (Conference Report). 
Open Society Foundation for South Africa/Child Justice Alliance, August 2006, p. 12. 
763
 Children’s Act (2004). 
764
 Children’s Act (2005). 
765
 Law of the Child Act (2009). 
766
 Children’s Act (1996). 
767
 Children’s Act (2005) and Child Justice Act (2008). 
768
 South Africa ratified the CRC on 16
th
 June 1995. 16
th
 June of every year is the day when the Day 
of the African Child is celebrated on the African continent in commemoration of the massacre of 
black children in South African in 1976. In the post-apartheid period, the CRC was the first 
international human rights treaty to be ratified by South Africa. See particularly Sloth-Nielsen, J., 
“Ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: Some Implications for 
South African Law”. South African Journal of Human Rights. Vol. 11, 1995, p. 401; and Odongo, 
G.O., “The Domestication of International Law Standards on the Rights of the Child with Specific 
Reference to Juvenile Justice in the African Context.” LL.D. Thesis, University of Western Cape, 
2005, p. 72 (note 18).   
769
 South African signed the ACRWC on 10
th
 October 1997, ratified it on 7
th
 January 2000 and 
deposited the instrument on 21
st
 January 2000. 
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Under both the CRC and ACRWC, all countries that have ratified these instruments 
have an obligation to implement them at a two-tier level. In the first place, ratifying 
countries have an obligation to implement these instruments through the international 
norm enforcement mechanism. In the second place, the ratifying countries have 
obligations to implement the instruments at the domestic level.
770
  
 
The discussion that follows in this Chapter, therefore, examines the specific state 
obligations to domestic the international juvenile justice standards in both South 
Africa and Tanzania in the constitutional and legal contexts. The aim of this Chapter 
is to set out a constitutional basis for the examination of the relevant juvenile justice 
related laws in the two countries as set out in Chapters Six and Seven. 
 
5.2  The Status of the CRC and the ACRWC in the Domestic Legal Order in 
South Africa and Tanzania 
The domestication of international child law in municipal law depends largely on the 
system applicable for the domestication of international treaties in each and every 
country.
771
 There are mainly two systems applicable to the domestication of 
international treaties in municipal law, namely, the monist; by which international 
conventions are directly incorporated into law, and the dualist system under which 
treaties can only be incorporated into national law by domestic statute.
772
  
                                                 
770
 Odongo, G.O., “The Domestication of International Law Standards on the Rights of the Child with 
Specific Reference to Juvenile Justice in the African Context”, op. cit, p. 68. 
771
 See particularly Odongo, G.O., ibid, p. 73; and Veerman, P. and B. Gross, “Implementation of the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza”. The 
International Journal of Children’s Rights. Vol. 3, 1995, p.  297.   
772
 Odongo, ibid. See also Mapunda, B.T., “Treaty Making and Incorporation in Tanzania.” East 
African Law Review. Vol. 28-30, December 2003. 
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The CROC, in its General Comment No. 5 on “General Measures”773 of the 
implementation of the CRC, has given endorsement through its interpretation of the 
system by which a state can domesticate international treaties.
774
 But, to a large 
extent, ‘the system chosen by a state can be deduced from looking at the state’s law 
and practice with respect to different international instruments.’775 All common law 
countries fall within the dualist system,
776
 which means that all such countries have 
to domesticate the principles enshrined in the CRC and the ACRWC through 
domestic statutes.
777
 So, Tanzania has domesticated the principles enshrined in the 
CRC and the ACRWC through the dualist approach, meaning that it has enacted a 
specific legislation to that effect. The South African position is founded on the 
commonality of the Roman-Dutch law common system, which also requires the 
passing of domestic laws to give effect to international law.
778
 Apart from enacting 
specific pieces of legislation to domestic international child rights law, the South 
African Constitution (1996) provides that a court, tribunal or forum “must consider” 
international law when interpreting the Chapter of the Constitution that constitutes 
                                                 
773
 CROC, General Comment No. 5: “General Measures of Implementation for the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child.” CRC/GC/2003/5 (Adopted at the 34
th 
session on 27 November 2003).  
774
 Ibid, paras 18-20.   
775
 Odongo, op. cit, quoting 
23
Lindholt, L., Questioning the Universality of Human Rights: The 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights in Botswana, Malawi and Mozambique. 
Aldershot/Vermont: Ashgate/Dartmouth, 1997, p. 85.   
776
 
 
See particularly Brownlie, I., Principles of Public International Law. 4
th 
edn. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1995, p. 43; and Sloth Nielsen, J., “Children’s Rights in the South African Courts: An 
Overview Since Ratification of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child”. International Journal 
on Children’s Rights. Vol. 10, 2002, p. 138.     
777
 For instance, Kenya in its Initial State Report on the CRC presented to the CROC and examined at 
the Committee’s 27th session in 2001 explained that: ‘The Constitution of Kenya does not specify the 
methods for transforming international treaties into municipal law. Kenya’s practice follows the 
English one whereby for a treaty to apply, Parliament must pass an enabling Act to give effect to it”. 
See CROC, Kenya Initial Report to the CROC. CRC/C/3/Add.62, 16 February 2001, para 46. On its 
part, Article 63(3)(e) of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania (1977) empowers 
Parliament to ratify international treaties signed by Tanzania before they become applicable at the 
municipal level.  
778
 Odongo, op. cit, p. 75 (noted 25). 
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the Bill of Rights.
779
 It also requires that in such interpretation, a court, tribunal or 
forum must ‘promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based 
on human dignity, equality and freedom’.780 Such constitutionalisation of 
international children’s rights standards in the South African Constitution has been 
behind a number of important judicial decisions based on children’s rights.781 In 
principle, 
A number of these decisions have dealt with juvenile justice, including the abolition 
of judicially imposed sentence of whipping by the constitutional court,
782
 decisions 
on the need to limit the duration of incarceration of juveniles,
783
and decisions 
affirming a constitutional imperative to restrict the use of life imprisonment for 
persons under 18 years of age.
784
 
 
As part of their international obligations, ratifying states are required to submit 
progressive reports to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CROC) and the 
African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
(ACERWC).
785
 The second aspect of states’ obligations under the two instruments – 
domestic implementation – is of great significance;786 because ‘the success or failure 
of any international human rights treaty should be evaluated in accordance with its 
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 Section 39(1)(b) of the South African Constitution (1996). 
780
 Ibid, Section 39(1) (a). 
781
 Odongo, op. cit, p. 107. 
782
 In S v Williams and Others 1995 (3) SA 632 (CC) it was held that judicial corporal punishment 
was unconstitutional. This holding was grounded in the CRC provisions on the right to protection 
from cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment in enshrined in Article 37.   
783
 In S v Kwalase 2000 (2) SACR 135 (CPD); and S v J and Others 2000 (2) SACR 310 (C) the CRC 
provisions regarding detention (Art 37) and the “soft law rules” on juvenile justice regarding the 
principle of detention as a last resort, were judicially considered.   
784
 Odongo, op. cit, p. 107. In Brandt v S [2005] 2 ALL SA 1 (SCA) the court considered the validity 
of the imposition of life imprisonment on persons under 18 within the framework of a minimum 
sentence legal regime in South Africa, and in light of the South African Constitution, CRC and the 
“soft law” instruments on juvenile justice.   
785
 The mandate, reporting and monitoring mechanisms of the CROC and ACERWC are discussed at 
length in Chapter 3 above. 
786
 Heyns, C. and F. Viljoen, The Impact of the United Nations Human Rights Treaties on the 
Domestic Level. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002, p. 1. 
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impact on human rights practices at the domestic level.’787 As discussed in Chapter 3 
above, under both the CRC and the ACRWC, States Parties’ obligations to 
implement these instruments in their respective jurisdictions are couched in such 
phraseology as States Parties shall take “measures to implement provisions and 
principles” in these instruments. As elucidated in Chapter 3, the “measures” 
envisaged include adoption of legislation, review and introduction of policies and/or 
other administrative or programmatic measures, including budgetary allocations, for 
children in accordance with the laid constitutional and/or principles and processes.  
 
The scope of domestic obligations imposed on the ratifying states by the 
international children’s rights law has been expounded by the CROC in its General 
Comment on “General Measures”788 on the implementation of the CRC. The CROC 
has expounded different mechanisms that are to be put in place and implemented at 
the domestic level. According to Odongo, 
These include the need for a comprehensive national strategy such as a National 
Plan of Action (NPA) on Children, independent human rights institutions such as 
children’s ombudspersons and national human rights commissions, making children 
visible in budgets, training and capacity building, international co-operation within a 
rights-based development assistance approach and local cooperation with civil 
society, amongst other measures.
789
 
 
 
In principle, the CROC has made it clear that ‘it believes a comprehensive review of 
all domestic legislation and related administrative guidance to ensure full compliance 
with the Convention is an obligation.’790 
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 Odongo, op. cit, pp. 68-9. 
788
 CROC, General Comment No. 5: “General Measures of Implementation for the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child.” CRC/GC/2003/5 (Adopted at the 34
th 
session on 27 November 2003).  
789
 Odongo, op. cit, p. 70. 
790
 CROC, General Comment No. 5, op. cit. 
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With regard to juvenile justice both Article 17 of the ACRWC and Article 40 of the 
CRC require that States Parties to take necessary measures for the full realisation of 
basic rights by children who come into conflict with the law. For instance, Article 
40(3) of the CRC requires States Parties to adopt ‘laws, procedures, authorities and 
institutions specifically applicable to children alleged as, accused of, or recognized as 
having infringed the penal law.’  This obligation ‘has been interpreted not only as 
requiring, at a minimum, that states establish juvenile justice systems but is also 
increasingly being construed as implying the need for distinct and dedicated 
legislation in the sphere of juvenile justice upon ratification of the Convention.’791 
 
From this exposition, it can be noted that ‘the interpretation of the obligation to 
undertake juvenile justice law reform as requiring separate and distinct legislation 
dedicated to juvenile justice influenced the South African law reform process.’792 
This has resulted in the enactment, by the Government of the Republic of South 
Africa, of the Child Justice Act, which is solely dedicated to juvenile justice; and the 
Children’s Act, which is dedicated to issues of child protection, care and welfare. In 
Tanzania, the Government has just enacted a composite Law of the Child Act, which 
combines provisions for child protection, care and welfare, on the one hand; and 
those regulating juvenile justice on the other.  
                                                 
791
 Odongo, op. cit, p. 71. See also Skelton, A., “Developing a Juvenile Justice System for South 
Africa: International Instruments and Restorative Justice.” In Keightley, R. (ed.), Children’s Rights. 
Kenwyn: Juta and Co., 1996, p. 183.  
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 Odongo, ibid. 
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5.3 ‘Direct’ Constitutionalisation of International Children’s Rights Law in 
South Africa 
South Africa has constitutionalised standards in the CRC and ACRWC in its 1996 
Constitution, which contains several provisions giving domestic application to 
international children’s rights standards. In the main, the South African Constitution 
‘acknowledges that children are physically and psychologically more vulnerable than 
adults.’793 It contains provisions protecting children’s rights, which entails the 
statement that children have the right not to be detained except as a measure of last 
resort and then for the shortest appropriate period of time, separate from adults and in 
conditions that take account of his her age. Therefore, in this section we look at the 
constitutionalisation of children’s rights in South Africa, in general, and the juvenile 
justice provisions, in particular. 
 
5.3.1 The Status of International Children’s Rights Law in South Africa 
Even before the adoption of the 1996 South African Constitution, children’s rights 
were given due recognition by the courts. This was a result of the ratification of the 
CRC by South Africa in 1995. For instance, one of the earliest cases to come before 
the newly constituted South African Constitutional Court (as a creature of the 1996 
Constitution) was S v Williams,
794
 which dealt with the sentence of corporal 
punishment. Until then corporal punishment was a sentence commonly used for the 
punishment of children by the courts in South Africa. Thus, in this case, the court 
                                                 
793
 Ballard, C., “Youthfulness and Sentencing Prior to the Operation of the Child Justice Act: A Case 
Review of Fredericks v The State.” Article 40, Vol. 14 No. 1, April 2012. 
794
 (1995) 3 SA 632 (CC). 
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struck down corporal punishment on the grounds that it was cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment. According to Section 231(2) of the South African Constitution, 
2. An international agreement binds the Republic (of South Africa) only after it has 
been approved by resolution in both the National Assembly and the National 
Council of Provinces, unless it is an agreement referred to in subsection (3). 
 
Under Section 231(4) an international agreement shall become law in South Africa 
when it is enacted into law by Parliament, save for self-executing provisions of the 
agreement, unless it contravenes the Constitution or national legislation. Legally 
speaking, this means that ‘South Africa generally has a dualist approach whereby an 
international instrument requires parliamentary approval for ratification and once 
ratified it must be domesticated before it can have the force of law nationally.’795  
 
Furthermore, Section 231(5) binds South Africa to international agreements which 
were before the entry into force of the 1996 Constitution. In terms of Section 
39(1)(b) of the Constitution of South Africa, provisions of international law – 
including those of the CRC and the ACRWC – can be relied upon by the courts when 
interpreting the Bill of Rights.
796
 In Government of the Republic of South Africa v 
Grootboom and Others
797
 (the Grootboom case), the South African Constitutional 
Court held that:  
… the relevant international law can be a guide to interpretation but the weight to be 
attached to any particular principle or rule of international law will vary. However, 
where the relevant principle of international law binds South Africa, it may be 
directly applicable. 
 
                                                 
795
 Saine, M., “Protecting the Rights of Children in Trouble with the Law: A Case Study of South 
Africa and The Gambia.” LL.M. Thesis, University of Pretoria, 2005, p. 21. 
796
 For a detailed discussion, see Dugard, J., “The Role of International Law in Interpreting the Bill of 
Rights.” South African Journal on Human Rights. Vol. 10 No. 1, 1994. 
797
 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC). 
207 
 
  
 
 
Parallel to this constitutional rule, are the provisions of Section 233, which 
provides that when interpreting any law, a court must prefer an interpretation 
that is consistent with international law ‘to which is consistent with it.’798 In 
addition, Section 39 thereof sanctions courts to invoke international human 
rights law while interpreting provisions of the 1996 Constitution. It 
categorically provides that: 
When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum … must promote the 
values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom; must consider international law; and may consider foreign 
law. 
 
 
In S v Makwanyane,
799
 the South African Constitutional Court held that international 
law, in this regard, includes both binding and non-binding international law.  
Interestingly, the foregoing constitutional provisions have been given binding force 
by the enactment of the Child Justice Act.
800
 
 
5.3.2 Protection of the Rights of Child Offenders in the South African 
Constitution 
The Constitution of South Africa (1996), regarded as one of the most progressive 
constitutions in modern time,
801
 protects children’s rights through the Bill of Rights. 
In essence, it affords children ‘a specific set of rights designed to nurture and protect 
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 Saine, M., op. cit, p. 21. 
799
 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC), para 55. 
800
 See particularly section 5.6.1 of this Chapter. 
801
 Mashamba, C.J., “Enforcing Social Justice in Tanzania: The Case of Economic and Social Rights.” 
LL.M. Thesis, Open University of Tanzania, 2007 (note 401). This Constitution has been referred to 
as one of the most progressive Constitutions in the world today, mainly because of the inclusion of 
economic, social and cultural rights in the Bill of Rights. It also goes as far as to provide for prisoners’ 
rights to adequate accommodation, nutrition, and medical treatment. [Section 35(2e)]. The 
Constitution is also progressive in terms of constitutionalising children’s rights generally and rights of 
children in conflict with the law particularly. 
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their particular interests and development.’802 In this context, the rights of the child 
protected in the Bill of Rights are grouped into two categories: general as well as 
specific child rights. Notably, the South African Bill of Rights contains two 
important drafting styles in respect of the inclusion of children’s rights in the 1996 
Constitution.
803
 Firstly, the rights of “everyone”, including children, to realise his or 
her rights as contained the Bill of Rights, including having access to adequate 
housing, health care services, food, water, and social security, as contained in 
sections 26 and 27.
804
 Also relevant in this regard is the right to further education in 
Section 29(1) (b).  
 
The second drafting style used in the Bill of Rights in the South African Constitution 
in respect of children’s rights is the express approach; that is, specific children’s 
rights are stipulated in Section 28 of the Constitution, which include rights of 
children deprived of their liberty. The rights in Section 28(1)(c) ‘are neither 
described as a right of “access to” the relevant rights, nor are they qualified in a 
similar form to the second subsections of Sections 26 and 27.’805 Seemingly, the 
absence of qualification in Sections 28(1)(c) and 29(1)(a) relates to the fact that these 
rights  ‘impose a direct duty on the State to ensure that those children who lacked 
these basic necessities of life are provided with them without delay.’806 In 
Grootboom, the Constitutional Court held that the State is obliged to ‘provide the 
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 Ballard, C., “Youthfulness and Sentencing Prior to the Operation of the Child Justice Act: A Case 
Review of Fredericks v The State”, op. cit. 
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 Mashamba, C.J., “Enforcing Social Justice in Tanzania: The Case of Economic and Social Rights”, 
op. cit. 
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 Liebenberg, S., “Taking Stock: The Jurisprudence on Children’s Socio-Economic Rights and its 
Implications for Government Policy.” ESR Review. Vol. 5 No. 4, September 2004, p. 3. 
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legal and administrative infrastructure necessary to ensure that children are accorded 
the protection contemplated by Section 28.’807 This obligation would normally ‘be 
fulfilled by passing laws and creating enforcement mechanisms for the maintenance 
of children, their protection from maltreatment, abuse, neglect or degradation, and 
the prevention of other forms of abuse of children mentioned in Section 28.’808 
 
Therefore, in compliance with this international obligation, South Africa first has 
constitutionalised the rights of the child, which specifically include the rights of 
children accused of committing criminal offences. As such, the discussion below 
details the extent of protection of general rights of the child and those of juvenile 
delinquents in the Constitution of South Africa. 
 
5.3.2.1 General Child Rights in the South African Constitution 
The general provisions that protect children’s rights in the South African 
Constitution include those enshrined in Sections 12 and 35. Under Section 28(3) a 
child is defined as any person below 18 years, which means that any person below 18 
years ‘is entitled to the protection under Section 28 without any discrimination.’809 
Discrimination against “any one” – including children in conflict with the law or 
those deprived of their liberty – is prohibited under Section 9(3). This provision 
enlists the ground for discrimination, including prohibition of discrimination based 
on race, gender, age, sex, disability, language, birth, culture, religion, ethnic or social 
origin. The prohibition of discrimination in the South African Constitution is in 
tandem with the provisions of Article 1 of the CRC and Article 2 of the ACRWC. 
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The principle of the best interests of the child is also provided for in Section 28(2) of 
the South African Constitution in the context of the CRC
810
 and ACRWC.
811
 In this 
context, this section demands that the best interests of the child are paramount in 
every matter – action and/or decision – concerning children; which should also be the 
guiding principle on any decision or action taken against or relating to a child 
deprived of his/her liberty. Nevertheless, this principle has been criticised by some 
writers for being ‘too broad ad vague and has failed to provide a reliable and 
determinate standard.’812  However, Goldstone, J., disagreed with this criticism in 
Minister for Welfare and Population Development v Fitzpatrick,
813
 observing that the 
best interests of the child rule should not be given exhaustive content; rather, it 
should be flexible in order to provide for the needs of specific children in specific 
circumstances. Similarly, the CROC has not provided any exhaustive criteria on the 
principle; but has emphasised that ‘in every decision or action consideration must be 
made on how it will affect the child’s rights and interests.’814 
 
In addition, Section 28(1)(d) of the South African Constitution provides that every 
child should be protected from neglect, abuse or degrading, or inhumane treatment. 
This protection applies to a child ‘at any period of time including when deprived of 
their liberty.’815 This section complements Section 12(c), (d) and (e), which prohibits 
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all forms of violence, torture, cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment against any 
person, including children. 
 
5.3.2.2 Specific Rights of Child Offenders in the South African Constitution 
Specifically, Section 28(1)(g) of the South African Constitution protects the rights of 
children in conflict with the law in that it makes mandatory that detention of such 
children should not be applied; unless it is applied as a matter of last resort and for 
the shortest appropriate period of time only. Augmenting international juvenile 
justice principles, the South African Constitution ‘recognises the fact that lengthy 
periods of imprisonment are generally harmful to children.’816 In similar terms with 
the CRC, the section does not provide an exhaustive guide ‘as to what amounts to 
“measures of last resort.”817 Nonetheless, it is important that ‘alternative measures 
must be employed to deal with the child and detention must always be the last option 
when these measures are not appropriate in the circumstances. In the event the child 
is detained then it must not be for longer than necessary.’818  
 
In this particular section, the South African Constitution provides for separation of 
juveniles detained from adult detainees.  It also requires that juveniles deprived of 
their liberty should be treated in a manner and kept in conditions appropriate to their 
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age and maturity, which is in line with international standards of the administration 
of juvenile justice.
819
  
 
In terms of Section 28(1)(h), the Constitution of South Africa guarantees the right of 
every child to free legal assistance in criminal proceedings paid for the state in cases 
where “substantial injustice” would otherwise result.820 This right is equally availed 
for children as well as adults in criminal proceedings. The phrase “substantial 
injustice” has been described by Skelton to include cases where a child is on trial and 
he or she does not have a lawyer.
821
  
  
Section 12 specifically protects children against physical restraints such as detention 
and imprisonment. In essence, it guarantees both procedural and substantive rights 
persons (including children) deprived of their liberty. In case there is such 
deprivation, the State is obliged to furnish reasons for deprivation of ‘every child and 
no child shall be detained without due process of law.’822 In addition, this section 
protects children against torture, cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment, which 
include corporal punishment and death penalty. In strict compliance to these 
provisions, in S v Makwanyane
823
 the South African Constitutional Court held that 
death penalty amounts to cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment; thus, it outlawed 
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Beijing, China, March 1999, p. 9. Available at www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/Publications/beijing.pdf 
(accessed 10 January 2012). 
822
 De Waal, et al, op. cit, p. 247. 
823
 S v Makwanyane, op. cit. 
213 
 
  
 
 
it in consequence. On a similar feat, the Constitutional Court outlawed corporal 
punishment in S v Williams
824
 on the basis of this section.  
 
In a more progressive approach, Section 35 of the Constitution of South Africa 
provides for the basic due process rights in the criminal justice – from the arrest stage 
to the sentencing stage. For instance, it provides that child deprived of his or her 
liberty must be released from detention if the interest of justice so permits, but 
subject to reasonable conditions.
825
 In application, this section should be read 
together with Section 28(g) that requires that detention of children should be a matter 
of last resort. In terms of Section 35(2)(d) of the Constitution, a child has a right to 
challenge the lawfulness of detention imposed upon her or him.  
 
Viewed in the above sense, as De Waal contends, although these due process rights 
in the South African Constitution do not seek to replace the statutory and common 
law principles governing the administration of criminal justice in South Africa,
826
 
‘the latter must comply with the provisions of the Bill of Rights and the rest of the 
[South African] Constitution.’827  
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5.4 ‘Indirect’ Constitutionalisation of International Children’s Rights Law 
in Tanzania 
The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania does not “directly” protect 
children’s rights828; rather it “indirectly” protects the basic rights and fundamental 
freedoms of every person in general terms. The term “every person”, in the context 
of Section 4 of the Interpretation of Laws Act
829
, means any word or expression 
descriptive of a person, which includes a child. Therefore, children are entitled to all 
the rights and freedoms set out in Articles 12 to 24 of the Constitution of Tanzania. 
In terms of Article 13(5) of the Constitution, discrimination of persons, including 
children, is prohibited.  
 
As we indicated in section 5.2 above, Tanzania ratified the CRC in June 1991 and 
ratified the ACRWC in February 2003 without any reservations, meaning that: 
‘Tanzania has undertaken to bring her domestic legislation in line with all the 
provisions of (these international instruments on the rights of the child).’830 
Certainly, this is in accord with the recommendations of the CROC, which has, on 
regular occasions, been emphasizing that it is an essential aspect of States Parties 
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thereto, while implementing the CRC, to ensure that all domestic legislation is “fully 
compatible” with the provisions and principles of the CRC.831 
 
In respect of Tanzania, the CROC, in its Concluding Observations in respect of the 
country’s initial report (1998) and the second periodic report (1998-2003), was 
concerned ‘at the lack of a clear time frame (for Tanzania) to finalize the consultative 
process and enact “The Children’s Act.”’832  It should be noted that, in its second 
periodic report to the CROC (1998-2003), Tanzania reported that it was undertaking 
legislative review and collecting views of stakeholders, including children, through 
the national ‘White Paper.’ It was reported that the National White Paper would 
engender “The Children’s Act.”833 Nevertheless, the CROC urged Tanzania to: 
[E]ngage all efforts and resources necessary for the enactment of the Children’s Act 
in Tanzania Mainland and a similar Act in Zanzibar, as a matters of priority. It 
further [urged Tanzania] to ensure that all of its domestic and customary legislation 
[should] conform fully to the principles and provisions of the Convention, and 
ensure its effective implementation.
834
 
 
However, when the lawmaking process was hastily undertaken by Tanzania in 2009 
several anomalies were discerned. First, Zanzibar
835
 and Tanzania Mainland
836
 
decided to enact separate child laws simply because children’s issues are not enlisted 
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in the list of Union Matters. Second, the process, at least in Tanzania Mainland, did 
not take enough time to enable wide consultations and adequate considerations of 
international child rights standards to be domesticated in the laws. Third, the child 
laws both in Zanzibar and Tanzania Mainland did not come out with coordination 
bodies of the various child rights stakeholders. Fourth, the two constitutions
837
 were 
not amended so as to constitutionalize children’s rights, particularly those rights 
relating to juvenile justice.  
 
As a result of the foregoing anomalies, the two child laws in Tanzania Mainland and 
Zanzibar have failed to do away with the problems that were inherent before these 
laws were not enacted. As indicated in this study
838
, the absence of a comprehensive 
child statute that would effectively protect children rights in Tanzania had, for a long 
time, exacerbated the worsening state of children rights in Tanzania.
839
  As the CRC 
Committee had noted, there are many laws (or legal provisions) in existence in 
Tanzania that, in one way or another, adversely affect the rights and welfare of the 
child in the country. For instance, the provisions Section 13 of the Law of Marriage 
Act, 1971, which allow a girl of 14 or 15 years to get married and a boy below 18 
years not to do so, are discriminatory as they provide inequitable treatment between 
girls in the same country. This is contrary to the provisions of Article 2 of the CRC, 
which prohibits children in the same country to be dealt with differently. 
 
                                                 
837
 See the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania (1977) and the Zanzibar Constitution 
(1984). 
838
 See Chapter Six of this Study. 
839
 See Mashamba, C.J., “Basic Principles to be Incorporated in the New Children Statute in 
Tanzania”, op. cit. 
217 
 
  
 
 
According to the Law Reform Commission of Tanzania (LRCT), this age structure 
has been criticized and various reasons have been advanced for change. The LRCT 
report mentions the reasons as follows: first, there are medical reasons which entail 
the reason that: 
[I]t is unhealthy and dangerous for a girl below the age of 20 years to give birth to 
children. The girl may become deformed and even lose life while giving birth. A 
child born by such a mother may be deformed and become a weakling. There is 
ample medical evidence that many mothers of tender age give birth by way of 
operation which is dangerous for the life of the mother.
840
 
 
Second, there are legal reasons to the effect that the ‘marriage contract has far 
reaching obligations than normal commercial contracts. The minimum age under the 
Law of Marriage Act is far too low in comparison with other laws such as the law of 
contract or election law.’841  According to Section 11(1) of the Law of Contract 
Act,
842
 a person under the age of eighteen is not competent to enter into a lawful 
contract, although he or she may only enter into contract as an infant for necessaries. 
At the same time, a person below the age of 18 years is denied a right to vote or to be 
voted for under Article 5(1) of the Constitution and the National Elections Act 
(1985)
843. For that matter, the LRCT report says that: ‘It has been argued that a girl 
below the age of 18 years may easily be coerced into a marriage by greedy parents 
and cause a lot of miseries to the girl in her married life.’844 
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Third, there are social reasons contending that, “early marriage deprive girls of 
opportunities to learn a trade of their choice or to continue with other post primary 
School training. On the other hand, for those who argued in favour of the present 
minimum age structure (15 years for girls and 18 years for boys), advanced the 
following reasons: 
First, some traditional communities recognize that once a girl attains puberty 
(kuvunja ungo) is considered as a grown up woman and capable of being married. 
Most of the girls reach puberty between the age of 10 to 15 years. Secondly, the 
statutory age for Primary School is at the age of 7 years he or she will complete 
compulsory Primary School education at the age of 14 years. If a girl does not 
continue with post Primary School training she will stay at home with her parents 
who argue that it is desirable to get such girls married off at the earliest possible 
moment to avoid embarrassments of child bearing out of wedlock.
845
 
 
In the opinion of the LRCT, there is a need to change the existing age structure for 
marriage which should be 21 years for both males and females. This age structure is 
slightly different from the CRC’s approach, which is 18 years. 
 
Another provision of the law that is repugnant to the principles of the CRC and the 
ACRWC is contained in the National Education Act,
846
 particularly the National 
Education Corporal Punishment Regulations (Control of Administration of Corporal 
Punishment in Schools) (1979) and the National Education (Expulsion and Exclusion 
of Pupils from Schools) Regulations (1979). Whereas the former allows 
administration of corporal punishment in schools, the latter provides, inter alia, for 
expulsion of impregnated school girls from primary schools. 
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At the same time, the Customary Law Declaration Order
847
  and the Local 
Customary Law (Declaration) Order (1963)
848
 contain several discriminatory 
provisions which impact on children, particularly girls. In particular, these codified 
customary laws discriminate illegitimate and girl children from inheriting their 
deceased male parents’ estates. In Elizabeth Stephen & Another v A.G.849 the High 
Court of Tanzania found several paragraphs of these customary laws to be 
‘discriminatory in more ways than one.’850   
 
The absence of a comprehensive statute for promoting and protecting children rights 
in Tanzania had caused serious predicaments to children in Tanzania, including 
rampant child abuses, neglect, school drop outs, early pregnancies, and early 
marriages.
851
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As a result of these anomalies facing children in Tanzania, many studies undertaken 
in the field of children rights in Tanzania have called upon the Government to enact a 
single legislation that would effectively protect children rights and welfare in the 
country.
852
 
5.5 Legislative Action in Favour of Juvenile Justice in South Africa 
The administration of juvenile justice in South Africa is currently governed by the 
Child Justice Act (2008),
853
 launched for implementation on 1 April 2010. The 
process for the enactment of this law began back in 1996 with the establishment of 
the South African Law Reform Commission (SALRC)’s Project Committee on 
Juvenile Justice. A Bill for this law was prepared in 2002
854
 and sought to provide 
for a dedicated juvenile justice system in South Africa. In 2002 and 2003 the Bill 
was debated and thereafter it laid dormant until it was revived and revised in 2008 
and later passed into law in 2009. The enactment of this law went parallel with the 
enactment of the Children’s Act in 2005,855 which provides for matters of child 
protection and social welfare. 
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The Child Justice Bill was signed into law by former South African President, 
Kgalema Motlanthe on 11
th
 May 2009
856
, after six years of debate and reworking. 
Speaking at the official launch of the Act in Soweto, Justice Minister Jeff Radebe 
said the legislation provides a criminal justice system specifically geared for children 
in conflict with the law. He said: ‘This is in recognition of the fact that the normal 
criminal justice system often fails to deal with the peculiar challenges facing 
children, such as their inability to understand the consequences of their actions.’857 In 
an effort to both humanize the juvenile justice system and to protect the rights of 
children in conflict with the law, the new legislation raises the minimum age of child 
offenders and provides for several diversion options. 
 
Like Ghana
858
 and The Gambia,
859
 South Africa decided to have a child justice-
specific law separate from the general children’s rights protection law. This was a 
result of several reasons, of greatest relevancy being the existence of ‘a strong non-
governmental organization (NGO) lobby for separate juvenile justice legislation 
which had commenced campaigning before the end of apartheid.’860 This resulted in 
the appointment of a project committee of the South African Law Reform 
Commission ‘to investigate proposals for a new juvenile justice system shortly after 
the entry into force of the 1996 Constitution which ushered in a democratic 
government.’861 
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5.5.1 The Demand for a Child Justice Law Separate from the Children’s Act 
The law reform for a juvenile justice-specific law in South Africa was made possible 
in the constitutional context of South Africa as discussed in section 5.3.2. The 
clamour for the law was also an impact of South Africa’s ratification of the CRC and 
ACRWC (discussed in section 5.3 above). In most African countries, South Africa 
inclusive, the ratification of these instruments has provided a climate for the re-
examination of the law relating to children along the principles and standards laid 
down in these instruments.
862
 As Odongo argues, the ‘search for new comprehensive 
children’s statutes began in South Africa before the ratification of the CRC in June 
1995.’863 This was because, 
The early 1990s was marked by the clamour for a new South African juvenile 
justice system to be underpinned by new legislation. The process of juvenile justice 
law reform was formally started with the formation of South African Law 
Commission’s Project on Juvenile Justice in 1996 … led to the Child Justice Bill … 
The Bill [sought] to provide for a dedicated juvenile justice system in South Africa. 
Further to this, a new Children’s Bill dealing with matters of child social welfare 
has now been passed by the National Assembly.
864
  
 
In fact, this clamour was hatched in the apartheid era in that country. As Amanda 
Dissel points out, apartheid resulted in ‘poverty, social exclusion, and deprivation for 
the majority of the black population.’865 Even after the successful negotiated 
transition to democracy in 1994, South Africa ‘continues to experience disparities in 
wealth, income, and opportunity.’866 This was coupled with the increasingly high rate 
of crime, particularly those committed by children and young people, contrary to 
early expectations that after the entrenchment of democracy crime rate would 
                                                 
862
 Sloth-Nielsen and Mezmur, op. cit. Pp. 332-8. See also Odongo, op. cit, pp. 77-8; and Sloth-
Nielsen, J. and B. Van Heerden, “New Child Care and Protection Legislation for South Africa? 
Lessons from Africa.” Stellenbosch Law Review. Vol. 3, 1997, p.  266.  
863
 Odongo, ibid, p. 78. 
864
 Ibid. 
865
 Dissel, A., “Youth, Crime and Criminal Justice in South Africa.” World Bank Legal Review: Law, 
Equity, and Development. Vol. 2, 2006, pp. 235-261, p. 236. 
866
 Ibid. 
223 
 
  
 
 
decrease.
867
 The effect of the increasing disparities in wealth and income in South 
Africa has ramifications on the nature of what Jock Young describes as a ‘vital 
ingredient in the criminogenic cocktail of late modern society.’868 This was 
evidenced in a survey of 63 countries around the world, which found that South 
Africa’s high crime rate was a result of, inter alia, the existing greater and worst 
income gap and inequality in the country. Amongst the countries surveyed, South 
Africa had the worst income inequality and the highest homicide rates.
869
  
 
In another survey that analysed crime and welfare data across all police precincts in 
South Africa, Demombynes and Ozler found that inequality around and within a 
given area were highly correlated to property crime, demonstrating that the returns to 
crime (i.e. the financial benefit to the criminal) were a major determinant factor of 
this type of crime. They also found that violent crimes were more likely to occur 
where there was a high degree of inequality within and around an area; whereby 
property offences – such murder and burglary – revealed a positive considerable 
connection between unemployment and crime. This was also the case with racial 
heterogeneity in an area, which correlated with all kinds of crimes.
870
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Set in this background, wealth and income inequality in South Africa have been on 
the increase, despite South Africa being among the 50 wealthiest nations in the 
world,
871
 sparkling unprecedented crime rates, particularly amongst juveniles and the 
youth. In this regard, children and young people are the most affected by poverty and 
marginalization; ‘and their experiences of social exclusion may contribute to risk 
drivers for crime.’872   
 
The harsh consequences of apartheid in South Africa towards the 1990s had specific 
relevance to juvenile justice, characterised by ‘the high rate of imprisoned children 
who in the days of apartheid were mostly political detainees and were subject to 
arbitrary arrests, detention without trial and sometimes torture.’873 So, 
During the 1980s the struggle in opposition to apartheid had extended the spotlight 
on politically detained children with calls for their release.
874
 The problem of pre-
trial detention was earmarked for particular attention in light of the burgeoning 
number of children, at the time, mostly detained in prisons and police cells without 
trial. With the move towards democratic rule from the early 1990s, this focus slowly 
disappeared and the campaign broadened to cover the general situation of children 
in conflict with the law.
875
   
 
To address these problems, a number of pieces of legislation were enacted in the 
transition from apartheid to democracy, culminating particularly in the adoption of 
the Constitution of South Africa in 1996 and later the Child Justice Act in 2008. This 
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was contributed to the presence of a strong NGO lobby in South Africa.
876
 In the 
main, 
 
The thrust of these campaigns was mainly fixed on the release of children from 
prisons and police custody - a feature that led to a number of legislative enactments 
aimed at limiting pre-trial 4detention of children.
877
 The commitment to address pre-
trial detention would later prove to be a dominant theme in the South African 
juvenile justice law reform process.
878
  
 
As already discussed above, this NGO lobby campaigned in the form of calling for a 
separate juvenile justice law throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, through 
numerous conferences and seminars – of significant relevance to the campaign for 
new legislation being the 1993 “International Seminar on Children in Trouble with 
the Law”.879 
 
5.5.2 The Consultative Process for the Enactment of the Child Justice Act 
The consultative process for the reform of the laws relating to juvenile justice in 
South Africa was highly coordinated by a Project Committee on Juvenile Justice, 
which was appointed by the Minister of Justice in December 1996 ‘to come up with 
recommendations for a dedicated child justice statute for South Africa.’880 Appointed 
and working under the auspices of the then South African Law Commission (SALC) 
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and J. Jepsen (eds.), Comparative Juvenile Justice. Copenhagen: Danish Institute of Human Rights, 
2004.  
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(now known as South Africa Law Reform Commission, SALRC)
881
, the committee 
comprised of six members ‘drawn from civil society and government and was 
assisted by a secretary and a consultant to the SALC.
882
 These members had different 
backgrounds in terms of their fields of expertise drawing from law, social work and 
sociology.’883  
 
The Committee adopted a “highly consultative process”,884 effectively involving and 
engaging CSOs, which was necessitated by the fact that the Minister had appointed 
individuals from civil society ‘whom he knew had been part of the NGO lobby group 
calling for substantial reform to the juvenile justice system.’885 In contrast, the 
reform of juvenile justice laws in Tanzania, which was made in a composite 
approach with the reform of other child-related laws in 2009,
886
 did not involve any 
such NGOs and it was made a secret until the Bill to Enact the Law of the Child was 
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published in the Government Gazette and introduced in Parliament for first reading 
in July 2009.
887
 
 
The Committee in South Africa consulted members of the public at three stages. 
First, it released an Issue Paper for public debate in 1997,
888
 proposing, for the first 
time, the enactment of a separate juvenile justice legislation. The release of the Issue 
Paper ‘was followed by a process of wide consultation with welfare, justice and 
prison officials and with individuals and organisations.’889 In fact, 
No less than 13 workshops and briefings were convened by the committee, which 
also advised the SALC to host a well-attended international drafting conference to 
discuss the feedback received. Extensive deliberations by the Committee on the 
views regarding the Issue Paper then ensued.
890
  
 
In the second stage, SALC released a lengthy Discussion Paper in December 1998, 
drafted on the basis of consultations regarding the Issue Paper. As Odongo reflects, 
the Discussion Paper ‘contained a draft Bill and these two documents formed the 
basis for subsequent country-wide consultation in the course of 1999.’891 This 
Discussion Paper was more comprehensive than the Issue Paper, ‘and in addition to 
including a draft Bill, it gave motivation and rationale for the content of the Bill 
besides reviewing existing law, available literature and foreign comparative law.’892 
 
                                                 
887
 See particularly Mashamba, C.J. and K.L. Gamaya, “The Enactment of the Tanzanian Law of the 
Child Act (2009): Some Lessons Learnt from CSO Participation in the Lawmaking Process’, op. cit. 
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The release of the Discussion Paper was followed by the last stage of further 
consultation ‘with relevant government departments, NGO representatives and 
parliamentary portfolio committees through workshops.’893 
 
Parallel to these consultations, the committee also consulted widely with children 
soliciting their views on the proposals developed.
894
 To be able to get children’s 
views on the proposals, a consultant was commissioned and produced its report 
henceforth.
895
 This mode was adopted from the Kenyan and Ugandan experiences, 
but the South African went further than the two examples by having a ‘specific 
objective of consulting children who had had experience with the juvenile justice 
system.’896 Some scholars have described this consultation with children ‘as one of 
the striking examples of the eagerness with which South Africa has sought to follow 
the precepts of international best practice.’897  
 
In the end, all views of the stakeholders so widely consulted were considered and 
incorporated in the SALC final report that informed the drafting of the Child Justice 
Act in South Africa.
898
 The final report was scrutinized by the Directorate of 
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Parliamentary and approved by Cabinet in November 2001. Thereafter, the 
Department of Justice redrafted it, giving raise to the Child Justice Bill of 2002.
899
  
 
5.6 Legislative Action in Favour of Juvenile Justice in Tanzania 
This part examines the child law reform process in Tanzania, by particularly looking 
at the basis for the claim for a child law and the participation of stakeholders in this 
process. 
 
5.6.1 The Need for a Comprehensive Child Law in Tanzania 
The need to have a comprehensive children’s law was voiced even before the 
adoption of the CRC in 1989 and the ACRWC in 1990.
900
 In 1986 the Law Reform 
Commission of Tanzania (LRCT)
901
 informed the Minister responsible for Justice 
that ‘it had established a working group to examine existing laws affecting children 
in Tanzania and provide recommendations for legislative revisions.’902 In its final 
report on the review, which took four years to be completed, the LRCT 
acknowledged that ‘there were already general indications and fears that the present 
law and practice relating to children’s problems in various socio-economic 
circumstances had been over-taken by the ever-changing circumstances.’903  
                                                 
899
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900
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Notably, the LRCT’s working group, which undertook the review exercise, did a 
very comprehensive review, having visited and did a survey in at least 12 regions in 
the country. It also sent out questionnaires to courts, local authorities, ministries and 
key state institutions responsible for children’s welfare. The team further visited 
Kenya and Zambia ‘to study legislation in those countries, and reviewed the laws of 
the United Kingdom and New Zealand.’904 Released at the time around which the 
CRC and the ACRWC were being adopted and implemented locally in various 
countries,
905
 the review report recommended, inter alia, for total repeal and 
replacement of the laws affecting children’s rights in Tanzania.906 
 
Since the LRCT report was released in 1994, the Government of Tanzania (GoT) 
expressed its intention to amend laws relating to children. In 2000 the Ministry of 
Constitutional Affairs and Justice adopted the LRCT recommendations. However, 
since then government efforts to enact a single child law became slow and sometimes 
with no specific focus. As such, in 2002/2003 the National Network of Organizations 
Working with Children in Tanzania (NNOC), supported by Save the Children, 
widely discussed and collected opinions and proposals from all stakeholders 
including children and came out with a proposed child statute,
907
 which was 
                                                                                                                                          
Group which produced the report was chaired by Dr. Ringo W. Tenga, an experienced advocate and 
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presented to the government as well. Supporting the recommendations of the LRCT, 
NNOC also proposed for a comprehensive children law.
908
 
 
5.6.2 The Basis for a Comprehensive Child Law 
The basis for pressing for a comprehensive legislation to protect and promote 
children’s statute is the fact that Tanzania ratified the CRC and ACRWC without any 
reservations, meaning that: ‘Tanzania has undertaken to bring her domestic 
legislation in line with all the provisions of (these international instruments on the 
rights of the child).’909 
 
Certainly, this is in accord with the recommendations of the UN Committee on the 
Rights of the Child (the  CROC), which has, on regular occasions, been emphasizing 
that it is an essential aspect of States Parties thereto, while implementing the CRC, to 
ensure that all domestic legislation is “fully compatible” with the provisions and 
principles of the CRC.
910
 
 
In respect of Tanzania, the CROC, in its Concluding Observations in respect of the 
country’s initial report (1998) and the second periodic report (1998-2003), was 
concerned ‘at the lack of a clear time frame (for Tanzania) to finalize the consultative 
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process and enact “The Children’s Act.”’911  It should be noted that, in its second 
periodic report to the CROC (1998-2003), Tanzania reported that it was undertaking 
legislative review and collecting views of stakeholders, including children, through 
the national “White Paper.” It was reported that the National White Paper would 
engender the Children’s Act.912 Nevertheless, the CROC urged Tanzania to ‘engage 
all efforts and resources necessary for the enactment of the Children’s Act in 
Tanzania Mainland and a similar Act in Zanzibar, as a matter of priority. It further 
[urged Tanzania] to ensure that all of its domestic and customary legislation [should] 
conform fully to the principles and provisions of the Convention, and ensure its 
effective implementation.’913 
 
However, it was only in July 2009 when the GoT introduced in Parliament a Bill to 
enact the Law of the Child Act (2009),
914
 which was read for the first time.
915
 
According to the long citation of the Bill, this is, 
An Act to provide for reform and consolidation of laws relating to children, to 
stipulate rights of the child and to promote, protect and maintain the welfare of a 
child with a view to giving effect to international and regional conventions on the 
rights of the child; to provide for affiliation, foster care, adoption and custody of the 
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child; to further regulate employment and apprenticeship; to make provisions with 
respect to a child in conflict with law and to provide for related matters. 
 
The Act was assented to by President Jakaya Kikwete on 20
th
 November 2009, which 
was the day when the world commemorated the 20
th
 anniversary of the adoption of 
the CRC. This historical event provides a step forward towards fulfilment of 
Tanzania’s obligations under international human rights law towards its children. 
The law is expected to create an environment to ensure maximum extent possible; 
the survival, protection and welfare of the child. This includes physical, mental, 
spiritual, moral, psychological and social development.   
 
5.6.3 Lack of Stakeholders’ Participation in the Child Law making in 
Tanzania 
Unlike in South Africa, the comprehensive child law in Tanzania was enacted 
without any significant participation of stakeholders. Surprisingly, the Bill to enact 
this Law was made public only 4
 
months before its passage in Parliament.
916
 Gamaya 
and Mashamba point out that the demand for a child law in Tanzania started before 
the CRC and the ACRWC were adopted. There are several reasons why the law 
reform took a long period of time to be completed in Tanzania, despite constant 
pressures from different circles, including CSOs and the CROC.  Amongst the 
reasons behind this prolonged process is the lack of political will on the part of the 
Government to enact the said law; and lack of coordinated lobby and pressure-groups 
                                                 
916
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amongst the CSOs themselves in Tanzania.
917
  In the next paragraphs, we shed light 
on the problems facing CSOs in participating in the child law-making process. 
 
5.6.3.1 Lack of Political Will to enact a Comprehensive Child Law in Tanzania 
On the part of the Government, it is disappointing to note that the law reform of the 
child laws in Tanzania took too long a time to be achieved as compared to other 
politically-motivated laws.
918
 Indeed, it took the state some 23 years to reform the 
said laws since LRCT started to conduct an empirical study on these laws in 1986. 
Although the Commission presented its findings and recommendations to the 
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs in April 1994,
919
 it took the 
Government some other four years to act upon it when the then Deputy Attorney-
General/Principal Secretary (Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs), the Late 
Kulwa Sato Masaba, formed a Committee for Reviewing, inter alia, the Report of 
the Commission.  
 
The Review Committee made its recommendations in 1998, proposing a number of 
proactive recommendations; seemingly, aiming at “overhauling” the entire children 
law regime so as to ground it onto internationally accepted children’s rights 
                                                 
917
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principles.
920
 This delay creates a feeling to members of CSO that the Tanzanian 
Government accords more attention to corporate matters than laws that affect the 
welfare of its citizen. 
 
At this stage, the Government in November 2001 decided to convene a consultative 
meeting to consider and provide inputs on three reports – that is, relating to 
inheritance, children and marriage matters. This meeting which brought together 
academics, women’s and children’s rights activists, lawyers, social workers and 
governmental officials, was organised by the then Ministry of Justice and 
Constitutional Affairs (MoJCA)
921
 in collaboration with the then Ministry of 
Community Development, Women and Children (MCDWC).
922
 The consultative 
meeting actually agreed with the LRCT recommendations regarding the need to have 
a comprehensive child statute.
923
 When the report of the consultative meeting, 
popularly known as the “Makaramba Report,”924 was submitted to the MoJCA it was 
‘decided that a cabinet paper should be prepared to allow for cabinet’s review of the 
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recommendations before legislation was prepared for consideration by the National 
Assembly.’925 
 
In June 2002, the Department of Social Welfare (DSW) convened a two-day 
workshop in Morogoro to review laws related to child rights in Tanzania. 
Specifically, the workshop aimed at gathering views and opinions from stakeholders 
about laws related to child rights; identifying gaps inherent in the existing laws; 
identifying challenges posed by different laws relating to child rights; and 
recommending amendments to the said laws. Again, the workshop was basically in 
agreement with the LRCT recommendations.  
 
However, the Government did not do anything, prompting the exasperation of the 
CROC, which, in its Concluding Observations in respect of the country’s initial 
report (1998) and the second periodic report (1998-2003), was concerned ‘at the lack 
of a clear time frame (for Tanzania) to finalize the consultative process and enact the 
Children’s Act.’926   
 
It should be noted that, in its second periodic report to the CROC (1998-2003), 
Tanzania reported that it was undertaking legislative review and collecting views of 
stakeholders, including children, through the national “White Paper.” It was reported 
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that the National White Paper would engender the Children’s Act.927 Nevertheless, 
the CROC urged Tanzania to expedite the lawmaking process.  
 
Considering Tanzania’s Initial Report to submitted in 2009, the ACERWC urged 
Tanzania ‘to work on the Concluding Observations made by the UN Committee on 
the Rights of the Child aimed at improving the state of juvenile justice in its 
jurisdiction, by particularly enacting comprehensive provisions in the juvenile justice 
standards; allocating sufficient human and physical resources; and conduct regular 
training to juvenile justice personnel to ensure that juvenile justice is administered in 
consonance with best practices and international standards.’928 
 
In a very interesting turn of events, in 2008 while presenting his ministry’s 2008/09 
budgetary speech in the National Assembly, the Minister for Constitutional Affairs 
and Justice, Hon. Mathias Chikawe, said the Government had no intention of 
enacting a single, comprehensive child law. Instead, the Government intended to 
make amendments to all laws affecting or touching on children’s rights. However, in 
his 2009/10 budgetary speech delivered in the same august house on 30
th
 June 2009, 
Hon. Chikawe said that the Government had already prepared a Bill on children’s 
rights to be tabled in Parliament at the end of the June-July 2009/2010 Budgetary 
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Session.
929
 This promise was supported by Hon. Margareth Sitta (Minister for 
Community Development, Gender and Children) when she addressed a stakeholders’ 
consultative meeting held in Dar es Salaam in June 2009.
930
 Eventually, the Law of 
the Child Act (2009) was at last passed by Parliament on 4
th
 November 2009. 
 
This turn of events on the part of the top government officials responsible for the 
children’s law reform only left a lot of unanswered questions. Was the Government 
really committed to see to it that the child law is effectively implemented? Were 
these conflicting statements meant to delay the process or show some measure of 
honouring the Government’s promise to enact the law, which had been repeatedly 
made since November 2001 when the then Minister for Community Development, 
Women and Children made the first promise to that effect.931 Besides, the way 
different ministries or government departments have been dealing with this matter 
shows lack of coordination of children’s issues on the part of the Government,932 
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three reports submitted by the Law Reform Commission of Tanzania in April 1994 on laws relating to 
marriage, inheritance and children. 
932
 In its recent Concluding Observations, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has raised an 
eye blow as to which state institution is responsible for coordination issues concerning children in the 
entire United Republic of Tanzania. See particularly United Republic of Tanzania, “The Country 
Second Periodic Report on the Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC): 
1998-2003,” Ministry of Community Development, Gender and Children; August, 2004; and United 
Republic of Tanzania, “Consideration of the Second CRC Periodic Report: 1998-2003 – Answers to 
Questions Raised for Additional and Updated Information to be Considered in Connection to Second 
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which is one of the reasons for delaying the legislative process; and might impede 
the implementation process of the new law. 
 
In contrast, it took the Ugandan Government only six years to enact a new child 
law
933
 after the coming into force of the CRC. On the other hand, the South African 
Government finalized the enactment of the Children’s Act934 in 2005935 and having 
enacted a provision in its 1996 Constitution
936
 that protects children’s rights.  
 
5.6.3.2 Some Religious Considerations 
Yet there are also other factors that affected the pace of the Government in the 
lawmaking process. This include the fact that, although all the reviews and 
workshops discussed above supported the need to have a single, comprehensive child 
law, there was in the offing resistance from some social circles, like religious groups, 
                                                                                                                                          
CRC Report during the UN CRC Committee Session on 15
th
-19
th
 May, 2006, in Geneva, 
Switzerland,” Ministry of Community Development, Gender and Children; April 2006. 
933
 Ugandan Children Statute (1996). 
934
 Parliament passed the Children's Amendment Bill on 22 November 2007. The President signed it 
into law on 13 March 2008, and its official name and number is the Children's Amendment Act (No. 
41 of 2007). It amends and completes the Children's Act (No. 38 of 2005), which was passed by 
Parliament on 14 December 2005 and signed into law by the President in June 2006.On 29 June 2007, 
the President published a proclamation in the Government Gazette for the commencement of certain 
sections of the Children's Act on 1 July 2007. Available at 
http://www.ci.or.za/frames.asp?section=lawreform (accessed 7 September 2011). The full text of the 
South African Children’s Act can be accessed at 
http://www.ci.org.za/deps/ci/plr/bills/ChildrensAct38-2005.pdf. 
935
 South Africa ratified the CRC in 1995 ‘and subsequently adopted the 1996 South African 
Constitution, which includes a special provision’ guaranteeing the rights of the child. See particularly 
ESR Review, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2003; Sloth-Nielsen, J. and B.D. Mezmur, “Surveying the Research 
Landscape to Promote Children’s Legal Rights in an African Context”, op. cit, pp. 330-353; Jonas, B., 
“Towards Effective Implementation of Children’s Rights in Tanzania: Lessons and Opportunities 
from Ghana and South Africa,” LL.M. Thesis, University of Pretoria, 2006; and Saine, M., 
“Protecting the Rights of Children in Trouble with the Law: A Case Study of South Africa and The 
Gambia,” University of Pretoria, 2005. 
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 Section 28 of the South African Constitution (1996). 
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about consolidating issues of marriage and inheritance into a single child law. 
Indeed, 
 
The social sensitivity of legislating what are customarily viewed as domestic 
concerns was clearly a concern among senior officials in Government, and this was 
the explanation for the decision to hold another round of public consultations in a 
white paper process after the Government considered the reports of the Law Reform 
Commission and the review committee.
937  
 
This, in effect, delayed the process; and, consequently, resulted in leaving out issues 
relating to child marriage and inheritance in the LCA. 
 
5.6.3.3 Lack of Coordinated Lobby amongst the Child Rights Stakeholders in  
Tanzania 
On their part, child rights stakeholders (including CSOs) were not vocal on the issue 
of not only having a child rights law but a juvenile justice one: because of lack of 
focused coordination amongst themselves, lack of resources (both financial and 
human) and their incapacity to push their advocacy agenda through the opaque 
government bureaucracy. For instance, NGOs have been looking for ways to 
participate in the preliminaries on the preparation of the Bill to no avail. The Bill was 
seen for the first time when the Government gazetted it on 10
th
 July 2009. This is 
contrary to what was done in South Africa towards the enactment of that country’s 
children’s laws: i.e., the Children’s Act and the Child Justice Act. As Lois Law 
opines, ‘it must be acknowledged that there was an extensive process of consultation 
with other national departments including Justice, Education, Health, Labour, Safety 
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 Tumbo-Masabo, Z. and V. Leach, “What Happened to the Children’s Statute?” Op. cit, p. 17. 
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and Security, the provinces, non-governmental organisations and service 
providers.’938 
 
The question of coordination has, in fact, haunted Tanzanian CSOs in the advocacy 
for a child statute. There has been lack of a strong CSO movement advocating for 
prompt enactment of the law, as was exhibited by women’s rights activists in the eve 
of the enactment of the most celebrated Sexual Offences (Special Provisions) Act 
(1998), popularly know as the SOSPA. The enactment of the SOSPA was greatly 
achieved due to strong coordination of championed by the pulsating stakeholders 
Tanzania Media Women Association (TAMWA). In fact, 
This example of sustained civil society pressure to bring about policy and legislative 
change has strong but limited lessons for children’s rights in Tanzania. The 
principal limitation is that a statute for children’s rights is not a single specific issue 
which would be universally agreed to resolve egregious wrong, even if the 
provisions of such a statute would go a long way towards protecting children and 
correcting abuse of children’s rights. The main lesson is that the strong coordination 
and resolve which brought about SOSPA seems to be sorely lacking on behalf of 
children, both within Government and among organisations of civil society.
939
 
 
Nonetheless, one of the more strategic and effective civil society labyrinth was 
recently championed by nola in the pre-enactment period. nola provided both 
technical and some financial resources
940
 from its stretched coffers under the 
Strategic Plan (2008-2012). nola had also collaborated with the now dormant 
National Network of Organisations Working with Children in Tanzania (NNOC) to 
                                                 
938
 Law, L., “The Children’s Act,” Briefing Paper 153 (Southern African Catholic Bishops’ 
Conference, Parliamentary Liaison Office), February 2006. See also Davel, C.J. and A.M. Skelton 
(eds.), Commentary on the Children’s Act. Pretoria: JUTA Publishers, 2006. 
939
 Tumbo-Masabo, Z. and V. Leach, “What Happened to the Children’s Statute?”, op. cit, p. 18. 
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 At some point, UNICEF and Save the Children supported the Taskforce, to which nola was a 
member, particularly regarding the convening of a stakeholders’ consultative meeting held in Dar es 
Salaam on 24
th
 and 25
th
 September 2009. UNICEF also supported the Coordinator and some of the 
coordination activities at the last moment leading to the submission of the position paper in October 
and November 2009. 
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gather and collate opinion from CSOs. Apart from holding several nationwide 
stakeholders’ opinion gathering meetings, NNOC members had gone as far as to 
commission two child rights experts to prepare a position paper as well as an 
alternative draft Bill of what principles should the new law contain. The documents 
were submitted to the Chief Parliamentary Draftsman (CPD) for consideration and 
incorporation (if relevant) into the Bill to be tabled in the Legislature. The two 
experts were Clement Mashamba (Advocate, Tanzanian) and Magnus Andersson (a 
Swedish lawyer then working in Tanzania).  
 
There was also another local NGO, namely the National Organization for Children 
Welfare and Human Relief (NOCHU). NOCHU, working on its own right, went 
around the country to collect and later collated the views of different stakeholders. 
On 28
th
 April 2009 and 10
th
 July 2009 the National Organisation for Legal 
Assistance (nola), on behalf of NNOC, presented the CSO Alternative Child Bill to 
the Parliamentary Standing Committee (Community Development) in Dodoma. The 
Committee welcomed the Bill and agreed to work in close collaboration with CSOs 
to see to it that the Government finalised the enactment of a comprehensive child 
law. On 7
th
 and 8
th
 October 2009 nola led its partner in presenting the CSOs views at 
a public hearing on the Bill to enact the Law of the Child Act (2009), which was 
organised by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Community Development. 
nola also did the same thing on 28
th
 October 2009 in Dodoma at a meeting involving 
members of the media, CSOs, line ministries and MPs.
941
 Again, on 3
rd
 November 
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 This meeting was organized by the Ministry of Community Development, Gender and Children. 
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2009, nola and partner CSOs made a final round of lobbying with MPs in the Pius 
Msekwa Hall at the Bunge premises. 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
Both the CRC and the ACRWC require States Parties thereto to undertake measures 
– legislative, policy, administrative and programmatic – to ensure that all rights and 
freedoms set out in these instruments are realised. In to comply with this obligation, 
both South Africa and Tanzania have constitutionalised human rights, particularly so 
children’s rights in the South African Constitution, which provide a range of 
protection to children’s rights, including those in conflict with the law. To make 
these constitutional guarantees more effective, both South Africa and Tanzania have 
enacted specific laws for the protection of rights of children in conflict with the law. 
The enactment of these laws was a result of the ever increasing global shift towards 
legislative measures taken by many contemporary states aimed at statutory 
domestication of children’s rights.  
 
In enacting these laws both countries undertook certain processes that were more or 
less consultative in nature. This Chapter has, therefore, examined the constitutional 
guarantee of the rights of children in conflict with the law and the paths followed by 
both South African and Tanzania in enacting the laws relating to the rights of 
children in conflict with the law. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
6.0 DOMESTICATION OF INTERNATIONAL JUVENILE JUSTICE 
STANDARDS IN SOUTH AFRICA: AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
LAW AND PRACTICE 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In Chapter Four  we observed that it is a well-established principle in international 
human rights law obliging states to domesticate human rights standards enshrined in 
a given international human rights instrument into their respective jurisdictions. It 
should be noted that this requirement is also embedded in Article 26 of the Vienna 
Convention of the Law of Treaties
942
, which establishes the principle of pancta sunt 
servanda, stating that: ‘Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and 
must be performed by them in good faith.’ Both the CRC and the ACRWC oblige 
States Parties thereto, inter alia, to domesticate international child rights standards, 
particularly those relating to children in conflict with the law. Such domestication is 
basically achieved through legislative efforts undertaken by States Parties thereto to 
give legal effect to the said instruments. In compliance with this requirement, South 
Africa has enacted the Child Justice Act (henceforth, the CJA) for the protection of 
children in conflict with the law as well as for the administration of juvenile justice 
system to domesticate international juvenile justice standards.  
 
This Chapter, therefore, examines the extent to which South Africa has domesticated 
international juvenile justice standards in the CJA. The Chapter begins by 
highlighting South Africa’s recognition of international juvenile justice standards and 
                                                 
942
 Done at Vienna on 23 May 1969, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties entered into force 
on 27 January 1980; and its text is published in United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, 2005, p. 331. 
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the supremacy of the Constitution in the administration of juvenile justice in that 
country. The Chapter then proceeds to examine the objectives of, and the guiding 
principles underlying, the CJA. It also examines the salient features of the CJA, 
which include the minimum age of criminal responsibility (MACR); methods of 
securing attendance of offending children in courts; release and detention or 
placement of children in conflict with the law; assessment of offending children; 
diversion and sentencing of children found to have offended penal law. In the end, 
the Chapter examines the provisions in the CJA relating to parliamentary oversight 
of the implementation of the juvenile justice law. 
6.2  Recognition of International Juvenile Justice Norms and the Supremacy 
of the Constitution 
The CJA, which has introduced a “new” and comprehensive system for dealing with 
child offenders
943
, is one of the progressive child justice laws recently enacted in 
contemporary Africa as it recognises principles of international child rights law. It 
also recognises the supremacy of the Constitution of South Africa on human rights 
generally and child justice in particular. The recognition of the supremacy of the 
Constitution of South Africa is set in clear terms in the Preamble to the CJA, which 
recognises it as the supreme law of the country adopted ‘to establish a society based 
on democratic values, social and economic justice, equality and fundamental human 
rights and to improve the quality of life of all its people and to free the potential of 
every person by all means possible.’ In respect of children in conflict with the law, 
the Preamble is clear in its elaboration thus: ‘the Constitution, while envisaging the 
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 Courtenay, R.M., “S v CKM & 2 Similar Cases (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae).”  Article 
40. Vol. 14 No. 1, April 2012. 
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limitation of fundamental rights in certain circumstances, emphasises the best 
interests of children, and singles them out for special protection, affording children in 
conflict with the law specific safeguards.’  
 
In clear terms, the long title of the CJA is emphatic on this assertion as it seeks to 
‘establish a criminal justice system for children, who are in conflict with the law and 
are accused of committing offences, in accordance with the values underpinning the 
Constitution and the international obligations of the Republic [of South Africa].’ It 
further states that the CJA seeks ‘to provide for the minimum age of criminal 
capacity of children’; as well as ‘to provide a mechanism for dealing with children 
who lack criminal capacity outside the criminal justice system’. The latter is very 
crucial because in many jurisdictions around the world the question of children who 
commit offences but are out of the age group canvassed by the criminal capacity is 
often left out. This usually results in a number of abuses of such children. 
 
The CJA also seeks ‘to make special provision for securing attendance at court and 
the release or detention and placement of children’; and ‘to make provision for the 
assessment of children’. It also seeks to make provision for child justice courts to 
hear all trials of children whose matters are not diverted; to extend the sentencing 
options available in respect of children who have been convicted; and to entrench the 
notion of restorative justice in the criminal justice system in respect of children who 
are in conflict with the law. 
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In principle, the CJA is set in the background which recognizes that: ‘before 1994, 
South Africa, as a country, had not given many of its children, particularly black 
children, the opportunity to live and act like children, and also that some children, as 
a result of circumstances in which they find themselves, have come into conflict with 
the law’. Thus, this background necessitated the enactment of this law. 
 
6.3 Objectives of the Child Justice Act 
The objectives clause of the CJA focuses on the promotion of the spirit of Ubuntu
944
 
in the child justice system through fostering children’s sense of dignity and worth 
and reinforcing children’s respect for human rights of others. Ubuntu, as a significant 
factor in African community solidarity on survival and justice issues, was better 
judiciously defined in S v Makwanyane
945
 by the South African Constitutional Court 
as: 
[A]culture which places some emphasis on communality and on the 
interdependence of the members of a community. It recognizes a person’s status as a 
human being, entitled to unconditional respect, dignity, value and acceptance from 
the members of the community such person happens to be part of. It also entails the 
converse, however. The person has a corresponding duty to give the same respect, 
dignity, value and acceptance to each member of that community. More 
importantly, it regulates the exercise of rights by the emphasis it lays on sharing and 
co-responsibility and the mutual enjoyment of rights by all.
946
 
 
Ubuntu, as an important African communal ethic, was also given judicial 
consideration by the Court of Appeal of Tanzania in DPP v Daudi Pete.
947
 In this 
                                                 
944
 This Bantu word is also explained in some Bantu vernaculars as Umuntu, ubunhu, ngumuntu, 
botho, ngabantu, etc. 
945
 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). For a detailed analysis of the import and dimensions of Ubuntu, see 
particularly Rwezaura, B., “Competing ‘Images’ of Childhood in the Social and Legal Systems of 
Contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa.” International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family. Vol 12, 1998, 
pp. 253-278; and Julia, Sloth-Nielsen and J. Gallinetti, “Just Say Sorry?” Ubuntu, Africanisation and the 
Child Justice System in the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008.” P.E.R. Vol. 14 No. 4, 2011. 
946
 S v Makwanyane, ibid, para. 224.  
947
 [1993] TLR 22 (CA). 
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case, the Court considered the African communal ethic to be ‘the co-existence of the 
individual and society, and also the reality of co-existence of rights and duties of the 
individual on the one hand, and the collective of communitarian rights and duties of 
society on the [which in effect] means that the rights and duties of the individual are 
limited by the rights and duties of society, and vice versa.’ 
 
In the view of Mokgoro, Ubuntu is a key social value which emphasises ‘group 
solidarity, conformity, compassion, respect, human dignity, humanistic orientation 
and collective unity.’948 Connecting Ubuntu and the concept of extended family in 
Africa, Mokgoro points out that: ‘a society based on Ubuntu places strong emphasis 
on family obligations. Although the concept of Ubuntu has proved difficult to define 
in the Western language
949
, in South Africa it is viewed as the basic constitutional 
value of human dignity; it is an idea based on deep respect for the human dignity of 
others.
950
  Concretizing the essence of Ubuntu in the African justice system, Sachs, 
J., held in Dikoko v Mokhatla that: ‘Ubuntu – botho is more than a phrase to be 
invoked from time to time to add a gracious and affirmative gloss to a legal finding 
already arrived at. It is intrinsic to and constitutive of our constitutional culture’.951 In 
Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers
952
, Justice Sachs of the South 
African Constitutional Court, J., held that the spirit of Ubuntu, as part of the deep 
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 Mokgoro, Y.J., “Ubuntu and the Law in South Africa.” Buffalo Human Rights Law Review. Vol. 4, 
1998. 
949
 See, for instance, Keevy, I “Ubuntu versus the Core Value of the South African Constitution.” 
Journal for Juridical Science. Vol. 32, 2009; and Julia, Sloth-Nielsen and J. Gallinetti, “Just Say 
Sorry?” Ubuntu, Africanisation and the Child Justice System in the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008”, op. cit, 
p. 69. 
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 See particularly Mokgoro in Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 6 SA 235 (CC), para 68 (per Mokgoro, J.). 
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 Ibid, para 113. 
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 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC). This case was dealing with the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and 
Unlawful Occupation of Land Act, No. 19 of 1998. 
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cultural heritage of the majority of the population in Africa, ‘suffuses the whole 
constitutional order.’  According to Justice Sachs, Ubuntu ‘combines individual 
rights with a communitarian philosophy. It is a unifying motif of the Bill of Rights, 
which is nothing if not a structured, institutionalized and operational declaration in 
our evolving new society of the need for human interdependence, respect and 
concern.’953 He suggests, therefore, that courts should be ‘called upon to balance 
competing interests in a principled way and promote the constitutional vision of a 
caring society based on good neighbourliness and shared concern.’ 
 
In terms of section 2(b) of the CJA, the promotion of the spirit of ubuntu in the child 
justice system is carried out through; first, fostering children’s sense of dignity and 
worth. Second, reinforcing children’s respect for human rights and the fundamental 
freedoms of others by holding children accountable for their actions and safe-
guarding the interests of victims and the community.
954
 Third, supporting 
reconciliation by means of a restorative justice response. Fourth, involving parents, 
families, victims and, where appropriate, other members of the community affected 
by the crime in procedures in terms of the CJA in order to encourage the 
reintegration of children. 
 
Furthermore, the CJA aims at providing for ‘the special treatment of children in a 
child justice system designed to break the cycle of crime, which will contribute to 
safer communities, and encourage these children to become law-abiding and 
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productive adults.’955 It also aims at preventing children ‘from being exposed to the 
adverse effects of the formal criminal justice system by using, where appropriate, 
processes, procedures, mechanisms, services or options more suitable to the needs of 
children and in accordance with the Constitution, including the use of diversion.’956 
Finally, the CJA aims at promoting ‘co-operation between government departments, 
and between government departments and the non-governmental sector and civil 
society, to ensure an integrated and holistic approach in the implementation of the 
CJA.’957 
 
Julia Sloth-Nielsen and Jack Gallinetti extrapolate several main characteristics 
underlying the provisions of Section 2 in relation to the introduction of the concept 
of Ubuntu in the CJA.
958
 They first argue that the theory of Ubuntu is characterised 
by ‘an understanding of the rootedness of child offenders in their families and 
communities (the expressions umuntu, ngumuntu, ngabantu are apposite).’ 
According to them, any resolution to the matter or outcome of the offence ‘must 
therefore take the child’s family and community context into account.’  They further 
argue that another way of looking at this issue relates to the communinitarianism 
which is said to differentiate Ubuntu and African philosophy from Western thought. 
Thus, Sections 2(b)(ii) and (iii) are probably indicative of  this dimension. It is 
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 Section 2(c) of the CJA. 
956
 Ibid. Section 2(d). 
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apparent, more clearly, in Section 2(b)(iv), which reinforces the notion that one’s 
personhood depends on one’s relationship with others.’959 
 
The second characteristic underlying Section 2 of the CJA, according to Sloth-
Nielsen and Gallinetti, is premised around the fact that ‘criminal justice processes 
and procedures adopted must be oriented towards values that are by definition held to 
be characteristic of Ubuntu.’960 Looking at the section one cannot fail to discern that 
these values underpin that the theory of Ubuntu ‘requires the fostering of a child’s 
sense of dignity and worth, and reinforcement of the child’s respect for the human 
rights and fundamental freedoms of others.’961 According to Sloth-Nielsen and 
Gallinetti, this broad ‘injunction clearly covers more than merely the end result of a 
criminal process (e.g. sanction or sentence) but spans the entire gamut of dealings 
with the child in the justice system, i.e. from the first contact (or arrest) throughout 
the procedure.’962 
 
The third characteristic advanced by Sloth-Nielsen and Gallinetti is the 
discouragement of revenge, banishment, exclusion or retaliation/expiation tradition 
of criminal procedure under African law, which are notable characteristics in most 
African criminal justice systems.
963
 Instead, the CJA accords with the well known 
dimensions of reconciliation and restorative justice, both of which are referred to 
directly among the objects of Ubuntu in section 2(b)(iii). This has to be in harmony 
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with safeguarding the interests of the victim
964
 and the community affected by the 
crime.
965
 This argument was seen most recently in the case of M v S (Centre for 
Child Law Amicus Curiae
966
) where Sachs, J. discussed correctional supervision as a 
sentence that allows for restorative justice: ‘Central to the notion of restorative 
justice is the recognition of the community rather than the criminal justice agencies 
as the prime site of crime control.’967 
 
6.4 The Guiding Principles of the Child Justice Act 
The CJA is couched in a very detailed, progressive approach with regard to its 
implementation in that it sets out certain Guiding Principles to enable smooth 
implementation. This represents a radical break with the hitherto traditional criminal 
justice system.
968
 These Guiding Principles must be taken into account when 
implementing the CJA.
969
 The principles are expressly set out in Section 3 of the 
CJA as follows: first, all consequences arising from the commission of an offence by 
a child should be proportionate to the circumstances of the child, the nature of the 
offence and the interests of society. Second, a child must not be treated more 
severely than an adult would have been treated in the same circumstances. Third, 
every child should, as far as possible, be given an opportunity to participate in any 
proceedings, particularly the informal and inquisitorial proceedings in terms of the 
CJA, where decisions affecting him or her might be taken. Fourth, every child should 
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2008. 
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be addressed in a manner appropriate to his or her age and intellectual development 
and should be spoken to and be allowed to speak in his or her language of choice, 
through an interpreter, if necessary.
970
 
 
Fifth, every child should be treated in a manner which takes into account his or her 
cultural values and beliefs. Sixth, all procedures in terms of this Act should be 
conducted and completed without unreasonable delay. Seventh, parents, appropriate 
adults and guardians should be able to assist children in proceedings in terms of the 
CJA; and, wherever possible, participate in decisions affecting them. Eighth, a child 
lacking in family support or educational or employment opportunities must have 
equal access to available services and every effort should be made to ensure that 
children receive similar treatment when having committed similar offences. Ninth, 
consideration should be made on the rights and obligations of children contained in 
international and regional instruments, with particular reference to the CRC and the 
ACRWC.
971
 
 
A cursory glance at the foregoing guiding principles reveals their importance in 
providing guidance and authority to the juvenile justice institutions and personnel 
implementing and applying the CJA. 
6.5 Salient Features of the Child Justice Act 
This part examines the salient features of the CJA, which include the minimum age 
of criminal responsibility (MACR); methods of securing attendance of offending 
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and J. Gallinetti, “Just Say Sorry?” Ubuntu, Africanisation and the Child Justice System in the Child 
Justice Act 75 of 2008”, op. cit. 
254 
 
  
 
 
children in courts; release and detention or placement of children in conflict with the 
law; assessment of offending children; diversion and sentencing of children found to 
have offended penal law. 
 
6.5.1 Criminal Capacity of Children and Minimum Age of Criminal  
Responsibility 
As opined by Odongo, the issue of age and criminal responsibility relates to two 
distinct aspects: first, it relates to the age at which children are deemed as having no 
mental capacity to commit a crime (doli incapax); and, second it relates to the age at 
which it is appropriate to render them liable to prosecution and formal sanctions (doli 
capax).
972
 In principle, the “age of criminal responsibility” refers to ‘the mental 
capacity of children (cognitive and connative) to commit crimes’973, for which they 
may be prosecuted and found guilty of offending.  Children below this age (the 
minimum age of criminal responsibility) are considered as lacking the capacity to 
commit crimes. Cappelaere, et al, define the “age of criminal responsibility” as 
referring to ‘the age at which a person is considered capable of discernment (the 
capacity to distinguish right from wrong) and therefore bearing the responsibility for 
his criminal acts. It is the age from which the child is judged capable of contravening 
the criminal law’.974 On the other hand, the age at which a person becomes liable to 
the adult criminal justice system (with the full procedures and penalties of the 
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 Odongo, op. cit, pp. 131-2, note 5. See also Bottoms, A. and J. Dignan, “Youth Justice in Great 
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ordinary criminal law being considered applicable) is treated as the upper age of 
criminal responsibility.
975
  
 
In assessing the criminal capacity of children at common law, courts consider such 
factors as the educational level, cognitive ability, domestic and environmental 
circumstances, age and maturity of the child, the nature and seriousness of the 
alleged offence, the impact of the offence on any victim, and the interests of the 
community. Other factors are the probation officer’s assessment report, the prospects 
of establishing criminal capacity if the matter were to be referred to preliminary 
inquiry, the appropriateness of diversion and other relevant factors.
976
 
 
(a) The Age of Criminal Capacity in International Law 
The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (the CROC) has often been concerned 
‘about the (very) low age of criminal responsibility in too many States Parties, which 
often belong to the Commonwealth and have inherited the low minimum age from 
British rule. The CRC requires that States Parties set a minimum age for criminal 
responsibility but without providing further information on what is acceptable in that 
regard.’977  Accordingly, the Beijing Rules limit themselves to the rule that the 
minimum age for criminal responsibility should not be too low. From the many 
recommendations of the CROC to the States Parties in this regard,  
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… it can be concluded that in all instances where the minimum age for criminal 
responsibility was below the age of 12 years, the Committee recommended an 
increase of that age without explicitly stating what it should be. However, it may 
nevertheless be concluded that the de facto acceptable lowest minimum age for 
criminal responsibility is 12 years and that the Committee favours a minimum age 
for criminal responsibility higher than 12 years.
978
 
 
As Prof. Jaap Doek (former chairperson of the CROC) argues, the practice of the 
implementation of this rule gives reason for concern. According to him, in many 
countries, ‘the prosecutor has the discretion to decide whether he or she will charge 
the child.’979 Because of this the CROC ‘is not in favour of the doli incapax rule and 
would prefer to set the minimum age at the level where the States Parties would like 
it to be in principle.’980 The CROC considers 14 years to be appropriate ‘as this is the 
age when children are considered to be doli capax.’981 
 
(b) Application of the CJA on Age of Criminal Capacity 
The age of criminal capacity in South Africa is determined in the context of the 
common law doctrine of doli capax/doli incapax, whereby under this rule a child 
below the prescribed age is presumed to lack criminal capacity.
982
 In fact, the 
rationale for this doctrine can be found in the Commission’s Report on Juvenile 
Justice ‘where it is reasoned that the presumptions create a “protective mantle” to 
immediately cover children of specified ages as each child’s level of maturity and 
development differs.’983 Thus, this doctrine ‘provides flexibility and protection for 
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children aged between 10 and 14 years who differ in emotional and intellectual 
understanding during those developmental years.’984 
 
In South Africa, ‘those children under 14 but over 7 years older985, are deemed to 
lack criminal capacity unless the State proves that the child in question can 
distinguish between right and wrong and knows the wrongfulness of offending at the 
time of commission of the offence.’986 However, this age has been criticised by Prof. 
Doek in the following regards:  
The minimum age for criminal responsibility of 10 years in the South African Bill 
does not meet this standard. One could argue that the minimum age is in fact 14 
years because children of 10 to 14 years of age fall under the rule of doli incapax, 
meaning that there is a rebuttable presumption that the child lacked criminal 
responsibility.’987 
 
Although the doli incapax presumptions were designed in order to protect children, it 
has been noted that they can easily be rebutted, and that they do not, in fact, present 
an impediment to the prosecution and conviction of young people. Zenzile, for 
example, provides a very interesting instance in the following regard: ‘mothers of 
children are asked to indicate whether their children understand the difference 
between right and wrong. An answer in the affirmative is often considered sufficient 
grounds to rebut the presumption of doli incapax.’988 
 
                                                 
984
 Ibid. 
985
 This age may be reviewed, with a view to raising it, in terms of section 8 of the CJA, which states 
that: 
‘8. In order to determine whether or not the minimum age of criminal capacity as set out in 
section 7(1) should be raised, the Cabinet member responsible for the administration of justice 
must, not later than five years after the commencement of this section, submit a report to 
Parliament, as provided for in section 96(4) and (5).’ 
986
 Zenzile, op. cit.  
987
 Doek, J., “Child Justice Trends and Concerns with a Reflection on South Africa.” Op. cit, p. 13. 
988
 Ibid. 
258 
 
  
 
 
Furthermore, the courts have noted that caution should be exercised where the 
accused are illiterate, ‘unsophisticated, and more so when they are children, with 
limited grasp of proceeding.’989  Provisions for the minimum age of criminal 
capacity are set out in Section 4 of the CJA. In terms of subsection (1) of this section, 
a child may possess criminal capacity if alleged to have committed an offence and 
‘was under the age of 10 years at the time of the commission of the alleged offence.’ 
A child may also possess the capacity to commit an offence if he or she was 10 years 
or older but under the age of 18 years when he or she was: handed a written notice in 
terms of Section 18 or 22; served with a summons in terms of Section 19; or arrested 
in terms of Section 20, for that offence. 
 
Under subsection (2) of Section 4, the Director of Public Prosecutions having 
jurisdiction may, in accordance with directives issued by the National Director of 
Public Prosecutions in terms of Section 97(4)(a)(i)(aa), direct that the matter be dealt 
with in terms of Section 5(2) – (4) in the case of a person who is alleged to have 
committed an offence when he or she was under the age of 18 years; and is 18 years 
or older but under the age of 21 years, at the time referred to in subsection (1)(b). 
Under Section 5(2) every child 10 years or older, who is alleged to have committed 
an offence and who is required to appear at a preliminary inquiry in respect of that 
offence ‘must, before his or her first appearance at the preliminary inquiry, be 
assessed by a probation officer, unless assessment is dispensed with in terms of 
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Section 41(3)
990
 or 47(5)
991.’ In terms of Section 5 (3) a preliminary inquiry’ must be 
held in respect of every child referred to in subsection (2) after he or she has been 
assessed,’ except where the matter has been diverted in accordance with Chapter 
6
992
; involves a child who is 10 years or older but under the age of 14 years where 
criminal capacity is not likely to be proved, as provided for in Section 10(2)(b)
993
; or 
has been withdrawn. 
 
Under Section 5(4) (a) a matter in respect of a child referred to in subsection (2) 
‘may be considered for diversion by a prosecutor in accordance with Chapter 6; or 
(ii) at a preliminary inquiry in accordance with Chapter 7
994
.  In terms of paragraph 
(b) of Section 5(4), a matter which is for any reason not diverted in terms of 
paragraph (a) must unless the matter has been withdrawn or referred to a children’s 
court, be referred to a child justice court for plea and trial in terms of Chapter 9
995
. 
According to paragraph (c) of Section 5(4): ‘A matter in respect of a child referred to 
in paragraph (b) may, before the conclusion of the case for the prosecution, be 
considered for diversion by a child justice court in terms of Chapter 9.’ 
 
(c) Criminal Capacity of Children under the Age of 14 Years 
The second arm of age of criminal responsibility under the CJA relates to those 
children committing offences under the age of 14 years. In terms of Section 7(1), a 
child who commits an offence while under the age of 10 years ‘does not have 
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criminal capacity and cannot be prosecuted for that offence, but must be dealt with in 
terms of Section 9.
996
 The provisions on how to deal with children committing 
offences but are under the age of criminal responsibility are in line with 
contemporary international law requirement that states must also legislate on how to 
deal with such children while setting the minimum age of criminal responsibility.
997
 
It has been said that ‘failure to recognize a link between setting a minimum age and 
how to deal with children below the minimum age leads to the possibility of serious 
violations of children’s rights. This makes provision for children below the minimum 
age a key to this aspect of the children’s rights model, just as the rule on setting a 
minimum age is.’998 
 
Therefore, the CJA has set out the manner through which children who are under the 
minimum age of criminal responsibility should be dealt with. This is set out in 
Section 9(1), which provides that: ‘Where a police official has reason to believe that 
a child suspected of having committed an offence is under the age of 10 years, he or 
she may not arrest the child.’ Such police official must immediately hand the child 
over to his or her parents or an appropriate adult or a guardian. If there is no parent, 
appropriate adult or a guardian is available or if it is not in the best interests of the 
child to be handed over to the parent, an appropriate adult or a guardian, a child 
should be handed over to a suitable child and youth care centre, and the police 
official must notify a probation officer about this action. 
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A probation officer, who receives notification from a police official in terms of 
subsection (1) of Section 9, must assess the child in terms of the provisions of 
Chapter 5
999
 which are applicable to children under the age of 10 years as soon as 
possible; but not later than seven days after being so notified.
1000
 According to 
Section 9(3)(a), after assessing
1001
 a child in terms of subsection (2), the probation 
officer may: 
(a)   refer the child to the children’s court on any of the grounds set out in section 
50; 
(b)  refer the child for counselling or therapy; 
(c)   refer the child to an accredited programme designed specifically to suit the 
needs of children under the age of 10 years; 
(d)  arrange support services for the child; 
(e)   arrange a meeting, which must be attended by the child, his or her parent or 
an appropriate adult or a guardian, and which may be attended by any other 
person likely to provide information for the purposes of the meeting referred 
to in subsection (4); or 
(f)   decide to take no action. 
 
It should be noted, however, that under Section 9(3)(b), any action taken under 
paragraph (a) ‘does not imply that the child is criminally liable for the incident that 
led to the assessment.’ 
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In the event of a child failing to comply with any obligation imposed in terms of this 
section, including compliance with the written plan referred to in subsection (4)(b), 
the probation officer must refer the matter to a children’s court to be dealt with in 
terms of Chapter 9 of the CJA.
1002
 Under subsection (2) of Section 7 of the CJA, a 
child ‘who is 10 years or older but under the age of 14 years and who commits an 
offence is presumed to lack criminal capacity, unless the State proves that he or she 
has criminal capacity in accordance with section 11’1003.  
 
The implication of this rule in practice is embedded in the common law
1004
 rebuttable 
presumption that ‘children under the age of fourteen years [are] doli incapax1005 in 
the sense that a case against an alleged child offender under 14 years of age would 
not proceed until the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant 
was capable of appreciating the difference between right and wrong.’1006 The CJA is 
very emphatic on this issue as under Section 11(1) it makes mandatory that the State 
must prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that a child who is 10 years or older but under 
the age of 14 years, has the capacity to appreciate the difference between right and 
wrong at the time of the commission of an alleged offence and to act in accordance 
with that appreciation. 
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The rationale for this requirement is also a common law creature predicated in the 
principle that ‘young children are slow to develop mental capacity and … that the 
criminal justice system is an inappropriate place to deal with their misbehaviour.’1007 
Accordingly, in making a decision regarding the criminal capacity of the child in 
question, the inquiry magistrate, for purposes of diversion; or,  if the matter has not 
been diverted, the child justice court, for purposes of plea and trial, must consider the 
assessment report of the probation officer referred to in Section 40 and all evidence 
placed before the inquiry magistrate or child justice court prior to diversion or 
conviction, as the case may be, which evidence may include a report of an evaluation 
referred to in subsection (3) of Section 11.
1008
 
 
In terms of subsection (3) of Section 11 of the CJA, an inquiry magistrate or child 
justice court may, suo mottu, or on the request of the prosecutor or the child’s legal 
representative, order an evaluation of the criminal capacity of the child referred to in 
subsection (1) of Section 11 by a suitably qualified person. The evaluation must 
include an assessment of the cognitive, moral, emotional, psychological and social 
development of the child. If an order has been made by the inquiry magistrate or 
child justice court in terms of subsection (3) of section 11, the person identified to 
conduct an evaluation of the child must furnish the inquiry magistrate or child justice 
court with a written report of the evaluation within 30 days of the date of the 
order.
1009
 Where an inquiry magistrate or child justice court has found that a child’s 
criminal capacity has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, the inquiry 
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magistrate or child justice court may, if it is in the interests of the child, cause the 
child to be taken to a probation officer for any further action in terms of Section 
9.
1010
 
 
In view of subsection (2) of Section 10 of the CJA, if the prosecutor decides in 
respect of a child referred to in subsection (1) that criminal capacity is likely to be 
proved in terms of Section 11, he or she may undertake one of the following options: 
divert the matter in terms of Chapter 6 if the child is alleged to have committed an 
offence referred to in Schedule 1; or refer the matter to a preliminary inquiry as 
provided for in Chapter 7. If the offence not likely to be proved in terms of Section 
11, the prosecutor may cause the child to be taken to a probation officer to be dealt 
with in terms of Section 9. 
 
(d) Age Determination and/or Estimation  
In order to adequately decide whether or not to process a child who has committed an 
offence in the juvenile justice system it is always fundamental to determine the age 
of such child. In recognition of this notion, the CJA has set out specific provisions 
for determination of age of the child to be dealt with in the juvenile justice system. 
There are certain circumstances in which age can be determined or estimated under 
the CJA: estimation by a probation officer, an inquiry magistrate, a child justice court 
or any other court before which a child is charged. These circumstances are 
described below. 
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(i) Responsibility of a Police Officer where Age of a Child is Uncertain 
The duty to facilitate determination of age lies first with a police officer involved in 
the processing of a child accused of committing an offence. Under Section 12(a) if a 
police official is uncertain about the age of a person suspected of having committed 
an offence but has reason to believe that the person may be a child under the age of 
10 years, the official must act in accordance with the provisions of Section 9 of the 
CJA, which deals with the manner of dealing with child under the age of 10 years. If 
the official is uncertain about the age of a person suspected of having committed an 
offence but has reason to believe that the person may be a child who is 10 years or 
older but under the age of 14 years, or a child who is 14 years or older but under the 
age of 18 years, the police official must treat the person as a child. In such case due 
regard must be had to the provisions relating to arrest in terms of Chapter 3; or 
release or detention in terms of Chapter 4, and, in particular, Section 27 relating to 
placement options before a child’s first appearance at a preliminary inquiry.1011 
 
(ii) Age Estimation by a Probation Officer 
A probation officer is duty-bound, under Section 13(1) of the CJA, to estimate the 
age of the child during an assessment of a child in terms of Chapter 5 of the CJA. 
The age of the child to be so determined must be the age at the time of the 
commission of the alleged offence. In making the estimation, the probation officer 
must consider any available information, including: a previous determination of age 
by a magistrate under the CJA or under the Criminal Procedure Act (the CPA) or an 
estimation of age in terms of the Children’s Act. Statements made by a parent, an 
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appropriate adult, guardian or any other person, including a religious or community 
leader, likely to have direct knowledge of the age of the child may also be 
considered. A statement made by the child concerned as well as a school registration 
form, school report, other document of a similar nature, a baptismal or other similar 
religious certificate should be considered. An estimation of age by a medical 
practitioner can also be considered.
1012
 
 
Under subsection (3) of Section 13 of the CJA, the probation officer ‘must submit the 
estimation on the prescribed form, together with any relevant documentation to the 
inquiry magistrate before the child’s appearance at a preliminary inquiry.’ However, 
the estimation of age by a probation officer in terms of this section may be altered 
and a different estimation of age may be recorded when evidence to the contrary 
emerge at any stage before sentence is passed.
1013
 
 
(iii) Age Determination by an Inquiry Magistrate or Child Justice Court 
An inquiry magistrate or a child justice court also may determine the age of a child 
charged before it, if, during a preliminary inquiry or during proceedings before a 
child justice court, the age of a child at the time of the commission of the alleged 
offence is uncertain.
1014
 In order to determine the age of a child, a presiding court 
officer may: first, consider the form and any documentation submitted by the 
probation officer in terms of Section 13(3); second, require any relevant 
documentation, information or statement from any person; third, subpoena any 
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person to produce the documentation, information or statements referred to in 
paragraph (b); or, fourth, if necessary, refer the child to a medical practitioner, in the 
prescribed manner, for an estimation of age.
1015
 
 
Under Section 14(3) (a), the presiding officer is obliged to ‘enter the age determined 
in terms of subsection (1) into the record of the proceedings as the age of the child.’ 
When evidence to the contrary emerges, the presiding officer ‘must alter the record 
to reflect the correct age.’1016 
 
(iv) Age Determination by Any Other Court 
The determination of age of a person appearing before any other court may be done 
by the court where there is any uncertainty as to whether such person was over or 
under the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the alleged offence. When 
this is done, the court must: first, determine the age of that person in accordance with 
Section 14
1017
; and, second, where necessary, ‘alter the record to reflect the correct 
age of that person, in accordance with the provisions of Section 16, which apply with 
the changes required by the context.’1018 
 
(v) Alteration of Error Regarding Age of a Child or Adult before the Court 
As it can be gathered from the provisions of Sections 13, 14 and 15 of the CJA 
discussed above, the age determined or estimated by the respective persons is not 
written on stones. The law is reasonably flexible where there are emerging 
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circumstances indicating that the age first determined was erroneous, consequent to 
which the concerned officer, particularly the presiding court officer, has power to 
alter such age in writing. 
 
This legal flexibility is specifically canvassed by the provisions of Section 16(1) of 
the CJA, which provides that, 
16. (1) If, at any stage during proceedings in terms of this Act, a presiding officer is 
satisfied on the basis of evidence placed before him or her that the age of a child or 
adult who is alleged to have committed an offence (hereafter in this section referred 
to as person) is incorrect, the age must be altered on the record of the proceedings in 
accordance with section 14. 
 
When this happens, the proceedings must be finalised in accordance with the 
provisions of the CJA, if the person is found to be a child
1019
; or the CPA, if the 
person is found to be an adult, unless the provisions of Section 4(2) are 
applicable.
1020
 
 
If a presiding officer is of the opinion that an error regarding age may have caused 
any prejudice to a person during the proceedings in question, he or she ‘must 
transmit the record of the proceedings to the registrar of the High Court having 
jurisdiction, in the same manner as provided for in Section 303 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act, in which event the proceedings must be dealt with in terms of the 
procedure on review as provided for in Section 304 of the Criminal Procedure 
Act.’1021 If a presiding officer is of the opinion that an error regarding age has not 
caused any prejudice to the person, he or she must continue with the proceedings in 
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terms of the provisions of the CJA, in accordance with his or her age, as altered
1022
, 
subject to subsection (1) of Section 16 of the CJA. 
 
6.5.2 Methods of Securing Attendance of a Child at Preliminary Inquiry 
The methods of securing the attendance of a child at a preliminary inquiry are set out 
in Section 17(1) of the CJA, which are, foremost, through a written notice, as 
provided for in Section 18; second, by a summons, as provided for in Section 19; or, 
third, by arrest, as provided for in Section 20. In terms of subsection (2) of Section 
17, where circumstances permit, ‘a police official should obtain guidance from the 
Director of Public Prosecutions or a prosecutor on whether or not the child is 
required to attend a preliminary inquiry and, if so, the manner in which the child’s 
attendance should be secured.’ 
 
6.5.3 Release or Detention of a Child Prior to Sentence   
This part examines the provisions relating to release and detention of children in 
conflict with the law, which are important features of the CJA.  
 
(a) Approach Followed when Considering Release or Detention of a Child after 
Arrest 
It should be borne in mind that children have the right to liberty, care and family life, 
which must enjoy the fullest protection possible and that limitation or infringement 
thereof must be subject to strict judicial control.
1023
 When it is necessary that they 
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should be removed from the family environment, children are entitled to appropriate 
alternative care and protection.
1024
 Section 21(1) of the CJA provides categorically 
that: ‘When considering the release or detention of a child who has been arrested, 
preference must be given to releasing the child.’ The approach for achieving this goal 
is set out in subsections (2) and (3) of Section 21. According to subsection (2)(a), 
prior to the child’s first appearance at a preliminary inquiry a police official must, in 
respect of an offence referred to in Schedule 1, ‘where appropriate, release a child on 
written notice into the care of a parent, an appropriate adult or guardian in terms of 
Section 18, read with Section 22.’ A prosecutor may also, in respect of an offence 
referred to in Schedule 1 or 2, authorise the release of a child on bail in terms of 
Section 25.
1025
 This provision if premised in the premise that: 
… detention should never be used as a mechanism of simply restoring structure, 
discipline or education to a “troubled or troublesome” child who has had the 
misfortune of being the product of a poor social upbringing or who lacks adequate 
parental control. Rather such children should be dealt with as either children in need 
of care and protection or be diverted away from the court-based just system should 
they have acknowledged that they have indeed committed the offence.
1026
 
 
In terms of subsection (3) of Section 25 of the CJA, a presiding officer may, at a 
child’s first appearance at a preliminary inquiry or thereafter at a child justice court, 
in respect of any offence, release a child into the care of a parent, an appropriate 
adult or guardian in terms of Section 24(2)(a); in respect of an offence referred to in 
Schedule 1 or 2, release a child on his or her own recognisance in terms of Section 
24(2)(b). Where a child is not released from detention in terms of paragraph (a) or 
(b), the presiding officer may release the child on bail in terms of Section 25. 
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(b) Release of Child on Written Notice  
The CJA provides that a police official must release a child on written notice in terms 
of Section 18 into the care of a parent, an appropriate adult or guardian if the child is 
in detention in police custody in respect of an offence referred to in Schedule 1, as 
soon as possible, and before the child appears at the preliminary inquiry.
1027
 This 
may not take place where the child’s parent or an appropriate adult or guardian 
cannot be located or is not available and all reasonable efforts have been made to 
locate the parent or appropriate adult or guardian. Release may not be opted where 
there is a substantial risk that the child may be a danger to any other person or to 
himself or herself.
1028
 
 
It is the law that where a child has not been released in terms of subsection (1) of 
Section 22, the investigating police official ‘must provide the inquiry magistrate with 
a written report in the prescribed manner, giving reasons why the child could not be 
released, with particular reference to the factors referred to in subsection (1)(a) or 
(b).’1029 
 
(c) Duty of Police Official when Releasing a Child  
The CJA imposes a duty on a police official who releases a child from detention in 
terms of Section 22 and places the child in the care of a parent or an appropriate adult 
or guardian. Under Section 23, it is provided that a police official who releases a 
child from detention in terms of Section 22 and places the child in the care of a 
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parent or an appropriate adult or guardian, ‘must, at the time of the release of the 
child, hand to the child and to the person into whose care the child is released, a 
written notice in accordance with Section 18.’ 
 
(d) Release of a Child  
Under Section 24 of the CJA, the presiding officer must, subject to subsection (2)(b) 
of this section, consider the release of the child, where such child, being in detention 
in respect of any offence, appears at a preliminary inquiry and the inquiry is to be 
postponed, or the matter, at the conclusion of the preliminary inquiry, is set down for 
trial in a child justice court; or at a child justice court and the matter is to be 
postponed. A presiding officer may, under subsection (2) of this section, release a 
child referred to in subsection (1) into the care of a parent, an appropriate adult or 
guardian; or, if the child is alleged to have committed an offence referred to in 
Schedule 1 or 2, on the child’s own recognisance, if it is in the interests of justice to 
release the child. 
 
In considering whether or not it would be in the interests of justice to release a child 
in terms of subsection (2) of Section 24, the presiding officer must have regard to the 
recommendations of the probation officer’s assessment report and all other relevant 
factors. These factors include: the best interests of the child; whether the child has 
previous convictions; the fact that the child is 10 years or older but under the age of 
14 years and is presumed to lack criminal capacity; the interests and safety of the 
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community in which the child resides; and the seriousness of the offence.
1030
 Under 
subsection (4) of Section 24 of the CJA, the presiding officer must, when releasing a 
child, warn him or her to appear on a specified date and at a specified time and place 
and may impose one or more conditions.
1031
  
 
In terms of subsection (5), if a child is released into the care of a parent, appropriate 
adult or guardian, the presiding officer ‘must direct the parent, appropriate adult or 
guardian to appear and warn the parent, appropriate adult or guardian to ensure that 
the child appears on a specified date and at a specified time and place and, if a 
condition has been imposed in terms of this section, to ensure that the child complies 
with that condition.’ If a child is released on his or her own recognisance, the 
presiding officer ‘must warn the child to appear on a specified date and at a specified 
time and place and, if a condition has been imposed in terms of this section, to 
comply with that condition.’1032  
 
The consequence of a child’s failure to comply with the foregoing conditions is set 
out in subsection (7)(a) of Section 24 to the effect that the presiding officer ‘may, on 
being notified of the failure ‘issue a warrant for the arrest of the child or cause a 
summons to be issued in accordance with Section 19, for the child to appear at the 
                                                 
1030
 Ibid. Section 24(3). 
1031
 Under section 24(4) the conditions imposed may include informing the child to: 
(a) report periodically to a specified person or at a specified place; 
(b) attend a particular school; 
(c) reside at a particular address; 
(d) be placed under the supervision of a specified person; 
(e) not interfere with any witness, tamper with any evidence or associate with any 
person or group of specified persons; or 
(f) comply with any other condition that the presiding officer deems fit in the 
circumstances.. 
1032
 Ibid, Section 24(6). 
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preliminary inquiry or child justice court.’ When a child appears before a presiding 
officer pursuant to a warrant of arrest or summons referred to above, the presiding 
officer must inquire into the reasons for the child’s failure to appear or comply with 
the conditions or to remain in attendance and make a determination whether or not 
the failure is due to the child’s fault. 
 
(e) Release of a Child on Bail 
Chapter 9 of the CPA applies to an application for the release of a child on bail, 
except for Sections 59 and 59A, to the extent set out in Section 21(2)(b) of the 
CJA.
1033
 According to subsection (2) of Section 25 of the CJA, an application for the 
release of a child, referred to in Section 21(3)(c), on bail, must be considered in the 
three stages. First, whether the interests of justice permit the release of the child on 
bail. Second, if so, a separate inquiry must be held into the ability of the child and his 
or her parent, an appropriate adult or guardian to pay the amount of money being 
considered or any other appropriate amount. Third, if after an inquiry referred to 
above, it is found that the child and his or her parent, an appropriate adult or guardian 
are unable to pay any amount of money, the presiding officer must set appropriate 
conditions that do not include an amount of money for the release of the child on 
bail; or where the child or his or her parents or appropriate adult are  able to pay an 
amount of money, the presiding officer must set conditions for the release of the 
child on bail and an amount which is appropriate in the circumstances. 
                                                 
1033
 Ibid, Section 25 (1). 
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6.5.4 Placement of a Child  
The placement of a child in conflict with the law awaiting trial in court has been a 
critical issue in many jurisdictions, both before and after the adoption of the CRC 
and the ACRWC. In many jurisdictions, the placement of children in remand 
facilities has been characterised by a chronic lack of protection of children’s rights in 
terms of the facilities themselves, lack of sufficient number of separate placement 
facilities resulting in putting children in adult prisons as well as lack of specialised 
juvenile personnel to properly help those children.
1034
 The CROC has, for instance, 
indicated that there has been excessive resort to deprivation of liberty against 
children who commit offences prior to trial.
1035
 In many jurisdictions around the 
world, there have been recorded arbitrary arrests and massive violations of the rights 
of children living and or working in the street (street children)
1036
, most of whom end 
up being arrested by the police and detained for status offences like loitering. As the 
CROC has noted, frequent and excessive arrests of street children in many countries 
has been largely due to their low status, frequently confronted with general social 
exclusion and stigmatization, including ill treatment by police officials.
1037
 In some 
                                                 
1034
 See, for instance, Tomasevski, K. (ed.), Children in Adult Prisons: An International Perspective. 
London: Frances Printer, 1986, p. 103.   
1035
 United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, “Recommendations from the Day of 
General of Discussion on Juvenile Justice.” Excerpted from United Nations Committee on the Rights 
of the Child, “Report on Tenth Session, CRC/C/43, Annex VIII, 10
th 
Session, 13 November 1995, 
para 219. 
1036
 A definition of street children formulated by the Inter-NGO Programme for Street Children and 
Street Youth states that:  “Street children are those for whom the street (in the widest sense of the 
word, i.e. unoccupied dwellings, wasteland etc.) more than their family has become their real home, a 
situation in which there is no protection, supervision or direction from responsible adults.”  Ennew, J., 
Street and Working Children: A Guide to Planning. London: Save the Children, 1994, p. 15. 
1037
 Odongo, op. cit. 
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jurisdictions, arbitrary arrests and detention of children have been recorded on the 
guise of a lame excuse that such children are in “need of care and protection”.1038  
 
However, as discussed in Chapter Four of this thesis, the deprivation of liberty for 
children accused of committing offences should be a matter of last resort. 
Recognizing the primacy of this principle, the CROC has regularly discouraged the 
practice of relying heavily on arrests and detention of offending children, as it affects 
concerned children both physically and mentally.
1039
 The CROC has, therefore, 
encouraged States Parties to establish separate juvenile justice systems that 
discourage arrests and detention of children in conflict with the law. In compliance 
with this, many countries that have recently enacted juvenile justice laws that have 
reflected this principle in their laws. South Africa is one of such countries that have 
paid heed to this call, as shall be discussed below. 
 
(a) Approach Followed when Considering Placement of a Child 
As noted above, through the CJA South Africa has managed to come out with 
effective arrangements for how to protect the basic rights and fundamental freedoms 
of children placed in detention facilities. The approach to be followed when 
considering placement of a child is laid down in Section 26, which states that if, after 
due consideration of the options for release of a child in terms of Part I of this law, ‘a 
decision is made that the child is to be detained or is to remain in detention a police 
official or presiding officer must give preference to the least restrictive option 
                                                 
1038
 See Gallinetti, J. “Diversion”. In Sloth- Nielsen, J. and J. Gallinetti (eds.), Child Justice in Africa: 
A Guide to Good Practice. Bellville: Community Law Centre, 2004, pp. 66-73, at p. 66.   
1039
 CROC, “Concluding Observations: Uruguay.” CRC/C/15/Add.62, 11 October 1996, para 14.   
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possible in the circumstances, as set out in subsections (2) and (3), beginning with 
the least restrictive option.’1040 According to subsection (2) of Section 26 of the CJA, 
prior to a child’s first appearance at a preliminary inquiry within 48 hours after 
arrest: 
(a) a police official must, depending on the age of the child and the alleged offence 
committed by the child, consider the placement of the child in a suitable child and 
youth care centre in accordance with section 27(a); or 
(b) if placement referred to in paragraph (a) is not appropriate or applicable, a police 
official must detain the child in a police cell or lock-up, in accordance with section 
27(b). 
 
In similar tone, subsection (3) of Section 26 of the CJA provides that a presiding 
officer may, at a child’s first or subsequent appearance at a preliminary inquiry or 
thereafter at a child justice court, order the detention of a child in a child and youth 
care centre in accordance with Section 29; or in prison in accordance with Section 
30, subject to the limitations set out in that section. 
 
(b) Placement Options for a Child  
Section 27 of the CJA provides that if, at any stage before a child’s first appearance 
at a preliminary inquiry, the child has not been released from detention in police 
custody and is charged, the police official must give consideration to the detention of 
the child in an appropriate child and youth care centre, if a centre is available and 
there is a vacancy, or if a centre or vacancy is not available, in a police cell or lock-
up. A child referred here is one who is either 10 years or older but under the age of 
14 years, with any offence; or 14 years or older, with an offence referred to in 
Schedule 1 or 2. If the child is 14 years or older and is charged with an offence 
                                                 
1040
 Section 26(1) of the CJA. 
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referred to in Schedule 3
1041
, the police official must cause the child to be detained in 
a police cell or lock-up. 
 
(c) Protection of Children Detained in Police Custody 
The protection of children detained in police custody is well covered in Section 28, 
which stipulates that a child who is in detention in police custody must be given 
adequate treatment. First, such child must be detained separately from adults; and, in 
such case, boys must be held separately from girls.
1042
 Second, such child must be 
detained in conditions which take into account their particular vulnerability and will 
reduce the risk of harm to that child, including the risk of harm caused by other 
children.
1043
 Third, the child must be permitted visits by parents, appropriate adults, 
guardians, legal representatives, registered social workers, probation officers, 
assistant probation officers, health workers, religious counsellors and any other 
person who, in terms of any law, is entitled to visit a child deprived of his or her 
liberty.
1044
 Fourth, the child must be cared for in a manner consistent with the special 
needs of children, including the provision of immediate and appropriate health care 
in the event of any illness, injury or severe psychological trauma; and adequate food, 
water, blankets and bedding.
1045
 
 
Under subsection (2) paragraph (a) of Section 28 of the CJA, if any complaint is 
received from a child or any other person during an arrest or while the child is in 
                                                 
1041
 This Schedule comprises of serious offences ranging from treason, sedition to murder. 
1042
 Section 28(1)(a) of the Child Justice Act. 
1043
 Ibid, Section 28(1)(b). 
1044
 Ibid, Section 28(1)(c). 
1045
 Ibid, Section 28(1)(d)(i)-(ii). 
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detention in police custody relating to any injury sustained or severe psychological 
trauma suffered by the child or if a police official observes that a child has been 
injured or is severely traumatised, that complaint or observation must, in the 
prescribed manner, be recorded and reported to the station commissioner, who must 
ensure that the child receives immediate and appropriate medical treatment if he or 
she is satisfied that any of the circumstances below exist. First, there is evidence of 
physical injury or severe psychological trauma. Second, the child appears to be in 
pain as a result of an injury. Third, there is an allegation that a sexual offence, as 
defined in section 1 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) 
Amendment Act (2007)
1046
, has been committed against the child; or there are other 
circumstances which warrant medical treatment. 
 
In the event of a report being made as referred to in Section 28(2)(a) of the CJA, the 
report
1047
 must, as soon as is reasonably possible, be submitted to the National 
Commissioner of Police, indicating the nature of the injury sustained or severe 
psychological trauma suffered by the child; an explanation of the circumstances 
surrounding the injury or trauma; and a recommendation as to whether or not any 
further action is required.
1048
 
 
Under subsection (3) of Section 28 the station commissioner of each police station is 
obliged to keep a register in which prescribed details regarding the detention of all 
                                                 
1046
 Act No. 32 of 2007. 
1047
 Under section 28(2)(c) of the CJA: ‘A copy of the medical report, if applicable, must accompany 
the report by the station commissioner referred to in paragraph (b) [of this subsection], and a further 
copy must be filed in the docket.’ 
1048
 Ibid, Section 28(2)(b)(i)-(iii). 
280 
 
  
 
 
children in police cells or lock-ups ‘must be recorded in a manner that entries 
regarding the detention of children are clearly distinguishable from those of adults.’ 
This requirement is intended to assist in obtaining data in relation to child offending, 
separate from data on offending by adults. In principle, the register may be examined 
by any person, as may be prescribed.
1049
 
 
(d) Placement of Offending Children in a Child and Youth Care Centre 
In certain circumstances, a child, who is alleged to have committed any offence, may 
be placed in a specified Child and Youth Care Centre (CYCC) under an order of a 
presiding officer.
1050
 Where a presiding officer must decide whether to place a child 
in a CYCC, consideration must be given to the following factors:  the age and 
maturity of the child; the seriousness of the offence in question; the risk that the child 
may be a danger to himself, herself or to any other person or child in the CYCC; the 
appropriateness of the level of security of the CYCC when regard is had to the 
seriousness of the offence allegedly committed by the child; and the availability of 
accommodation in an appropriate CYCC.
1051
 
 
In addition, subsection (3) provides that whenever a presiding officer is required to 
make a decision in terms of subsection (1) of Section 29, the presiding officer must 
consider the information referred to in Section 40(2), which requires that a 
recommendation referred to in subsection (1)(d) relating to the placement of the child 
in a child and youth care centre must be supported by current and reliable 
                                                 
1049
 Ibid, Section 28(4). 
1050
 Ibid, Section 29 (1). 
1051
 Ibid, Section 29(2). 
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information in a prescribed form, obtained by the probation officer from the 
functionary responsible for the management of the centre regarding the availability 
or otherwise of accommodation for the child in question
1052
; and the level of security, 
amenities and features of the CYCC.
1053
 
 
Where the information referred to in subsection (3) is, for any reason, not available, 
called into question or no longer current, the presiding officer may request the 
functionary responsible for the management of a child and youth care centre to 
furnish a prescribed sworn statement in respect of the availability or otherwise of 
accommodation for the child in question; and all other available information relating 
to the level of security, amenities and features of the CYCC.
1054
 
 
(e) Placement of a Child in a Prison 
The placement of children in prisons is provided for in Section 30 of the CJA. 
Subsection (1) of this section provides that a presiding officer may only order the 
detention of a child in a specified prison, if an application for bail has been 
postponed or refused or bail has been granted but one or more conditions have not 
been complied with; the child is 14 years or older; and/or the child is accused of 
having committed an offence referred to in Schedule 3. The placement may also be 
done where the detention is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice 
or the safety or protection of the public or the child or another child in detention; 
                                                 
1052
 Ibid, Section 40(2)(a). 
1053
 Ibid, Section 40(2)(b). 
1054
 Ibid, Section 29(4). 
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and/or there is likelihood that the child, if convicted, could be sentenced to 
imprisonment. 
 
Under subsection (2) of Section 30, a child who is 14 years or older but under the age 
of 16 years may only be detained in a prison if, in addition to the factors referred to 
in subsection (1)(a), (c), (d) and (e) above, the DPP or an authorized prosecutor 
‘issues a certificate which confirms that there is sufficient evidence to institute a 
prosecution against the child for an offence referred to in Schedule 3 and is charging 
the child with the offence.’ In terms of subsection (3) of the same section, before a 
decision is made to detain or further detain a child in prison, the presiding officer 
must consider any recommendations relating to placement in the probation officer’s 
assessment report, the information referred to in Section 40(2) and any relevant 
evidence placed before him or her. This includes evidence, where applicable, in 
respect of the best interests of the child; the child’s state of health; previous 
convictions, previous diversions or charges pending against the child; or the risk that 
the child may be a danger to himself, herself or to any other person or child in a 
CYCC. The information may also include any danger that the child may pose to the 
safety of members of the public; whether the child can be placed in a CYCC, which 
complies with the appropriate level of security; the risk of the child absconding from 
a CYCC; the probable period of detention until the conclusion of the matter; any 
impediment to the preparation of the child’s defence or any delay in obtaining legal 
representation, which may be brought about by the detention of the child; the 
seriousness of the offence in question; or any other relevant factor. 
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A presiding officer ordering the detention of a child in prison in terms of this section 
‘must direct that the child be brought before him or her or any other court every 14 
days to reconsider the order.’1055 In addition, a presiding officer may order the 
detention of a child who is alleged to have committed an offence referred to in 
Schedule 1 or 2 in a prison instead of a CYCC, ‘if he or she, in addition to the factors 
referred to in subsections (1) and (3), finds substantial and compelling reasons, 
including any relevant serious previous convictions or any relevant pending serious 
charges against the child, provided that the child is 14 years or older.’1056 A presiding 
officer making an order to place a child in a prison in terms of paragraph (a) of 
subsection (5) of Section 30 of the CJA ‘must enter the reasons for the decision on 
the record of the proceedings.’1057 
 
6.5.5 Assessment of Offending Children 
Another progressive element of the CJA is its emphasis on assessment of a child who 
comes into conflict with the law. The duty to conduct an assessment on every child 
who is alleged to have committed an offence is placed on a probation officer, unless 
assessment has been dispensed with in terms of Section 41(3).
1058
 In terms of 
subsection (2) of Section 34, a probation officer who has been notified by a police 
official that a child has been handed a written notice, served with a summons or 
arrested, ‘must assess1059 the child before the child appears at a preliminary inquiry 
                                                 
1055
 Ibid, Section 30(4). 
1056
 Ibid, Section 30(5)(a). 
1057
 Ibid, Section 30(5)(b). 
1058
 Ibid, Section 34(1). 
1059
 Section 37 (1) provides that:  
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within the time periods provided for in Section 43(3)(b).’ According to the 
provisions of Section 43(3)(b), a preliminary inquiry referred to in paragraph (a) 
must be held within 48 hours of arrest as provided for in Section 20(5) if a child is 
arrested and remains in detention; or within the time periods specified in a written 
notice in terms of Section 18 or a summons in terms of Section 19. Otherwise, a 
probation officer who has been notified by a police official that a child under the age 
of 10 years has been dealt with in terms of Section 9 ‘must make arrangements to 
assess the child within seven days of the notification.’1060  
 
The law imposes mandatory duties on a probation officer when conducting the 
assessment of child accused of committing an offence. Such duties include 
explaining the purpose of the assessment to the child
1061
; informing the child of his 
or her rights in the prescribed manner
1062
; explaining to the child the immediate 
procedures to be followed
1063
; and inquiring from the child whether or not he or she 
intends to acknowledge responsibility for the offence in question
1064
. 
 
In addition, the probation officer may, at any stage during the assessment of a child, 
‘consult with any person who may provide information necessary for the assessment, 
                                                                                                                                          
‘The assessment of a child may take place in any suitable place identified by the probation 
officer, which may include a room at a police station, a magistrate’s court, the offices of the 
Department of Social Development or a One-Stop Child Justice Centre. 
(2) The place identified in terms of subsection (1) must, as far as possible, be conducive to 
privacy.’ 
1060
 Ibid, Section 34(3). 
1061
 Ibid, Section 39(1)(a). 
1062
 Ibid, Section 39(1)(b). 
1063
 Ibid, Section 39(1)(c). 
1064
 Ibid, Section 39(1)(d). 
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including a prosecutor, a police official or a diversion service provider.’1065 The 
probation officer may also, at any stage during the assessment, consult privately with 
any person present;
1066
 or he or she may consult any person who is not at the 
assessment and who has any information relating to the assessment; but if additional 
information is obtained, the child must be informed accordingly.
1067
 
 
In case a child is accused with another child or other children, the probation officer 
‘may conduct the assessment of the children simultaneously if this will be in the best 
interests of all the children concerned.’1068 During the assessment the probation 
officer ‘must encourage the participation of the child.’1069 
 
(a) The Purpose of Assessment of Offending Children 
The purpose of conducting assessment of a child who is accused of committing an 
offence is stipulated in Section 35 of the CJA, which strives to achieve the goals 
below. First, to establish whether a child may be in need of care and protection in 
order to refer the child to a children’s court in terms of Section 50 or Section 64 of 
the CJA. Second, to estimate the age of the child if the age is uncertain. Third, to 
gather information relating to any previous conviction, previous diversion or pending 
charge in respect of the child. Fourth, to formulate recommendations regarding the 
release or detention and placement of the child. Fifth, it strives to achieve: where 
appropriate, establish the prospects for diversion of the matter. 
                                                 
1065
 Ibid, Section 39(2). 
1066
 Ibid, Section 39(3). 
1067
 Ibid, Section 39(4). 
1068
 Ibid, Section 39(5). 
1069
 Ibid, Section 39(6). 
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Sixth, in the case of a child under the age of 10 years or a child referred to in Section 
10(2)(b), it strives to establish what measures need to be taken in terms of Section 9. 
Seventh, in the case of a child who is 10 years or older but under the age of 14 years, 
it seeks to express a view on whether expert evidence referred to in Section 11(3) 
would be required. Eighth, to determine whether the child has been used by an adult 
to commit the crime in question. Ninth, to provide any other relevant information 
regarding the child which the probation officer may regard to be in the best interests 
of the child or which may further any objective which the CJA intends to achieve. 
 
(b) Confidentiality of Information Obtained at Assessment 
The CJA emphasises that any information obtained at an assessment is 
confidential.
1070
 The law also emphasises that such information may only be used for 
any purpose authorized by the CJA, including at a preliminary inquiry
1071
; and it is 
inadmissible as evidence during any bail application, plea, trial or sentencing 
proceedings in which the child appears.
1072
 Any person who contravenes these 
provisions ‘is guilty of an offence and, if convicted, liable to a fine or to 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding three months.’1073 
 
(c) Persons who can Attend at the Assessment Session 
The law is very categorical on the categories of persons who are allowed to attend 
the assessment session. Under Section 38(1) of the CJA it is mandatory that the child 
who is accused of committing an offence must be present at his or her assessment. 
                                                 
1070
 Ibid, Section 36(1). 
1071
 Ibid, Section 36(1)(a). 
1072
 Ibid, Section 36(1)(b). 
1073
 Ibid, Section 36(2). 
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The second category of persons obliged to be present during the assessment is the 
child’s parent or an appropriate adult or a guardian. The child’s parent or an 
appropriate adult or a guardian of the child may, however, not be present at the 
assessment if he or she has been exempted by the probation officer from attending; 
or excluded by the probation officer from attending because he or she has disrupted, 
undermined or obstructed the assessment or it is in the best interests of the child or 
the administration of justice.
1074
 
 
In addition, the probation officer may permit the following persons to attend an 
assessment: a diversion service provider
1075
; a researcher
1076
; or any other person 
whose presence is necessary or desirable for the assessment.
1077
 If there is any risk 
that the child may escape or endanger the safety of the probation officer or any other 
person, the probation officer may request a police official to be present at an 
assessment.
1078
 
In terms of subsection (5) of Section 38 of the CJA, a probation officer may, where 
appropriate, ‘elicit the views of the child in private regarding the presence of any 
person who is attending the assessment.’ A probation officer ‘must make every effort 
to locate a parent or an appropriate adult or a guardian in order to conclude the 
assessment of a child and may request a police official to assist in the location of that 
person.’1079 Nonetheless, the probation officer may conclude the assessment of a 
child in the absence of a parent, appropriate adult or guardian ‘if all reasonable 
                                                 
1074
 Ibid, Section 38(2). 
1075
 Ibid, Section 38(3)(a). 
1076
 Ibid, Section 38(3)(a). 
1077
 Ibid, Section 38(3)(a). 
1078
 Ibid, Section 38(4). 
1079
 Ibid, Section 38(6)(a). 
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efforts to locate that person have failed or if that person has been notified of the 
assessment and has failed to attend.’1080 
 
(d) The Assessment Report of a Probation Officer 
Under the provisions of Section 40 of the CJA the probation officer is obliged to 
complete an assessment report in the prescribed manner with recommendations. The 
recommendations should canvass the issues below, where applicable. First, the 
possible referral of the matter to a children’s court in terms of Section 50 or 64 of the 
CJA. Second, the appropriateness of diversion, including a particular diversion 
service provider, or a particular diversion option or options, as provided for in 
Section 53. Third, the possible release of the child into the care of a parent, an 
appropriate adult or guardian or on his or her own recognisance, in terms of section 
24. Fourth, if it is likely that the child could be detained after the first appearance at 
the preliminary inquiry, the placement of the child in a specified CYCC or prison in 
terms of Section 29 or Section30. Fifth, in the case of a child under the age of 10 
years, establish what measures need to be taken in terms of Section 9. Sixth, the 
possible criminal capacity of the child if the child is 10 years or older but under the 
age of 14 years, as provided for in Section 10, as well as measures to be taken in 
order to prove criminal capacity. Seventh, whether a further and more detailed 
assessment of the child is required in order to consider the circumstances referred to 
in subsection (3) of Section 40 of the CJA. Eighth, an estimation of the age of the 
child if this is uncertain, as provided for in Section 13.
1081
 
                                                 
1080
 Ibid, Section 38(6)(a). 
1081
 Ibid, Section 40(1). 
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Where a recommendation relates to the placement of the child in a CYCC, referred to 
in subsection (1)(d) above, it must be supported by current and reliable information 
in a prescribed form, obtained by the probation officer from the functionary 
responsible for the management of the CYCC regarding the availability or otherwise 
of accommodation for the child in question
1082
; and the level of security, amenities 
and features of the CYCC.
1083
 In principle, a recommendation referred to in 
subsection (1)(g) of Section 40 of the CJA,  may be made in one or more of the 
following circumstances: the possibility that the child may be a danger to others or to 
himself or herself; the fact that the child has a history of repeatedly committing 
offences or absconding; where the social welfare history of the child warrants a 
further assessment; and the possibility that the child may be admitted to a sexual 
offenders’ programme, substance abuse programme or other intensive treatment 
programme.
1084
 
 
In the assessment report the probation officer must indicate whether or not the child 
intends to acknowledge responsibility for the alleged offence.
1085
 This report ‘must 
be submitted to the prosecutor before the commencement of a preliminary inquiry, 
with due regard to the time periods referred to in Section 43(3)(b).’1086 
6.5.6 Diversion  
Diversion is a central pillar of a modern child’s rights-oriented juvenile justice 
system; and ‘the extent to which a juvenile justice system incorporates diversion both 
                                                 
1082
 Ibid, Section 40(2)(a). 
1083
 Ibid, Section 40(2)(b). 
1084
 Ibid, Section 40(3). 
1085
 Ibid, Section 40(4). 
1086
 Ibid, Section 40(5). 
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in legislation and practice is one pointer to the system’s adherence to children’s 
rights.’1087 Prof Jap Doek argues that: ‘Although there are encouraging steps in a 
number of countries to develop measures with a view to divert the cases from the 
traditional criminal procedures … there are still too many States Parties that have 
taken very little or no action in this regard.’1088 He further argues that in addition, and 
when judicial proceedings have been initiated, ‘there are often no or very few 
effective alternatives for the traditional sanctions - in particular the deprivation of 
liberty.’1089 However, writing before the Bill for the enactment of the CJA, Prof 
Doek noted that: 
 
The Bill has to be commended for the very strong emphasis on diversion and 
alternatives to deprivation of liberty, although there does not seem to be a clear 
distinction between diversion as a measure to avoid judicial proceedings and 
measures available during the trial (also called diversion) that do not actually divert 
the case but present alternatives for traditional sanctions. However, the provisions 
for diversion are detailed and meet international standards. Nevertheless, I still 
wonder whether it is necessary and what would be the reason of having three levels 
of diversion?
1090
 
 
In conventional criminal procedure there are three opportunities for action by three 
different role-players in the diversion process: the police, the prosecutor and the 
court. Within a wide-ranging diversion policy the police can, and should, play a 
crucial role when the child ‘has first contact with the police [where] the judicial 
proceedings have not yet been initiated. In other words, there is the possibility that 
                                                 
1087
 Odongo, G.O., “The Domestication of International Law Standards on the Rights of the Child with 
Specific Reference to Juvenile Justice in the African Context”, op. cit, p. 191. 
1088
 Doek, J., “Child Justice Trends and Concerns with a Reflection on South Africa”, op. cit, p. 14. In 
the terminology of the CRC, Article 40(3)(b) these are ‘measures for dealing with such children 
without resorting to judicial proceedings’. 
1089
 Doek, ibid, p. 14. 
1090
 Ibid, pp. 14-5. 
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the police may issue an informal warning. There is not enough attention paid to the 
role of the police in the diversion process.’1091 
 
In this section we, thus, examine the law and practice of diversion in South Africa. 
We commence this discussion by looking at the definition and origins of diversion 
and its entrenchment in the South African criminal justice system. 
 
6.5.6.1 Definition of Diversion in Criminal Justice 
Diversion has been defined as the election – in suitable and deserving cases – ‘of a 
manner of disposal of a criminal case other than through normal court proceedings.’ 
1092
 Viewed in this nous, diversion usually ‘implies the provisional withdrawal of the 
charges against the accused, on condition that the accused participates in particular 
programs and/or makes reparation to the complainant. Diversion is preferable to the 
mere withdrawal of cases as the offender is charged with taking responsibility for his 
or her actions.’1093 
 
6.5.6.2 Definition of Diversion in Juvenile Justice 
In relation to juvenile justice, diversion refers to ‘programmes and practices which 
are employed for young people who have initial contact with the police, but are 
diverted from traditional juvenile justice processes before children’s court 
                                                 
1091
 Ibid, p. 15. 
1092
 Part 7 of the Prosecution Policy of the South African National Prosecuting Authority. See also 
Anderson, A.M., “Restorative Justice, the African Philosophy of Ubuntu and the Diversion of 
Criminal Prosecution.” An unpublished paper (on file). 
1093
 Anderson, ibid. 
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adjudication.’1094 In broad sense, diversion has been defined as entailing ‘strategies 
developed in the youth justice system to prevent young people from committing 
crime or to ensure that they avoid formal court action and custody if they are arrested 
and prosecuted’.1095 In Odongo’s view, this definition is so broad as to include 
preventative programmes in relation to child offending.
1096
 It has, therefore, been 
observed that ‘diversion can incorporate a variety of strategies from school-based 
crime prevention programmes through to community based programmes used as an 
alternative to custody.’1097 Odongo argues that, 
Although pre-trial diversion represents the earliest stage at which child offenders 
may be channelled away from the formal criminal justice process, diversion may 
occur at any stage. In most juvenile justice systems in Africa, the use of diversion 
remains a relatively new concept, though different forms of diversion became an 
integral part of juvenile justice systems in most Western countries from the 
1970s.
1098
 
 
Being one of a few child justice centred laws enacted in Sub-Saharan Africa, the CJA 
incorporates comprehensive provisions relating to diversion of child offenders away 
from the juvenile justice system at all stages of the process. However, before we 
traverse on the salient features of the diversion provisions in this law, we first set out 
a brief background to diversion in South Africa. 
                                                 
1094
 Polk, K., “Juvenile Diversion in Australia: A National Review”. Unpublished paper presented at 
the conference on Juvenile Justice: From Lessons of the Past to a Roadmap for the Future, convened 
by the Australian Institute of Criminology in conjunction with the New South Wales Department of 
Juvenile Justice, Sydney, 1-2 December 2003. 
1095
 Muncie, J., Youth and Crime: A Critical Introduction. London: Sage, 1999, p. 305. See also 
Wood, C., Diversion in South Africa: A Review of Policy and Practice, 1990-200. Pretoria: Institute 
for Security Studies (ISS) Paper 79, 2003, p. 1. 
1096
 Odongo, G.O., “The Domestication of International Law Standards on the Rights of the Child with 
Specific Reference to Juvenile Justice in the African Context”, op. cit, p. 192. 
1097
 Ibid. See also Wood, C., Diversion in South Africa: A Review of Policy and Practice, 1990-2003. 
Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies, Occasional Paper, 2003. 
1098
 Odongo, G.O., ‘The Impact of International Law on Children’s Rights on Juvenile Justice Law 
Reform in the African Context”, op. cit, pp. 152-3. See also Sarre, R., “Destructuring and Criminal 
Justice Reforms: Rescuing Diversion Ideas from the Waste Paper Basket.” Current Issues in Criminal 
Justice, Vol. 10 No. 3, 1999, p. 259. 
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6.5.6.3 Introduction of Diversion in the Juvenile Justice System in South Africa 
Diversion services in South Africa have been offered since the beginning of the 
1990s,
1099
 although the first attempt to incorporate diversion in an official document 
was through the inclusion of recommendations on diversion in the Interim Policy 
Recommendations of the IMC.
1100
 Therefore, the Interim Policy Recommendations 
was the first government document to formally acknowledge the limited availability 
of diversion programmes and the unequal access to these programmes.
1101
 In order to 
cure this state of affairs, the IMC recommended that an effective referral process be 
developed; that diversion should be offered at a range of levels
1102
; and that a new 
diversion option, family group conferencing, should be piloted.
1103
 
 
As Sloth-Nielsen
1104
 contends, an issue paper,
1105
 a discussion paper,
1106
 and a 
report
1107
 of a project committee of the South African Law Reform Commission to 
                                                 
1099
 See Wood, C., Diversion in South Africa: A Review of Policy and Practice 1990-2003, op. cit. The 
process began in early 1990s as a result of the establishment of the Youth Empowerment Scheme 
Programme (“Yes” programme) by the National Institute for Crime Prevention and Reintegration of 
Offenders (NICRO). See, for instance, Gallinetti, J., “Diversion.” In Sloth-Nielsen, J. and J. Gallinetti 
(eds.), Child Justice in Africa: A Good Guide to Good Practice. Bellville: Community Law Centre, 
2005; and Sloth-Nielsen, J., “Child Justice and Law Reform.” In Davel, C.J. (ed.), Introduction to 
Child Law in South Africa. Pretoria: Juta Law, 2000, pp. 418-428. 
1100
 IMC Interim Policy Recommendations 1996 40-47. However, it should be noted that under 
international law, the CRC under Article 40(3)(b) enshrines, for the first time, the desirability of the 
development of diversion for child justice systems. Diversion is also the subject of rule 11 of the 
Beijing Rules for. Previous academic publications or working papers on diversion in the South 
African context existed before the IMC (for instance, The Drafting Consultancy 1994). For further 
discussion, also see Sloth-Nielsen, J. “A Short History of Time: Charting the Contribution of Social 
Development Service Delivery to Enhance Child Justice 1996 – 2006”. In Gallinetti, J. et al (eds.), 
Child Justice in South Africa: Children’s Rights under Construction. Newlands/Cape Town: Open 
Society Foundation for South Africa and Child Justice Alliance, 2006, p. 26. 
1101
 Ibid. See also Julia, Sloth-Nielsen and J. Gallinetti, “Just Say Sorry?” Ubuntu, Africanisation and the 
Child Justice System in the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008”, op. cit. 
1102
 Sloth-Nielsen, J., ibid, p. 26. 
1103
 Sloth-Nielsen, J., “The Juvenile Justice Law Reform Process in South Africa: Can a Children’s 
Rights Approach carry the Day?” Quinnipiac Law Review. Vol. 18, 1999. pp.  469-489. See also 
Wood, op. cit. 
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 Sloth-Nielsen, J., “A Short History of Time: Charting the Contribution of Social Development 
Service Delivery to Enhance Child Justice 1996 – 2006”, op. cit. 
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draft proposals for a child system followed closely on the recommendations of the 
Inter-Ministerial Committee (the IMC) in proposing for legislative inclusion of 
diversion.
1108
 
 
Then, diversion was an ever expanding and diversifying field, ‘even in the absence of 
a legislative base.’1109 The fact that tens of thousands of South African children 
access diversion every year ‘is a substantial achievement in a very short period of 
time. The provincial Departments of Social Development have supported, 
mainstreamed and diversified diversion services to the extent that implementation of 
Article 40(3)(b) of the CRC is a signal characteristic of child justice service in South 
Africa.’1110  
 
6.5.6.4 Categories of Diversion 
In compliance with international law on diversion
1111
, the CJA has provisions for 
diversion implemented at a three-tier level in the juvenile justice system
1112
: there is 
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 SA Law Commission Issue Paper. Vol. 54  No 9, Juvenile Justice. May 1997. 
1106
 SA Law Commission Discussion Paper. Vol. 55 No 79. Juvenile Justice. December 1998. 
1107
 SA Law Commission Discussion Report. Vol. 56, 2000. 
1108
 Sloth-Nielsen, J., “Child Justice and Law Reform”, op. cit. 
1109
 Sloth-Nielsen, J., “A Short History of Time: Charting the Contribution of Social Development 
Service Delivery to Enhance Child Justice 1996 – 2006”, op. cit. 
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 Ibid. 
1111
 Article 40(3)(b) of the CRC obliges States Parties to ensure that diversion is part and parcel of 
their criminal justice systems. 
1112
 As Sloth-Nielsen and Gallinetti argue, the idea of dividing the diversion options into different 
levels originated in the SALRC draft of the Bill. According to them: ‘The three levels signified 
diversion responses differing in proportion in relation to the seriousness of the offence, and depending 
on whether or not the child had previously been a beneficiary of diversion. Each level of options is 
linked to the Schedules listing the applicable offences. During the parliamentary process, the number 
of levels was reduced from three to two in an effort to simplify the system.’ See Julia, Sloth-Nielsen 
and J. Gallinetti, “Just Say Sorry?” Ubuntu, Africanisation and the Child Justice System in the Child 
Justice Act 75 of 2008”, op. cit. p. 75 (note 39). 
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the pre-trial forum in the form of preliminary inquiry;
1113
 diversion at the prosecution 
and sentencing stages; and diversion through resort to restorative justice. The three 
stages of diversion in South Africa are examined below. 
 
(a) Diversion at the Preliminary Inquiry 
Diversion held at the preliminary inquiry takes at the pre-trial stage with the aim of 
determining, inter alia, how to best deal with individual cases of children, whereby 
consideration for diversion is an express objective.
1114
 This is an informal pre-trial 
procedure which is inquisitorial in nature
1115
; and may be held in a court or any other 
suitable place.
1116
 In a way, 
The preliminary inquiry is expected to strengthen referral procedures for diversion 
by involving role-players (such as social workers, judicial officers and police) other 
than the prosecutor alone. [This ensures] the development of and growth of pre-trial 
diversion and assure[s] more uniformity in the process of referral.
1117
 
 
Under Section 43(2) of the CJA, the preliminary inquiry aims, inter alia, at 
establishing whether or not the matter can be diverted before plea; and identifying a 
suitable diversion option, where applicable. In principle, the preliminary inquiry 
must be held within 48 hours of arrest as provided for in Section 20(5) if a child is 
arrested and remains in detention; or within the time periods specified in a written 
notice in terms of section 18
1118
 or a summons in terms of section 19.
1119
 
 
(b) Diversion at the Prosecution and Sentencing Levels 
                                                 
1113
 See particularly Chapter 7 (Sections 43-50) of the CJA. 
1114
 Odongo, G.O., ‘The Impact of International Law on Children’s Rights on Juvenile Justice Law 
Reform in the African Context”, op. cit, pp. 155. 
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 See section 47 of the CJA. 
1116
 Ibid. Section 43(1). 
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 Odongo, G.O., ‘The Impact of International Law on Children’s Rights on Juvenile Justice Law 
Reform in the African Context”, op. cit. 
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The second level of diversion is an array of diversion opportunities at the different 
levels of the juvenile justice process that encourage the ‘development of innovative 
diversion practices which need not be cost intensive.’1120  These kinds of innovations 
in the diversion of juvenile offenders away from the juvenile justice system in South 
Africa can be carried out through a wider access to diversion at the different levels of 
the juvenile justice system: from the police arrest and prosecution
1121
 to the 
sentencing
1122
 levels.
1123
  
 
Diversion at this stage is made ‘after consideration of all relevant information 
presented at a preliminary inquiry, or during a trial, including whether the child has a 
record of previous diversions.’1124 In addition diversion will be considered for 
diversion if- 
(a) the child acknowledges responsibility for the offence; 
                                                 
1120
 Odongo, G.O., ‘The Impact of International Law on Children’s Rights on Juvenile Justice Law 
Reform in the African Context”, op. cit. 
1121
 See particularly Sections 41, 42, 52, 53 and 97 of the CJA. Section 42(1) states that if a matter is 
diverted in terms of section 41, the child and, where possible, his or her parent, appropriate adult or 
guardian ‘must appear before a magistrate in chambers, in order to have the diversion option that has 
been selected by the prosecutor, made an order of court.’ 
1122
 See particular Chapter 8 (Sections 51-62) of the CJA. 
1123
 The objectives of diversion carried out by the court, as comprehensively set out in Section 51 of 
the CJA, are to: 
‘(a) deal with a child outside the formal criminal justice system in appropriate cases; 
(b) encourage the child to be accountable for the harm caused by him or her; 
(c) meet the particular needs of the individual child; 
(d) promote the reintegration of the child into his or her family and community; 
(e) provide an opportunity to those affected by the harm to express their views on its 
impact on them; 
(f) encourage the rendering to the victim of some symbolic benefit or the delivery of 
some object as compensation for the harm; 
(g) promote reconciliation between the child and the person or community affected by 
the harm caused by the child; 
(h) prevent stigmatising the child and prevent the adverse consequences flowing from 
being subject to the criminal justice system; 
(i) reduce the potential for re-offending; 
(j) prevent the child from having a criminal record; and 
(k) promote the dignity and well-being of the child, and the development of his or her 
sense of self-worth and ability to contribute to society.’ 
1124
 Ibid, Section 52(1). 
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(b) the child has not been unduly influenced to acknowledge responsibility; 
(c) there is a prima facie case against the child; 
(d) the child and, if available, his or her parent, an appropriate adult or a guardian, 
consent to diversion; and 
(e) the prosecutor indicates that the matter may be diverted in accordance with 
subsection (2) or the Director of Public Prosecutions indicates that the matter may be 
diverted in accordance with subsection (3). 
 
The CJA also sets out two levels of diversions options. Under Section 53(2) level one 
applies to offences referred to in Schedule 1; and level two applies to all other 
offences as referred to in Schedules 2 and 3.
1125
 
 
In level two diversion options include; first, the level one diversion options referred 
to in subsection (3)(j) to (q) above. Second, compulsory attendance at a specified 
centre or place for a specified vocational, educational or therapeutic purpose, which 
                                                 
1125
 In level one diversion options include: 
‘(a) an oral or written apology to a specified person or persons or institution; 
(b) a formal caution, with or without conditions; 
(c) placement under a supervision and guidance order; 
(d) placement under a reporting order; 
(e) a compulsory school attendance order; 
(f) a family time order; 
(g) a peer association order; 
(h) a good behaviour order; 
(i) an order prohibiting the child from visiting, frequenting or appearing at a 
specified place; 
(j) referral to counselling or therapy; 
(k) compulsory attendance at a specified centre or place for a specified vocational, 
educational or therapeutic purpose; 
(l) symbolic restitution to a specified person, persons, group of persons or 
community, charity or welfare organisation or institution; 
(m) restitution of a specified object to a specified victim or victims of the alleged 
offence where the object concerned can be returned or restored; 
(n) community service under the supervision or control of an organisation or 
institution, or a specified person, persons or group of persons identified by the 
probation officer; 
(o) provision of some service or benefit by the child to a specified victim or victims; 
(p) payment of compensation to a specified person, persons, group of persons or 
community, charity or welfare organisation or institution where the child or his or 
her family is able to afford this; and 
(q) where there is no identifiable person, persons or group of persons to whom 
restitution or compensation can be made, provision of some service or benefit or 
payment of compensation to a community, charity or welfare organisation or 
institution.
1125’ 
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may include a period or periods of temporary residence. Third,  referral to intensive 
therapy to treat or manage problems that have been identified as a cause of the child 
coming into conflict with the law, which may include a period or periods of 
temporary residence. Fourth, placement under the supervision of a probation officer 
on conditions which may include restriction of the child’s movement outside the 
magisterial district in which the child usually resides without the prior written 
approval of the probation officer.
1126
 
 
In selection of diversion options, the following factors must be considered: first, the 
diversion option must be at the appropriate level in terms of Section 53. Second, the 
child’s cultural, religious and linguistic background. Third, the child’s educational 
level, cognitive ability and domestic and environmental circumstances. Fourth, the 
proportionality of the option recommended or selected, to the circumstances of the 
child, the nature of the offence and the interests of society. Fifth, the child’s age and 
developmental needs.
1127
 The CJA also, in a very progressive way, provides for 
minimum standards applicable to diversion, which ‘must be structured in a way so as 
to strike a balance between the circumstances of the child, the nature of the offence 
and the interests of society,’1128 provided that such standards ‘may not be 
exploitative, harmful or hazardous to the child’s physical or mental health’;1129 and 
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 Ibid, Section 53(4). 
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 Ibid, Section 54(1). In terms of subsection (2)(a) of Section 54, ‘In the case of an offence referred 
to in Schedule 1, level one diversion options set out in Section 53(3) are applicable and may be used 
in combination.’  In the case of an offence referred to in Schedule 2 or 3, ‘level two diversion options 
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 Ibid, Section 55(1). 
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‘may not interfere with the child’s schooling.’1130 The standards also ‘must be 
appropriate to the age and maturity of the child.’1131 Furthermore, the standards ‘may 
not be structured in a manner that completely excludes certain children due to a lack 
of resources, financial or otherwise.’1132 The standards ‘must be sensitive to the 
circumstances of the victim.’1133 
 
In terms of subsection (2) of Section 54, the CJA sets out the expected outcomes 
diversion programmes must yield to. It categorically states that, where reasonably 
possible, the programmes: first, impart useful skills; second, must include a 
restorative justice element which aims at healing relationships, including the 
relationship with the victim; third, must include an element which seeks to ensure 
that the child understands the impact of his or her behaviour on others, including the 
victims of the offence, and may include compensation or restitution; fourth, must be 
presented in a location reasonably accessible to the child; fifth, must be structured in 
a way that they are suitable to be used in a variety of circumstances and for a variety 
of offences; sixth, must be structured in a way that their effectiveness can be 
measured; seventh, must be promoted and developed with a view to equal application 
and access throughout the country, bearing in mind the special needs and 
circumstances of children in rural areas and vulnerable groups; and, eighth, must 
involve parents, appropriate adults or guardians, if applicable. 
 
                                                 
1130
 Ibid, Section 55(1)(c). 
1131
 Ibid, Section 55(1)(b). 
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 Ibid, Section 55(1)(d). 
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 Ibid, Section 55(1)(e). 
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The law also sets out criteria for provision and accreditation of diversion 
programmes and diversion service providers. In this regard, a prosecutor, an inquiry 
magistrate or a child justice court ‘may only refer a matter for diversion to a 
diversion programme and diversion service provider that has been accredited in 
terms of this section and has a valid certificate of accreditation, referred to in 
subsection (2)(e).’1134 The law also obliges the Cabinet member [minister] 
responsible for social development, in consultation with the Cabinet members 
responsible for the administration of justice, education, correctional services, safety 
and security and health: first, create a policy framework to develop the capacity 
within all levels of Government and the non-governmental sector to establish, 
maintain and develop programmes for diversion; second, to establish and maintain a 
system for accreditation, as prescribed, of programmes for diversion and diversion 
service providers
1135
; and, third, ensure the availability of resources to implement 
diversion programmes, as prescribed.
1136
 The CJA does progressively provide for 
monitoring of compliance with diversion order, which is done by a probation officer 
                                                 
1134
 Ibid, Section 56 (1). This requirement is, however, subject to Section 98(2), which provides that: 
‘Every diversion programme and diversion service provider which existed at the time of the 
commencement of this Act may continue to operate until it has been informed of the decision in 
respect of its application as provided for in Section 56(2)(c)(iii).’  
1135
 Under subsection (2)(b) of Section 56, this system for accreditation must contain— 
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minimum standards referred to in Section 55; 
(ii) criteria for the evaluation of the content of diversion programmes to ensure that they reflect a 
meaningful and adequate response to the harm caused by offences committed by children, to 
achieve the objectives of diversion; 
(iii) mechanisms to monitor diversion programmes and diversion service providers in respect of 
their ability to render quality service in achieving the objectives of diversion and their ability to 
promote compliance with diversion orders; 
(iv) measures for the removal of diversion programmes and diversion service providers from the 
system, where appropriate.’ 
1136
 Ibid, Section 56(2)(a). 
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identified in a diversion order.
1137
 It also provides for penalty for non-compliance 
with the diversion order.
1138
 Under Section 58(1), where a child fails to comply with 
any diversion order, the magistrate
1139
, the inquiry magistrate or child justice court 
may, on being notified of the failure, ‘issue a warrant for the arrest of the child or 
cause a summons to be issued in respect of the child in terms of Section 19, to appear 
before the magistrate, inquiry magistrate or child justice court.’ Such magistrate, 
inquiry magistrate or child justice court ‘must inquire into the reasons for the child’s 
failure to comply with the diversion order and make a determination whether or not 
the failure is due to the child’s fault’1140; and if it is found that the failure is not due 
to the child’s fault, the magistrate, inquiry magistrate or child justice court may 
continue with the same diversion option with or without altered conditions; add or 
apply any other diversion option; or make an appropriate order which will assist the 
child and his or her family to comply with the diversion option initially applied, with 
or without altered or additional conditions.
1141
 
 
If it is found that the failure is due to the child’s fault the following actions may be 
taken: first the prosecutor, in the case where the matter was diverted by a prosecutor 
in terms of Section 41(1) or at a preliminary inquiry in terms of Section 49(1), may 
decide to proceed with the prosecution, in which case Section 49(2) applies with the 
                                                 
1137
 Ibid, Section 57(1). In terms of subsection (2) of Section 57: ‘If a child fails to comply with the 
diversion order, the probation officer or person identified in terms of subsection (1) must, in the 
prescribed manner, notify the magistrate, inquiry magistrate or child justice court in writing of the 
failure.’ 
1138
 Ibid. Section 58. 
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 Referred to in Section 42, ibid. 
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 Ibid, Section 58(2). 
1141
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changes required by the context.
1142
 Or, the child justice court, in the case where the 
matter was diverted by the court in terms of Section 67, may record the 
acknowledgement of responsibility made by the child as an admission referred to in 
Section 220 of the Criminal Procedure Act and proceed with the trial.
1143
 Or, the 
prosecutor or child justice court must, where the matter does not go to trial, decide on 
another diversion option which is more onerous than the diversion option originally 
decided on.
1144
 
 
In a very progressive manner, Section 59 of the CJA sets out the legal consequences 
of diversion. The section provides that if a matter has been diverted and the diversion 
order has been successfully complied with, a prosecution on the same facts may not 
be instituted.
1145
 This happens where diversion has been undertaken by a prosecutor 
in terms of Chapter 6
1146
, at a preliminary inquiry in terms of Chapter 7
1147
 or by a 
child justice court in terms of Chapter 9
1148
.  In addition, the section provides that a 
private prosecution in terms of Section 7 of the Criminal Procedure Act ‘may not be 
instituted against a child in respect of whom the matter has been diverted in terms of this 
Act.’1149 
(c) Diversion through Restorative Justice Practices 
The third level of diversion is trough resort to restorative justice practices such as 
family group conferences and victim-offender mediation. These practices, ‘while 
                                                 
1142
 Ibid, Section 58(4)(a). 
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 Ibid, Section 58(4)(b). 
1144
 Ibid, Section 58(4)(c). 
1145
 Ibid, Section 59(1)(a). 
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303 
 
  
 
 
drawing from practices in Western juvenile justice systems, resonate with African 
concepts of restorative justice and reconciliation.’1150 In terms of Section 61(1)(a) of 
the CJA,  a family group conference is an informal procedure which is intended ‘to 
bring a child who is alleged to have committed an offence and the victim together, 
supported by their families and other appropriate persons and, attended by persons 
referred to in subsection (3)(b), at which a plan is developed on how the child will 
redress the effects of the offence.’ It may only take place if both the victim and the 
child consent.
1151
 The Act further provides that: 
(2) If a child has been ordered to appear at a family group conference, a probation 
officer appointed by the magistrate referred to in section 42, an inquiry magistrate or 
a child justice court must, within 21 days after the order
1152
, convene the conference 
by— 
(a) setting the date, time and place of the conference; and 
(b) taking steps to ensure that all persons who may attend the conference are 
timeously notified of the date, time and place of the conference.
1153
 
 
The family group conference must be facilitated by a family group conference 
facilitator, who may be a probation officer or a diversion service provider referred to 
in Section 56(1).
1154
 The conference may be attended by the following persons: first, 
the child and his or her parent, an appropriate adult or a guardian; second, any person 
requested by the child; third, the victim of the alleged offence, his or her parent, an 
appropriate adult or a guardian, where applicable, and any other support person of 
the victim’s choice; and fourth, the probation officer, if he or she is not the family 
group conference facilitator. Fifth, the prosecutor; sixth, any police official; seventh, 
                                                 
1150
 Odongo, G.O., “The Impact of International Law on Children’s Rights on Juvenile Justice Law 
Reform in the African Context”, op. cit, p. 155. 
1151
 Section 61(1)(b) of the CJA. 
1152
 According to subsection (4) of Section 61: ‘If a family group conference fails to take place on the 
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place.’ 
1153
 Ibid, Section 61(2). 
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a member of the community in which the child normally resides, as determined by 
the family group conference facilitator; and, eighth, any person authorised by the 
family group conference facilitator to attend the conference.
1155
 
 
Participants in a family group conference must follow the procedure agreed on by 
them and may agree to a plan in respect of the child
1156
, which may include the 
application of any option contained in Section 53(3); or any other action appropriate 
to the child, his or her family and local circumstances, which is consistent with the 
principles contained in the CJA.
1157
 The plan must specify the objectives for the child 
and the period within which they are to be achieved; and it should contain details of 
the services and assistance to be provided to the child and a parent, an appropriate 
adult or a guardian. The plan must also specify the persons or organisations to 
provide the required services and assistance; and state the responsibilities of the child 
and of the child’s parent, an appropriate adult or a guardian. It must state personal 
objectives for the child and for the child’s parent, an appropriate adult or a guardian. 
The plan further must include any other matters relating to the education, 
employment, recreation and welfare of the child as are relevant; and must include a 
mechanism to monitor the plan.
1158
 
 
The family group conference facilitator ‘must record the details of and reasons for 
any plan agreed to at the family group conference and must furnish a copy of the 
record to the child and to the probation officer or person referred to in Section 
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 Ibid, Section 61(3)(b). 
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 Ibid, Section 61(5). 
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57(1).’1159 In the event of the conference not taking place or the child failing to 
comply with the plan agreed to at the family group conference, the probation officer 
or person ‘must notify the magistrate, inquiry magistrate or child justice court in 
writing of the failure, in which case Section 58 applies.’1160 If the participants in a 
family group conference cannot agree on a plan, the conference ‘must be closed and 
the probation officer must refer the matter back to the magistrate, inquiry magistrate 
or child justice court for consideration of another diversion option.’1161 It is the law 
that no information furnished by the child at a family group conference may be used 
in any subsequent criminal proceedings arising from the same facts.
1162
 
 
The practice of victim-offender mediation (VOM) is legally sanctioned under 
Section 62 of the CJA. In accordance with subsection (1)(a) of this section, a victim-
offender mediation ‘means an informal procedure which is intended to bring a child 
who is alleged to have committed an offence and the victim together at which a plan 
is developed on how the child will redress the effects of the offence.’ As with the 
family group conference, the VOM may only take place if both the victim and the 
child consent.
1163
 Where a child has been ordered to appear at the VOM, Section 
61(2), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8) and (9) will apply with the changes required by the 
context.
1164
  
 
                                                 
1159
 Ibid, Section 61(7)(a). 
1160
 Ibid, Section 61(7)(b). 
1161
 Ibid, Section 61(8). 
1162
 Ibid, Section 61(9). 
1163
 Ibid, Section 62(1)(b). 
1164
 Ibid, Section 62(2). 
306 
 
  
 
 
As is the case with the family group conference, a probation officer appointed by a 
magistrate referred to in Section 42, an inquiry magistrate or a child justice court 
must convene the victim-offender mediation.
1165
 In principle, the VOM must be 
mediated by a probation officer or a diversion service provider referred to in Section 
56(1), who or which may regulate the procedure to be followed at the mediation.
1166
  
 
6.5.7 Sentencing 
Sentencing refers to the final decision made by a criminal court in relation to the 
term of imprisonment (or otherwise) the accused person is liable to serve. It is 
normally made at the conclusion of criminal proceedings. It is significant to note at 
the outset that sentencing ‘is pre-eminently a matter for the discretion of the trial 
court.’1167 The trial court’s discretion to hand down a certain type of sentence 
depends on ‘the seriousness and the nature of the crime, and also on whether the 
relevant legislation dictates a particular punishment for a crime.’1168 It should also be 
noted that trial courts, regardless of their jurisdiction, are often guided by similar 
sentencing principles in deliberating over an appropriate sentence, which include 
retribution, deterrence, prevention and rehabilitation. In South Africa, these 
principles are guided by what has come to be referred to as the “Zinn Triad”: i.e., the 
                                                 
1165
 Ibid, Section 62(3). 
1166
 Ibid, Section 62(4). 
1167
 See particularly S v Pillay 1977 (4) SA 531 (A) at 534H-535A; and S v Frazzie 1964 (4) SA 673 
(A). 
1168
 Tomkin, J., Orphans of Justice: In Search of the Best Interests of the Child when a Parent is 
Imprisoned – A Legal Analysis. Geneva: Quaker United Nations Office, 2009, p. 26. 
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crime in question; the personal circumstances of the offender; and the interests of the 
community at large.
1169
  
 
However, where the trial court has failed ‘to exercise its discretion properly and 
judicially or at all, and thereby committing a material misdirection, an appeal court 
will be at large to interfere with the sentence.’1170  It should also be noted that 
sentencing ‘is clearly the most difficult part of criminal proceedings. It involves a 
careful and dispassionate consideration of balancing the gravity of the offence, the 
interests of society and the personal circumstances of the offender
1171
 not forgetting, 
the interest of the victim.’1172  
 
In this section we, therefore, examine provisions relating to sentencing in the CJA. 
The discussion in this section revolves around the universal rationale of sentencing; 
the objectives of, and factors affecting, sentencing; and sentencing options in the 
CJA. 
6.5.7.1 The Universal Rationale for Sentencing 
For years, criminal justice has grappled with what should be the rationale ‘to serve as 
a guiding principle in sentencing.’1173 For a long time around the world, ‘the public 
                                                 
1169
 The Zinn Triad was developed in S v Zinn 1969 (2) SA 537 (A) and approved in the Supreme 
Court in S v Malagas 2001 (2) SA 1222 (SCA). In similar tone, the Irish Supreme Court held in The 
People (DPP) v M. [1994] 3 IR 306; [1994] I.L.R.M. 541, where it was held that the sentence must be 
appropriate to the gravity of the offence and the personal circumstances of the offender. In R v Asia 
Salum and Another (1986) TLR 12, the High Court of Tanzania held that: ‘In imposing sentence the 
court is required to take into consideration several factors; such as, the gravity of the offence, the 
record of the accused, his age and the interests of society and those of the accused.’ See also Republic 
v Kidato Abudlla [1973] L.R.T. 82. 
1170
 Fredericks v S [2011] ZASCA 177. 
1171
 S v Zinn 1969 (2) 537 (A) at 540 G. 
1172
 Fredericks v S, op. cit. 
1173
 Inciardi, J.A., Criminal Justice, op. cit, p. 424. 
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has alternated between revulsion at inhumane sentencing practices and prison 
conditions (denounced as “barbaric” and “uncivilized”) on the one hand and 
dissatisfaction with overly compassionate treatment (seen as “codling criminals”) on 
the other.’1174 Viewed in this context, the fate of convicted offenders ‘has repeatedly 
shifted according to prevailing values and current perceptions of danger and fear of 
crime.’1175 Arising from this thinking are five competing schools of thoughts about 
the rationale of sentencing: retribution, vengeance, incapacitation, deterrence, and 
rehabilitation.
1176
 
 
Today, therefore, international standards relating to criminal justice concerning 
sentencing have evolved and codified in many international human rights 
instruments. In relation to sentencing of children, the CRC and the Beijing Rules 
have set out minimum sentencing standards, premised around two important sets of 
standards: first, principles that should underpin and provide the aims of sentencing; 
and, second, principles that set out restrictions or prohibitions on sentencing that are 
to be imposed on children. Underlying this supposition, the CRC lays down the 
“principle of proportionality”, which requires that the administration of juvenile 
justice must aim at ensuring ‘that children are dealt with in a manner appropriate to 
their well-being and proportionate both to their circumstances and the offence.’1177 In 
addition to this principle, is the principle enunciated in Article 37 of the CRC 
                                                 
1174
 Ibid. 
1175
 Ibid, pp. 424-5. 
1176
Ibid. In relation to sentencing of child offenders, these principles have been given wide due 
consideration by the South African Supreme Court of Appeal in Fredericks v S (2008/11) [2011] 
ZASCA 177 (29 September 2011). This case is discussed later in this section. 
1177
 Article 40(4) of the CRC. See also General Comment No. 20, 2007; and Rule 17(1)(a) of the 
Beijing Rules. 
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restricting deprivation of liberty in respect of children to be used as a last resort and 
for the shortest appropriate period. This article also bars capital punishment
1178
, life 
imprisonment without a possibility of release, and any cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.  
 
Therefore, States Parties to the CRC are obliged to adopt sentencing policies that are 
in harmony with the foregoing principles. In compliance with this obligation, the 
CJA has incorporated provisions regulating sentencing of children found guilty of 
committing criminal offences in Chapter 10. In the discussion in the section below, 
we examine the law relating to sentencing in the CJA. However, before we discuss 
the sentencing process under the CJA, we provide a brief analysis of the guidelines 
on sentencing prevalent in South Africa prior to its enactment and operationalisation. 
 
Before the CJA was enacted and became operational, there were, in addition to the 
Constitution, guidelines on sentencing which had been authoritatively laid down in 
case law.
1179
 The first case to explicitly consider the principles relevant to sentencing 
of children in the context of the foregoing international law and in the new 
constitutional era in South Africa was S v Z en Vier Sake
1180
. In this case, five 
matters came before the High Court on review in which children in conflict with the 
law had been sentenced to suspended terms of imprisonment. Considering the 
                                                 
1178
 The imposition of death sentence for children who commit offences is prohibited under Article 
6(5) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Article 37(a) of the 
CRC. This rule is so universally practised and accepted, to the extent of reaching the level of jus 
cogens. See particularly Odongo, G.O., “The Impact of International Law on Children’s Rights on 
Juvenile Justice Law Reform in the African Context”, op. cit, p. 159. 
1179
 Ballard, C., “Youthfulness and Sentencing Prior to the Operation of the Child Justice Act: A Case 
Review of Fredericks v The State.” Article 40, Vol. 14 No. 1, April 2012. 
1180
 1999(1) SACR 427 (E). 
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options and principles applicable to child offenders, the court laid down the 
following guidelines on sentencing of children: 
(a) diversion should be considered prior to trial and sentencing in appropriate 
cases; 
(b) age must be properly determined prior to sentencing; 
(c) a sentencing court must act dynamically to obtain full particulars about the 
accused’s personality and personal circumstances; 
(d) a sentencing court must exercise its wide sentencing discretion 
sympathetically and imaginatively; 
(e) a sentencing court must adopt, as its point of departure, the principle that, 
where possible, a sentence of imprisonment should be avoided; and should bear 
in mind especially that: the younger the accused is, the less appropriate 
imprisonment will be; imprisonment is rarely appropriate in the case of a first 
offender; and short-term imprisonment is appropriate; and 
(f) a sentencing court must not impose suspended imprisonment where 
imprisonment is inappropriate for a particular accused.
1181
 
 
Subsequently, case law ‘generally affirmed these guidelines and courts thus became 
receptive to the idea that a sentence should be responsive to the individualised needs 
of the child, and where possible, sentences of imprisonment should be avoided.’1182 
For instance, in Ntaka v The State
1183
 the appellant, who was 17 years old at the time 
he committed the offence of rape, argued before the South African Supreme Court of 
                                                 
1181
 These principles are discussed in Ballard, C., op. cit, pp. 10-11. 
1182
 Ibid, p. 10. 
1183
 [2008] ZACSA 30, March 2008 (unreported). 
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Appeal (SCA) that the High Court, ‘in sentencing him to ten years imprisonment (of 
which four were conditionally suspended), had failed to investigate adequately the 
possibility of correctional supervision.’1184 Although Judge Cameron (writing for the 
majority) found that, in the light of the gravity of the offence, ‘a prison sentence 
[was] unavoidable’; he held that the High Court sentence disregarded 
 
… the youthfulness of the appellant when he committed the crime. It treats him too 
much like the adult when he was not when he raped his victim. It may set him for 
ruin, while foreclosing the possibility, embodied in his youth, that he will still 
benefit from resocialisation and re-education. It fails to individualize the sentence 
with the emphasis on preparing him, as a child offender, for his return to society. 
[Emphasis supplied]. 
 
Therefore, Judge Cameron reduced the term of imprisonment from ten to five years; 
and, invoking the provisions of Section 276(1)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Act 
(1997)
1185
, he placed the appellant under correctional supervision. 
 
Another noteworthy judgment is Brandt v S
1186
 where the SCA replaced a sentence 
of life imprisonment imposed by the High Court on an offender, who was 17 years at 
the time of the commission of the offence, with a sentence of 18 years imprisonment. 
In particular, the SCA held that: 
 
In Sentencing a young offender, the presiding officer must be guided in the decision-
making process by certain principles: including the principle of proportionality; the 
best interests of the child; and, the least possible restrictive deprivation of the child’s 
liberty, which should be a measure of last resort and restricted to the shortest 
possible period of time. Adherence to recognised international law principles must 
entail a limitation on certain forms of sentencing such as a ban on life imprisonment 
without parole for child offenders.
1187
 [Emphasis added]. 
 
                                                 
1184
 Ballard, op. cit. 
1185
 Act 51 of 1997, which permits the placement of child offender under correctional supervision ‘in 
the discretion of the Commissioner or a parole board’. 
1186
 [2005] 2 All SA 1 (SCA). 
1187
 Ibid, para. 20. 
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The most recent decision
1188
 to consider the principles applicable in sentencing of 
child offenders prior to the operation of the CJA in South Africa is Fredericks v 
S.
1189
 In this case, the appellant appealed to the SCA against the sentence only 
imposed by the Western Cape High Court (Cape Town) (Dlodlo and Yekiso, JJ).
1190
 
He and his co-accused were convicted and sentenced by the Parrow Regional Court 
as follows: on count 1: robbery with aggravating circumstances as contemplated in 
Section 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act (1997), whereby firearms and knife were 
used, for which they were sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment each; on count 2: 
rape, whereby his co-accused only was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment; and on 
count 3: rape, to 10 years’ imprisonment each. Effectively, the appellant was to serve 
a total of 25 years’ imprisonment and his co-accused, 35 years’ imprisonment. On 
appeal to the Western Cape High Court, their appeal was dismissed and the sentences 
were confirmed. On further appeal to the SCA, the only issue for determination was 
                                                 
1188
 The judgement in appeal in this case was delivered by the SCA on 29 September 2011. 
1189
 Case No. 208/2011 [SCA] (neutral citation Fredericks v S (2008/11) [2011] ZASCA 177 (29 
September 2011)). This case is considered at length in Ballard, C., “Youthfulness and Sentencing 
Prior to the Operation of the Child Justice Act: A Case Review of Fredericks v The State”, op. cit. 
1190
 Briefly, the facts of this case were thus: On 6 of July 1999, in the dead of night, the appellant and 
his co-accused entered the premises of the complainant, Mr Esterhuizen, with the intention of 
unlawfully breaking into the house and steal. They found Mr Esterhuizen outside the house, as the 
barking of the dogs had woken him. They produced a firearm and a knife. They forced Mr Esterhuizen 
back into the house. All the other occupants of the house, his wife and children, were awakened and 
bundled into one room and threatened with the firearm and knife. The appellant and his co-accused 
demanded money. Having failed to solicit money they demanded bank cards. The appellant took Mr 
Esterhuizen’s bank cards and went to the bank to withdraw money, after having forcefully obtained 
the pin code. His co-accused remained in the house while wielding the firearm. The appellant returned 
without the money. The two accused started removing the goods, as listed in the charge sheet, whose 
value was estimated at R6220.00. While ransacking the house, the appellant raped one of the children, 
E, a 15 year old girl and later his co-accused also raped her. Later the co-accused raped the other 
child, L, 18 years of age. This whole episode took about six to seven hours. The appellant removed the 
stolen goods, while his co-accused remained in the house but left the house later. Apparently these 
goods were to be used to pay back a debt they owed a rival gang. The appellant and his co-accused 
were later arrested, charged, convicted and sentenced by the Parrow Regional Court. Effectively the 
appellant was to serve a total of 25 years’ imprisonment and his co-accused, 35 years’ imprisonment. 
They appealed to the Western Cape High Court (Dlodlo J and Yekiso J concurring). Their appeal was 
dismissed and the sentences confirmed. Leave to appeal against sentence to the SCA was granted by 
the High Court in respect of the appellant only. 
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whether or not, in the circumstances of this case, the Regional Court and the High 
Court misdirected themselves in imposing a lengthy custodial sentence on a juvenile 
who was 14 years and 10 months old at the time of the commission of the offence.  
 
It should be noted that the commission of the offences in this case took place on 6 
July 1999, well before the CJA was enacted and became operational. Thus, the SCA 
applied the principles applicable to sentencing of child offenders as enshrined in the 
South African Constitution and case law. The SCA found the sentencing of of a 14 
year old child to 25 years’ imprisonment, given the circumstances of this case, 
‘startlingly inappropriate.’ The SCA noted the difficulty that arises ‘when a juvenile 
has to be sentenced for having committed a very serious crime like in this case’; and 
held that: 
Whilst the gravity of the offences calls loudly for severe sentence with strong 
deterrent and retributive elements, the youthfulness of the appellant required a 
balanced approach reflecting an equally strong rehabilitative component. After all, 
the appellant was an immature youth merely 14 years old. Although youthfulness 
remains a strong mitigating factor, one cannot ignore the sad reality that, nowadays 
it is the youth that is engaged in violent and serious crimes. 
 
It acknowledged, nonetheless, that although the general purpose of sentencing is to 
deter, punish and prevent the re-ocurrence of crimes in society, when it comes to 
child offenders, ‘rehabilitation seems to be emphasized more.’1191 In coming to this 
conclusion, the SCA considered the decision in S v Jansen
1192
, where it was held 
that: 
In the case of a juvenile offender it is above all necessary for the Court to determine 
what appropriate form of punishment in the peculiar circumstances of the case 
would best serve the interests of society as well as the interests of the juvenile. The 
interests of the society cannot be served by disregarding the interests of the juvenile, 
                                                 
1191
 Ballard, op. cit. See also S v B 2006 (1) SACR 311 (SCA), paras. 19-20. 
1192
 1975 (1) SA 425 (A) at 427H-428A. 
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for a mistaken form of punishment might easily result in a person with a distorted or 
more distorted personality being eventually returned to society. [Emphasis mine]. 
 
Having considered the relevant constitutional and international law principles, the 
SCA held that ‘the attention given to a child when considering sentence is not done 
in a vacuum. The seriousness of the offence, its impact on the victims and the 
interests of the broader society must be taken into consideration.’ This reasoning is in 
line with what Botha, JA, held in S v Jansen
1193; that is: ‘To enable a Court to 
determine the most appropriate form of punishment in the case of a juvenile 
offender, it has become the established practice in the Courts to call for a report of 
the offender by a probation officer in, at least, all serious cases.’1194  
 
Elaborating on its observation that sentencing ‘is clearly the most difficult part of 
criminal proceedings’; the SCA held that: 
It becomes more onerous where a child is the offender and the offence is a very 
serious one. In the present case the robbery involves the use of a firearm and a knife 
whilst the rape is of a child under the age of 16 years. A decision regarding an 
appropriate sentence becomes even more difficult – when a juvenile has to be 
sentenced for having committed a very serious crime like in this case.  
 
Therefore, the court held while the gravity of the offences requires a ‘severe sentence 
with strong deterrent and retributive elements, the youthfulness of the appellant 
required a balanced approach reflecting an equally strong rehabilitative component.’ 
Appreciating the fact that the appellant was an immature youth merely 14 years old 
at the time he committed the offence, the SCA balanced between his youthfulness, as 
“a strong mitigating factor”; and the seriousness of the crime he committed, which 
calls for severe punishment of the offender with a view to preventing re-occurrence. 
Out of this balance, the court decided to lower the sentence, aiming at rehabilitation 
                                                 
1193
 S v Jansen , op. cit. 
1194
 See particularly S v Adams 1971 (4) SA 125; and S v Yibe 1964 (3) SA 502 (E). 
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of the appellant. This finding was premised in the provisions of Section 28(1)(g) of 
the South African Constitution, which provides that: 
Every child has the right – not to be detained except as a measure of last resort, in 
which case, in addition to the rights a child enjoys under sections 12 and 35, the 
child may be detained only for the shortest appropriate of time, … 
In the light of these provisions, the SCA was of the view that: ‘Failure to give effect 
to the above constitutional imperative renders such omission a material misdirection 
by a presiding officer.’ The court observed further that: 
 
This conclusion was influenced by Brandt v S
1195
, where Ponnan, JA, held that 
international law principles, which are well re-echoed in the South African 
Constitution, reiterate that proportionality is a consideration and that ‘child offenders 
should not be deprived of their liberty except as a measure of last resort and, where 
incarceration must occur, the sentence must be individualized with the emphasis on 
preparing the child offender from the moment of entering into the detention facility 
for his or her return to society.’ In S v Williams1196 it was suggested that South 
Africa’s child justice legislation should incorporate accepted international standards, 
as well as such further rules and limitations as to ensure effective implementation of 
the international standards. Concepts, such as resocialisation and re-education when 
dealing with sentencing of children, were suggested to be regarded as 
complementary to the traditional aims of punishment relating to adults. In fact, when 
the CJA was enacted, it paid heed to these judicial pronouncements as indicated in 
the following analysis. 
 
                                                 
1195
 [2005] 2 All SA 1 (SCA). 
1196
 1995 (7) BCLR 861 (CC). 
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6.5.7.2 Objectives of Sentencing and Factors to be Considered in Sentencing 
As pointed out above, the CJA has incorporated international law as well as South 
African constitutional law principles relating to sentencing of child offenders. One of 
such principles is for a child justice legislation to set out clear objectives of 
sentencing. The objectives
1197
 of sentencing are set out in Section 69(1) of the CJA, 
which are: first, to encourage the child to understand the implications of and be 
accountable for the harm caused. Second, to promote an individualized response 
which strikes a balance between the circumstances of the child, the nature of the 
offence and the interests of society. Third, to promote the reintegration of the child 
into the family and community. Fourth, to ensure that any necessary supervision, 
guidance, treatment or services which form part of the sentence assist the child in the 
process of reintegration. Fifth, to use imprisonment only as a measure of last resort 
and only for the shortest appropriate period of time. 
 
When considering the imposition of a sentence involving compulsory residence in a 
CYCC in terms of Section 76
1198
, a child justice court must, in addition to the factors 
referred to in subsection (4) relating to imprisonment, consider the following factors: 
first, whether the offence is of such a serious nature that it indicates that the child has 
a tendency towards harmful activities. Second, whether the harm caused by the 
offence indicates that a residential sentence is appropriate. Third, the extent to which 
                                                 
1197
 The rationale for CJA to embody a sentencing chapter with an enumeration of objectives of 
sentencing is discussed at some considerable in Gallinetti, J., Getting to Know the Child Justice Act. 
Bellville: Child Justice Alliance, 2009; and Sloth-Nielsen, J. and Gallinetti, J., “‘Just Say Sorry?’ 
Ubuntu, Africanisation and the Child Justice System in the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008”, op. cit, pp. 
77-80. 
1198
 This sentence is one that provides a programmes referred to in Section 191(2)(j) of the Children’s 
Act. 
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the harm caused by the offence can be apportioned to the culpability of the child in 
causing or risking the harm. Fourth, whether or not the child is in need of a particular 
service provided at a CYCC.
1199
 
 
When considering the imposition of a sentence involving imprisonment in terms of 
Section 77, the child justice court must take the following factors into account: first, 
the seriousness of the offence, with due regard to  the amount of harm done or risked 
through the offence; and the culpability of the child in causing or risking the 
harm.
1200
 Second, the court must consider protection of the community to be offered 
to the concerned child
1201
. Third, the court must also consider the severity of the 
impact of the offence on the victim.
1202
 Fourth, the court must consider the previous 
failure of the child to respond to non-residential alternatives, if applicable.
1203
 Fifth, 
the court must establish the desirability of keeping the child out of prison.
1204
  
 
In this context, the North Gauteng Court, while reviewing three different but similar 
cases
1205
 decided by magistrates courts on this matter, has held that ‘when 
considering sentencing a child to a reform school a court must be guided by the 
principles of sentencing.’1206 The court was of the view that ‘a child has the not to be 
detained except as a measure of last resort, in which case the child may only be 
                                                 
1199
 Section 69(3) of the CJA. 
1200
 Ibid. Section 69(4)(a). 
1201
 Ibid. Section 69(4)(b). 
1202
 Ibid. Section 69(4)(c). 
1203
 Ibid. Section 69(4)(d). 
1204
 Ibid. Section 69(4)(e). 
1205
 These cases are reviewed in Courtenay, R.M., “S v CKM & 2 Similar Cases (Centre for Child 
Law as Amicus Curiae)”, op. cit. 
1206
 Ibid. 
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detained for the shortest appropriate period of time.’1207 In particular, the North 
Gauteng High Court held in these cases that: 
 
[R]eferral to a reform school, which amounts to an involuntary, compulsory 
admission to a facility where the convicted child is obliged to participate in various 
programs, represents a serious invasion of the child’s rights to freedom of 
movement and decision making. Such a sentence should therefore not be imposed 
lightly or without compelling reasons. 
 
In two of the three cases, the court, after considering the fact that the children were 
first time offenders, they were young and that the crimes were not serious, found the 
sentences
1208
 wholly inappropriate and set them aside. 
 
The CJA obliges a child justice court imposing a sentence to request a pre-sentence 
report prepared by a probation officer prior to the imposition of sentence.
1209
 This 
prerequisite is founded in the premise that in the South African juvenile justice 
system, ‘probation officers play a pivotal role in the sentencing of a child 
offender.’1210 As Courtenay points out, probation officers are the ‘ones at the 
coalface, who have an intimate knowledge of the social factors relevant to the matter 
                                                 
1207
 Ibid. 
1208
 In one of the two cases, a child anonymised as CKM appeared before the Mankweng Magistrate’s 
Court for the first time on 9 September 2009, where he was charged together with two others with 
assault, for allegedly having hit one FT on 5 September 2009. There were no allegations in the trial 
court that the complainant had suffered any injuries. CKM was fourteen years old at the time he 
committed the alleged offence. He pleaded guilty and was convicted as charged. The magistrate 
sentenced CKM to detention in a reform school, on the strength of the recommendation contained in 
the probation officer’s pre-sentence report. The recommendation was based on CKM’s failure to 
successfully complete a diversion programme; the fact was that he was without supervision by a 
parent and had developed into a difficult child. CKM had no previous convictions. In the other case, a 
child anonymised as FTM appeared before the same magistrate as CKM on a charge of housebreaking 
with the intent to commit an unknown crime. Similar to CKM the magistrate, on the strength of the 
probation officer’s report, sentenced him to a reform school. The recommendations were based on 
FTM’s failure to successfully complete a diversion programme and that he was a “troubled and 
troublesome child”. These facts are adopted from Courtenay, R.M., “S v CKM & 2 Similar Cases 
(Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae)”, op. cit. 
1209
 Section 71(1)(a) of the CJA. 
1210
 Courtenay, R.M., “S v CKM & 2 Similar Cases (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae)”, op. 
cit. 
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at hand.’1211 It is in recognition of this pivotal role of probation officers that courts in 
the South African juvenile justice system ‘place considerable weight on their pre-
sentence reports in order to make determinations of just and equitable sentences.’1212 
 
Under the CJA, the probation officer must complete the report ‘as soon as possible 
but no later than six weeks following the date on which the report was requested.’1213 
However, the child justice court may dispense with a pre-sentence report where a 
child is convicted of an offence referred to in Schedule 1 or where requiring the 
report would cause undue delay in the conclusion of the case, to the prejudice of the 
child, ‘but no child justice court sentencing a child may impose a sentence involving 
compulsory residence in a child and youth care centre providing a programme 
referred to in Section 191(2)(j)of the Children’s Act or imprisonment, unless a pre-
sentence report has first been obtained.’1214  
 
Where a probation officer recommends that a child be sentenced to compulsory 
residence in a CYCC referred to in Section 191(2)(j) of the Children’s Act, the 
recommendation ‘must be supported by current and reliable information, obtained by 
the probation officer from the person in charge of that centre, regarding the 
availability or otherwise of accommodation for the child in question.’1215 In 
compiling their reports, probation officers must consider all alternatives to detention, 
                                                 
1211
 Ibid. 
1212
 Ibid. 
1213
 Section 71(2) of the CJA. 
1214
 Ibid. Section 71(1)(b). 
1215
 Section 71(3) of the CJA. 
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which must be placed before the sentencing court.
1216
 In so doing, custodial sentence 
(whether in correctional centres or in an CYCC) ‘should only be recommended as a 
last resort and, where appropriate, for the shortest period of time.’1217 Furthermore, a 
recommendation for custodial sentence should be ‘reserved for child offenders who 
commit the most serious of crimes and even then only when facts justify such 
recommendations.’1218 Nonetheless, a child justice court ‘may impose a sentence 
other than that recommended in the pre-sentence report and must, in that event, enter 
the reasons for the imposition of a different sentence on the record of the 
proceedings.’1219 
 
6.5.7.3 Sentencing Options 
Paragraph (4) of Article 40 of the CRC requires that alternative options to sentencing 
and institutional placement of children found guilty of committing offences must be 
available to ensure that sentencing is consistent with the aims of juvenile justice. In 
compliance with this requirement, the CJA provides an array of sentencing options, 
including community-based sentences, which is ‘a sentence which allows a child to 
remain in the community and includes any of the options referred to in Section 53, as 
sentencing options, or any combination thereof and a sentence involving correctional 
supervision referred to in Section 75.’1220  
 
                                                 
1216
 Courtenay, R.M., “S v CKM & 2 Similar Cases (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae)”, op. 
cit. 
1217
 Ibid. 
1218
 Ibid. 
1219
 Section 71(4) of the CJA. 
1220
 Ibid, Section 72(1). 
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Another sentencing option is restorative justice sentence whereby a child justice 
court that convicts a child of an offence may refer the matter: to a family group 
conference in terms of Section 61
1221
; or for victim-offender mediation in terms of 
Section 62
1222
; or to any other restorative justice process which is in accordance with 
the definition of restorative justice.
1223
 Payment of fine or alternatives to fine is also 
used as one of the sentencing options under the CJA. Under Section 74(1) a child 
justice court convicting a child of an offence for which a fine is appropriate must, 
before imposing a fine, first, inquire into the ability of the child or his or her parents, 
an appropriate adult or a guardian to pay the fine, whether in full or in instalments; 
and, second consider whether the failure to pay the fine may cause the child to be 
imprisoned. 
 
The child justice courts may also impose sentences involving correctional 
supervision under Section 75 of the CJA. In this regard, the child justice court that 
convicts a child of an offence may impose a sentence involving correctional 
supervision in the case of a child who is 14 years or older, in terms of Section 
276(1)(h) or (i) of the CPA; or  in the case of a child who is under the age of 14 
years, in terms of Section 276(1)(h) of the CPA. The child justice court may also 
impose a sentence of compulsory residence in CYCC (providing a programme 
referred to in Section 191(2)(j) of the Children’s Act) in terms of Section 76(1). 
 
                                                 
1221
 Ibid, Section 73(1)(a). 
1222
 Ibid, Section 73(1)(b). 
1223
 Ibid, Section 73(1)(c). 
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The sentence of imprisonment may not be imposed by the child justice court on a 
child who is under the age of 14 years at the time of being sentenced for the 
offence.
1224
 However, the child justice court may sentence a child who is 14 years or 
older at the time of being sentenced for the offence, but this ‘must only do so as a 
measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time.’1225 The child 
justice court may also postpone or suspend passing a sentence in terms of Sections 
77(2) and 78(1) of the CJA and Section 297 of the CPA. In such situation, the court 
may consider the following as conditions
1226
:  
(a) Fulfilment of or compliance with any option referred to in section 53(3)(a) to 
(m), (q) and (7) of this Act; and  
(b) a requirement that the child or any other person designated by the child justice 
court must again appear before that child justice court on a date or dates to be 
determined by the child justice court for a periodic progress report.
1227
 
 
Under subsection (3) of Section 78 of the CJA a child justice court that has 
postponed the passing of sentence in terms of subsection (1) of this section on one or 
more conditions ‘must request the probation officer concerned to monitor the child’s 
compliance with the conditions imposed and to provide the court with progress 
reports indicating compliance.’ 
6.5.8 Appeals and Automatic Review of Certain Convictions and Sentences 
This part analyzes the right to appeal for children convicted as having infringed penal 
law under the CJA. It also examines circumstances where such convictions and 
sentences are subject to automatic review. 
                                                 
1224
 Ibid, Section 77(1)(a). 
1225
 Ibid, Section 77(1)(b). 
1226
 In addition to the provisions of Section 297 of the CPA. 
1227
 Ibid, Section 78(2). 
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6.5.8.1 Appeals 
The right of appeal to children convicted by the child justice court is well provided 
for in terms of Section 84 of the CJA; and is procedurally dealt with in terms of the 
provisions of Chapters 30 and 31 of the CPA. However, where a child was, at the 
time of the commission of the alleged offence, under the age of 16 years; or 16 years 
or older but under the age of 18 years and has been sentenced to any form of 
imprisonment that was not wholly suspended,  
… he or she may note the appeal without having to apply for leave in terms of 
section 309B of that Act in the case of an appeal from a lower court and in terms of 
section 316 of that Act in the case of an appeal from a High Court: Provided further 
that the provisions of section 302(1)(b) of that Act apply in respect of a child who 
duly notes an appeal against a conviction, sentence or order as provided for in 
section 302(1)(a) of that Act. 
 
In principle, the child referred to in subsection (1) ‘must be informed by the 
presiding officer of his or her rights in respect of appeal and legal representation and 
of the correct procedures to give effect to these rights.’1228 
 
6.5.8.2 Automatic Review in Certain Cases 
The child who is convicted by the child justice court also has the right to have his or 
her case reviewed in certain circumstances.
1229
 This takes place in the purview of 
Section 85(1) of the CJA and in terms of the provisions of Chapter 30 of the CPA 
dealing with the review of criminal proceedings in the lower courts. However, if a 
child was, at the time of the commission of the alleged offence, under the age of 16 
years; or 16 years or older but under the age of 18 years, and has been sentenced to 
                                                 
1228
 Ibid, Section 84(2). 
1229
 Recently, the North Gauteng High Court reviewed three different cases involving child offenders 
decided by the Mankweng Magistrate’s Court in the purview of this provision. See particularly 
Courtenay, R.M., “S v CKM & 2 Similar Cases (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae)”, op. cit. 
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any form of imprisonment that was not wholly suspended, or any sentence of 
compulsory residence in a child and youth care centre providing a programme 
provided for in Section 191(2)(j) of the Children’s Act, ‘the sentence is subject to 
review in terms of Section 304 of the Criminal Procedure Act by a judge of the High 
Court having jurisdiction, irrespective of the duration of the sentence.’1230 
 
In a progressive approach, the CPA guarantees the right to be admitted to bail for 
every child whenever his or her release on bail is considered, pending the review of a 
sentence as provided for in Section 307 of the CPA; or the appeal against a sentence 
as provided for in Sections 309(4) and 316 of the CPA. In such circumstances, the 
provisions of Section 25 of the CJA, dealing with the release of children on bail, 
apply.
1231
 
 
6.6 Parliamentary Oversight of the Implementation of the CJA 
Section 96(3) of the CJA provides a room for parliamentary oversight of the 
implementation of the CJA.
1232
 It categorically requires the Cabinet member 
responsible for the administration of justice to consult with the Cabinet members 
responsible for safety and security, correctional services, social development, 
education and health and submit reports to Parliament on the implementation of the 
CJA within one year after its commencement. These reports are in respect of each the 
                                                 
1230
 Section 85(2) of the CJA. 
1231
 Ibid, Section 86. 
1232
 An overview of issues that were discussed in Parliament during the review of the parliamentary 
oversight of the first year of operation of the CJA in 2011 is discussed in Waterhouse, S., “Parliament 
Reviews the Implementation of the Child Justice Act.” Article 40. Vol. 13 No. 2, September 2011. 
The proceedings of this review are available at http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20110622-joint-
meeting-implementation-child-justice-act. See also Gallinetti, J., Getting to Know the Child Justice 
Act, op. cit. 
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Department or institution referred to in Section 94(2)
1233
, on the implementation of 
the CJA.
1234
 The said departments are required to submit those reports to Parliament 
every year thereafter.
1235
 
Functionally, the requirement to submit implementation reports to Parliament allows 
the legislature to exercise its oversight function through monitoring the 
implementation of the CJA. It also ensures that the implementation ‘is consistent 
with the original intention of the legislature.’1236 This requirement is actually in line 
with South African new approach to ensuring that the hitherto existing gap and 
disparity between policy and legislation and their implementation are closed. This 
trend can also be seen in respect of such legislation as Criminal Law (Sexual 
Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act (2007).
1237
 In principle, this 
approach ‘has forced the question of how to strengthen the implementation of 
important laws that protect and promote basic human rights.’1238 So, the approach 
‘can be seen as an attempt by the legislature to take steps to close the gap through 
systematizing oversight.’1239 
 
                                                 
1233
 These departments constitute the Intersectoral Committee for Child Justice established under 
Section 94(1) of the CJA. They consist of the Director-General: Justice and Constitutional 
Development, who is the chairperson of the Committee; the National Director of Public Prosecutions; 
the National Commissioner of the South African Police Service; the National Commissioner of 
Correctional Services; the Director-General (Social Development); the Director-General (Education); 
and the Director-General (Health). 
1234
 Section 96(3)(a) of the CJA. 
1235
 Ibid, Section 96(3)(b). 
1236
 Waterhouse, S., “Parliament Reviews the Implementation of the Child Justice Act”, op. cit. 
1237
 See particularly Section 65(3) of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) 
Amendment Act, No. 32 of 2007. This section contains reporting requirement similar to Section 96(3) 
of the CJA. 
1238
 Waterhouse, op. cit. 
1239
 Ibid. 
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As noted during the deliberations on the first year of implementation of the CJA at 
Parliament that took place on 22
nd
 June 2011
1240
, regular reporting Parliament allows 
for the identification of strengths, weaknesses and gaps in the implementation 
process; thus, enabling Parliament to identify gaps and weaknesses in the CJA. It is 
only upon identifying the strengths, weaknesses and gaps in the implementation 
process that Parliament can effect efficient amendments to the CJA.  
 
6.7 Conclusion 
This Chapter has examined South Africa’s international law obligation to 
domesticate international juvenile justice standards. In compliance with this 
obligation, South Africa enacted the CJA in 2008, which came into force on 1 April 
2010 in terms of Section 100. The enactment of the CJA has brought about 
progressive elements in the administration of juvenile justice in South Africa. Such 
progressive elements include the CJA’s recognition of international juvenile justice 
standards and the supremacy of the Constitution; the guiding principles underlying 
the CJA; and the MACR. It has also brought about progressive features relating to 
methods of securing attendance of a child at preliminary inquiry or in courts; release 
and detention or placement of children; and assessment of offending children.  
 
                                                 
1240
 The meeting was convened by Parliamentary Portfolio Committees on Justice and Constitutional 
Development and Correctional Services, where they were briefed by the Department of Justice and 
Constitutional Development on behalf of the Inter-Sectoral Committee on Child Justice (ISCCJ), 
established in terms of Section 94 of the CJA. See particularly, Inter-Sectoral Committee on Child 
Justice, “Presentation to Portfolio Committee on Justice and Constitutional Development: 
Consolidated Progress Report on Implementation of the Child Justice, 2008 (Act No. 75 of 2008): 
Inter-Sectoral Child Justice Steering Committee (ISCCJ).” Presented by Advocate P. Kambula, Chief 
Director (Promotion of Rights of Vulnerable Groups, Department of Justice and Constitutional 
Development on behalf of the Director-General of the National Department of Justice and 
Constitutional Development and the Chair of the National ISCCJ, 22
nd
 June 2011. In attendance at this 
meeting, there were also representatives of various State Departments and civil society organisations. 
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In a very detailed manner, the CJA has also legislated provisions and programmes 
relating to diversion where now diversion is statutorily entrenched and recognised. 
The Chapter has examined the sentencing options in the CJA as well as the 
parliamentary oversight of the implementation of the CJA. It can, therefore, be 
concluded that the CJA complies, to a great extent, with the international juvenile 
justice standards. In short, the CJA has managed to domesticate all international 
juvenile justice standards relating to the administration of juvenile justice; by clearly 
regulating the MACR as well as the treatment of children below the MACR. It has 
also creatively blended theories inherent in the African justice systems, such as 
Ubuntu, with principles enshrined in the international juvenile justice law. As 
discussed in this Chapter, the CJA provides a significant legislative statement of the 
theory of Ubuntu, which seeks to balance between the interests of the offending child 
and his or her family, on the one hand, and the interests of the victim and the 
community affected by offending, on the other; thereby discouraging revenge and 
retaliation to the offending child. 
 
The CJA has also adequately domesticated the due process rights inherent in 
international juvenile justice law. These include the right to legal representation, 
whereby free legal assistance is to be provided by the state; the right to be heard; the 
right to admission to bail without undue restrictions; the rights to a fair trial; and the 
right not to be subjected to inhumane or degrading treatment. The CJA has also 
domesticated the international law principle which requires that incarceration of a 
child should only be applied as a matter of last resort and only for a short period. In 
this context, the CJA encourages diversion of the child offender right from the time 
328 
 
  
 
 
the child is arrested up until he or she is finally and conclusively processed through 
the criminal justice system. To be able to check the effectiveness of its 
implementation, the CJA contains provisions relating to parliamentary oversight of 
the implementation; by compelling a cabinet member responsible for the 
administration of justice to submit to parliament implementation reports within one 
year after the CJA became operational. As seen in the discussion in this Chapter, the 
requirement to submit implementation reports allows parliament to exercise its 
oversight function through monitoring of the implementation of the CJA. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
7.0 DOMESTICATION OF INTERNATIONAL JUVENILE JUSTICE 
STANDARDS IN TANZANIA: AN EXAMINATION OF THE LAW 
AND PRACTICE 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The need to provide legal protection to children in conflict with the law in 
international law cannot be over emphasised. Similarly, in Tanzania this need has 
been expressed for a long time now.
1241
 This call has been founded in many 
international human rights instruments, particularly basing on the principle set out in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948 to the effect that 
childhood is entitled to special care and assistance.
1242
 The UDHR, in particular, has 
recognized similar provisions in the Geneva Declaration of Human Rights (1924) 
and the UN Declaration of the Rights of the Child (1959),
1243
 which states that: ‘the 
child, by reason of his physical and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and 
care, including appropriate legal protection, before as well as after birth.’  
 
Thus, when the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (CRC)
1244
 in 1989 there was already in existence other 
international instruments protecting the rights of children, particularly those in 
                                                 
1241
 See particularly Law Reform Commission of Tanzania, “Report on Laws Relating to Children in 
Tanzania”. Submitted to the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, April 1994; Legal and 
Human Rights Centre, The State of Juvenile Justice. Dar es Salaam: Legal and Human Rights Centre, 
2003; and Tume ya Haki za Binadamu na Utawala Bora, Taarifa ya Ziara za Tume Wilayani na 
Ukaguzi wa Magereza na Vituo vya Polisi kwa Mwaka 2003/2004. Dar es Salaam: Tume ya Haki za 
Binadamu na Utawala Bora, 2004, p. 15. 
1242
 See particularly Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
1243
 The Declaration was adopted by the UNGA on 20
th
 November 1959. 
1244
 The CRC was adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by the UNGA 
resolution 44/25 of 20
th
 November 1989; and entered into force on 2
nd
 September 1990, in accordance 
with Article 49. 
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conflict with the law. Interestingly, the preamble to the CRC refers to the United 
Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (the 
“Beijing Rules”) in recognition that ‘in all countries in the world, there are children 
living in exceptionally difficult conditions, and that such children need special 
consideration.’ According to principle 2 of the UN Declaration on the Rights of the 
Child: ‘The child shall enjoy special protection, and shall be given opportunities and 
facilities, by law and by other means, to enable him to develop physically, mentally, 
morally, spiritually and socially in a healthy and normal manner and in conditions of 
freedom and dignity. In the enactment of laws for this purpose, the best interests of 
the child shall be the paramount consideration.’ 
 
The United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child (the “CROC”) has 
regularly emphasised that ‘all countries that have ratified the CRC need to ensure 
that their legislation is fully compatible with the provisions and principles of the 
CRC.’1245 In respect of Tanzania, the CROC has, more than once, urged Tanzania to 
enact legislation that would effectively protect children’s rights, including the rights 
of children in conflict with the law.
1246
 Emphasising on the need for Tanzania to 
                                                 
1245
 African Child Policy Forum, In the Best Interest of the Child: Harmonizing Laws in Eastern and 
Southern Africa. Addis Ababa: African Child Forum/UNICEF, 2007, p.3. 
1246
 See particularly CROC, “Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: 
United Republic of Tanzania,” 09/07/2001, CRC/C/15/Add.156; CROC, “Concluding Observations: 
United Republic of Tanzania.” UNCRC/C/TZA/CO/2, 21 June 2006; CROC, “Consideration of 
Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 12(1) of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child on the Sale, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography: Concluding 
Observations (United Republic of Tanzania).” Consideration of the Initial Report of the United 
Republic of Tanzania, CRC/C/OPSC/TZA/CO/1, 3 October 2008; CROC, Consideration of Reports 
Submitted by States Parties under Article 12(1) of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict: Concluding Observations 
(United Republic of Tanzania).” Consideration of the Initial Report of the United Republic of 
Tanzania, CRC/C/OPAC/TZA/CO/1, 3 October 2008. See also African Committee of Experts on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC), “Concluding Recommendations on the Republic of 
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implement this recommendation, in 2010, the African Committee of Experts on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC) recommended that:  
The Committee urges the State Party to work on the Concluding Observations made 
by the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child aimed at improving the state of 
juvenile justice in its jurisdiction, by particularly enacting comprehensive provisions 
in the juvenile justice standards; allocating sufficient human and physical resources; 
and conduct regular training to juvenile justice personnel to ensure that juvenile 
justice is administered in consonance with best practices and international 
standards.
1247
 
 
However, this was not done until 31
st
 July 2009 when the Government of Tanzania 
introduced in Parliament a Bill to enact the Law of the Child Act (LCA)
1248
. This Bill 
was passed by Parliament into law on 4
th
 November 2009 and assented to by 
President Jakaya Kikwete on 20
th
 November 2009. Provisions relating to legal 
protection of children in conflict with the law have been, particularly, contained in 
Part IX of the LCA.  
Therefore, this Chapter examines the provisions relating to the protection of children 
in conflict with the law in the context of the existing international children’s rights 
instruments. The Chapter looks at the prevalence of, and risk factors for, juvenile 
delinquency in Tanzania. It also examines the impact of juvenile delinquency in 
society and how to prevent it. In a detailed account, the Chapter critically examines 
provisions relating to the treatment of children in conflict with the law as set out in 
Part IX of the LCA; by particularly scrutinising its salient features – i.e., criminal 
capacity and minimum age of criminal responsibility; and the exposure of children in 
conflict with the law to the criminal justice system. 
                                                                                                                                          
Tanzania Report on the Status and Implementation of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare 
of the Child”, 2010. 
1247
 ACERWC, “Concluding Recommendations on the Republic of Tanzania Report on the Status and 
Implementation of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child”, 2010, p. 9. 
1248
 The Bill Supplement in respect of this Bill was published in the Gazette of the United Republic of 
Tanzania, Vol. 90 No. 20, on 10
th
 July 2009. 
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Other salient features relating to juvenile justice examined in this Chapter are the 
establishment of the Juvenile Court, its jurisdiction and applicable procedures. 
Methods of securing the attendance of a child in conflict with the law at the 
preliminary inquiry are also among the features examined in this Chapter. In 
addition, the Chapter examines the procedure obtained in the release and/or detention 
of a child in conflict with the law pending his or her processing in the criminal 
justice system; and the manner of dealing with a child committing an offence in 
association with adults.  
 
Furthermore, the Chapter critically examines provisions relating to evidence adduced 
in court by a child as a witness; sentencing of a child; and placement of a child upon 
sentencing. In the end, the Chapter analyses the gaps inherent in the LCA in relation 
to the administration of juvenile justice.  
7.2 Prevalence of Juvenile Delinquency in Tanzania 
Although there is no nationwide consolidated and disaggregated statistical data, 
juvenile delinquency is widespread in Tanzania.
1249
 Non-availability of statistical 
information on child offending in Tanzania is common as a result of lack proper 
record and data management systems in the juvenile justice institutions: the police, 
judiciary, prisons and social welfare department. In a recent study
1250
 commissioned 
by the Ministry of Constitutional and Legal Affairs (MoCLA) in collaboration with 
                                                 
1249
 See Legal and Human Rights Centre, The State of Juvenile Justice, op. cit; Tume ya Haki za 
Binadamu na Utawala Bora, Taarifa ya Ziara za Tume Wilayani na Ukaguzi wa Magereza na Vituo 
vya Polisi kwa Mwaka 2003/2004, op. cit, p. 15; and Commission for Human Rights and Good 
Governance, “Report on Situational Analysis of Children Deprived of their Liberty in Detention 
Facilities in Tanzania.” Dar es Salaam: Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance, 2011. 
1250
 The research was conducted by the National Organisation for Legal Assistance (nola) based in 
Tanzania and the UK-based Coram Children Legal Centre (Essex University).  
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UNICEF, for instance, researchers sought to collect central level collated data and 
data from the entries in police log books in all of the sample regions on the number 
of children who were arrested in a 12 month period, disaggregated by age, gender 
and type of offence.  Unfortunately, ‘researchers were only able to collect 
quantitative data from the log-books of police stations in three out of the ten study’s 
regions
1251:  Lindi Urban, Dodoma Central and Tanga Urban Police Stations.’1252 In 
addition, researchers were unable to collect data on the extent and nature of 
offending by children at the national level
1253
; although official statistics indicate that 
offending children mostly commit theft, followed by housebreaking.1254 However, the 
table below indicates criminal cases involving children dealt with by the police. 
 
Table 1: Number of persons under 18 who have been arrested by the police due to an alleged 
conflict with the law (2008 - 2010) in Tanzania Mainland 
 
Reported 
Cases 
Sent 
to 
court 
Convicted Acquitted Under 
investigation 
Closed 
Undetected 
No 
offence 
disclosed 
No 
further 
action 
Total 
arrested 
3258 669 428 411 664 774 66 246 3258 
Source: Ministry of Home Affairs, Tanzania Police Force, December 2011. 
 
Available statistical information indicates that juvenile delinquency is rampant in 
Tanzania, whereby 50% of the children arrested in a 12-month period in the three 
police stations under the MoCLA study were arrested for suspected theft or for 
                                                 
1251
 These Regions were Arusha, Dar es Salaam, Dodoma, Kigoma, Kilimanjaro, Lindi, Mbeya, 
Mtwara, Mwanza and Tanga. 
1252
 See United Republic of Tanzania, “An Analysis of the Situation for Children in Conflict with the 
Law in Tanzania.” Dar es Salaam: Ministry of Constitutional and Legal Affairs (MoCLA)/UNICEF, 
July 2011. 
1253
 Ibid. 
1254
 Reported in United Republic of Tanzania, “Consideration of the Second Periodic CRC Report: 
1998-2003,” answers to questions raised for additional and updated information considered in 
connection with the 2
nd
 CRC report to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child on 15
th
 -19
th
 May 
2006. 
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another suspected minor property offence.  Sexual offences were the second most 
common type of offence for which children were arrested, constituting 21%.  As the 
MoCLA study notes: ‘significant proportion of arrests for sexual offences was for 
statutory rape; that is, sexual conduct that is, in fact, consensual, but where one or 
both of the parties was below the age of consent at the time of the act.’1255  
According to the MoCLA study: 
 
It appears that there are no guidelines setting out the circumstances in which the 
offence of statutory rape should be prosecuted and the circumstances in which there 
will be a presumption against prosecution, as this will not be in the public interest. 
These findings were supported by the juvenile justice professionals who were 
interviewed in all regions.  Virtually all reported that theft (e.g. pick pocketing, 
stealing, particularly of mobile phones) was by far the most common offence for 
which children were arrested in their district.  These professionals also noted that 
sexual offences (in particular, rape) represented a significant proportion of all 
offences for which children are arrested.  Most professionals also mentioned more 
serious property offences such as breaking, entering and stealing and armed robbery 
as being among the offences for which children are typically arrested in their 
district.  Several professionals reported that, where children are arrested for more 
serious property offences, they are normally being ‘used’ by adults to commit these 
offences.
1256
 
 
The data provided in the MoCLA report also indicates that a significant proportion of 
children are arrested for public disorder offences, such as vagrancy, loitering, touting 
or for “disrupting passengers”.1257  Juvenile justice professionals across most districts 
also mentioned that it is not uncommon for children to be arrested for disorder 
offences, such as “roaming around town”, “using abusive language”, and so on. The 
report finds this to be a cause for concern in that:  ‘Offences such as vagrancy, 
loitering and truancy are often the result of poverty, lack of parental care and other 
socio-economic problems.  They disproportionately affect vulnerable children, such 
                                                 
1255
 Ibid. 
1256
 Ibid. 
1257
 Ibid. 
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as children living or working on the street.’1258 In fact, the CROC has stated that 
these offences should not be criminalised but rather, dealt with through a State’s 
child protection system, using measures that give ‘effective support to parents and/or 
caregivers and measures which address the root causes of this behaviour.’1259  
According to Article 56 of the Riyadh Guidelines: ‘In order to prevent further 
stigmatization, victimization and criminalization of young persons, legislation should 
be enacted to ensure that any conduct not considered an offence or not penalized if 
committed by an adult is not considered an offence and not penalized if committed 
by a young person.’ 
 
At the same time, the juvenile justice system in Tanzania suffers scarcity of detention 
facilities for offending children. This can be exemplified by the fact that the remand 
facilities for children are unevenly distributed – located in Arusha, Dar es Salaam, 
Kilimanjaro, Mbeya and Tanga regions only
1260
 – with the central, western and 
north-western zones having no separate placements for children.
1261
 The first report 
released on the monitoring of the implementation of MKUKUTA
1262
 in December 
                                                 
1258
 Ibid. 
1259
 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 10:  “Children’s Rights in 
Juvenile Justice”. CRC/C/GC/10, 25 April 2007, para. 9. 
1260
 By the end of 2012 there were established 7 Retention Homes under Section 133(9) of the Law of 
the Child Act. As per the First Schedule to the Law of the Child (Retention Homes) Rules (2012) GN. 
No. 151, the existing Retention Homes are located in Arusha, Dar es Salaam, Mbeya, Moshi, Mtwara, 
Mwanza and Tanga Regions. However, the Mtwara and Mwanza Retention Homes are yet to be 
operational.  
1261
 See particularly United Republic of Tanzania, Status Report 2006: Progress Towards the Goals 
for Growth, Social Wellbeing and Governance in Tanzania. Dar es Salaam: Research and Analysis 
Working Group/MKUKUTA Monitoring System, Ministry of Planning, Economy and Empowering, 
2006, p. 32; and Tume ya Haki za Binadamu na Utawala Bora, Taarifa ya Ziara za Tume Wilayani na 
Ukaguzi wa Magereza na Vituo vya Polisi kwa Mwaka 2003/2004, op. cit. 
1262
 This is an abbreviation of Kiswahili words:  Mkakati wa Kukuza Uchumi na Kuondoa Umaskini 
Tanzania, whose English version is:  National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty 
(NSGRP). 
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2006 by Research and Analysis Working Group (RAWG)
1263
, also notes that the 
administration of juvenile justice in the country is ‘lagging due to the lack of 
appropriate facilities; the central, western and north-western zones do not have 
separate placement for juvenile offenders.’1264 
 
At the same time, there is only one Approved School (at Irambo in Mbeya region) 
and one Juvenile Court (at Kisutu in Dar es Salaam region) as illustrated by the table 
below. 
 
Table 2: Number of institutions specifically for persons under 18 as, accused of, or 
recognized as having infringed the penal law 
 
Facility Number 
Retention Homes
1265
 5  
Juvenile Court 1 
Approved school 1 
Total 7 
 
 
This means that offending children in these zones are processed in the criminal 
justice system and remanded or imprisoned in facilities with adult offenders,
1266
 
                                                 
1263
 RAWGU was under the MKUKUTA Monitoring System, in then the Ministry of Planning, 
Economy and Empowering (MPEE). Currently, it is under the Ministry of Finance. 
1264
 See United Republic of Tanzania, Status Report 2006: Progress Towards the Goals for Growth, 
Social Wellbeing and Governance in Tanzania. Dar es Salaam: Research and Analysis Working 
Group, MKUKUTA Monitoring System, 2006, p. 27. 
1265
 According to the First Schedule to the Law of the Child (Retention Homes) Rules, GN. No. 
151/2012, there are two additional Retention Homes established under Section 133(9) and Rule 5(2) 
of these Rules. These Retention Homes are to be located in Mtwara and Mwanza Regions; and were 
not functional at the time of completion of this study. 
1266
 Legal and Human Rights Centre, The State of Juvenile Justice, op. cit; and Tume ya Haki za 
Binadamu na Utawala Bora, Taarifa ya Ziara za Tume Wilayani na Ukaguzi wa Magereza na Vituo 
vya Polisi kwa Mwaka 2003/2004, op. cit, p. 15. This seems to be a common problem even in other 
East African countries:  Kenya and Uganda. In Uganda, for instance, although the country’s 
Constitution provides [in Articles 34(6) and 93(6)] that child offenders kept in lawful custody or 
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which has a negative impact on the offending children’s well-being and welfare.1267 
This is justified by the number of children (844) who were kept in pre-trial detention 
in Tanzania Mainland in 2003-2005, which greatly surpasses the required capacity of 
the available child detention facilities in the country (428).1268 Recent statistical 
information also confirms this contention as illustrated in the figure below: 
 
Figure 1: Number of Children Admitted to Three Retention Homes in Months (2011) 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Constitutional and Legal Affairs/UNICEF, “Analysis of the 
Situation for Children in Conflict with the Law.” July 2011.  
 
However, this number is not realistic because, as the recent report of the MKUKUTA 
Monitoring System notes, the pattern of data relating to juvenile delinquency in 
                                                                                                                                          
detention shall be kept separately from adult offenders and not to be remanded in adult prisons, in 
practice children in conflict with the law are detained in adult jails due to lack of sufficient child 
detention facilities. See particularly African Child Policy Forum, In the Best Interest of the Child: 
Harmonizing Laws in Eastern and Southern Africa, op. cit, p. 87. 
1267
 For a detailed discussion on this issue see particularly, Legal and Human Rights Centre, The State 
of Juvenile Justice, ibid; Mashamba, C.J., “Fundamental Principles of Administration of Juvenile 
Justice and State Compliance with its Obligations under International Human Rights Instruments: The 
Case of Tanzania.” Op. cit; and Mashamba, C.J., “Emerging Issues in Diverting Juvenile Offenders 
from Criminal Justice System: The Socio-Cultural Realities, Economics and Politics of 
Administration of Juvenile Justice in Tanzania”, op. cit. 
1268
 See statistics available at the former Ministry of Home Affairs 2006 (Prisons) reported in United 
Republic Of Tanzania, “Consideration of the Second CRC Periodic Report: 1998-2003 – Answers to 
Questions Raised for Additional and Updated Information to be Considered in Connection to Second 
CRC Report during the UN CRC Committee Session on 15
th
-19
th
 May, 2006, in Geneva, 
Switzerland,” Ministry of Community Development, Gender and Children; April 2006 
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recent years is erratic.
1269
  The report notes that the Ministry of Home Affairs, which 
is responsible for maintaining data on detained or arrested juveniles, has no 
comprehensive data on the number of offending children. Instead, the report 
observes, the ‘number of juveniles detained in remand homes [are] reported by the 
Ministry of Health and Social Welfare.’1270 The report notes further that, 
The number of juveniles in [remand] homes consistently decreased from 913 in 
2004 to 728 in 2006, increased to 1,101 in 2007 and decreased again to 880 in 2008. 
In the absence of further information on the total number of juveniles in detention it 
is difficult to say whether the trend for juvenile detention is improving. However, 
the Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance (CHRAGG) has 
expressed particular concern about the numbers of juveniles who are being detained 
in facilities with adults.
1271
 
 
The practice of placing offending children in adult remand or prison facilities 
breaches the principle enacted in Article 17(2)(b) of the ACRWC and Article 37(c) 
and (d) of the CRC, all of which require that children who are to be placed in 
detention must be placed in separate facilities from those housing adult offenders. 
This principle aims at saving offending children from being contaminated with 
criminal manners by adult offenders when they intermingle in remand or prison 
facilities.  
 
So, from the available official data, it can be argued that the present criminal justice 
system in Tanzania does not provide adequate safeguards to children in conflict with 
the law. Therefore, it is in itself violative of the basic rights of children in conflict 
with the law, contrary to the established international juvenile justice standards.  
                                                 
1269
 United Republic of Tanzania, Poverty and Human Development Report 2009. Dar es Salaam: 
Research and Analysis Working Group (Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs)/Research on 
Poverty Alleviation (REPOA), 2009, p. 127. 
1270
 Ibid. 
1271
 Ibid. See also Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance, Annual Report for 2006/07. 
Dar es Salaam: Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance (CHRAGG), 2008. 
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The MoCLA study has enlisted several risk factors for children coming into conflict 
with the law in Tanzania. Basing its findings on interviews with children in conflict 
with the law and with juvenile justice professionals, the study indicates that, ‘across 
all regions, poverty, lack of parental care (including children who are orphans or who 
cannot live at home due to economic conditions or exposure to abuse), poor 
parenting or parental neglect are factors which expose children to a greater risk of 
coming into conflict with the law.’1272  According to the report, these factors will 
often ‘lead children into situations which make them more “visible” to police or 
more vulnerable to being exploited by adults, such as those children who are living 
on the street or children who are working.’1273  The report also mentions poor 
educational attainment to be a risk factor for children coming into conflict with the 
law.
1274
   
 
Respondents, in another survey conducted by the National Organisation for Legal 
Assistance (nola) for Plan Tanzania in 2007
1275
, were of the views that juvenile 
delinquency has adverse effects on the respective offending children leading them to 
(i) adopting criminal behaviours; (ii) adopting truant behaviours; (iii) undermining 
the best interests of the child in the child growing stages; (iv) curtailing positive 
development of the child; (v) child abuse; (vi) subjecting the child to abject poverty 
and hence miserable future; and (vii) child school dropping-out. 
                                                 
1272
 See United Republic of Tanzania, “An Analysis of the Situation for Children in Conflict with the 
Law in Tanzania”, op. cit. 
1273
 Ibid. 
1274
 Ibid. 
1275
 Plan Tanzania, “Report on the Situation of Children’s Rights in Dar es Salaam, Kibaha, Kisarawe, 
Ifakara, Mwanza and Geita” (2007). A report of a survey conducted for Plan Tanzania by nola. This 
research was conducted by nola on behalf of Plan International. 
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7.3 Lack of Measures for Preventing Child Offending 
Although the CRC and the ACRWC do not contain specific provisions addressing 
the prevention of offending by children, the CROC  has emphasized the need for a 
juvenile justice system to address the social roots of offending, and it has also 
consistently proposed, that the “Riyadh Guidelines” on Prevention of Juvenile 
Delinquency ‘should be regarded as providing relevant standards for implementation. 
The Guidelines requires “comprehensive prevention plans” to be instituted at every 
level of government and proposes that they should be implemented within the 
framework of the Convention and other international instruments.’1276 
However, in Tanzania there are no any discernible measures devised, and currently 
being taken, by the state to prevent child offending in the country. Asked what 
measures should be adopted to prevent offending by children in their respective 
communities, respondents in the Plan and MoCLA surveys were of the views, inter 
alia, that: (i) the Government should establish a well-functioning juvenile justice 
system; (ii) the Government should construct remand homes and approved schools at 
least in every region; and improve the condition of the existing ones; (iii) the 
Government and CSOs should ensure that offending children are availed prerequisite 
legal aid; (iv)  the Government should ensure that it expedites the introduction of 
diversion measures of juvenile delinquents
1277
; and (v) the Government should 
ensure that juvenile justice personnel are specifically trained to enable them to 
effectively administer the juvenile justice system. 
                                                 
1276
 Hodgkin, R., and P. Newell, Implementation Handbook for the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, op. cit, p. 546. 
1277
 This aspect is discussed in part 7.6 of this chapter. 
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7.4 Lack of a Separate, Comprehensive Legal Framework for Children in 
Conflict with the Law in Tanzania  
The Law of the Child Act (LCA) does not provide a separate, comprehensive set of 
legal provisions and procedures that apply specifically to children in conflict with the 
law.
1278
 The LCA, which ‘represents a significant development in establishing a 
separate criminal justice system for children’1279 by containing a number of 
provisions that specifically apply to children in conflict with the law, does not cover 
all aspects of the criminal justice process relating to children in conflict with the law 
as compared to the South African CJA.
1280
 The LCA ‘is limited to establishing and 
regulating proceedings before the Juvenile Court, the application of custodial and 
alternative sentences, and regulating Approved Schools.’1281 This omission 
contravenes the requirement of international children’s rights norms, which demand 
that states should develop separate juvenile justice systems with separate rules of 
procedure applying for children only. 
 
According to the CROC, the CRC and the UN rules and guidelines together ‘call for 
the adoption of a child-oriented [justice] system that recognizes the child as a subject 
                                                 
1278
 See particularly United Republic of Tanzania, “An Analysis of the Situation for Children in 
Conflict with the Law in Tanzania”, op. cit; and Mashamba, C.J., “A Child in Conflict with the Law 
under the Tanzanian Law of the Child Act (2009): Accused or Victim of Circumstances?” Vo. 8 No. 2 
The Justice Review, 2009. 
1279
 United Republic of Tanzania, “An Analysis of the Situation for Children in Conflict with the Law 
in Tanzania”, ibid. 
1280
 Examined in Chapter Six of this study. 
1281
 See Legal and Human Rights Centre, The State of Juvenile Justice, op. cit; and Tume ya Haki za 
Binadamu na Utawala Bora, Taarifa ya Ziara za Tume Wilayani na Ukaguzi wa Magereza na Vituo 
vya Polisi kwa Mwaka 2003/2004, op. cit, p. 15. Of late, however, the the Minister of Health and 
Social Welfare has made the Law of the Child (Retention Homes) Rules (2012), GN. No. 151/2012, 
which were published on 4
th
 May 2012. Amongst other things, the Rules regulate the establishment, 
functioning and monitoring of the functioning of the retention homes. They also set out a 
comprehensive child rights that are to be protected by the retention homes in respect of children in 
these institutions [see particularly Rule 4(1)]. 
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of fundamental rights and freedoms and stresses the need for all actions concerning 
children to be guided by the best interests of the child as a primary consideration.’1282 
This call derives its basis from the provisions of Article 40 of the CRC and Article 
17 of the ACRWC, which oblige States Parties thereto to put in place policy, 
legislative and practical/programmatic measures that accord ‘special protection for 
all children alleged as, accused of, or recognised as having infringed the penal 
law.’1283 Therefore, Tanzania, being a State Party to these international children 
rights instruments,
1284
 has an obligation to abide by this requirement. Although this 
obligation is enshrined in the long title to the LCA
1285
, it is not well articulated in the 
same law; thus, a need arises to amend it or have a separate child justice law in the 
context of the South African CJA.
1286
 
 
7.5 Salient Features of the LCA in Respect of Children in Conflict with the 
Law  
This part critically examines the salient features in the LCA relating to children in 
conflict with the law. These features include the criminal capacity; the establishment 
of the Juvenile Court and the administration of juvenile justice in Tanzania; 
                                                 
1282
 Report on the ninth session, May-June 1995, CRC/C/43, Annex VIII, p. 64. 
1283
 African Child Policy Forum, In the Best Interest of the Child: Harmonizing Laws in Eastern and 
Southern Africa, op. cit, p. 79. See also Hodgkin, R. and P. Newell, Implementation Handbook for the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, op. cit, p. 590. 
1284
 Tanzania ratified the CRC in 1991 and the ACRWC in 2003. 
1285
 The long title of the LCA stipulates that this is: ‘An Act to provide for reform and consolidation of 
laws relating to children, to stipulate rights of the child and to promote, protect and maintain the 
welfare of a child with a view to giving effect to international and regional conventions on the rights 
of the child; to provide for affiliation, foster care, adoption and custody of the child; to further regulate 
employment and apprenticeship; to make provisions with respect to a child in conflict with law and to 
provide for related matters.’ 
1286
 A recent call for the amendment of the LCA to encompass detailed provisions relating to child 
justice was made at the 15
th
 Family Law Conference in Cape Town. See Mashamba, C.J., “The 
Implications of the 2009 Law of the Child Act on Family Law in Tanzania.” A paper presented at the 
Family Law Conference held at Radisson Hotel, Granger Bay, Cape Town, South Africa, on 15-16 
March 2012. 
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jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court; procedure and proceedings in the Juvenile Court; 
methods of securing attendance of child at preliminary inquiry; release (on bail or 
otherwise) and/or detention of a child prior to sentence;   and manner of dealing with 
a child committing an offence in association with adults. Other salient features 
examined in this part include placement of a child in a retention or remand home; 
procedure on hearing in the Juvenile Court; procedure where a child is a witness; 
sentencing and alternative to custodial sentence; and appeal against the decisions of 
the juvenile court. 
 
The guiding principles for the administration of juvenile justice under the LCA are 
enshrined in section 99(1). According to this section, the procedure for conducting 
proceedings by the Juvenile Court in all matters is in accordance with rules to be 
made by the Chief Justice for that purpose.
1287
 While the rules are yet to be 
promulgated by the CJ, in any case involving a child, the following principles are to 
be observed in the context of this section:- 
(a) the Juvenile Court should sit as often as necessary; 
(b) proceedings in the Juvenile Court should be held in camera
1288
; 
(c) proceedings should be informal as possible, and made by enquiry without 
exposing the child to adversarial procedures; 
(d) a social welfare officer should be present; 
                                                 
1287
 At the time of compiling this research, the Chief Justice had prepared the rules, which were 
submitted to the Attorney General for publication in the official Gazette. 
1288
 Under Subsection (2) of Section 99 of the LCA, apart from members and officers of the Juvenile 
Court, only the following persons may, at the discretion of the Court, attend any sitting of Juvenile 
Court: first, parties to the case before court, their advocates, witnesses and other persons directly 
concerned or involved in the case; and, second, any other person whom the court may authorize to be 
present. 
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(e) a parent, guardian or a next of kin has the right to be present in the 
proceedings involving a child in the Juvenile Court; 
(f) the child has the right to be represented by a next of kin or an advocate; 
(g) the right to appeal should be clearly explained to the child; and 
(h) the child has the right to give an account and express an opinion. 
 
It is, nonetheless, expected that the rules
1289
 to be made by the CJ will make a clear 
provision for the guiding principles and procedures in the administration of juvenile 
justice in Tanzania. 
 
Unlike the South African Child Justice Act, which is a child-justice specific law, the 
Tanzanian Law of the Child Act does not have specific objectives for the 
administration of juvenile justice. Rather, in its long title, the LCA seeks to make 
provisions with respect to a child in conflict with law. Impliedly, the provisions 
contained in Part IX of the LCA seek to establish a separate system for dealing with 
child offenders away from the criminal justice system.  
 
7.5.1 Criminal Capacity of Children  
The import of criminal capacity of children both at the international and municipal 
levels is discussed at length in Chapter Six, whereby it is observed that the CRC has 
required States Parties to set a minimum age for criminal responsibility (MACR) 
that, according to the Beijing Rules, should not be too low. In recognition of (and in 
                                                 
1289
 At the time of writing of this study, there were consultations underway to make rules of procedure 
for the effective functioning of Part IX of the LCA, particularly in the Juvenile Court. 
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compliance with) this requirement, the LCA has clearly set out the MACR as 
discussed herein below. 
 
7.5.1.1 Definition of a Child 
In the previous legal setting there was a chronic problem of defining who a child 
was. Different laws provided differently as to who was the child, which resulted in 
more practical controversies.
1290
 In order to do away with this glitch, the LAC has 
provided a single definition of a child. In section 3(1) the LAC defines a child as a 
person below the age of eighteen years. This is a very progressive definition, which 
complies with the definitions of a child in the CRC and ACRWC; and it is hoped that 
there will be no further controversies as to who is a child in Tanzania. 
 
7.5.1.2 Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility (MACR) 
As stated in Chapter Six (Section 6.5.1) of this study, States Parties to both the CRC 
and ACRWC are obliged to set a minimum age of criminal responsibility 
(MACR)
1291
; that is, an age below which a child cannot be presumed to have the 
                                                 
1290
 For a detailed account on this problem, see particularly United Republic of Tanzania, “Report of 
Tanzania Law Reform Commission on the Law Relating to Children in Tanzania.” Report submitted 
to the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, April 1994; Legal and Human Rights Centre, The 
State of Juvenile Justice, op. cit; UN CRC Committee, “Consideration of Reports Submitted by States 
Parties under Article 40 of the Convention – Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights 
of the Child: United Republic of Tanzania,” CRC/C/TZA/CO/2, dated 2nd June, 2006; and Mashamba, 
Clement J., “Basic Principles to be Incorporated in the New Children Statute in Tanzania.” In 
Mashamba, C.J. (ed.), Using the Law to Protect Children’s Rights in Tanzania: An Unfinished 
Business, op. cit. 
1291
 Article 40(3) of the CRC requires that States ‘shall seek to promote the establishment of a 
minimum age below which children shall be presumed not to have the capacity to infringe the penal 
law’. Similarly, the ACRWC provides that ‘there shall be a minimum age below which children shall 
be presumed not to have the capacity to infringe the penal law.’ 
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capacity to infringe criminal law.
1292
 In General Comment No. 10, the CROC urges 
that States Parties should be encouraged to increase their minimum age of criminal 
responsibility, regarding 12 years as the absolute MACR. In this regard, the CROC 
has recommended that States Parties should continue to increase their respective 
MACR to an even higher age level, for instance, 14 or 16 years.
1293
  
 
However, the minimum age of criminal responsibility in Tanzania is low compared 
to the foregoing international standard.
1294
 
 
As set out in the Penal Code, the 
“absolute” MACR is ten years. However, a child below the age of 12 years is not 
considered to be criminally responsible ‘unless it is proved that at the time of 
committing the act or making the omission he or she had capacity to know that he or 
she ought not to do the act or make the omission.’1295 This appears to offer protection 
to children between the ages of 10 to 12 years, ‘as it provides a presumption that a 
child aged 10 – 12 years is doli incapax (i.e. incapable of committing a crime) and 
appears to place an obligation on the state to rebut this presumption.’1296 But it 
should be noted that the CROC has expressed concern about the practice of doli 
incapax in its concluding observations on States Parties’ reports and in its General 
Comment No. 10,
1297
  emphasizing that it ‘strongly recommends that States parties 
                                                 
1292
 Rule 4 of the Beijing Rules states that: ‘in those legal systems recognising the concept of the age 
of criminal responsibility for juveniles, the beginning of that age shall not be fixed at too low an age 
level, bearing in mind the facts of emotional, mental and intellectual maturity.   
1293
 General Comment No. 10, paras 32 and 33. 
1294
 See particularly United Republic of Tanzania, “An Analysis of the Situation for Children in 
Conflict with the Law in Tanzania”, op. cit. 
1295
 See Section 15(2) of the Penal Code, Cap. 16 R.E. 2002. 
1296
 See particularly United Republic of Tanzania, “An Analysis of the Situation for Children in 
Conflict with the Law in Tanzania”, op. cit. 
1297
 General Comment No. 10, para. 34, provides that: ‘The Committee wishes to express its concern 
about the practice of allowing exceptions to a minimum age of criminal responsibility which permit 
the use of a lower minimum age of criminal responsibility in cases where the child, for example, is 
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set a minimum age of criminal responsibility that does not allow, by way of 
exception, the use of a lower age.’1298 In particular, the CROC, in its concluding 
observations on Tanzania in 2006, urged the government to ‘clearly establish the age 
of criminal responsibility at 12 years, or at an older age that is an internationally 
accepted standard.’1299 
 
The LCA has expressly amended Section 15 of the Penal Code by particularly adding 
a subsection, which provides that: ‘any person under the age of twelve years who 
commits an act or omission which is unlawful shall be dealt with under the Law of 
the Child Act 2009.’ 1300 However, the meaning of this provision is unclear; because 
the LCA covers many areas and contains provisions that encompass juvenile justice 
and child protection. This amendment may only serve, therefore, to apply the 
juvenile justice provisions of the LCA to children in conflict with the law who are 
aged between 10 and 12 years. This, in effect, does not absolve children aged 
between 10 and 12 years of criminal liability.
1301
 
 
7.5.1.3 Determination of the MACR  
Unlike the CJA in South Africa, the LCA does not require every juvenile justice 
agency (police, social welfare/probation services, prosecution, defence and the 
judiciary) to determine the age of a child who come into contact with them. Instead, 
                                                                                                                                          
accused of committing a serious offence or where the child is considered mature enough to be held 
criminally responsible’. 
1298
 Ibid. 
1299
 CROC, “Concluding Observations: United Republic of Tanzania.” UNCRC/C/TZA/CO/2, 21 June 
2006, para. 70(b). 
1300
 See particularly Section 174 of the LCA. 
1301
 United Republic of Tanzania, “An Analysis of the Situation for Children in Conflict with the Law 
in Tanzania”, op. cit.  
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the duty to determine the age of a child accused of committing an offence is vested in 
the court. It should be noted, nevertheless, that the LCA has cured the mischief of 
misinterpreting the age of “a child” when such child is before the Juvenile Court or 
any court. Before the LCA was enacted the practice was for the court to order for 
medical examination of a child in conflict with the law, which was to be corroborated 
by other circumstantial evidence such as statement from parents, relatives or 
guardians. However, in practice, medical evidence as to determination of age was 
problematic. For instance, in Sangu Saba & Another v R
1302
, where an x-ray was used 
to examine the accused as to his age, the East African Court of Appeal held that:  ‘It 
is so well known as to be within the judicial knowledge of the court that even with 
the aid of X-rays, age cannot be assessed exactly.’ In similar tone, in Yusufu 
Kabonga v R
1303, Biron, J. (as he then was) held that: ‘However high the medical 
officer's qualifications and the extent of his experience, I am very far from persuaded 
that a doctor ... could give a definite assessment in respect of age ... with that degree 
of certainty required in a criminal law.’ 
 
In order to address this anomaly, the practice was as described by George, C.J. (as he 
then was) in Francis Mtunguja v R
1304
: that is, the court should call for additional 
evidence to corroborate the medical evidence as to age. This was allowed even on 
appeal so as to elucidate a matter left vague in the trial court. In Emmanuel Kibona v 
R
1305, the High Court held that: ‘Evidence of a parent is even better than that of a 
medical doctor as regards that parent’s child’s age. And additional evidence is as 
                                                 
1302
 [1971] HCD no. 385. 
1303
 [1968] HCD no. 188. 
1304
 [1970] HCD no. 181. 
1305
 (1995) TLR 241. 
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vital in sentencing as in the trial itself.’ So it allowed the appellants to bring 
additional evidence in the form of baptism certificates and any other certificates. 
 
Thus, the requirement of determining the age of a child who is brought before the 
Juvenile Court or any court is now clearly set out in Sections 113 and 114 of the 
LCA. Accordingly, Section 113(1) provides that where a person, whether charged 
with an offence or not
1306, ‘is brought before any court1307 otherwise than for the 
purpose of giving evidence, and it appears to the court that he is a child, the court 
shall make due inquiry as to the age of that person.’1308 In determining the age of a 
person before it, the court has a duty to take into account the “best interests of the 
child” enacted in Section 4 of the LCA. As the High Court held in the Lulu Case, this 
principle has to ‘be applied presumptively to any person whose age if to be 
determined.’1309 In this case, an actress commonly known as Lulu was arraigned at 
the Kisutu Resident Magistrates’ Court for murder of one Steven Charles Kanumba 
(a renowned actor in Tanzania). Committal proceedings were commenced at the 
same court, in the course of which the advocates for Lulu for applied to the presiding 
magistrate for an order seeking to stay the committal proceedings; and, instead 
                                                 
1306
 In Elizabeth Michael Kimemeta @ Lulu v Republic, High Court of Tanzania at Dar es Salaam, 
Miscellaneous Criminal Application No. 46 of 2012 (unreported) (herein after, “the Lulu Case”) the 
High Court held that: ‘Section 113 (1) may apply even where there are no proceedings pending in a 
particular Court. However, a person seeking such determination must satisfy the Court that he is not a 
mere busy body and that the application is made for good purpose. For instance, a social welfare 
officer who is faced with such a question in the discharge of his functions under the Act, may wish to 
call upon the aid of a Court of law in order to find out whether a particular person is a child or not. In 
such a situation, the matter will proceed in accordance with the procedure set out in subsections 
(2),(3), (4) and (5) of Section 113.’ 
1307
 In the Lulu Case (ibid) the High Court held that by virtue of the definition of the word “Court” in 
Section 3 of the LCA, the High Court ‘has concurrent jurisdiction with the other Courts mentioned 
therein to determine the age of a person in trouble with the law.’ 
1308
 This matter has recently been given judicial interpretation for the first time in the Lulu Case, ibid. 
1309
 Ibid, p. 11. 
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thereof, commit the said child to the Juvenile Court. The presiding magistrate 
declined to grant this prayer, holding, inter alia, that the said court had no 
jurisdiction to entertain such an application and held that ‘If the accused has any 
application to make, the same [could only] be made to the High Court of Tanzania.’ 
Consequent to this holding, the advocates for Lulu applied to the High Court for, 
inter alia, an order that the High Court should order the Kisutu Resident Magistrates’ 
Court to stay the committal proceedings and ascertain the age of the accused with a 
view to committing her to the Juvenile Court in the context of the LCA. 
 
Although the High Court faulted the procedure used by the advocates for Lulu of 
making a fresh application instead of an application for revision of the foregoing 
order, it invoked its supervisory powers under Section 44 of the Magistrates’ Courts 
Act (1984)
 1310
; thereby revising and quashing the said order. In this context, the 
                                                 
1310
 Cap. 11 R.E. 2002. Section 44(1)(a) of the Magistrate’s Court Act provides that:  
          ‘(1) In addition to any other powers in that behalf conferred upon the High Court, the High 
Court– 
(a) shall exercise general powers of supervision over all district courts and courts of a resident 
magistrate and may, at any time, call for and inspect or direct the inspection of the records of 
such courts and give such directions as it considers may be necessary in the interests of 
justice, and all such courts shall comply with such directions without undue delay…’ 
However, this approach was quashed by the Court of Appeal of Tanzania when this matter landed in 
that court in DPP v Elizabeth Michael Kimemeta @ Lulu v Republic Court of Appeal of Tanzania at 
Dar es Salaam, Criminal Application No. 6 of 2012 (unreported). In this case, Luanda, JA, held that 
the High Court has no revisional powers under Section 44(1) of the Magistrate’s Courts Act (MCA); 
rather, it has supervisory powers. Referring to its previous decision in John Mgaya & 4 Others v 
Edmund Mjengwa & 6 Others Court of Appeal of Tanzania at Dar es Salaam, Criminal Appeal No. 8 
of 1997 (unreported), the Court of Appeal held that the scope of the High Court in Section 44(1) of the 
MCA is to supervise District and Resident Magistrates’ Courts through giving directions; and not to 
revise their decisions. According to the Court of Appeal, ‘to “supervise” is not one and the same thing 
as to “revise”.’ The Court of Appeal, therefore, counselled that the High Court ought to have given 
directions to the Resident Magistrate’s Court (Kisutu) to determine the age of the accused person, 
instead of doing so by itself through the purported revision. It consequently quashed the proceedings 
in the High Court and remitted the records to the Kisutu Resident Magistrate’s Court for continuation 
of committal proceedings without any direction as to the determination of age. It should be noted that, 
by so doing, the Court of Appeal of Tanzania failed to use this opportunity to rectify the legal problem 
associated with the determination of age of an accused person who appears to be under 18 years of 
age. 
351 
 
  
 
 
High Court held that: ‘The decision of the RM’s Court to refuse to entertain the 
applicant’s application was an error of law and an abdication of the Court’s duty.’ 
Staying the committal proceedings at Kisutu Resident Magistrates’ Court pending its 
determination of the applicant’s age, the High Court held that: 
Considering the seriousness of the charge facing the applicant and the urgency of 
determining whether or not the applicant is entitled to the benefits of the Law of the 
Child Act, and in the interests of justice, this Court, invoking its supervisory powers 
under section 44 of the Magistrates’ Court Act, shall proceed to determine the 
correct age of the applicant now before it, in terms of section 113 of the Law of the 
Child Act.
1311
 
 
As it was stated by the High Court in the Lulu Case, Section 113 of the LCA ‘does 
not say under what circumstances it is to be applied.’1312 According to the High 
Court this does not, nonetheless, ‘deviate from the requirement that there must be a 
legally acceptable purpose for which that person is brought to Court (other than for 
giving of evidence).’1313 Thus, the High Court opined that: 
There must be a reason as to why a person is brought before a Court of law in order 
for the Court to exercise its powers and determine the age of that person. Otherwise, 
one could invoke the provision and present a person in any Court, at any time, so 
long as the Court is one of those envisaged by the Act, and request that an enquiry 
be made on the age of that person. The legislature could not have intended it to be 
so wide.
1314
 
 
The procedure to be followed in determining the age of a person brought before a 
court is set out in subsection (2) of Section 113, which obliges the court to ‘take such 
evidence at the hearing of the case which may include medical evidence and, or 
DNA test as necessary to provide proof of birth, whether it is of a documentary 
nature or otherwise as it appears to the court to be worthy of belief.’ To justify the 
validity of medical evidence or a DNA test as to the age of a child, the court is 
obliged under subsection (3) of Section 113 to receive a certificate signed by a 
                                                 
1311
 See the Lulu Case, op. cit, p. 13. 
1312
 Ibid, p. 8. 
1313
 Ibid. 
1314
 Ibid. 
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medical practitioner licensed under the provisions of the law governing medical 
practice in Tanzania. However, the court may order otherwise where circumstances 
warrant departure from this requirement.  
 
It should be noted that an order or judgment of the court ‘shall not be invalidated by 
any subsequent proof that the age of that person has not been correctly stated to the 
court and the age found by the court to be the age of the person so brought before it 
shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to be the true age of that 
person.’1315 It should also be noted that medical evidence and or collection of blood 
for the purpose of DNA from the child ‘shall be conducted in the presence of a social 
welfare officer.’1316 
 
The foregoing rule has an exception embedded in the provisions of Section 114(1), 
which provide that where it appears to the court that ‘any person brought before it is 
of the age of beyond eighteen years, that person shall, for the purposes of this 
section, be deemed not to be a child.’ However, where the court has failed to 
establish the correct age of the person brought before it, ‘then the age stated by that 
person, parent, guardian, relative or social welfare officer shall be deemed to be the 
correct age of that person.’1317  
                                                 
1315
 Section 113(4) of the LCA. 
1316
 Ibid. Section 113(5). 
1317
 Ibid. Section 114(2). In their Alternative Child Act Bill, CSOs had suggested that: ‘Section 71(1) 
An order or judgment of the court shall not be invalidated by any subsequent proof that the age of the 
person has not been correctly stated to the court and the age presumed or declared by the court to be 
the age of that person shall be deemed to be his true age for the purposes of the proceedings. 
(2) A certificate signed by a medical officer as to the age of a person under eighteen years of age shall 
be evidence of that age.’ 
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The problem with the foregoing provisions is that they apply to age determination by 
the court only. This is contrary to the spirit of international juvenile justice law, 
which requires that age determination of a child who comes into contact should apply 
to all juvenile justice agencies: police, social welfare and court. The South African 
CJA is in compliance with this international juvenile justice law requirement and has 
comprehensive provisions relating to age determination; where there are certain 
circumstances in which age can be determined or estimated: estimation by a 
probation officer, an inquiry magistrate, a child justice court or any other court 
before which a child is charged.
1318
 
 
In respect of the minimum age of criminal responsibility, the LCA has expressly 
amended Section 15 of the Penal Code by adding a subsection providing that: ‘any 
person under the age of twelve years who commits an act or omission which is 
unlawful shall be dealt with under the Law of the Child Act 2009.’  However, the 
meaning of this provision has been criticized as unclear. In fact, the LCA covers 
many areas and contains provisions that ‘encompass juvenile justice and child 
protection. It is unclear whether this changes the minimum age of criminal 
responsibility in the Penal Code, which is 12 years, or 10 years if criminal capacity 
can be established.’ 1319 
                                                 
1318
 This aspect is discussed at length in Chapter Six of this study. 
1319
 United Republic of Tanzania, “An Analysis of the Situation for Children in Conflict with the Law 
in Tanzania”, op. cit. 
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7.5.1.4 Treatment of Children under the MACR 
 
In Chapter Six it has been noted that international children’s rights law requires 
states parties to set up legal protection mechanisms for the treatment of children who 
commit criminal activities which may be offences had they been within the MACR. 
However, the LCA does not contain such legal protection. Accordingly, children 
below the age of criminal responsibility in some regions in Tanzania are being 
processed through the criminal justice system. Data from admissions into three 
Retention Homes over a 12 month period obtained in the MoCLA study shows that 
‘five children below the age of 10 were admitted into the Homes.’1320  Similarly, in 
its recent survey in all prisons of Tanzania, CHRAGG also found a number of 
children under the age of 10 years in detention. In this study researchers reported that 
27 out of 179 children interviewed during visits to detention centres stated that they 
were under 10 years old.
1321
 
Many of these children were detained for disorder or other minor offences.  This 
included a child in Tanga Retention Home who was nine at the time of admission 
and had been arrested for theft; two children in Dar es Salam aged four and nine for 
‘disturbing passengers’, and a child aged eight in Mbeya for vagrancy. According to 
professionals, children below the MACR are sometimes brought by parents or carers 
to the police station or primary courts.  A Primary Court Magistrate in Moshi, for 
instance, reported that:  
The youngest child I dealt with was eight.  Sometimes parents bring their children to 
court to ask whether they can be sent to the Approved School.  In these cases, I need 
to establish which offence has been committed.   
 
                                                 
1320
 Ibid. 
1321
 Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance.  “Report on Situational Analysis of 
Children Deprived of their Liberty in Detention Facilities in Tanzania”, op. cit, p. 33. 
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At the Moshi Retention Home a Social Welfare Officer in Charge informed 
researchers in the MoCLA study that: 
… the youngest child detained in the Retention Home is a boy of nine years.  He is 
being charged for use of abusive language against his mother, together with his 
brother.  He is treated in the same manner as any other juvenile, despite him being 
below the minimum age of criminal responsibility. 
 
The MoCLA study also found 10 children under the age of 12 placed in the retention 
homes (most were arrested for theft).  In practice, there is no procedure for 
establishing capacity for children aged between 10 and 12 years.  This omission has 
the effect of exposing children to the formal criminal justice system where they, in 
fact, have no criminal responsibility.     
 
As noted in the MoCLA study, the reason for processing children who are below the 
MACR through the criminal justice system is partly attributed to a lack of knowledge 
of juvenile justice laws on the part of juvenile justice personnel, including lack of 
knowledge of what the MACR is.
1322
  It is also caused by the sheer absence of clear 
legal provisions relating to procedure or mechanisms of referral for children below 
the MACR, as opposed to the clear mechanisms in the South African CJA on the 
treatment of children below the MACR.  It is, therefore, not surprising to note that 
Police Officers and Magistrates interviewed in this study appear to be ‘at a loss for 
what to do with children below the MACR who engage in criminal behaviour.  In 
Mbeya, for instance, a Police Sergeant, who stated that the minimum age of criminal 
responsibility is seven, reported that the same procedure is followed for a child under 
the MACR who engages in criminal behaviour (arrest; interview; draft a charge; 
                                                 
1322
 See particularly United Republic of Tanzania, “An Analysis of the Situation for Children in 
Conflict with the Law in Tanzania”, op. cit. 
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bring him before a court of law).’1323 For instance, one 12 year old child ‘was found 
in police detention, having been arrested the night before.  He had been taken to 
court that morning, and the Magistrate did not lay charges as he was too young.  The 
child was taken back to the police station and detained.’1324 
 
In addition, there is an “acceptable” practice amongst several professionals that 
children below the MACR who engage in more serious criminal behaviours are 
detained for their own protection.  That is, ‘due to anger in the community over, in 
particular, more serious crimes.  In these cases, Police Officers in some regions feel 
it is necessary to arrest a child below the MACR and process them through the 
criminal justice system.’1325 For instance, a Police Officer in Charge in Arusha 
responded in the MoCLA study that: ‘normally [we arrest children] from 10 years.  
However, due to the gravity of the offence and sentiments from the community, we 
sometimes arrest such children under 10 for very serious offences.’1326 
 
7.5.2 Exposure of Children in Conflict with the Law to the Criminal Justice 
System 
Although international juvenile justice law requires that specialised units for children 
in conflict with the law be established within the police, the prosecution, the 
judiciary, the court administration and social services,
1327
 in Tanzania there is yet to 
                                                 
1323
 Ibid. 
1324
 Ibid. 
1325
 Ibid. 
1326
 Ibid. 
1327
 General Comment No. 10, paras 92, 93 and 94. 
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evolve a specialised juvenile justice system.
1328
 This contention is concretized by the 
fact that, although the LCA de jure establishes separate juvenile courts to deal with 
all cases involving children in Tanzania
1329
, there is only one juvenile court at Kisutu 
in Dar es Salaam that has been established.  Similarly, there are only five specialised 
Retention Homes
1330
 and one Approved School
1331, which ‘only have very limited 
geographical coverage.’1332; although the Ministry of  Health and Social Welfare has 
plans to establish two additional Retention Homes, one in Mwanza and another in 
Singida.  Specialised units, procedures and practices within most criminal justice 
institutions – police, social welfare, legal aid providers and courts – have not been 
developed; with limited number of juvenile prosecutors specializing in juvenile 
justice.  
7.5.3 The Establishment of the Juvenile Court and the Administration of 
Justice in Tanzania 
This part examines the Juvenile Court by looking at the legal provisions establishing 
it, its jurisdiction and procedures in the conduct of proceedings before it. 
 
7.5.3.1 Establishment of the Juvenile Court 
The establishment, jurisdiction of, and proceedings in, the juvenile court are set out 
in Sections 97 through to 114 of the LCA. The establishment of juvenile courts is set 
out in Section 97(1) for the purposes of hearing and determining cases relating to 
                                                 
1328
 United Republic of Tanzania, “An Analysis of the Situation for Children in Conflict with the Law 
in Tanzania”, op. cit. 
1329
 See particularly Section 97 and Section 98 of the LCA. 
1330
 The Retention Homes are located in Arusha, Dar es Salaam, Kilimanjaro, Mbeya and Tanga 
Regions. 
1331
 The Approved School s is located at Irambo, about 40km from the Mbeya City.  
1332
 United Republic of Tanzania, “An Analysis of the Situation for Children in Conflict with the Law 
in Tanzania”, op. cit. 
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child matters. Under subsection (2) of Section 97, ‘the Chief Justice may, by notice 
in the Gazette, designate any premises used by a primary court to be a Juvenile 
Court.’ According to subsection (3) of Section 97 of the LCA, a ‘Resident Magistrate 
shall be assigned to preside over the Juvenile Court.’  
 
This provision is in tandem with the international juvenile justice law. According to 
General Comment No. 10 (2007) on “Children’s Rights in Juvenile Justice”, the 
CROC emphasises that: 
The laws must provide the court/judge, or other competent, independent and 
impartial authority or judicial body, with a wide variety of possible alternatives to 
institutional care and deprivation of liberty, which are listed in a non-exhaustive 
manner in article 40(4) of CRC, to assure that deprivation of liberty be used as a 
measure of last resort and for the shortest possible period of time (art. 37(b) of 
CRC).
1333
 
 
Under the same General Comment, the CROC ‘requires States to develop and 
implement a comprehensive juvenile justice policy.’1334 According to the Committee, 
This comprehensive approach should not be limited to the implementation of the 
specific provisions contained in articles 37 and 40, but should also take into account 
the general principles enshrined in articles 2, 3, 6, and 12 and all other relevant 
articles of the CRC, such as articles 4 and 39.
1335
 
 
The establishment of a comprehensive juvenile justice system, by particularly having 
a separate juvenile court system, is derived from the provisions of Article 40(3) of 
the CRC, which provides that: 
  
3. States Parties shall seek to promote the establishment of laws, procedures, 
authorities and institutions specifically applicable to children alleged as, accused 
of, or recognised as having infringed the penal law, and, in particular: 
                                                 
1333
 CROC, General Comment No. 10 (2007) on “Children’s Rights in Juvenile Justice”. 
CRC/C/GC/10. 
1334
 Hodgkin, R. and P. Newell, Implementation Handbook for the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, Geneva/New York: UNICEF, 2007, p. 603. 
1335
 CROC, General Comment No. 10, op. cit, para 3. 
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(a) the establishment of a minimum age below which children shall be presumed not 
to have the capacity to infringe the penal law; 
 
(b) wherever appropriate and desirable, measures for dealing with such children 
without resorting to judicial proceedings, providing that human rights and legal 
safeguards are fully respected. [Emphasis added]. 
 
This has been given more emphasis by the United Nations Secretary-General’s 
Study on Violence Against Children, which reported to the General Assembly in 
October 2006, recommending that: ‘States should establish comprehensive, child-
oriented, restorative juvenile justice systems that reflect international standards.’1336 
 
Therefore, the establishment of the juvenile court is a positive element of the LCA; 
and aims at domesticating the foregoing international standards in Tanzania. In 
support of this progressive element, CSOs had for a long time proposed for the 
establishment of the Family and Children Courts from the ward on to the High Court 
levels.
1337
 However, there is a general fear amongst CSOs that there might be 
constructed very few juvenile courts; thus, proposing that the Chief Justice may 
assist in, or encourage, the construction of the courts through local government 
authorities.
1338
 It should be noted, however, that the construction of the court 
buildings should be carried out parallel to the increase in the number of requisite 
expertise on the part of juvenile justice personnel to properly manage these 
institutions for children. 
                                                 
1336
 See United Nations, “Report of the Independent Expert for the United Nations Study on Violence 
against Children.” United Nations General Assembly, sixty-first session, August 2006, A/61/, para. 
112(b).  
1337
 See Section 14 of the CSOs Alternative Child Bill submitted to the Minister for Justice and 
Constitutional Affairs in 2003.  
1338
 See CSOs “Position Paper on the Bill to enact the Law of the Child Act (2009)” presented to the 
Parliamentary Standing Committee (Community Development) on 7
th
 and 8
th
 October 2009 at the 
Karimjee Hall in Dar es Salaam. 
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7.5.3.2 Jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court 
The jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court is set out in Section 98 of the Act. Under this 
section, the Juvenile Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine two sets of matters: 
first, criminal charges against a child; and, second, applications
1339
 relating to child 
care, maintenance and protection.
1340
 In addition, the Juvenile Court ‘shall also have 
jurisdiction and exercise powers conferred upon it by other written law.’1341  
 
Under subsection (3) of Section 98, the Juvenile Court ‘shall, wherever possible, sit 
in a different building from the building ordinarily used for hearing cases by or 
against adults.’ The legal position before the enactment of the LCA was more or less 
similar to this one. Under Section 3(1) of the Children and Young Persons Act it was 
provided that the court ‘when hearing charges against children or young persons 
shall, if practicable, unless the child or young person is charged jointly with any 
other person not being a child or young person, sit in a different building or room 
from that in which the ordinary sittings of the court are held.’ Then the High Court 
interpreted this section strictly. For instance, in Mukamambogo v R
1342
 the appellant 
was charged with and convicted of acts intended to cause grievous harm contrary to 
Section 222(2) of the Penal Code and was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment by 
the District Court. However, there was nothing in the record indicating that the 
                                                 
1339
 CSOs were of the view that the word “applications” limits the scope of litigation as under Order 
XLIII Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, Cap. 33 R.E. 2002 ‘Every application to the Court made … 
shall, unless otherwise provided, be made by a chamber summons supported by affidavit.’ As such, 
they recommended that the word “applications” should be replaced by the word “matters” which is 
more wide and would allow any other form of court documents (like petitions) to be filed in court in 
respect of child care, maintenance and protection. See CSOs “Position Paper on the Bill to Enact the 
Law of the Child Act (2009)”, ibid. 
1340
 Section 98(1) of the Act. 
1341
 Ibid, Section 98(2). 
1342
 (1971) HCD no. 63. 
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proceedings were held in a place different from an ordinary court room, nor was 
there any indication that it was not practicable for the court to sit in a place different 
from an ordinary court room. On appeal the High Court quashed the conviction and 
set aside the sentence because the District Court was not properly constituted.
1343
 
Consequently, the case was remitted back for retrial before a properly constituted 
Juvenile Court. 
 
Currently, however, there is a likelihood of having some practical hurdles when it 
comes to implementing Section 98(3) of the LCA, as there are few court buildings to 
serve this purpose. Besides, there is always a limited budget allocated to the 
Judiciary for this matter as well as there is lack of political will to build sufficient 
court buildings as opposed to current emphasis on constructing buildings for 
secondary schools at every ward.
1344
 
 
Interestingly, Section 103(1) of the LCA provides that a ‘police officer shall not 
bring a child to the court unless investigation has been completed or the offence 
requires committal proceedings.’ In addition, subsection (2) of Section 103 provides 
that: ‘Where a child is brought before the Juvenile Court for any offence other than 
homicide, the case shall be disposed by that court on that day.’ 
 
                                                 
1343
 In the main, the high Court was of the view that: ‘The appellant was a young person and was not 
on a joint charge with any adult. In order to comply with the above provision therefore the trial 
magistrate in hearing the case should, if practicable, have sat in a place different from an ordinary 
court room. It would appear also that this requirement was mandatory by reason of the word “shall” 
used in the subsection quoted above [i.e. Section 3(1) of the Children and Young Persons Act].’ 
1344
 See Government of the United Republic of Tanzania, “Initial Tanzania Report on the African 
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990).” Submitted to the Committee of Experts on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia) by the Ministry of Community 
Development, Gender and Children in December 2006. 
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In this context, therefore, the court has power to dispose the case wherever the 
circumstances of that case warrant such action, unless in cases of homicide. This 
provision, if applied objectively by the courts, would prove to be progressive in 
reducing unnecessary delays of cases involving children.  
 
7.5.3.3 Procedure and Proceedings in the Juvenile Court 
The procedure and proceedings in the Juvenile Court are set out in Sections 99 and 
100 of the LCA. Specifically, Section 99 provides for the procedure in the Juvenile 
Court. Indeed, the procedure set out in subsection (1) of this section is not 
exhaustive, but there is a room for the Chief Justice to make rules for that purpose. 
Otherwise, the subsection sets out conditions or fundamental principles
1345
 to be 
observed when the Juvenile Court determines matters before it. These principles are 
similar to those provided for in Article 40(2)(b) of the CRC, which provides that: 
(b) Every child alleged as or accused of having infringed the penal law has at least 
the following guarantees: 
 
(i) To be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law;
1346
 
 
(ii) To be informed promptly and directly of the charges against him of her, and, if 
appropriate through his or her parents or legal guardians, and to have legal or other 
appropriate assistance in the preparation and presentation of his or her defence;
1347
 
 
(iii) To have the matter determined without delay
1348
 by a competent, independent 
and impartial authority or judicial body in a fair hearing according to law, in the 
                                                 
1345
 These principles are examined in part 7.2 above. 
1346
 See also Article 11 of the UDHR; Article 17(2)(c)(i) of the ACRWC; and Article 14(2) of the 
ICCPR. 
1347
 Article 9(2) of the ICCPR requires that anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of 
arrest, of the reasons for it ‘and shall be promptly informed of any charges against him.’ According to 
Article 14(3)(a) of the ICCPR, every one charged with a criminal offence shall be ‘informed promptly 
and in detail in a language which he understands of the nature and cause of the charge against him.’  
1348
 General Comment No. 10 (2007) on “Children’s Rights in Juvenile Justice,” the United Nations 
Committee on the Rights of the Child points out that: ‘Internationally there is a consensus that for 
children in conflict with the law the time between the commission of the offence and the final 
response to this act should be as short as possible. The longer this period, the more likely it is that the 
response loses its desired positive, pedagogical impact, and the more the child will be stigmatized.’ 
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presence of legal or other appropriate assistance
1349
 and, unless it is considered not 
to be in the best interest of the child, in particular, taking into account his or her age 
or situation, his or her parents or legal guardians; 
 
(iv) Not to be compelled to give testimony or to confess guilt;
1350
 to examine or 
have examined adverse witnesses and to obtain the participation and examination of 
witnesses on his or her behalf under conditions of equality; 
 
(v) If considered to have infringed the penal law, to have this decision and any 
measures imposed in consequence thereof reviewed by a higher competent, 
independent and impartial authority or judicial body according to law;
1351
 
 
(vi) To have the free assistance of an interpreter if the child cannot understand or 
speak the language used;
1352
 
 
(vii) To have his or her privacy fully respected at all stages of the proceedings. 
 
Under General Comment No. 10 (2007) the CROC states that ‘no information shall 
be published that may lead to the identification of a child offender because of its 
effect of stigmatization and possible impact on their ability to obtain an education, 
work, housing, or to be safe’. It further states that ‘the right to privacy also means 
that records of child offenders shall be kept strictly confidential and closed to third 
parties except for those directly involved in the investigation, adjudication and 
disposal of the case.’ With a view to avoiding stigmatization and/or prejudgments, 
the CROC emphasises that ‘records of child offenders shall not be used in adult 
                                                                                                                                          
CROC, General Comment No. 10, 2007 (“Children’s Rights in Juvenile Justice”) CRC/GC/10, para. 
23. 
1349
 According to Rule 15(1) of the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of 
Juvenile Justice (‘the Beijing Rules’), ‘Throughout the Proceedings the juvenile shall have the right to 
be represented by a legal adviser or to apply for free legal aid where there is provision for such aid in 
the country.’ Rule 15(2) of the Beijing Rules provides that: ‘The parents or the guardians shall be 
entitled to participate in the proceedings and may be required by the competent authority to attend 
them in the interest of the juvenile. They may, however, be denied participation by the competent 
authority if there are reasons to assume that such exclusion is necessary in the interest of the juvenile.’ 
1350
 Article 11 of the UDHR and Article 14 of the ICCPR require that in the determination of a 
criminal charge, everyone shall be entitled ‘not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess 
guilt.’ 
1351
 See also 17(2)(c)(iii) of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. 
1352
 See also Article 17(2)(c)(ii) of the ACRWC; Article 14(3)(f) of the ICCPR; and United Nations 
Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 9 (2007) on “The Rights of the Children 
with Disabilities.” 
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proceedings in subsequent cases involving the same offender, or to enhance some 
future sentencing.’ 
 
Under subsection (2) of Section 99 of the LCA, there is a prerequisite in relation to 
persons who are required to appear in a Juvenile Court at its discretion.
1353
 These 
persons include: parties to the case before court, their advocates, witnesses and other 
persons directly concerned or involved in the case; and any other person whom the 
court may authorize to be present.  
 
In respect of proceedings in the Juvenile Court Section 100(1) of the LCA 
categorically provides that the Juvenile Court, when hearing a charge against a child 
‘shall, if practicable, unless the child is charged jointly with any other person not 
being a child, sit in a different building or room that which the ordinary proceedings 
of the court are held.’1354  Where, in the course of any proceedings in a court it 
appears to the court that the person charged or to whom the proceedings relate is a 
child, the court ‘shall stay the proceedings and commit the child to the Juvenile 
Court.’ in addition, where, in the course of any proceedings in a Juvenile Court ‘it 
appears that the person charged or to whom the proceedings relate is an adult, the 
court shall proceed with the hearing and determination of the case according to the 
                                                 
1353
 CSOs were skeptical about the requirement for court discretion in allowing appearance of other 
parties than the child, because the discretion might be abused in practice to the detriment of the child. 
1354
 Section 100(2) of the LCA. 
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provisions of Magistrates Court Act
1355
 or Criminal Procedure Act,
1356
 as the case 
may be.’1357 
 
7.5.3.4 Methods of Securing Attendance of Child at Preliminary Inquiry 
Appearance in the Juvenile Court is governed by Sections 108 and 112 of the LCA. 
According to Section 108(1), where the child does not admit the offence with which 
he is charged, or where the court does not accept the statement of the child as 
amounting to a plea of guilty to that charge, the court ‘shall proceed to hear the 
evidence of the witnesses for the prosecution.’ Under subsection (2) of Section 108 
of the LCA,  
(2) In all proceedings against a child, where parents, guardian, relatives or social 
welfare officer attend, any one of them may, with the prior consent of the court, assist 
the accused child in the conduct of his case and, in particular, in the examination and 
cross-examination of witnesses.
1358
 
 
Surprisingly, the provisions of Sections 108(2) and 112 have failed to appreciate the 
fact that a child is entitled to free legal aid granted by the State, as opposed to its 
counter-part, the South African CJA.
1359
  
 
                                                 
1355
 Cap. 11 R.E. 2002. 
1356
 Cap. 20 R.E. 2002. 
1357
 Section 100(3) of the LCA. 
1358
 The provisions of section 108(2) are similar to the provisions of Section 112 of the LCA, which 
provide that: ‘Where a child is charged with any offence, the Juvenile Court may in its discretion 
require the attendance of his parents, guardian, relative or a social welfare officer and may make such 
orders as are necessary for procuring the attendance.’ 
1359
 The need for provision of free legal aid to children in conflict with the law is discussed in part 7.5 
of this Chapter. CSOs had suggested, in Section 54(5) of their Alternative Child Bill, that: 
‘(5) A child arrested and charged with an offence shall have the right to free legal assistance and 
court representation [which] shall be accorded to him or her by the state or any other interested 
person or organization or institution.  
(6) A child arrested and charged with an offence shall have the right to free assistance by an 
interpreter if he or she does not understand or speak the language used at the police or in court.’ 
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Under international juvenile justice law, it is well established that children in conflict 
with the penal law should be accorded a fair trial, even more specific than adults in 
such a situation. In order for fair trial for children accused of or found guilty of 
infringing penal law to be effectively realized there must be adequate guarantee to 
the right of access to justice.
1360
 This so principally because:  
Access to justice is a paramount element of the right of a fair trial. Most accused and 
aggrieved persons are unable to afford legal services due to the high cost of court and 
professional fees. It is the duty of governments to provide legal assistance to indigent 
persons in order to make the right to a fair trial more effective.
1361
  
 
States are thus urged to: ‘Urgently examine ways in which legal assistance could be 
extended to indigent accused persons, including through adequately funded public 
defender and legal aid schemes.’1362  States are also obliged to ‘allocate adequate 
resources to judicial and law enforcement institutions to enable them to provide 
better and more effective fair trial guarantee to users of the legal process.’ 1363 
 
However, the Government of Tanzania has failed to come up with provisions in the 
LCA setting out a comprehensive legal aid scheme and/or allocated adequate 
resources to judicial and law enforcement institutions to enable them ‘to provide 
better and more effective fair trial guarantee to users of the legal process in 
                                                 
1360
 See Article 17(2)(c)(iii) of the ACRWC and Articles 20, 37(d) and 40(2)(b)(iii) of the CRC. 
1361
 Article 9 of the Resolution on the Right to a Fair Trial ad legal Assistance in Africa (the Dakar 
Resolution). The Dakar Resolution was adopted by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights in 1999. 
1362
 Ibid. 
1363
 Ibid. 
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Tanzania.’1364  Nonetheless, the Government of Tanzania has continued to provide 
legal aid only to persons accused of capital offences such as murder and treason.
1365
 
 
7.5.5 Release or Detention of a Child Prior to Sentence   
It is a well-established rule of criminal law that where an accused person is brought 
before a police station or court, he or she should either be released on bail upon 
meeting bail conditions prescribed by law or detained where he or she fails to meet 
the conditions. This part, therefore, examines provisions relating to release and 
detention of children in conflict with the law as provided for in the LCA as well as 
other criminal procedural laws. 
 
7.5.5.1 The Right to Bail for a Child 
The right to bail is a well-entrenched principle of many modern criminal law statutes. 
In Tanzania, Section 148 of the Criminal Procedure Act (1985)
1366
 guarantees this 
right and provides several conditions for an accused person to be admitted to bail. 
The application of this section was given judicial consideration in DPP v Daudi s/o 
Pete,
1367
 where it was held, inter alia, that under Article 15(2)(a) of the Constitution 
of the United Republic of Tanzania (1977) a person may be denied or deprived of 
personal liberty under “certain circumstances” and subject to a ‘procedure prescribed 
by law.’ Then Section 148(5)(e) of the Criminal Procedure Act did not contain the 
requisite prescribed procedure for denying bail to an accused person; thus, according 
                                                 
1364
 See UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, “Consideration of Reports submitted by States 
Parties under Article 44 of the Convention – Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights 
of the Child: United Republic of Tanzania.” 02/06/2006, op. cit, paras. 70 and 71. 
1365
 See particularly the Legal Aid (Criminal Proceedings) Act (1969), Cap. 21 R.E. 2002. 
1366
 Ibid.  
1367
 [1993] TLR 22. 
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to the Court of Appeal, Section 148(5)(e) of the Act therefore violated Article 15(2) 
of the  Constitution. It was, consequently, declared unconstitutional. 
 
In the LCA, the right to bail for offending children is entrenched in Section 101, 
which provides that: 
 
101. Where a child is apprehended with or without a warrant and cannot be brought 
immediately before a Juvenile Court, the officer in charge of the police station to 
which he is brought shall –  
 
(a) unless the charge is one of homicide or any offence punishable with 
imprisonment for a term exceeding seven years; 
(b) unless it is necessary in the interest of that child [to] remove him from 
association with any undesirable person; or 
(c) unless the officer has reason to believe that the release of that child would 
defeat the ends of justice, 
 
release such child on a recognizance being entered into by himself or by his parent, 
guardian, [and] relative or without sureties. 
 
 
In principle, this provision seems to contain some safeguards to a child brought 
before a police station.
1368
  
 
7.5.5.2 Prevention of a Child to Associate with Adult Offenders 
In terms of Section 102 of the LCA, a ‘police officer shall make arrangements for 
preventing, so far as practicable, a child while in custody, from associating with an 
                                                 
1368
 A more progressive proposal to this regard was made by CSOs in their Alternative Child Bill 
submitted to the Parliamentary Standing Committee (Community Development) in Dodoma on 28
th
 
April 2009. In Section 49(1), the Bill states that: 
‘49.- (1) The police officer shall have the duty to ensure that the juvenile is always free to be 
granted bail, even if the juvenile does not have a person to bail him or her out, unless the police 
officer concerned is satisfied that- 
(a) It is necessary and in the best interest of the juvenile to remand him or her; or 
(b) The child might disappear.’  
According to Section 49(2) of the CSO Alternative Bill: ‘No child shall be put in detention for more 
than 24 hours before being made to appear before a magistrate.’ 
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adult charged with an offence unless he is a relative.’  The law requires a child to be 
removed from custody ‘where he is likely to associate with adult offenders and other 
undesirable influence.’1369 This provision is concomitant to the provisions of Article 
37(c) of the CRC, which provides that: ‘every child deprived of liberty shall be 
separated from adults unless it is considered in the child’s best interest not to do so 
and shall have the right to maintain contact with his or her family through 
correspondence and visits, save in exceptional circumstances.’ 
 
Under Article 10(2)(b) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR, 1966) it is provided that: ‘Accused juvenile persons shall be separated from 
adults and brought as speedily as possible for adjudication.’ Similarly, under Rule 
8(d) of the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners
1370
 it is required 
that: ‘Young prisoners shall be kept separate from adults.’ Under paragraph 85 of 
General Comment No. 10 (2007) on “Children’s Rights in Juvenile Justice,”1371 the 
CROC states that: ‘Every child deprived of liberty shall be separated from adults. A 
child deprived of his/her liberty shall not be placed in an adult prison or other facility 
for adults.’ 
 
7.5.5.3 Remanding a Child 
Section 104 of the LCA contains provisions regulating the remanding process of a 
child. In particular, Section 104(1) provides that, where a Juvenile Court remands a 
                                                 
1369
 R v Njama Zuberi (1985) TLR 241. 
1370
 Adopted by the First United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of 
Offenders, held at Geneva in 1955, and approved by the Economic and Social Council by its 
resolutions 663 C (XXIV) of 31 July 1957 and 2076 (LXII) of 13 May 1977. 
1371
 CROC, General Comment No. 10 (2007): Children's Rights in Juvenile Justice, 25 April 
2007, CRC/C/GC/10. Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4670fca12.html [accessed 16 
January 2012]. 
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child or commits a child for trial before the High Court and the child is not released 
on bail or is not permitted to go on large, it ‘may, instead of committing the child to 
prison, order him to be handed over to the care of the Commissioner, fit person or 
institution named in the order.’1372 When this happens, the child should remain in the 
custody of that person or institution during the period mentioned in the order or until 
he or she is further dealt with according to law and shall be deemed to be in legal 
custody during that period. 
 
Under paragraph 85 of General Comment No. 10 (2007), the CROC emphasises that 
the arrest, detention or imprisonment of a child must be in conformity with the law 
and shall be used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate 
period of time
1373
; and, as such, no child shall be deprived of his/her liberty 
unlawfully or arbitrarily.
1374
 
 
In particular, Article 37 of the CRC contains provisions governing the detention of 
juveniles outside the juvenile justice system. According to paragraph (b) of Article 
37 of the CRC, ‘No child shall be deprived of his or her liberty unlawfully or 
arbitrarily. The arrest, detention or imprisonment of a child shall be in conformity 
with the law and shall be used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest 
appropriate period of time.’ Where it is imperative to detain a child, such child 
should be entitled to a number of rights, including the rights to be treated with 
                                                 
1372
 Rule 4 of the Law of the Child (Retention Homes) Rules (2012), GN. No. 151/2012, requires 
production of a court remand order to the manager before a child is admitted into a retention home.  
1373
 Paragraph 85(a) of General Comment No. 10 (2007). 
1374
 Ibid, para 85(b). 
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respect and without discrimination of any kind.
1375
 Other rights to which a child in a 
retention home is entitled include the right to be provided with care that takes into 
account his individual needs, having regard to the child’s age, gender, disability, 
health status and personal circumstances
1376
; the right to be provided with adequate 
nutrition, clothing and nurturing
1377
; the right to access to adequate preventive and 
remedial medical care
1378
; and the right to education and training appropriate to his 
or her age, level of maturity, aptitude and ability.
1379
 
 
In addition, a child placed in a retention home is entitled to the rights to reasonable 
privacy (including possession and protection of his or her personal belongings)
1380
; to 
be informed of the behaviour that is expected of him or her and the consequences of 
his or her failure to meet those expectations
1381
; to be protected from all forms of 
violence, abuse, neglect and exploitation
1382
; and not to be subjected to torture or 
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, including any cultural  
practice which dehumanises or is injurious to his or her physical and mental well-
being.
1383
 The child in a retention home is also entitled to the rights to a suitable 
amount of time for daily free leisure, exercise and play
1384
; to be consulted and to 
express his or her views, according to his or her abilities, about significant decisions 
                                                 
1375
 The listed grounds of discrimination are gender, race, age, religion, language, political opinion, 
disability, health status, custom, ethnic origin, rural or urban background, birth, socio- economic 
status, being a refugee or other status. See particularly Section 5 of the LCA and Rule 4(1)(a) of Law 
of the Child (Retention Homes) Rules (2012), op. cit. 
1376
 Ibid, Rule 4(1)(b). 
1377
 Ibid, Rule 4(1)(c). 
1378
 Ibid, Rule 4(1)(d). 
1379
 Ibid, Rule 4(1)(e). 
1380
 Ibid, Rule 4(1)(f). 
1381
 Ibid, Rule 4(1)(g). 
1382
 Ibid, Rule 4(1)(h). 
1383
 Ibid, Rule 4(1)(i). 
1384
 Ibid, Rule 4(1)(j). 
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affecting him or her
1385
; and to the necessary support and to an interpreter if language 
or disability is a barrier to consulting with them on decisions affecting his or her 
custody or care and development.
1386
 
 
7.5.6 Procedure on Hearing in a Juvenile Court 
The procedure on hearing of cases in the Juvenile Court is set out in Sections 105-07, 
109 and 110 of the LCA. Whereas Section 105 obliges the Juvenile Court on hearing 
a charge against a child to explain to him, in simple language, the particulars of the 
alleged offence, Section 106 requires the Juvenile Court after explaining the 
particulars of the alleged offence to ‘ask the child to make a statement on whether he 
has a cause to show why he should not be convicted.’1387  
 
7.5.6.1 The Problem with the Plea of Guilty in the Law of the Child Act 
One of the problematic provisions relating to the procedure in the Juvenile Court is 
Section 107 of the LCA, which simply states that: ‘Where the statement made by the 
child amounts to a plea of guilty the court may convict him.’ If not applied carefully 
by the courts due to their tender age and ignorance of the legal consequences of the 
sanctions relating to the offences with which they are charged, many children may 
                                                 
1385
 Ibid, Rule 4(1)(k). 
1386
 Ibid, Rule 4(1)(l). 
1387
 Reference to the word “convicted” in this section is somewhat contrary to the spirit of the 
international standards on the administration of juvenile justice, which discourages reference to legal 
terms that may lead to labeling the child as a criminal. The word “conviction” is, thus, fit for adult 
offenders. It is accepted in international juvenile justice law that such a child should only be referred 
to as a child who has been found to have violated the penal law; not as convicted. This would augur 
well with the spirit of Section 119(1) of the LCA which prohibits sentencing a child found to have 
committed an offence to imprisonment. At this stage, it is important that a juvenile justice law should 
reinforce the need for a child to be held accountable and understand the implications of the harm 
caused by his or her criminal activity; rather than convicting and punishing him or her. See 
particularly Section 69(1) of the South African Child Justice Act. 
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find themselves being summarily convicted by the courts. It would be expected that 
this section ought to have set out some pre-requisites for such summary conviction. 
This would include the court warning and satisfying itself if – given the age and level 
of knowledge the child possesses as well as the circumstances of the case – the 
offending child possesses sufficient knowledge to know the impact of such plea of 
guilty.   
 
This argument is backed up by the principles of conviction upon a plea of guilty as 
were enunciated by the High Court of Tanzania in Buhimila Mapembe v R,
1388
 where 
Chipeta, J. (as he then was), inter alia, held that, in any case in which a conviction is 
likely to proceed on a plea of guilty, it is most desirable not only that every 
constituent of the charge should be explained to the accused but that he should be 
required to admit or deny every element of it unequivocally. His Lordship was of the 
view that the words “it is true” when used by an accused person may not necessarily 
amount to a plea of guilty, particularly where the offence is a technical one.  
In that case, His Lordship observed that the facts given by the public prosecutor 
could not be reasonably said to have amounted to full disclosure of the ingredients or 
elements of the offence, rather they appeared to be more of an allegation that the 
appellant had possession of the lion skin. 
 
So, Section 107 of the LCA ought to have taken into account the likely danger of the 
court to rely on the child’s plea of guilty without taking into account the above 
prerequisites. This provision is likely to be abused by the courts as was the case in a 
                                                 
1388
 [1988] TLR 174. 
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case decided by the Magu District Court in 1999
1389
 where a nine-year old boy was 
convicted for life imprisonment on a plea of guilty. In that case, the accused was on 
15
th
 June, 1999 charged in the Magu District Court with the offence of rape contrary 
to Section 130 (1) and (2) (e) and Section 131 (2) (a) of the Penal Code
1390
 as 
repealed and replaced by the Sexual Offences Special Provisions Act (1998).
1391
  
 
At that time the accused was living with his parents at Nyalikungu Village, in Magu 
District. When the charge and facts were read by the prosecution before Hon. DMF 
Kamalamo (DM) the accused replied to the allegations thus: ‘I have heard the facts 
they are true and correct.” On that basis, the court erroneously pronounced that: 
‘Accused has been convicted on his plea of guilty to the charge.’ 
 
Thereafter, on the same date, the court, instead of pronouncing its sentence, Hon. 
Kamalamo (DM) ordered that: 
After read (sic) the Act, which it is contradictory (sic) sentence has been reserved 
till after consultation with high level authority. In such circumstances sentence will 
be delivery (sic) after received (sic) report from High Court Mwanza (sic). 
 
Upon that order, the court adjourned the case until 22
nd
 June 1999 and admitted the 
accused to bail. When the case, once again, came up in court on 22
nd
 June, 1999 
before the same Magistrate the prosecutor, one Assistant Inspector Komba, prayed 
the court to pass the sentence as previously ordered by the court. Asked to mitigate 
the sentence, the accused child simply said: ‘I have nothing to say about the 
sentence.’ Consequently, the court passed the sentence in the following terms: 
                                                 
1389
 R v Mohamed Abdullah, District Court of Magu, Criminal Case No. 116 of 1999. 
1390
 Cap. 16 R.E. 2002. 
1391
 Cap. 101 R.E. 2002. 
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I have taken into consideration that accused person (sic) is first offender (sic) 
regarding the gravity of the offence as it has been prescribed under the sexual 
offences special provision (sic) my hands are tied up I can’t fold them on my head 
thinking about (sic) sentence to be imposed to the accused. Further this court had 
(sic) nothing to do other than imposing the sentence which has been prescribed by 
the statute which it (sic) is life imprisonment. In such circumstances under section 
131 (3) of the sexual offences special provisions (sic) Act No. 4 of 1998, (sic) 
Accused is hereby sentenced to life imprisonment. 
 
This conviction and sentence were, however, reversed by the High Court on 
revision,
1392
 basically on the fact that the accused child was below the MACR and 
that the plea of guilty was equivocal. 
 
7.5.6.2 Examination of Witnesses in the Juvenile Court 
Examination of witnesses in both civil and criminal proceedings is a very crucial 
stage whereby parties are required to prove their respective cases through 
presentation of evidence in the form of testimony by their witnesses under 
oath/affirmation or presentation of relevant documents. Where witnesses are required 
to testify orally, they must either take oath or affirmation – i.e. swearing for 
Christians or affirming for Muslims (depending on their religious beliefs) to tell the 
truth and nothing but the truth.
1393
 
 
In both criminal and civil proceedings, the examination of witnesses has three stages. 
First, after taking the oath, the witness is examined first by the party for whom the 
witness is called to testify or his advocate (i.e. examination-in-chief). At this level, 
the witness should not be asked leading questions. The primary object of 
                                                 
1392
 This case (and its implications) is discussed at some considerable length in Legal and Human 
Rights Centre, The State of Juvenile Justice in Tanzania, op. cit, pp. 14-16.  
1393
 See particularly Busegi Kulwa v Celtel Tanzania Ltd., High Court of Tanzania (Labour Division) 
at Dar es Salaam, Labour Revision No. 33 of 2009 (unreported). 
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examination-in-chief is to let the witness adduce material facts which he knows and 
which the case of the party calling him wholly depends. Thus, the party calling the 
witness must extract as much of the material facts in his favour as the witness knows 
or remembers. 
 
Second, the witness is cross-examined by the opposite party (i.e. cross-examination), 
whereby questions relevant to the dispute are asked by the opposite party. At this 
level, the other party may obtain additional information from the witness or 
challenge any aspect of the evidence given by the witness.
1394
 As a general rule of 
practice on cross-examination in civil procedure, a party who fails to cross-examine a 
witness is rendered incompetent to ask the court to do so later.
1395
 The main purpose 
of cross-examination is to test the accuracy and truthfulness of the witness, to destroy 
or weaken his evidence or show that the witness is unreliable, or to extract evidence 
that favours the cross-examining party.
1396
 
 
Third, the witness may be re-examined by the party calling the witness (i.e. re-
examination), whereby the calling party has a further opportunity to ask questions to 
the witness relating to issues dealt with during cross-examination. The purpose of 
re-examination is to repair the damage done by cross-examination.
1397
 This is the last 
opportunity a witness has to clarify on vague statements or apparent contradictions 
revealed in cross-examination. 
                                                 
1394
 Ibid. Rule 25(1)(b)(ii). 
1395
 See particularly, Paul Yustus Nchia v National Executive Secretary, CCM & Another, Court of 
Appeal of Tanzania at Dar es Salaam, Civil Appeal No. 85 of 2005 (unreported). 
1396
 See generally Chipeta, B.D., Civil Procedure in Tanzania: A Student’s Manual. Dar es Salaam: 
Dar es Salaam University Press Ltd., 2002. 
1397
 Rule 25(1)(c) of the Mediation and Arbitration Guidelines. 
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Section 109 of the LCA sets out the procedure for cross-examination of witnesses
1398
 
before the Juvenile Court.  The section provides that at the close of the evidence of 
each witness, the Juvenile Court ‘shall put to the witnesses such questions as 
appears to be necessary or desirable, either for the purpose of establishing the truth 
or the facts alleged or to test the credibility of the witness.’ This section introduces 
the civil law procedure (as opposed to the common law adversarial procedure) of 
cross-examination where the court plays the role of the defence by asking the 
witnesses questions on behalf of the child. However, the section ought to have left a 
room for the child, if he or she possesses sufficient knowledge to be able to put 
questions to the witnesses, to do so; or to the child’s advocate or parent, guardian or 
relative in accordance with Section 108(2) of the LCA. This would guarantee the 
principle of equality of arms in the trial before the Juvenile Court.
1399
 
 
Under paragraph 59 of its General Comment No. 10 (2007), the CROC states that the 
guarantee in Article 40(2)(b)(iv) of CRC ‘underscores that the principle of equality 
of arms (i.e. under conditions of equality or parity between defence and prosecution) 
                                                 
1398
 In law, “cross-examination” is the interrogation of a witness called by one's opponent. It is 
preceded by “direct examination” or “examination-in-chief” and may be followed by a “re-direct” or 
“re-examination” of the same witness by the party who has called before the court such witness. 
1399
 Indeed, one of the elements of the broader concept of a fair trial is the principle of equality of 
arms, which requires each party to be given a reasonable opportunity to present his or her case under 
conditions that do not place him or her at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis his opponent. See, 
among many authorities, Niderost-Huber v Switzerland [1997] ECHR 18990/91 at para 23, 18 
February 1997. That right means, in principle, the opportunity for the parties to a trial to have 
knowledge of and comment on all evidence adduced or observations filed, with a view to influencing 
the court's decision (see particularly Lobo Machado v Portugal [1996] ECHR 15764/89 at para 31, 20 
February 1996). This position is not altered when the observations are neutral on the issue to be 
decided by the court. (See particularly Goc v Turkey [2002] ECHR 36590/97 at para 55) or, in the 
opinion of the court concerned, they do not present any fact or argument which has not already 
appeared in the impugned decision.  See also SH v Finland (App no 28301/03) [2008] ECHR 
28301/03.  
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should be observed in the administration of juvenile justice.’ In the context of this 
paragraph, the term “to examine or to have examined” refers ‘to the fact that there 
are distinctions in the legal systems, particularly between the accusatorial and 
inquisitorial trials. In the latter, the defendant is often allowed to examine witnesses 
although he/she rarely uses this right, leaving examination of the witnesses to the 
lawyer or, in the case of children, to another appropriate body.’ However, the CROC 
notes, ‘it remains important that the lawyer or other representative informs the child 
of the possibility to examine witnesses and to allow him/her to express his/her views 
in that regard, views which should be given due weight in accordance with the age 
and maturity of the child (Art. 12).’1400 
In practice, however, the right to “equality of arms” between the prosecution and 
defence can be said to be often honoured only in the breach. First, most of the 
international and local courts or tribunals simply allocate far more resources – 
financial, material, and human – to the prosecution than to the defence.1401 To 
address this anomaly, most international tribunals, for instance the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone (SCSL), have embraced the idea that “equality of arms” means equality 
of resources, whereas the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) have said, following the latter’s 
decision in Prosecutor v Kayishema,
1402
 “equality of arms” means only equality of 
rights between the prosecution and the defence.  
                                                 
1400
 General Comment No. 10 (2007), op. cit. 
1401
 For a detailed discussion on the application of the principle of equality of arms visit 
Http://Lawofnations.Blogspot.Com/2006/02/Inequality-Of-Arms-At-International.Html (accessed 26 
January 2012). 
1402
 Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, decided on 21
st
 May 1999. 
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Under Section 110 of the LAC, it is provided that where after the prosecution 
witnesses have given evidence and the Juvenile Court is satisfied that the evidence 
before it established a prima facie case against the child the Juvenile Court ‘shall 
hear the witnesses for the defence and any further statement which the child may 
wish to make in his defence.’ This principle is, to a larger extent, in line with the 
provisions of Article 12(2) of the CRC, which requires that a child be provided with 
the opportunity to be heard in any judicial or administrative proceedings affecting the 
child, either directly or through a representative or an appropriate body in a manner 
consistent with the procedural rules of national law.
1403
 
 
7.5.6.3 Child as a Witness 
The LCA has brought forth a very progressive element regarding the protection of 
the rights of a child who testifies in a court of law. According to Section 115(1) of 
the LCA, where in any cause or matter a child called as a witness does not, in the 
opinion of court, understand the nature of an oath, the evidence ‘may be received if 
in the opinion of the court, which opinion shall be recorded in the proceedings, the 
child is possessed of sufficient intelligence to justify the reception of the laws of 
evidence and understands the duty of speaking the truth.’ Under subsection (2) of 
Section 115 of the LCA, where evidence received by virtue of subsection (1) is given 
on behalf of the prosecution is not corroborated by any other material evidence in 
support of it implicating the accused the court ‘may after warning itself, act on that 
evidence to convict the accused if it is fully satisfied that the child is telling the 
truth.’  
                                                 
1403
 See also para 43 of General Comment No. 10 (2007) on ‘Children’s Rights in Juvenile Justice,” 
UN Committee on the Rights of the Child. 
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In the LCA there is a significant departure from the rules of evidence relating to the 
admissibility of evidence of a child of tender age. Under subsection (3) of Section 
115 of the LCA it is provided that, 
(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, where in any criminal proceedings 
involving sexual offence
1404
 the only independent evidence is that the child or victim of 
sexual offence, on its own merits, notwithstanding that such evidence is not 
corroborated, proceed to convict for reasons to be recorded in the proceedings, if the 
court is satisfied that the child is telling nothing but the truth. 
 
Under the rules of evidence, the evidence of a “child of tender age”1405 requires   
corroboration before it can be acted upon.
1406
 This rule was given judicial 
consideration in Said Hemed v R.
1407
 In that case, the principal witness for the 
prosecution was a child of tender years.  In the learned High Court Judge's estimation 
of his age, at the time he appeared in the witness box in August 1986 the witness was 
between 9 and 10 years.  Therefore, the witness was aged between 5 and 6 years at 
the time the offence (killing) took place.  He gave unsworn evidence, the judge 
having got the impression, upon a voire dire
1408
, that he was sufficiently intelligent to 
justify the reception of his evidence, though he did not understand the nature of oath.  
However, the Court of Appeal was of a different opinion that, 
 
                                                 
1404
 In terms of subsection (4) of Section 115 of the LCA, ‘For the purposes of this section and any 
other written laws, “sexual offence” means any sexual offence as created by the Penal Code.’ 
1405
 Under Section 127(5) of the Evidence Act (1967), Cap. 6 R.E. 2002, a “child of tender age” means 
a child whose apparent age is not more fourteen years. This definition was confirmed by the Court of 
Appeal in Hassani Hatibu v R, Court of Appeal of Tanzania at Dar es Salaam, Criminal Appeal No. 
71 of 2002 (unreported). 
1406
 In Hassani Hatibu v R, ibid, it was held that ‘it is imperative for the trial judge or magistrate when 
the witness involved is a child of tender age to conduct a voire dire examination. This is to be done in 
order for the trial judge of magistrate to satisfy himself or herself that the child understands the nature 
of an oath.’ 
1407
 [1987] TLR 117 (CA). 
1408
 The judicial consensus on this matter is that where ‘in a criminal case involving the evidence of a 
child of tender age, the trial court does not conduct a voire direexamination in terms of Section 127 of 
the [Evidence] Act, the reception of such evidence is improper.’ per Lubuva, J.A. (as he then was) in 
Hassani Hatibu v R. See also Jonas Raphael v R, Court of Appeal of Tanzania at Dar es Salaam, 
Criminal Appeal No. 42 of 2003 (unreported). 
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As observed above, P.W.1 was aged between 5 and 6 years at the time of the killing.  
He came to give evidence in the High Court four years after the event when he had 
attained the age of 9 or 10 years.  He was then schooling in Std. III.  But this is the 
child who told the court that he did not know the names of his parents, and that he was 
not aware of the fact that his sister Esta has died.  We are amazed in our judgement we 
are not satisfied that P.W.1 was possessed of sufficient intelligence.  We therefore 
entertain serious misgivings about his recollection of the event. 
 
We are fully apprehensive of the fact that we are sitting on appeal and that we have not 
had the opportunity of seeing or hearing the witness.  But on the materials on record we 
strongly feel that the finding of the learned judge in respect of P.W.1's intelligence was 
not reasonably open to him and we are, therefore, obliged to disturb it.  We take the 
view that as a matter of prudence the evidence of P.W.1 required corroboration before 
it could be acted upon. 
 
Under paragraph 56 of its General Comment No. 10 (2007), the UNCROC urges that 
a child should not be ‘compelled to give testimony or to confess or acknowledge 
guilt.’ This is in line with Article 14(3)(g) of the ICCPR. 
 
7.5.7 Procedure upon Conviction  
The procedure upon conviction of a juvenile in the Juvenile Court is set out in 
Section 111 of the LCA. Under subsection (1) of this section it is provided that, 
where the child admits the offence and the Juvenile Court accepts its plea or after 
hearing the witnesses the Juvenile Court is satisfied that the offence is proved, the 
Juvenile Court ‘shall convict the child and then, except in cases where the 
circumstances are so trivial as not to justify such a procedure, obtain such 
information as to his character, antecedents, home life, occupation and health as 
may enable it to deal with the case in the best interests of the child, and may put to 
him any question arising out of that information.’ According to subsection (2): ‘For 
the purpose of obtaining information or for special medical examination or 
observation, the Juvenile Court may remand the child or may release him on bail.’ 
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Under paragraph 52 of its General Comment No. 10 (2007), the CROC ‘recommends 
that States Parties set and implement time limits for the period between the 
commission of the offence and the completion of the police investigation, the 
decision of the prosecutor (or other competent body) to bring charges against the 
child, and the final adjudication and decision by the court or other competent judicial 
body.’ This recommendation is in line with the provisions of Article 37 of the CRC, 
which requires that children should be detained only as a measure of last resort and 
for the shortest appropriate period of time.This requirement is affirmed in Article 
107A(2)(b) of the Constitution of Tanzania (1977), which obliges courts to expedite 
determination of cases as a general rule. In South Africa, Section 66 of the CJA gives 
effect to the constitutional right to a speedy trial contained in Section 35 of the 
Constitution of South Africa (1996)
1409, by providing that ‘all trials must be 
concluded as speedily as possible with as few postponements as necessary.’1410 
 
However, the LCA does not provide for a timeframe within which trials involving 
children would be finalised and sentence handed down. This timeframe would 
guarantee expeditious and certain disposition of cases in the Juvenile Court, 
particularly in a judicial system fraught with inordinate delays in determination of 
cases like Tanzania.
1411
 For instance, in its first report
1412
 released in December 2006, 
                                                 
1409
 See also Section 28(1)(g) of the Constitution of South Africa. 
1410
 See particularly Gallinetti, J., Getting to Know the Child Justice Act, op. cit, p. 51. 
1411
 For a detailed account of the magnitude of the problem of delays of cases in Tanzanian courts, see 
particularly United Republic of Tanzania, Financial and Legal Sector Upgrading Project (FILMUP), 
“Legal Sector Report,” Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1996; United Republic of Tanzania, Legal 
Sector Reform Programme: Medium Term Strategy (2005/06-2007/08). Dar es Salaam: Government 
Printer, 2004; Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, A Vision of Accessible and Timely Justice 
for All in the New Millennium. Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 2004; Mashamba, C.J., “Access to 
Justice and State Policy Considerations in Tanzania.” The Justice Review. Vol. II No. 2, 2006; United 
Republic of Tanzania, Status Report 2006: Progress Towards the Goals for Growth, Social Wellbeing 
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the Research and Analysis Working Group (RAWG), MKUKUTA Monitoring 
System, which was then under the Ministry of Planning, Economy and Empowering 
(MPEE), observed that:
1413
   
 
Administration of justice should be expedited. There is a backlog of unresolved 
criminal and civil disputes, and the number of trained legal personnel is insufficient. 
Data indicates that the percentage of people held in remand for more than two years 
is 15.7 percent in 2005. The target is 7.5%. Given the overcrowding in prisons, 
reducing this number could help to ease congestion.
1414
 
 
The fixing of a certain timeframe within which a case is disposed of has been 
embedded in the current labour law regime in Tanzania – within 30 days for 
mediation
1415
 and arbitration
1416
 – and it has proved to be quite useful in expeditious 
determination of labour cases both in the Commission for Mediation and Arbitration 
(CMA) and the High Court (Labour Division).
1417
 In the absence of a fixed 
timeframe for disposal of cases in the Juvenile Court one expects to see inordinate 
delays in determination of cases in the Juvenile Court as it is the case in the ordinary 
courts. 
                                                                                                                                          
and Governance in Tanzania. Dar es Salaam: Research and Analysis Working Group, MKUKUTA 
Monitoring System (then under the Ministry of Planning, Economy and Empowering), 2006; and 
Mashamba, C.J., “Overview of the Implementation of Cluster III of MKUKUTA: Governance and 
Accountability.” The Justice Review. Vol. IV No. 5, 2007. 
1412
 This report aimed at providing an analysis using national set of indicators revised in 2005/06 
under Tanzania’s National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (better known in Kiswahili, 
Mkakati wa Kukuza Uchumi na Kuondoa Umaskini Tanzania, MKUKUTA). 
1413
 See United Republic of Tanzania, Status Report 2006: Progress Towards the Goals for Growth, 
Social Wellbeing and Governance in Tanzania, op. cit. 
1414
  Ibid, p. 27. 
1415
 See particularly sections 86 of the Employment and Labour Relations Act (Act No. 6 of 2004), 
Cap. 366 R.E. 2002. 
1416
 Ibid, Section 88(9), which provides that: ‘Within thirty days of the conclusion of the arbitration 
proceedings, the arbitrator shall issue an award with reasons signed by the arbitrator.’ See also Rules 
18 (3) and 22 of the Labour Institutions (Mediation and Arbitration Guidelines) Rules (2007), GN. 
No. 67 dated 23
rd
 Mach 2007. 
1417
 See particularly Bu zwagi  Pro jec t  v  Antony  La meck ,  High  Cour t  o f  Tanzania  
(Labo ur  Divis ion)  a t  Mwa nza ,  Revi s io n N0.  2 97  of  2008  (u nrepor ted ) ;  and  21
st
 
Century Food & Packaging Ltd. v Emmanuel Mzava Kimweli, High Court of Tanzania (Labour 
Division) at Dar es Salaam, Revision No. 158 of 2008 (unreported). 
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7.5.8 Disposition of Cases and Placement of a Child  
Section 116 the LCA sets out procedure for committing a “convicted” child to 
custodial sentence. On the face of the section – particularly from the reading of the 
title of the section, i.e. “custodial sentence” – it seems that custodial sentence is the 
most preferred sentence. This would seem to be contrary to Article 37(b) of the CRC, 
which emphasizes that in the disposition phase of the proceedings, deprivation of 
liberty must be used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate 
period of time. Under paragraph 28 of General Comment No. 10 (2007), the CROC 
requires that when judicial proceedings are initiated by a competent authority against 
the juvenile: ‘the juvenile justice system should provide for ample opportunities to 
deal with children in conflict with the law by using social and/or educational 
measures, and to strictly limit the use of deprivation of liberty, and in particular pre-
trial detention, as a measure of last resort.’ 
 
According to para 28 of General Comment 10: ‘This means that States parties should 
have in place a well-trained probation service to allow for the maximum and 
effective use of measures such as guidance and supervision orders, probation, 
community monitoring or day report centres, and the possibility of early release from 
detention.’ However, the provisions of section 116 actually provides for alternative 
or diversionary measures to deal with “convicted” offending children. The section 
provides for such alternative sentences like conditional discharge and probation. 
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7.5.8.1 Conditional Discharge 
 
Section 116(1) the LCA vests powers in the Juvenile Court to make an order of 
conditional discharge, instead of committing the offending child to custodial 
sentence. This section requires that where a child is convicted of an offence other 
than homicide, the Juvenile Court ‘may make an order discharging the offender 
conditionally on his entering into recognizance, with or without sureties, to be of 
good behaviour during such period not exceeding three years, as specified in the 
order but if a child has demonstrated good behaviour then that child shall be 
presumed to have served the sentence.’ 
 
7.5.8.2 Probation Orders 
Another provision that can be used as one of the diversionary measure at the stage of 
disposition of a case in the Juvenile Court is the one relating to the grant of a 
probation order. This is provided for in Section 116(2) of the LCA, which 
categorically stipulates that, 
116.- (2) A recognizance entered into under [subsection (1) of] this section shall, if 
the court so orders, contain a condition that the child be under the supervision of 
parent, guardian, relative or social welfare [officer] as may be named in the order 
during the period specified in the order, if that person is willing to undertake the 
supervision, and such other conditions for securing the supervision as may be 
specified in the order. 
 
Under subsection (3) of Section 116 of the LCA, the person named in the probation 
order ‘may at any time be relieved of his duties and, in that case or in the case of the 
death of a person so named, another person may be substituted by the Juvenile Court 
before which the child is bound by his recognizance to appeal for conviction or 
sentence.’ 
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In principle, the probation order means that the child is not put in a penal institution, 
under the condition that he/she will behave well and regularly report to a probation 
officer. If the child fails to behave well, the court may later decide to detain him/her 
in a child penal institution. Before making a probation order, the court should be 
advised by a social welfare officer. If the court finds a child guilty of an offence, it 
should be able to place the child under custody of some other person or family 
instead of prison custody. If the court finds a child guilty of an offence, it should be 
able to place that child under supervision of: a probation officer, or a ‘fit 
person/institution’ so appointed by the court, or a village authority (i.e., the 
village/area executive officer). 
  
At the time of the enactment of the LCA, it was also proposed that a child should not 
be separated from his or her parents, unless the circumstances of the case make this 
necessary.
1418
 It was proposed further that the placement of a child in an institution in 
any case should be a disposition of last resort; and where it is imperative to place the 
child in an institution, it shall be for a minimum period.
1419
 
 
7.5.8.3 Procedure Relating to a Child’s Failure to Observe Release Conditions  
As noted above, Section 116 of the LCA sets out circumstances in which the court 
may release a child on prescribed conditions. Such release may be in the form of 
conditional discharge or on a probation order. Where a child so released fails to 
observe the release conditions imposed by the court under Section 116 he or she may 
face sanctions set out in Section 117 of the LCA. As such, where the Juvenile Court 
                                                 
1418
 Section 60(3) of the CSO Alternative Bill. 
1419
 Ibid, Section 60(4). 
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is satisfied by information on oath that the child has failed to observe any of the 
conditions of his recognizance, it should issue summons to the child or young person 
and his sureties, if any, requiring him or them to attend at such court and at such time 
as may be specified in the summons.
1420
 Upon summoning the child or his sureties, 
the Juvenile Court before which a child is bound by his recognizance to appear for 
sentence, on being satisfied that he has failed to observe any condition of his 
recognizance, may forthwith deal with child as for the original offence.
1421
 
 
7.5.8.4 Power to Order Parent to Pay Fine Instead of a Child 
The LCA empowers the Juvenile Court, upon convicting a child of any offence, to 
impose an order for payment of a fine, compensation or costs; instead of committing 
the child to custodial placement. This is particularly done where the court is of the 
opinion that the case would be best disposed of in the best interests of the child by 
the imposition of a fine, compensation or costs, whether with or without any other 
punishment. Considering the fact that a child is legally incapable of possessing 
property, including those in monetary form, the LCA vests power in the Juvenile 
Court to order a parent, guardian or relative of the convicted child to pay fine, 
compensation or costs instead of the child.
1422
 However, a parent, guardian or 
relative may not be compelled to pay fine where the court is satisfied that he or she 
                                                 
1420
 Section 117(1) of the LCA. 
1421
 Ibid, Section 117(2). 
1422
 In Marcela Barthazar v Hussein Rajab (1986) TLR 8 (HC) the High Court held that a 
compensation order in respect of a convicted juvenile may in an appropriate case only be made against 
a parent or guardian of the child or young person. It cannot be made against the juvenile. 
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cannot be found; or where it is satisfied that he or she has not contributed the 
commission of the offence by neglecting to exercise due care of the child.
1423
  
 
Before the Juvenile Court issues an order for fine, compensation or costs, it must 
give the concerned parent, guardian, or relative an opportunity of being heard.
1424
 
Where parent or guardian is aggrieved by the order, he or she may appeal against 
such order.
1425
 
 
The provisions are similar to Section 27 (3) of the Penal Code, which allows the 
court to order that a convicted person should pay fine as an alternative to custodial 
imprisonment. This section provides that: ‘A person liable to imprisonment may be 
sentenced to pay a fine in addition to, or instead of, imprisonment.’ In Salum 
Shaaban v R.
1426
 Mtenga, J. (he then was) stated the rationale for paying fine instead 
of custodial imprisonment, explaining that fine:  
                                                 
1423
 Section 118(1) of the LCA. Before the enactment of the LCA, compensation in respect of 
convicted juveniles was governed by Section 21 of the Children and Young Persons Act, Cap. 13. In 
Marcela Barthazar v Hussein Rajab, ibid, the respondent's child sustained some injury at the hands of 
the child of the appellant. The trial court found the appellant’s child liable and, inter alia, ordered the 
respondent to pay compensation. The High Court found to be ‘undesirable to order the appellant to 
pay any compensation.’ According to the High Court, the parties’ children, who were neighbours, 
were attending school and, at the material time, ‘they were coming from school together with other 
school children. There was no evidence or indication from the evidence that the appellant in any way 
conduced to the commission of the offence by neglecting to exercise due care of her offending child. 
The incident was a result of common trivial school children's playful squabbles for which it is wrong, 
of itself, to hold parents or guardians responsible by way of payment of compensation. It is neither 
conducive to, nor shall it promote, good and amicable neighbourly relations.’ 
1424
 Section 118(2) of the LCA. In Marcela Barthazar v Hussein Rajab, ibid, reinforcing this 
provision, which is similar to Section 21(2) of the repealed Children and Young Persons Act, the High 
Court held that: ‘a court may not order a parent to pay a fine or compensation or costs without giving 
the parent an opportunity to be heard.’ In Ramadhani Mwenda v Republic 1989 TLR 3 the High Court 
held that if a sentencing court is minded to impose a sentence of fine as an option to a custodial 
sentence, such court should take pains to inquire into the financial means of the accused. See also Ally 
and others v R [l972] HCD n. 115. 
1425
 Ibid, Section 118(4). 
1426
 [1985] TLR 71. 
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… is an option given by the legislature which therefore means that in imposing a 
sentence, the court must ascertain that a sentence of fine should first be imposed and 
in default of payment of such fine, then a sentence of imprisonment can be given … 
In imposing a sentence of fine the court must ascertain that the fine can be paid 
rather than impose a sentence which cannot be paid and as a result the accused goes 
to jail.
1427
  
 
In Nyakulima d/o Chacha v R.
1428
 Mohan, J. (as he then was) observed that: ‘The 
principle is that a fine should be one which an accused person can reasonably be 
expected to pay.’ 
 
However, the problematic provision in Section 118 is subsection (3) which entails 
recovery of the imposed fine, compensation or costs by any means, including by 
distress against, or imprisonment of, the defaulting parent, guardian or relative. The 
subsection categorically provides that: 
(3) Any sum imposed or ordered to be paid by a parent, guardian, or relative may be 
recovered from him by distress or imprisonment in like manner if the order had been 
made on the conviction of the parent, guardian or relative of the child with [which 
he] was charged. 
 
This offends the international juvenile justice standards. Under paragraph 55 of its 
General Comment No. 10 (2007), the CROC ‘regrets the trend in some countries to 
introduce the punishment of parents for the offences committed by their children.’ 
The CROC also elaborates that: ‘Civil liability for the damage caused by the child’s 
act can, in some limited cases, be appropriate, in particular for the younger children 
(e.g. below 16 years of age).’ But the CROC discourages criminalizing parents of 
children in conflict with the law, because it will ‘most likely not contribute to their 
becoming active partners in the social reintegration of their child.’ So, the provisions 
                                                 
1427
 Ibid, at p. 73. 
1428
 1 T.L.R. 341. 
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of subsection (3) of Section 118 of the LCA ought to be reconsidered with a view to 
being amended in the context of paragraph 55 of General Comment 10. 
 
7.5.9 Alternative Sentences 
The LCA progressively prohibits the imposition of the sentence of imprisonment on 
a child found guilt of an offence.
1429
 As the High Court held in R. v Asia Salum and 
Another
1430
, as a rule, youthful offenders should not be sentenced to terms of 
imprisonment, where there is an opportunity to mix with and learn bad habits from 
more seasoned criminals.
1431
 According to the High Court, the imprisonment only 
serves to bring the child ‘into contact with hard core criminals and make him more of 
a criminal by the time he left the prison than when he entered it.’ 
 
Instead, subsection (2) of Section 119 provides that, where a child is convicted of 
any offence punishable with imprisonment, the court may impose any other 
alternative order
1432
, which may be made under the LCA.
1433
 Such alternative orders 
                                                 
1429
 Section 119(1) of the LCA. 
1430
 (1986) TLR 12. 
1431
 The principle that youthful offenders should not be sentenced to terms of imprisonment is also 
evident from the decision of this court in R. v Teodosio s/o Alifa [1967] HCD 216. 
1432
 This provision is more progressive than the provisions of Section 22(2) of the repealed Children 
and Young Persons Act, which provided that: ‘No young person shall be sentenced to imprisonment, 
unless the court considers that, none of the other methods in which the case may be legally dealt with, 
by the provisions of this or any other Ordinance, is suitable.’ (Emphasis supplied). The highlighted 
phrase gave an opportunity for many trial magistrates to sentence children to imprisonment. See 
particularly R. v John s/o Gilied (1984) TLR 273. 
1433
 In R. v Fidelis John (1988) TLR 165, the accused child was convicted on his plea of guilty for 
escaping from lawful custody and was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment and six strokes of the 
cane. On revision, the High Court held, inter alia, that the trial court had no legal justification to 
sentence the accused to 6 months’ imprisonment. The trial court ought to have resorted to the 
alternative forms of punishment provided for juvenile offenders. Accordingly the sentence of 6 
months imprisonment was quashed and set aside; and the accused child was set at liberty forthwith. 
However, the High Court blessed the trial court’s sentence of 6 strokes of the cane imposed on the 
accused, saying that it ‘meets the justice of the case.’ Although corporal punishment is allowed in the 
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include: discharging the child without making any order
1434
; ordering the child to be 
repatriated, at the expense of the Government, to his or her home or district of origin 
if it is within Tanzania
1435
; or ordering the child to be handed over to the care of a fit 
person or institution named in the order, if the person or institution is willing to 
undertake such care.
1436
 
 
This provision is more or less similar to the provisions of Article 37(b) of the CRC, 
which provides that: ‘No child shall be deprived of his or her liberty unlawfully or 
arbitrarily. The arrest, detention or imprisonment of a child shall be in conformity 
with the law and shall be used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest 
appropriate period of time.’ Essentially, these principles would provide guidance to 
the sentencing Juvenile Court to deal with the matter in the best interests of the child. 
 
The LCA also contains provisions that regulate the procedure relating to the 
commitment of a convicted child to an approved school established under Section 
121 of the LCA. This is particularly set out in Section 120(1) of the LCA, which 
requires that where a child is convicted of an offence which if committed by an adult 
would have been punishable by a custodial sentence, the court may order
1437
 that 
child be committed to custody at an approved school. However, an order committing 
a convicted child to an approved school ‘shall not be made unless the patron of the 
approved school to which the child is to be committed has informed the Juvenile 
                                                                                                                                          
Tanzanian juvenile justice system, international children’s rights law prohibits it. See particularly, 
Article 37 of the CRC; and Article 17(1) and (2)(a) of the ACRWC. 
1434
 Ibid, Section 119(2)(a). 
1435
 Ibid, Section 119(2)(b). 
1436
 Ibid, Section 119(2)(c). 
1437
 Under subsection (3) of Section 120 of the LCA, the order made under this section is referred to as 
“an approved school order”. 
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Court that he has a vacancy which may be filled by the person in respect of whom it 
is proposed to make the order.’1438 
7.6  Inherent Gaps in the LCA Relating to Protection of Children in Conflict 
with the Law 
Although it has been hailed as one of the greatest achievements of the fourth phase 
Government in protection of children’s rights in Tanzania,1439 the LCA has several 
gaps in relation to the protection of children in conflict with the law. This aspect was 
noted by some circles during the public hearing on the Bill to enact the LCA, but the 
Government paid a deaf ear to this plea.
1440
 Notably, one of the serious gaps is lack 
of a clear list enumerating the standards constituting the best interest of the child.
1441
 
Unlike the LCA, the Zanzibar Children’s Act (2011)1442 and the South African 
Children’s Act (2005)1443 contain a clear enumeration of factors constituting the best 
interests of the child. 
 
There is also lack of a clear listing of the diversion measures at each stage of the 
administration of juvenile justice (as enumerated in the South African CJA); as well 
as lack of the obligation of the government to provide legal assistance to children in 
                                                 
1438
 Ibid, Section 120(2). 
1439
 See, for instance, the statement of UNICEF’s Tanzania Representative, Heimo Laakkonen, made 
at the public hearing on the Bill to enact the Law of the Child (2009) organised by the Parliamentary 
Standing Committee (Community Development) at Karimjee Hall in Dar es Salaam on 7
th
 and 8
th
 
October 2009. ‘This is a huge step forward,’ said the UNICEF Representative after witnessing the 
passage of the bill through Parliament on 4
th
 November 2009 following two days of deliberation. 
‘With the 20th anniversary of the Convention on the Rights of the Child just around the corner, this 
gives us, and Tanzania’s children, two monumental achievements to celebrate!” he said. This 
statement is available at http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/tanzania_51662.html (accessed 18 
December 2011). 
1440
 See particularly “CSOs’ Addendum Position Paper presented to the Parliamentary Standing 
Committee (Community Development)” at Dodoma Bunge Premises on 3rd November 2009. 
1441
 Ibid. 
1442
 See particularly section 4 of the Zanzibar Children’s Act (2011). 
1443
 See particularly section 7 of the South African Children’s Act (2005). 
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conflict with the law.
1444
 The law also has failed to provide explicit provisions 
regarding the establishment and functioning of the juvenile court in every region of 
Tanzania Mainland. In this regard, the law has failed to address the question of 
seriousness in establishing juvenile courts around and across the country, now that 
the country has only one juvenile court at Kisutu in Dar es Salaam. Further, the law 
does not abolish corporal punishment imposed on children, particularly in the 
administration of the juvenile justice system. The LCA also does not establish a 
central body to coordinate the work and functions of the juvenile justice agencies and 
actors: the police, judiciary, (the prisons department
1445
), the social welfare 
department as well as civil society organisations working with and for children in the 
country.
1446
 
 
7.7 Provision of Legal Assistance to Children in Conflict with the Law  
Under international juvenile justice law, it is well established that children in conflict 
with the penal law should be accorded a fair trial, even more specific than adults in 
                                                 
1444
 See particularly Mashamba, C.J., “Introduction to the Tanzanian Law of the Child Act (2009).” A 
paper presented at a training of Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC) Staff on the Child Law 
Organized by the Directorate of Advocacy and Reforms of the LHRC, held in Dar es Salaam on 23 
June 2010. 
1445
 The prisons department is included here as a juvenile justice agency as it currently holds of most 
of the remanded and imprisoned children in Tanzania as a result of lack of Retention Homes and 
Approved School as discussed in Section 7.2 above. 
1446
 Only recently a loose Child Justice Forum (CJF) was set up under the coordination of the Ministry 
of Constitutional and Legal Affairs (MoCLA). The CJF, which is a result of the recommendations 
made in two studies (on juvenile justice and on access to justice for under 18’s) conducted by nola and 
Coram Children Legal Centre (Essex University, UK) under UNICEF funding, adopted a five-year 
Strategy in February 2012 that would ensure, inter alia, that activities and programmes undertaken by 
stakeholders are adequately improved and coordinated. 
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such a situation.
1447
 According to Article 11 of the Resolution on the Right to a Fair 
Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa (the “Dakar Resolution”) of 1999,1448 
 
11. Children and Fair Trial 
Children are entitled to all the fair trial guarantees and rights applicable to adults 
and to some additional protection. The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of 
the Child requires that: ‘Every child accused of or found guilty of having infringed 
penal law shall have the right to special treatment in a manner consistent with the 
child’s sense of dignity and worth and which reinforces the child’s respect of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms.’1449 
 
7.7.1 State Obligation to Provide Legal Assistance to Offending Children 
In order for fair trial for children accused of or found guilty of infringing penal law 
to be effectively realized there must be adequate guarantee to the right of access to 
justice.
1450
 This is so principally because: ‘Access to justice is a paramount element 
of the right of a fair trial. Most accused and aggrieved persons are unable to afford 
legal services due to the high cost of court and professional fees. It is the duty of 
governments to provide legal assistance to indigent persons in order to make the right 
to a fair trial more effective.’1451  
 
States are thus urged to: ‘Urgently examine ways in which legal assistance could be 
extended to indigent accused persons, including through adequately funded public 
defender and legal aid schemes.’1452  States are also obliged to ‘allocate adequate 
                                                 
1447
 See particularly Mashamba, C.J., “Tanzania's Obligations for Juvenile Justice Reform in the 
Contexts of the Juvenile Justice and Access to Justice Studies under the CRC/ACERWC.” A briefing 
paper presented at the Child Justice Forum, Bagamoyo, 13 September 2011. 
1448
 Dakar Resolution, op. cit. 
1449
 See also Guidelines (H) and (O) of  the Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and 
Legal Assistance in Africa, 2003, adopted by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
in 2003. 
1450
 See Article 17(2)(c)(iii) of the ACRWC and Articles 20, 37(d) and 40(2)(b)(iii) of the CRC. 
1451
 Article 9 of the Dakar Declaration, op. cit. 
1452
 Ibid. 
395 
 
  
 
 
resources to judicial and law enforcement institutions to enable them to provide 
better and more effective fair trial guarantee to users of the legal process.’ 1453 
 
However, as of now the Government of Tanzania has not set out any comprehensive 
legal aid scheme or allocated any adequate resources to judicial and law enforcement 
institutions to enable them ‘to provide better and more effective fair trial guarantee to 
users of the legal process in Tanzania,’1454 except only for persons accused of capital 
offences such as murder and treason. The right is guaranteed and granted, by virtue 
of the provisions of Section 310 of the Criminal Procedure Act (1985).
1455
  
 
According to Section 3 of the Legal Aid (Criminal Proceedings) Act (1969),
1456
 the 
Chief Justice or a judge of the High Court may certify that a certain accused person 
should be extended free legal aid throughout the proceedings facing him or her where 
it appears to the certifying authority that ‘it is desirable, in the interest of justice that 
an accused should have legal aid in preparing and conduct of his defence or appeal 
and that his means are insufficient to enable him to obtain such aid.’1457 
 
Due to this serious omission, the CROC has urged the Government of Tanzania, inter 
alia, to first: ‘Ensure that persons under 18 years of age in conflict with the law have 
                                                 
1453
 Ibid. 
1454
 See UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, “Consideration of Reports submitted by States 
Parties under Article 44 of the Convention – Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights 
of the Child: United republic of Tanzania.” 02/06/2006, op. cit, paras. 70 and 71. 
1455
 Act No. 9 of 1985 (Cap. 20 R.E. 2002). 
1456
 Act No. 21 of 1969 (Cap. 21 R.E. 2002). 
1457
 This provision was determined in The Judge i/c High Court (Arusha) and A.G. v N.I. Munuo 
Ng’uni, Court of Appeal of Tanzania at Arusha, Civil Appeal No. 45 of 1998 (unreported). See also 
N.I. Munuo Ng’uni v The Judge i/c High Court (Arusha) and the Attorney General, High Court of 
Tanzania at Arusha, Civil Cause No. 3 of 1995 [unreported]. 
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access to legal aid as well as independent and effective complaints mechanisms.’1458 
Second, to: ‘Improve child-sensitive court procedure in accordance with the United 
Nations Guidelines on Justice in Matters involving Child Victims and Witnesses of 
Crime (annexed to Economic and Social Council resolution 2005/20 of 22 July 
2005).’1459 
 
7.7.2 Provision of Legal Assistance to Offending Children by “Other Actors” 
From the foregoing explanation, where states are incapable of fulfilling their 
obligation to provide legal aid to the indigent and vulnerable persons, like children, 
the ‘contribution of the judiciary, human rights NGOs and professional associations 
should be encouraged.’1460 In Tanzania, though, most of the legal aid NGOs that 
exist provide legal assistance to persons having civil cases
1461
, not criminal cases.
1462
 
In this case, thus, children in conflict with the penal law are not yet included in the 
schemes of existing legal aid providers. It would be important for any meaningful 
child’s rights-centred approach to assisting children, like the one undertaken by 
many children’s rights and legal aid NGOs, to take initiatives to providing legal 
assistance to juveniles in conflict with the penal law in Tanzania. This would help to 
minimize the inherent sufferings of juvenile delinquents in the country’s criminal 
justice system, as elaborated in this Chapter. 
                                                 
1458
 CROC, “Consideration of Reports submitted by States Parties under Article 44 of the Convention 
– Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: United Republic of 
Tanzania.” 02/06/2006, op. cit, para. 71. 
1459
 Ibid. 
1460
 Article 9 of the Dakar Declaration, op cit. 
1461
 See generally ST Associates-Process Consultants & Facilitators, “Final Report for Baseline 
Survey on Tanzania Mainland and Zanzibar for Legal Service Facility: ID: LSF 001 BLST CSTA.” 
Dar es Salaam, Legal Service Facility, 2012. 
1462
 In certain cases, nola has been providing legal assistance to a limited number of juvenile 
delinquents. On its part, the Women’s Legal Aid Centre (WLAC) is running a pilot legal aid project 
for children at the Kisutu Juvenile Court in Dar es Salaam. 
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7.8 Conclusion 
This Chapter has discussed the protection of the rights of the child in conflict with 
the law in Tanzania in the context of the existing international instruments on 
juvenile justice. It has briefly examined how the foregoing development in 
international law has influenced many countries in the world to domesticate 
international standards on the administration of juvenile justice, Tanzania being 
amongst them. In Tanzania, the LCA has contained provisions regulating the 
administration of juvenile justice.  
 
Although the LCA has been recognised as progressive, it has failed to address 
certain, critical areas of the administration of the juvenile justice system. These 
include lack of clear provisions setting out diversion measures for child offenders at 
all stages of the administration of the juvenile justice system. The LCA has also 
failed to provide for the right to legal aid for offending children. It is, therefore, 
urged that the Government should work on the gaps inherent in the LCA. It is also 
urged that the Chief Justice (the CJ)
1463
 should ensure that the rules of procedures in 
the Juvenile Court are made as soon as possible now that the LCA has become 
operational.
1464
 In this process, the CJ should widely consult stakeholders involved in 
the administration of the juvenile justice system. 
 
In order for the law to be effectively enforced, the Government should ensure that 
concerned personnel are adequately trained in the administration of the juvenile 
                                                 
1463
 Section 99(1) of the LCA empowers the Chief Justice to make rules to regulate the procedure in 
the Juvenile Court. 
1464
 The LCA entered into force on 1
st
 April 2010. 
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justice system in the context of the LCA and the above-discussed international 
instruments on the administration of juvenile justice. To this end, members of the 
public should as well be made aware on the basic elements of the law in order for 
them to observe the law, hence promote and protect the rights of children in conflict 
with the law. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
 
8.0 GENERAL OBSERVATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
CONCLUSION 
 
8.1 General Overview 
This thesis has strived to comparatively examine the administration of the juvenile 
justice systems in South Africa and Tanzania in the context of international juvenile 
justice law. The central focus of this study was the extent to which both South Africa 
and Tanzania have domesticated international juvenile justice norms as both 
countries have ratified the major international children’s rights instruments – the 
CRC and the ACRWC.
1465
 It has focused on the influence of the international 
children’s rights instruments in the law reform processes relating to juvenile justice 
in both countries.
1466
 
 
The rationale for this comparative examination of administration of the juvenile 
justice systems in Tanzania and South Africa is premised in the fact that both 
countries share a significant number of similarities as well as differences in sub-
Saharan Africa. Both countries follow the common law system
1467
 as well as they 
have a high rate of crimes committed by children and young people, with South 
Africa having a higher rate, which is amongst the leading countries in the world.
1468
 
                                                 
1465
 Considered in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. 
1466
 Considered in Chapters 6 and 7. 
1467
 However, South Africa blend the common law system with a mixed Roman-Dutch system. 
1468
 See for instance, Steyn, F., Review of South African Innovations in Diversion and Reintegration of 
Youth at Risk. Claremont: Open Society Foundation for South Africa, 2005; Dissel, A., “Youth, Crime 
and Criminal Justice in South Africa.” The World Bank Legal Review: Law, Equity and Development. 
Vol. 2, 2006, pp, 236-261; and Legal and Human Rights Centre, The State of Juvenile Justice in 
Tanzania. Dar es Salaam: Legal and Human Rights Centre, 2003. 
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In both countries, crimes continue to threaten the personal safety, socio-emotional 
health and economic growth of their citizens, particularly those living in poor and 
criminogenic environments (i.e., environment conducive to crime).
1469
  
 
Although both countries have only domesticated international children’s rights norms 
in their jurisdiction in the past ten years
1470
, South Africa has taken a more 
progressive incorporation of international children’s rights norms1471 as compared to 
Tanzania.
1472
 Whereas South Africa has adopted a separate law on child justice, 
Tanzania has adopted a composite law, incorporating provisions for the protection 
and promotion of children’s rights in the same text with provisions relating to 
children in conflict with the law. 
 
All in all, this thesis has noted that the enactment of child justice-specific laws in 
South Africa and Tanzania has been influenced by the development in international 
children’s rights law that emphasises the need for special legal protection of children 
in conflict with the law at the domestic level. This development in international law 
has emphasised adopting a juvenile justice approach that views children as beneficiaries 
of rights in the criminal justice system rather than reflecting either a justice or a welfare 
approach view which regards children as non-beneficiaries of rights. This Chapter, 
therefore, summarizes the general observations and conclusions drawn in this thesis. 
 
                                                 
1469
 Steyn, ibid, p. 1. 
1470
 Interestingly, both the Tanzanian LCA and the South African CJA became operational on 1
st
 April 
2010. 
1471
 Considered in Chapters Five and Six. 
1472
 Considered in Chapters Five and Seven. 
401 
 
  
 
 
8.2 Observations 
The observations and conclusions drawn in this Chapter revolve around the main 
theme of this thesis: i.e. the extent to which both South Africa and Tanzania have 
domesticated international juvenile justice law and the extent to which the norms and 
standards enshrined in the newly enacted juvenile justice laws are implemented. The 
Chapter also summarizes the challenges and prospects in the effective 
implementation of these laws. 
8.2.1 The Place of Human Rights and Juvenile Justice in the Administration of 
the Criminal Justice System  
This thesis has examined the essentials of criminal justice as it impacts on human 
rights and juvenile justice. In this context, the thesis has analysed the relationship 
between criminal justice and juvenile justice, as the concept and practice of juvenile 
justice derived from developments in the criminal justice system in the 19
th
 century 
after the first juvenile court was established in Chicago in 1899.
1473
 The thesis has 
discussed the place of human rights and juvenile justice in the administration of the 
criminal justice system, in the context that the former are premised on the need to 
                                                 
1473
 For a detailed account of the early development of the juvenile courts in the US, see particularly 
Pitts, J., “Youth Justice in England and Wales.” In Mathews, R. and J. Young (eds.), The New Politics 
of Crime and Punishment. Oregon: William Publishing, 2003. Pp. 71-99; Butts, J.A., “Can we do 
Without Juvenile Justice?” Criminal Justice Magazine. Vol.15 No. 1, Spring 2000. Available at 
www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/cjmag/15-1 jb.html (accessed 6 January 2011); Shepherd, R.E., Jr., 
“Still Seeking the Promise of Gault: Juveniles and the Right to Counsel.” Criminal Justice Magazine. 
Vol.15 Issue 1, Spring 2000. Available at www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/cjmag/18-2shep.html 
(accessed 6 January 2011); Inciardi, J., Criminal Justice. 7
th
 edn. New York/Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002; Pickett, R.S., House of Refuge: Origins of Juvenile Reform in New York State, 
1815-1857. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1969; Regoli, R.M. and J.D. Hewitt, Delinquency in 
Society. 4
th
 edn. Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2000; Odongo, G.O., “The Domestication of International 
Standards on the Rights of the Child with Specific Reference to Juvenile Justice in the African 
Context.” LL.D. Thesis, University of Western Cape, 2005; Hoghuhi, M., “The Juvenile Delinquent 
has Become the Demon of the Twentieth Century.” In Hoghuhi, M., The Delinquent: Directions for 
Social Control. London: Burnet Books 13, 1983; and Steinberg, L., “Juveniles on Trial: MacArthur 
Foundation Study Calls Competency into Question.” Criminal Justice Magazine. Vol.18 No. 3, 2003. 
Available at www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/cjmag/18-3ls.html (accessed 13 January 2011). 
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balance between the interest of the state in prosecuting criminal offenders and the 
offenders’ basic human rights and needs. In this context, the thesis has examined the 
importance of the “due process rights” – i.e. the right to a fair trial and a public 
hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by, and acting 
in accordance with the, law – in the administration of the criminal justice system 
generally and juvenile justice particularly. 
 
8.2.2 Ensuring Effective Protection of Children’s Rights  
Today, children’s rights form a very fast growing body of normative principles and 
standards in international law. This is because the world community has committed 
itself to ensuring that the rights of the child are fully protected, as children are now 
considered one of the key beneficiaries of human rights. This was not the case before 
the 20
th
 century. Before this period, children’s rights were not given any 
consideration within the legal systems around the world, which facilitated consistent 
and sometimes legally-accepted abuses against children.
1474
 This trend only changed 
from the latter part of the 19
th
 century when human rights activists, legal scholars and 
jurists started to advocate for legal protection of children - beginning first with the 
rights of children in conflict with the law and later to all children’s rights.1475 It has, 
therefore, been observed that international children’s rights norms have evolved, 
codifying the children’s rights and standards particularly through the CRC and the 
ACRWC. It has also been noted that these international children’s instruments, 
together with other international human rights instruments touching on children’s 
                                                 
1474
 See Chapter One of this Thesis. 
1475
 As discussed in Chapters One and Three of this Thesis, the US was the first country to establish a 
juvenile court in 1889. 
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rights, have set out normative protection mechanisms (commonly called treaty 
bodies) through which the rights of the child can be vindicated. 
8.2.3 The Evolution of Juvenile Justice and the Protection of Children in 
Conflict with the Law in International Law 
The thesis has considered the conception of the juvenile justice system in the late 
1800s, which strived to reform US policies regarding youth offenders. The thesis has 
noted that prior to this period, misbehaving juveniles in the US, like in other parts of 
Western Europe, often faced arrest by the police, initial placement in the local jail 
with adults, and eventual institutionalisation in a house of refuge or workhouse.
1476
  
It has been argued that in the US juvenile justice, in its earliest form, was conceived 
and developed out of the need for a separate court for child offenders, away from the 
ordinary courts that dealt with offending adults. So, the first juvenile court was 
established in Cook County under the 1899 Illinois Juvenile Court Act; and by 1945 
every State in the US had a juvenile court. From the early 20
th
 century, the juvenile 
court was transplanted to Western Europe; and in England, it was given legal 
recognition through the enactment of juvenile justice-specific legislation.
1477
   
 
In order to get a better understanding of the evolution of juvenile justice to its 
contemporary status, the thesis has analysed the three models of juvenile justice from 
its inception – the welfarism, back to justice and corporatism – as they have impacted 
on the development of modern-day juvenile justice. The thesis has also examined 
modern-day administration of juvenile justice in the context of the CRC and the 
                                                 
1476
 Inciardi, J., Criminal Justice. 7
th
 edn. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. p. 638. 
See also Pickett, R.S., House of Refuge: Origins of Juvenile Reform in New York State, 1815-1857. 
Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1969. 
1477
 Pitts, J., “Youth Justice in England and Wales.” In Mathews, R. and J. Young (eds.), The New 
Politics of Crime and Punishment. Devon, UK: William Publishing, 2003. 
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ACRWC and how these international children’s rights instruments have influenced 
law reforms in many countries, particularly in African. 
 
8.2.4  State Obligations to Domesticate International Juvenile Justice Norms 
The thesis has noted that in many countries around the world, ‘measures have been 
taken or are underway to bring existing laws, relevant to children in conflict with the 
law, in line with the provisions of the CRC, in particular article 40.’1478 Whereas 
some countries, like Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, have adopted a composite 
legislation constituting provisions for protection of rights of children in conflict with 
the law and those for the care and protection of children’s rights in a single text, 
others have adopted separate legislation for the two aspects of children’s rights. 
Whereas South Africa has adopted the latter after it ratified the CRC in 1995
1479
 and 
the ACRWC in 2000
1480
; Tanzania ratified the CRC in June 1991 and the ACRWC 
in 2003. This means that South Africa and Tanzania are bound to implement the two 
children’s rights instruments at the domestic level. Under both the CRC and 
ACRWC, all countries that have ratified these instruments have an obligation to 
implement them at a two-tier level. In the first place, ratifying countries have an 
obligation to implement these instruments through the international norm 
                                                 
1478
 Doek, J., “Child Justice Trends and Concerns with a Reflection on South Africa.” In Gallinetti, J., 
et al (ed.), Child Justice in South Africa: Children’s Rights Under Construction (Conference Report). 
Open Society Foundation for South Africa/Child Justice Alliance, August 2006, p. 12. 
1479
 South Africa ratified the CRC on 16
th
 June 1995. 16
th
 June of every year is the day when the Day 
of the African Child is celebrated on the African continent in commemoration of the massacre of 
black children in South African in 1976. 
1480
 South African signed the ACRWC on 10
th
 October 1997, ratified it on 7
th
 January 2000 and 
deposited the instrument on 21
st
 January 2000. 
405 
 
  
 
 
enforcement mechanism. In the second place, the ratifying countries have obligations 
to implement the instruments at the domestic level.
1481
  
 
As part of their international obligations, ratifying states are required to submit 
progressive reports to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CROC) and the 
African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
(ACERWC).
1482
 The second aspect of states’ obligations under the two instruments – 
domestic implementation – is of great significance;1483 because ‘the success or failure 
of any international human rights treaty should be evaluated in accordance with its 
impact on human rights practices at the domestic level.’1484 Under both the CRC and 
the ACRWC, States Parties’ obligations to implement these instruments in their 
respective jurisdictions are couched in such phraseology as States Parties shall take 
“measures to implement provisions and principles” in these instruments. The 
“measures” envisaged include adoption of legislation, review and introduction of 
policies and/or other administrative or programmatic measures, including budgetary 
allocations, for children in accordance with the laid constitutional and/or principles 
and processes.  
 
The scope of domestic obligations imposed on the ratifying states by the 
international children’s rights law has been expounded by the CROC in its General 
                                                 
1481
 Odongo, G.O., “The Domestication of International Law Standards on the Rights of the Child with 
Specific Reference to Juvenile Justice in the African Context.” LL.D. Thesis, University of Western 
Cape, 2005, p. 68. 
1482
 The mandate, reporting and monitoring mechanisms of the CROC and ACERWC are discussed at 
length in Chapter 3 above. 
1483
 Heyns, C. and F. Viljoen, The Impact of the United Nations Human Rights Treaties on the 
Domestic Level. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002, p. 1. 
1484
 Odongo, op. cit, pp. 68-9. 
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Comment on “General Measures”1485 on the implementation of the CRC. The CROC 
has expounded different mechanisms that are to be put in place and implemented at 
the domestic level, including the need for a comprehensive national strategy such as 
a National Plan of Action (NPA) on Children and setting up independent human 
rights institutions such as children’s ombudspersons and national human rights 
commissions. The measures also entail making children visible in budgets, training 
and capacity building, international co-operation within a rights-based development 
assistance approach and local cooperation with civil society, amongst other 
measures.
1486
 In principle, the CROC has made it clear that ‘it believes a 
comprehensive review of all domestic legislation and related administrative guidance 
to ensure full compliance with the Convention is an obligation.’1487 
 
With regard, to juvenile justice both Article 17 of the ACRWC and Article 40 of the 
CRC require that States Parties State Parties to take necessary measures for the full 
realisation of basic rights by children who come into conflict the law. For instance 
Article 40(3) of the CRC requires States Parties to adopt ‘laws, procedures, 
authorities and institutions specifically applicable to children alleged as, accused of, 
or recognized as having infringed the penal law.’  This obligation ‘has been 
interpreted not only as requiring, at a minimum, that states establish juvenile justice 
systems but is also increasingly being construed as implying the need for distinct and 
                                                 
1485
 CROC, General Comment No. 5: “General Measures of Implementation for the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child.” CRC/GC/2003/5 (Adopted at the 34
th 
session on 27 November 2003).  
1486
 Odongo, op. cit, p. 70. 
1487
 CROC, General Comment No. 5, op. cit. 
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dedicated legislation in the sphere of juvenile justice upon ratification of the 
Convention.’1488 
 
From this exposition, it can be noted that ‘the interpretation of the obligation to 
undertake juvenile justice law reform as requiring separate and distinct legislation 
dedicated to juvenile justice influenced the South African law reform process.’1489 
This has resulted in the enactment, by the Government of the Republic of South 
Africa, of the Child Justice Act, which is solely dedicated to juvenile justice; and the 
Children’s Act, which is dedicated to issues of child protection, care and welfare. In 
Tanzania, the Government has just enacted a composite Law of the Child Act, which 
combines provisions for child protection, care and welfare, on the one hand; and 
those regulating juvenile justice on the other. The thesis, therefore, examines the 
specific state obligations to domestic the international juvenile justice standards in 
both South Africa and Tanzania in the constitutional and legal contexts.  
 
8.2.5 Domestication of International Juvenile Justice Norms in South Africa 
This thesis has observed that it is a well-established principle in international human 
rights law obliging states to domesticate human rights standards enshrined in a given 
international human rights instrument into their respective jurisdictions. Both the 
CRC and the ACRWC oblige States Parties thereto, inter alia, to domesticate 
international child rights standards, particularly those relating to children in conflict 
with the law. Such domestication is basically achieved through legislative efforts 
                                                 
1488
 Odongo, op. cit, p. 71. See also Skelton, A., “Developing a Juvenile Justice System for South 
Africa: International Instruments and Restorative Justice.” In Keightley, R. (ed.), Children’s Rights. 
Cape Town, Juta and Co., 1996, p. 183.  
1489
 Odongo, ibid. 
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undertaken by States Parties thereto to give legal effect to the said instruments. In 
compliance with this requirement, South Africa has enacted the Child Justice Act 
(henceforth, the CJA) for the protection of children in conflict with the law as well as 
for the administration of juvenile justice system to domesticate international juvenile 
justice standards.  
 
Therefore, the thesis has found that South Africa has domesticated international 
juvenile justice standards in the CJA by recognising and incorporating the 
international juvenile justice standards and the supremacy of the Constitution in the 
administration of juvenile justice in its jurisdiction. The thesis has also examined the 
objectives of, and the guiding principles underlying, the CJA. It has further examined 
the salient features of the CJA, which include exhaustive, comprehensive provisions 
relating to the minimum age of criminal responsibility (MACR) and the treatment of 
children under the MACR; methods of securing attendance of offending children in 
courts; release and detention or placement of children in conflict with the law; 
assessment of offending children; diversion and sentencing of children found to have 
offended penal law. In a very progressive way, the CJA contains provisions relating 
to parliamentary oversight of the implementation of the juvenile justice law.
1490
 In 
translating these provisions into reality, it has been noted that the first submissions 
for parliamentary review were made in 2011.
1491
 As noted in this study, the 
                                                 
1490
 Section 96(3) of the CJA requires the Cabinet Member responsible for the administration of 
justice to consult with the Cabinet Members responsible for safety and security, social development, 
correctional services, education and health in order to submit reports from these associated 
departments to Parliament on the implementation of the Act. These reports must be submitted to 
Parliament within one year of the commencement of the Act and annually thereafter. 
1491
 See particularly Waterhouse, S., “Parliament Reviews the Implementation of the Child Justice 
Act.”Article 40. Vol. 13 No. 2, 2011. 
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requirement to report to Parliament allows the legislature to exercise its oversight 
function through monitoring the implementation of the CJA and ensuring that 
implementation is consistent with the original intention of the legislation.
1492
 
 
8.2.6 Domestication of International Juvenile Justice Norms in Tanzania  
Notably, this thesis has observed that the need to provide legal protection to children 
in conflict with the law in international law cannot be over emphasised. Similarly, 
the thesis has noted that, in Tanzania this need has been expressed for a long time 
now.
1493
 This call has been founded in many international human rights instruments, 
particularly basing on the principle set out in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) of 1948 to the effect that childhood is entitled to special care and 
assistance.
1494
 The UDHR, in particular, has recognized similar provisions in the 
Geneva Declaration of Human Rights (1924) and the UN Declaration of the Rights 
of the Child (1959),
1495
 which states that: ‘the child, by reason of his physical and 
mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal 
protection, before as well as after birth.’  
 
                                                 
1492
 Ibid. 
1493
 See particularly Law Reform Commission of Tanzania, “Report on Laws Relating to Children in 
Tanzania”. Submitted to the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, April 1994; Legal and 
Human Rights Centre, The State of Juvenile Justice. Dar es Salaam: Legal and Human Rights Centre, 
2003; and Tume ya Haki za Binadamu na Utawala Bora, Taarifa ya Ziara za Tume Wilayani na 
Ukaguzi wa Magereza na Vituo vya Polisi kwa Mwaka 2003/2004. Dar es Salaam: Tume ya Haki za 
Binadamu na Utawala Bora, 2004, p. 15. 
1494
 See particularly Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
1495
 The Declaration was adopted by the UNGA on 20
th
 November 1959. 
410 
 
  
 
 
Thus, when the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (CRC)
1496
 in 1989 there was already in existence other 
international instruments protecting the rights of children, particularly those in 
conflict with the law. Interestingly, the preamble to the CRC refers to the United 
Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (the 
“Beijing Rules”) in recognition that ‘in all countries in the world, there are children 
living in exceptionally difficult conditions, and that such children need special 
consideration.’ According to principle 2 of the UN Declaration on the Rights of the 
Child: ‘The child shall enjoy special protection, and shall be given opportunities and 
facilities, by law and by other means, to enable him to develop physically, mentally, 
morally, spiritually and socially in a healthy and normal manner and in conditions of 
freedom and dignity. In the enactment of laws for this purpose, the best interests of 
the child shall be the paramount consideration.’ 
 
The United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child (the “CROC”) has 
regularly emphasised that ‘all countries that have ratified the CRC need to ensure 
that their legislation is fully compatible with the provisions and principles of the 
CRC.’1497 In respect of Tanzania, the CROC has, more than once, urged Tanzania to 
enact legislation that would effectively protect children’s rights. However, this was 
not done until 31
st
 July 2009 when the Government of Tanzania introduced in 
                                                 
1496
 The CRC was adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by the UNGA 
resolution 44/25 of 20
th
 November 1989; and entered into force on 2
nd
 September 1990, in accordance 
with Article 49. 
1497
 African Child Policy Forum, In the Best Interest of the Child: Harmonizing Laws in Eastern and 
Southern Africa. Addis Ababa: African Child Forum/UNICEF, 2007, p.3. 
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Parliament a Bill to enact the Law of the Child Act (LCA)
1498
. This Bill was passed 
by Parliament into law on 4
th
 November 2009 and assented to by President Jakaya 
Kikwete on 20
th
 November 2009. Provisions relating to legal protection of children 
in conflict with the law have been, particularly, contained in Part IX of the LCA.  
 
Therefore, the thesis has considered the prevalence of, and risk factors for, juvenile 
delinquency in Tanzania. It has also examined the impact of juvenile delinquency in 
society and how to prevent it. In a detailed account, the has critically examined 
provisions relating to the treatment of children in conflict with the law as set out in 
Part IX of the LCA; by particularly scrutinising its salient features – i.e., criminal 
capacity and minimum age of criminal responsibility; and the exposure of children in 
conflict with the law to the criminal justice system. 
 
Other salient features relating to juvenile justice examined are the establishment of 
the Juvenile Court, its jurisdiction and applicable procedures. Methods of securing 
the attendance of a child in conflict with the law at the preliminary inquiry are also 
among the features examined in the thesis. In addition, the thesis has critically 
examined the procedure obtained in the release and/or detention of a child in conflict 
with the law pending his or her processing in the criminal justice system; and the 
manner of dealing with a child committing an offence in association with adults.  
 
                                                 
1498
 The Bill Supplement in respect of this Bill was published in the Gazette of the United Republic of 
Tanzania, Vol. 90 No. 20, on 10
th
 July 2009. 
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Furthermore, the thesis has critically considered the provisions relating to evidence 
adduced in court by a child as a witness; sentencing of a child; and placement of a 
child upon sentencing.  
 
8.3 Inherent Challenges in Implementing the LCA in Relation to the 
Administration of Juvenile Justice 
The thesis has examined inherent challenges in the implementation of the LCA in 
relation to the administration of juvenile justice, as highlighted below: 
(i) Like in most Sub-Saharan African countries, both in South Africa1499 and 
Tanzania
1500
 there is no nationwide consolidated and disaggregated statistical 
data, despite the fact that juvenile delinquency is widespread. As the recent 
report of the MKUKUTA Monitoring System in Tanzania notes, the pattern 
of data relating to juvenile delinquency in recent years is erratic.
1501
   
(ii) The thesis has observed that in Tanzania there is lack of retention homes for 
placing children whose cases are pending and who have not been able to 
obtain bail as well as there is only one approved for placing convicted 
                                                 
1499
 Waterhouse, S., “Parliament Reviews the Implementation of the Child Justice Act.” Article 40. 
Vol. 13 No. 2, September 2011. 
1500
 See Legal and Human Rights Centre, The State of Juvenile Justice, op. cit; Tume ya Haki za 
Binadamu na Utawala Bora, Taarifa ya Ziara za Tume Wilayani na Ukaguzi wa Magereza na Vituo 
vya Polisi kwa Mwaka 2003/2004. Dar es Salaam: Tume ya Haki za Binadamu na Utawala Bora, 
2004, p. 15; See particularly United Republic of Tanzania, Status Report 2006: Progress Towards the 
Goals for Growth, Social Wellbeing and Governance in Tanzania. Dar es Salaam: Research and 
Analysis Working Group/MKUKUTA Monitoring System, Ministry of Planning, Economy and 
Empowering, 2006; United Republic of Tanzania, “An Analysis of the Situation for Children in 
Conflict with the Law in Tanzania.” Dar es Salaam: Ministry of Constitutional and Legal Affairs 
(MoCLA)/UNICEF, July 2011; and Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance, “Report 
on Situational Analysis of Children Deprived of their Liberty in Detention Facilities in Tanzania.” Dar 
es Salaam, Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance, 2011. 
1501
 United Republic of Tanzania, Poverty and Human Development Report 2009. Dar es Salaam: 
Research and Analysis Group (Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs)/Research on Poverty 
Alleviation (REPOA), 2009, p. 127. 
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children. This problem has resulted in yet another problem: placing children 
in conflict with the law in same facilities with adults. As noted in Chapter 
Seven of the thesis, the Commission for Human Rights and Good 
Governance (CHRAGG) has expressed particular concern about the numbers 
of juveniles who are being detained in facilities with adults.
1502
 The thesis has 
argued that the practice of placing offending children in adult remand or 
prison facilities breaches the principle enacted in Article 17(2)(b) of the 
ACRWC and Article 37(c) and (d) of the CRC, all of which require that 
children who are to be placed in detention must be placed in separate 
facilities from those housing adult offenders. 
(iii) The thesis has pointed out that the CROC has emphasized the need for a 
juvenile justice system to address the social roots of child offending. The 
CROC has thus consistently proposed, that the “Riyadh Guidelines” on 
Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency ‘should be regarded as providing relevant 
standards for implementation. The Guidelines requires “comprehensive 
prevention plans” to be instituted at every level of government and proposes 
that they should be implemented within the framework of the Convention and 
other international instruments.’1503 However, the thesis has found that in 
Tanzania there are no any discernible measures devised, and currently being 
taken, by the state to prevent child offending in the country. 
(iv) The thesis has considered that unlike the CJA in South Africa, the LCA does 
not provide a separate, comprehensive set of legal provisions and procedures 
                                                 
1502
 Ibid. See also Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance, Annual Report for 2006/07. 
Dar es Salaam: Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance (CHRAGG), 2008. 
1503
 Hodgkin, R., and P. Newell, Implementation Handbook for the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, op. cit, p. 546. 
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that apply specifically to children in conflict with the law.
1504
 The LCA, 
which ‘represents a significant development in establishing a separate 
criminal justice system for children’1505 by containing a number of provisions 
that specifically apply to children in conflict with the law, does not cover all 
aspects of the criminal justice process relating to children in conflict with the 
law as compared to the South African CJA.
1506
 It ‘is limited to establishing 
and regulating proceedings before the Juvenile Court, the application of 
custodial and alternative sentences, and regulating Approved Schools.’1507 
(v) The thesis has noted that minimum age of criminal responsibility (MACR), 
pegged between 10 and 12 years of age, in Tanzania is lower than the 
proposed the international minimum standard, which is to be pegged between 
14 and 16 years.
1508
 
 
As set out in the Penal Code, the “absolute” MACR is 
ten years. However, a child below the age of 12 years is not considered to be 
criminally responsible ‘unless it is proved that at the time of committing the 
act or making the omission he or she had capacity to know that he or she 
ought not to do the act or make the omission.’1509 The thesis has argued that 
although this appears to offer protection to children between the ages of 10 
                                                 
1504
 See particularly United Republic of Tanzania, “An Analysis of the Situation for Children in 
Conflict with the Law in Tanzania.” Op. cit; and Mashamba, C.J., “A Child in Conflict with the Law 
under the Tanzanian Law of the Child Act (2009): Accused or Victim of Circumstances?” The Justice 
Review. Vo. 8 No. 2, 2009. 
1505
 United Republic of Tanzania, “An Analysis of the Situation for Children in Conflict with the Law 
in Tanzania”, ibid. 
1506
 Examined in Chapter Six of this study. 
1507
 See Legal and Human Rights Centre, The State of Juvenile Justice, op. cit; and Tume ya Haki za 
Binadamu na Utawala Bora, Taarifa ya Ziara za Tume Wilayani na Ukaguzi wa Magereza na Vituo 
vya Polisi kwa Mwaka 2003/2004, op. cit, p. 15. 
1508
 See particularly United Republic of Tanzania, “An Analysis of the Situation for Children in 
Conflict with the Law in Tanzania”, op. cit. the CJA in South Africa has amended the common law 
principle of criminal capacity by raising the minimum age of criminal capacity from 7 to 10 years.  
1509
 See Section 15(2) of the Penal Code, Cap. 16 R.E. 2002. 
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and 12 years (by providing a presumption that a child aged 10 – 12 years is 
doli incapax) and appears to place an obligation on the state to rebut this 
presumption,
1510
 the CROC has expressed concern about the practice of doli 
incapax. The CROC concerns have been expressed in its concluding 
observations on States Parties’ reports and in its General Comment No. 
10,
1511
  emphasizing that it ‘strongly recommends that States parties set a 
minimum age of criminal responsibility that does not allow, by way of 
exception, the use of a lower age.’1512 In particular, the CROC, in its 
concluding observations on Tanzania in 2006, urged the government to 
‘clearly establish the age of criminal responsibility at 12 years, or at an older 
age that is an internationally accepted standard.’1513 
(vi) The thesis has noted that international children’s rights law requires states 
parties to set up legal protection mechanisms for the treatment of children 
who commit criminal activities which may be offences had they been within 
the MACR. However, the thesis has observed that the LCA does not contain 
such legal protection. Available data indicates that children below the age of 
criminal responsibility in Tanzania are being processed through the criminal 
justice system.
 1514
 
                                                 
1510
 See particularly United Republic of Tanzania, “An Analysis of the Situation for Children in 
Conflict with the Law in Tanzania”, op. cit. 
1511
 General Comment No. 10, para 34, provides that: ‘The Committee wishes to express its concern 
about the practice of allowing exceptions to a minimum age of criminal responsibility which permit 
the use of a lower minimum age of criminal responsibility in cases where the child, for example, is 
accused of committing a serious offence or where the child is considered mature enough to be held 
criminally responsible’. 
1512
 Ibíd. 
1513
 CROC, “Concluding Observations: United Republic of Tanzania.” UNCRC/C/TZA/CO/2, 21 June 
2006, para 70(b). 
1514
 Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance.  “Report on Situational Analysis of 
Children Deprived of their Liberty in Detention Facilities in Tanzania”, op. cit, p. 33; and United 
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(vii) The thesis has observed that although international juvenile justice law 
requires that specialised units for children in conflict with the law be 
established within the police, the prosecution, the judiciary/court 
administration and social services,
1515
 in Tanzania there is yet to evolve a 
specialised juvenile justice system.
1516
 Currently, there are no juvenile justice 
personnel especially trained on juvenile justice; there are not specialised 
courts (with only juvenile court at Kisutu in Dar es Salaam); as well as with 
only five retention homes and only one approved school. In addition, there is 
limited budget set out for the administration of juvenile justice. 
(viii) The thesis has found that although under subsection (2) of Section 97 of the 
LCA, ‘the Chief Justice may, by notice in the Gazette, designate any premises 
used by a primary court to be a Juvenile Court,’ up until now the Chief 
Justice has not been able to designate any premises to be used as a juvenile 
court.  
(ix) The thesis has argued that the procedure in the Juvenile Court set out in 
Section 99(1) of the CJA is not exhaustive, but there is a room for the Chief 
Justice to make rules for that purpose. However, the thesis has noted that up 
until now the Chief Justice has not made such rules of procedure to regulate 
the proceedings in the Juvenile Court. To the contrary, in South Africa rules 
                                                                                                                                          
Republic of Tanzania, “An Analysis of the Situation for Children in Conflict with the Law in 
Tanzania”, op. cit. 
1515
 General Comment No. 10, paras 92, 93 and 94. 
1516
 United Republic of Tanzania, “An Analysis of the Situation for Children in Conflict with the Law 
in Tanzania”, op. cit. 
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of procedure (made under the CJA) applicable in the juvenile court have been 
made and are already applicable.
1517
 
(x) The thesis has observed that Sections 108(2) and 112 of the LCA allow  
parents, guardian, relatives or social welfare officer to attend, with the prior 
consent of the court, to assist the accused child in the conduct of his case and, 
in particular, in the examination and cross-examination of witnesses. 
However, these provisions have failed to appreciate the fact that a child is 
entitled to free legal aid granted by the State, as opposed to its counter-part, 
the South African CJA.
1518
 
(xi) In particular, the thesis has argued that one of the problematic sections 
relating to the procedure in the Juvenile Court is Section 107, which simply 
states that: ‘Where the statement made by the child amounts to a plea of 
guilty the court may convict him.’ The thesis has noted that if not applied 
carefully by the courts due to their tender age and ignorance of the legal 
consequences of the sanctions relating to the offences with which they are 
charged, many children may find themselves being summarily convicted by 
the courts. It would be expected that this section ought to have set out some 
pre-requisites for such summary conviction. This would include the court 
warning and satisfying itself if – given the age and level of knowledge the 
                                                 
1517
 See particularly the Directives of the National Director of Public Prosecutions, made under 
Section 97(4)(a) of the CJA (published in Government Gazette No. 33067 on 31 March 2010; 
National Instruction 2/2010 Children in Conflict with the Law ( approved and published in the 
Government Gazette No. 33508, for general information, on 2 September 2010; and the Policy 
Framework for the Accreditation and Quality Assurance of Diversion Services in South Africa 
(approved on 26 May 2010 by the Portfolio Committee for Justice and Constitutional Development. 
An invitation for applications for the accreditation of diversion programmes and diversion service 
providers was published in Government Gazette No. 33469 on 20 August 2010).  
1518
 The need for provision of free legal aid to children in conflict with the law is discussed in part 7.5 
of this Chapter. 
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child possesses as well as the circumstances of the case – the offending child 
possesses sufficient knowledge to know the impact of such plea of guilty.
1519
  
(xii) The thesis has noted that under paragraph 52 of its General Comment No. 10 
(2007), the CROC ‘recommends that States Parties set and implement time 
limits for the period between the commission of the offence and the 
completion of the police investigation, the decision of the prosecutor (or other 
competent body) to bring charges against the child, and the final adjudication 
and decision by the court or other competent judicial body.’ However, the 
LCA does not set out such timeframe, which would guarantee expeditious 
and certain disposition of cases in the Juvenile Court, particularly in a judicial 
system fraught with inordinate delays in determination of cases like 
Tanzania.
1520
 
(xiii) The thesis has considered provisions relating to diversion in the LCA, which 
are scanty and limited only to few situations such alternatives to custodial 
                                                 
1519
 In Buhimila Mapembe v R. [1988] TLR 174,
1519
 Chipeta, J. (as he then was), inter alia, held that, 
in any case in which a conviction is likely to proceed on a plea of guilty, it is most desirable not only 
that every constituent of the charge should be explained to the accused but that he should be required 
to admit or deny every element of it unequivocally. 
1520
 For a detailed account of the magnitude of the problem of delays of cases in Tanzanian courts, see 
particularly United Republic of Tanzania, Financial and Legal Sector Upgrading Project (FILMUP), 
“Legal Sector Report”. Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1996; United Republic of Tanzania, Legal 
Sector Reform Programme: Medium Term Strategy (2005/06-2007/08). Dar es Salaam: Government 
Printer, 2004; Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, A Vision of Accessible and Timely Justice 
for All in the New Millennium. Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 2004; Mashamba, C.J., “Access to 
Justice and State Policy Considerations in Tanzania.” The Justice Review. Vol. II No. 2, 2006; United 
Republic of Tanzania, Status Report 2006: Progress Towards the Goals for Growth, Social Wellbeing 
and Governance in Tanzania. Dar es Salaam: Research and Analysis Working Group, MKUKUTA 
Monitoring System (then under the Ministry of Planning, Economy and Empowering), 2006; and 
Mashamba, C.J., “Overview of the Implementation of Cluster III of MKUKUTA: Governance and 
Accountability.” The Justice Review. Vol. IV No. 5, 2007. 
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sentences. Unlike the LCA, the CJA contains comprehensive provisions 
relating to diversion programmes in South Africa.
1521
 
(xiv) Unlike the LCA, the Zanzibar Children’s Act (2011)1522 and the South 
African Children’s Act (2005)1523 contain a clear enumeration of factors 
constituting the best interests of the child. 
(xv) The thesis has pointed out that the LCA does not abolish corporal punishment 
on children, particularly in the administration of the juvenile justice system.  
(xvi) The thesis also argues that the LCA also does not establish a central body to 
coordinate the work and functions of the juvenile justice agencies and actors: 
the police, judiciary, (the prisons department
1524
), the social welfare 
department as well as civil society organisations working with and for 
children in the country.
1525
 
8.4 General Recommendations  
From the observations and findings set out above, this thesis provides two general 
recommendations: the need to have child-specific provisions in the envisaged new 
constitution of Tanzania and a review of the LCA with a view to making more 
comprehensive and progressive. 
                                                 
1521
 See particularly Section 51 of the CJA. The objects of the CJA, as set out in Section 2, include the 
use of diversion as a means to prevent children being exposed to the adverse effects of the formal 
justice system. 
1522
 See particularly Section 4 of the Zanzibar Children’s Act (2011). 
1523
 See particularly Section 7 of the South African Children’s Act (2005). 
1524
 The prisons department is included here as a juvenile justice agency as it currently holds of most 
of the remanded and imprisoned children in Tanzania as a result of lack of Retention Homes and 
Approved School as discussed in part 7.1 above. 
1525
 Only recently a loose Child Justice Forum (CJF) was set up under the coordination of the Ministry 
of Constitutional and Legal Affairs (MoCLA). The CJF, which is a result of the recommendations 
made in two studies (on juvenile justice and on access to justice for under 18’s) conducted by nola and 
Coram Children Legal Centre (Essex University, UK) under UNICEF funding, adopted a five-year 
Strategy in February 2012 that would ensure, inter alia, that activities and programmes undertaken by 
stakeholders are adequately improved and coordinated. 
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8.4.1 Constitutionalisation of the Rights of Children in Conflict with the Law  
In modern constitution-making, the need to constitutionalize human rights generally 
and children’s rights particularly emanates from the assumption that ‘the constitution 
is the supreme law of the land and therefore any law or conduct inconsistent with it is 
void.’1526 Therefore, constitutionalisation of basic rights is ‘an attempt to entrench 
such rights in not only the highest law in the country for justiciable purposes, but 
also to flag the primary purpose for the existence of the state namely; the promotion 
and protection of human dignity, equality for all, and human rights.’1527 It is, 
therefore, pertinent that ‘countries become alive to the need to strengthen democracy 
by ensuring Children Rights in their constitutions as they have done with Human 
Rights.’1528 In principle, it can be argued that respect for a constitution ‘increases 
when basic rights and fundamental freedoms (including children’s rights) are 
guaranteed in a constitution via a Bill of Rights.’1529 
 
In the light of the foregoing amplification, many States Parties to the CRC and the 
ACRWC have adopted constitutional measures to domesticate the provisions of 
enshrined not only in these treaties, but also in other international human rights 
treaties. This has been evidenced by the constitutionalisation of children’s rights in 
the Bills of Rights in the recently-promulgated Constitution of Kenya (2010), in the 
                                                 
1526
 Mutungi, O. K., “The Constitutionalisation of Basic Rights.” In Constitution of Kenya Review 
Commission, “Report of the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission.”Approved for Issue at the 
68
th
 Meeting of the Commission held on 10
th
 April 2003. Available online at 
http://www.ldphs.org.za/resources/local-government-database/by-country/kenya/commission-
reports/Devolution%20and%20constitutional%20development%20papers.pdf (accessed 2 January 
2013), p. 174. 
1527
 Ibid. 
1528
 Muthoga, L.G., “International Conventions of the Rights of the Child.” In Constitution of Kenya 
Review Commission, “Report of the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission”, ibid, p. 202. 
1529
 Mukangara, D.R., “Forms and Reforms of Constitution-Making with Reference to Tanzania.” 
UTAFITI [New Series) Special Issue Vol. 4, 1998-2001, pp. 131-150, p. 141. 
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1995 Uganda Constitution as well as the 1996 South African Constitution, to 
mention but a few examples. As considered in Chapter Five, the constitutionalisation 
of children’s rights in these constitutions has helped to give these rights a 
constitutional basis upon which violations of the rights can be constitutionally 
vindicated. It is, therefore, proposed that the envisaged new constitution
1530
 for 
Tanzania to be adopted later this year
1531
 should also contain the rights of children, 
particularly those in conflict with the law. 
8.4.2 A Call for Review of the LCA Provisions Relating to the Administration 
of Juvenile Justice 
In order to overcome the problems identified in the examination of the LCA in the 
context of the international juvenile justice law as well as the South African CJA in 
relation to the administration of juvenile justice in the Tanzania, there is a dire need 
to review the relevant provisions in the LCA. Such review should aim at further 
harmonisation of the law relating to juvenile justice in Tanzania with the 
international juvenile justice norms. One of the critical areas of concern in this regard 
should the need to have a separate child justice law like in South Africa. The separate 
child law should be prepared along with the rules and regulations to be made under 
it, in order to avoid the existing situation where regulations and rules which are 
supposed to be made under the LCA have not been made by the relevant authorities.  
                                                 
1530
 From April 2012 Tanzania embarked on the review of its current Constitution with a view to 
adopting a new one as envisaged under the Constitutional Review Act, Cap. 83 R.E. 2012. The 
constitutional review and re-writing process is overseen by the Constitutional Review Commission 
established under this law. 
1531
 See particularly Raia Mwema newspaper (Dar es Salaam), “Jaji Warioba kukabidhi Katiba 
Oktoba: Kwenda Bunge la Katiba Novemba”. Issue No. 281, 6-12 February 2013, p. 2. 
422 
 
  
 
 
8.5 Specific Recommendations 
This part summarizes recommendations in respect of the inherent gaps observed in 
the course of this study. 
 
8.5.1 Strengthening Data Collection and Management Systems  
The importance of statistical data and information in the administration of juvenile 
justice in any legal system is pivotal to the better functioning of the system. In this 
thesis it has, however, been observed that there is no nationwide consolidated and 
disaggregated statistical data, whereby the pattern of data relating to juvenile 
delinquency in recent years is erratic.
1532
  In order to address this anomaly, it is 
critical that the concerned juvenile justice authorities should make sure that there is 
in place an effective data collection and management system that would help to 
generate statistical data and information that is updated and cover all aspects of the 
administration of juvenile justice. Such statistical data and information would help 
policy- and decision -makers in adequately and effectively budgeting and planning 
for children.
1533
 The concerned juvenile justice personnel also should be specifically 
trained in data collection, maintenance and dissemination to enable them to 
effectively discharge their functions. 
                                                 
1532
 United Republic of Tanzania, Poverty and Human Development Report 2009. Dar es Salaam: 
Research and Analysis Group (Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs)/Research on Poverty 
Alleviation (REPOA), 2009, p. 127. 
1533
 Konga, B.H., “Budgeting for Children.” A paper presented at a workshop on budgeting for the 
child’s best interests for government officials, organised by the National Organisation for Legal 
Assistance (nola) and Mkombozi Children’s Centre, held at Landmark Hotel, Dar es Salaam, on 15 
May 2012.  
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8.5.2 Establishment of Retention and Reformatory Facilities 
This thesis has reaffirmed the international juvenile justice law requirement that the 
deprivation of liberty in relation to children should be considered as a matter of last 
resort, undertaken in the best interests of the child and only for a shortest possible 
period. It has been contended that where it is considered to be in the best interests of 
the child to deprive the child of his or her liberty, the placement facility should 
separate from the one used by adult offenders.
1534
 However, this  thesis has observed 
that in Tanzania there is lack of retention homes for placing children whose cases are 
pending and who have not been able to obtain bail as well as there is only one 
approved for placing convicted children. As noted in the thesis, this problem has 
resulted in yet another problem: placing children in conflict with the law in same 
facilities with adults.  
 
In a bid to address the foregoing challenge, argued that the State should ensure that 
there are sufficient retention and reformatory facilities
1535
 throughout the country to 
ensure that all children who deprived of their liberty are placed in separate facilities.
 
In addition, the facilities should be constructed in such a way that they will not 
impede the child’s realisation of his or her rights while placed therein – including the 
right to education, the right to health, freedom of belief as well as the right to leisure 
and recreation. 
                                                 
1534
 Article 17(2)(b) of the ACRWC and Article 37(c) and (d) of the CRC require that children who 
are to be placed in detention must be placed in separate facilities from those housing adult offenders. 
1535
 See particularly United Republic of Tanzania, Status Report 2006: Progress Towards the Goals 
for Growth, Social Wellbeing and Governance in Tanzania. Dar es Salaam: Research and Analysis 
Working Group, MKUKUTA Monitoring System, which is under the Ministry of Planning, Economy 
and Empowering, 2006, p. 27. 
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8.5.3 Putting in Place Measures to Prevent Offending by Children 
This thesis has pointed out that although the CROC has emphasized the need for a 
juvenile justice system to address the social roots of offending in the context of the 
“Riyadh Guidelines” on Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency in Tanzania there are no 
any discernible measures devised, and currently being taken, by the state to prevent 
child offending in the country. It is, therefore, urged that the relevant juvenile justice 
authorise should put in place “comprehensive prevention plans”, which aims at 
preventing offending by children, to be instituted at every level of government and 
proposes that they should be implemented within the framework of the CRC, 
ACRWC and other international instruments.
1536
 
 
8.5.4 Establishing and Strengthening a Separate Juvenile Justice System 
It has been noted in this thesis that although the LCA was intended to domesticate 
international law norms relating to children’s rights, it has failed to fully incorporate 
international juvenile justice norms. In particular, unlike the CJA in South Africa, the 
LCA does not provide a separate, comprehensive set of legal provisions and 
procedures that apply specifically to children in conflict with the law.
1537
 Therefore, 
it is urged that the review of the LCA as proposed in part 8.2 above should be geared 
towards ensuring that the international law requirement to have a separate, 
comprehensive set of laws, rules, regulations and procedures on administration of 
juvenile justice is adequately provided for in the law. 
                                                 
1536
 Hodgkin, R., and P. Newell, Implementation Handbook for the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, op. cit, p. 546. 
1537
 See particularly United Republic of Tanzania, “An Analysis of the Situation for Children in 
Conflict with the Law in Tanzania.” Op. cit; and Mashamba, C.J., “A Child in Conflict with the Law 
under the Tanzanian Law of the Child Act (2009): Accused or Victim of Circumstances?” The Justice 
Review. Vo. 8 No. 2, 2009. 
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In addition, specialised units for children in conflict with the law should be 
established within the police, the prosecution, the judiciary, the court administration 
and social services.
1538
 Juvenile justice personnel should be especially trained on 
juvenile justice; as well the government should set out sufficient budget to all 
juvenile justice agencies for the administration of juvenile justice. 
 
8.5.5 Bringing the MACR into Full Compliance with International Juvenile 
Justice Law 
Given the finding that the minimum age of criminal responsibility (MACR) (10 and 
12 years) prevalent in Tanzania is low compared to the international standard, it is 
urged that the government should bring it in full compliance with the CROC’s 
recommendation in its concluding observations on States Parties’ reports and in its 
General Comment No. 10.
1539
 The new MACR should be pegged at ‘12 years, or at 
an older age that is an internationally accepted standard.’1540 
 
It is also urged that Tanzania should replicate South Africa by amending the LCA 
and the Penal Code so that the ladders for determination of age of an offending child 
in existence in the latter applies also in the former. This will entail that the police, 
social welfare/probation services, the prosecution and the court will also be vested 
with a mandatory duty to determine the age of an offending child who come into 
                                                 
1538
 General Comment No. 10, paras 92, 93 and 94. 
1539
 General Comment No. 10, para. 34, provides that: ‘The Committee wishes to express its concern 
about the practice of allowing exceptions to a minimum age of criminal responsibility which permit 
the use of a lower minimum age of criminal responsibility in cases where the child, for example, is 
accused of committing a serious offence or where the child is considered mature enough to be held 
criminally responsible’. 
1540
 CROC, “Concluding Observations: United Republic of Tanzania.” UNCRC/C/TZA/CO/2, 21 June 
2006, para. 70(b). 
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contact with them. Tanzania should also emulate South Africa on having provisions 
in its LCA and the Penal Code on how to deal with children under the MACR who 
are involved in criminal activities or behaviours, which should also go hand-in-hand 
with the setting up of alternative placement facilities for such children.  
 
8.5.6  Enacting Provisions to Regulate the Treatment of Children below the 
MACR 
In order to avoid arresting and prosecuting children who are below the MACR, the 
Government of Tanzania is urged to enact provisions that would provide a clear 
procedure on how to deal with children who commit criminal activities which may 
be offences had they been within the MACR. The South African CJA can serve as a 
best practice in this regard. 
 
8.5.7 Adopting Rules of Procedures in the Juvenile Court 
Although under subsection (2) of Section 97 of the LCA, ‘the Chief Justice may, by 
notice in the Gazette, designate any premises used by a primary court to be a 
Juvenile Court,’ the thesis has noted that up until now the Chief Justice has not been 
able to designate any premises to be used as a juvenile court. This means that the 
Juvenile Court is yet to start applying the LCA. It is, therefore, recommended that the 
CJ should ensure that the rules of procedure are made, in consultation with all 
relevant stakeholders. 
8.5.8 Providing Legal Assistance to Children in Conflict with the Law 
In order to ensure that Tanzania complies with international law requirement to 
provide free legal assistance to children in conflict with the law, it is urged that the 
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law is amend to entrench this rule. It is not just enough to allow parents, guardian, 
relatives or social welfare officer to participate in court proceedings to assist the 
accused child in the conduct of his case
1541
 without providing such child with legal 
assistance. This is true in a country where the majority of parents or guardians cannot 
meet the exorbitant legal fees charged by advocates. 
 
8.5.9 Clearing the Ambiguity in Section 107: The Problematic Plea of Guilty 
As noted in Chapter Seven, Section 107, this simply states that: ‘Where the statement 
made by the child amounts to a plea of guilty the court may convict him,’ is 
ambiguous and needs to be rectifying in the context of the decisions of the High 
Court in Buhimila Mapembe v R.
1542
  
 
8.5.10 Setting Timeframe for Determination of Cases in the Juvenile Court 
Although in paragraph 52 of its General Comment No. 10 (2007), the CROC 
recommends that States Parties should set and implement time limits for the period 
between the commission of the offence and the final adjudication and decision by the 
court or other competent judicial body, the thesis has noted that the LCA does not set 
out such timeframe, which would guarantee expeditious and certain disposition of 
cases in the Juvenile Court, particularly in a judicial system fraught with inordinate 
delays in determination of cases like Tanzania.
1543
 It is, therefore, urged that the LCA 
                                                 
1541
  Sections 108(2) and 112 of the LCA. 
1542
 [1988] TLR 174. 
1543
 For a detailed account of the magnitude of the problem of delays of cases in Tanzanian courts, see 
particularly United Republic of Tanzania, Financial and Legal Sector Upgrading Project (FILMUP), 
“Legal Sector Report”.  Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1996; United Republic of Tanzania, 
Legal Sector Reform Programme: Medium Term Strategy (2005/06-2007/08). Dar es Salaam: 
Government Printer, 2004; Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, A Vision of Accessible and 
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should be amended to ensure that every action in the proceedings in the Juvenile 
Court has a time limit within which it can be finalised. 
 
8.5.11 Enacting Comprehensive Provisions Relating to Diversion 
The importance of having statutory provisions regulating diversion has been 
highlighted in South Africa. Such provisions should clearly state the role of different 
juvenile justice actors at different levels in the application of diversion in the 
administration of juvenile justice.
1544
 However, the thesis has that in the LCA there 
are scanty and limited only to few situations such alternatives to custodial sentences. 
It is urged that the LCA should amended so as it can contain comprehensive 
provisions relating to diversion programmes in the context of the South Africa.
1545
 
8.5.12 Abolishing Corporal Punishment 
Although international juvenile justice law prohibits the imposition of corporal 
punishment in the administration of juvenile justice, the LCA does not abolish 
corporal punishment on children in conflict with the law. It is urged that the LCA 
should be amended so that it can outlaw corporal punishment not only in the 
administration of juvenile justice, but in all aspects relating to the child. 
                                                                                                                                          
Timely Justice for All in the New Millennium. Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 2004; Mashamba, 
C.J., “Access to Justice and State Policy Considerations in Tanzania.” The Justice Review. Vol. II No. 
2, 2006; United Republic of Tanzania, Status Report 2006: Progress Towards the Goals for Growth, 
Social Wellbeing and Governance in Tanzania. Dar es Salaam: Research and Analysis Working 
Group, MKUKUTA Monitoring System (then under the Ministry of Planning, Economy and 
Empowering), 2006; and Mashamba, C.J., “Overview of the Implementation of Cluster III of 
MKUKUTA: Governance and Accountability.” The Justice Review. Vol. IV No. 5, 2007. 
1544
 See particularly Badenhorst, C., Overview of the Implementation of the Child Justice Act, 2008 
(Act 75 of 2008): Good Intentions, Questionable Outcomes. Pinelands (South Africa): Open Society 
Foundation for South Africa, 2010; and Gallinetti, J., Getting to Know the Child Justice Act. Bellville: 
Child justice Alliance, 2009. 
1545
 See particularly Section 51 of the CJA. The objects of the CJA, as set out in Section 2, include the 
use of diversion as a means to prevent children being exposed to the adverse effects of the formal 
justice system. 
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